No, there is no human consumption clause in that portion of the law. It is outright illegal because this circumvents the analogue act. This is an explicit declaration that it is as illegal as DOM is illegal.
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1308/1308_11.htm
Wrong. Intent for "Human consumption" HAS been ruled a required condition for analogue scheduled status. But not by the supreme court, though the ruling was never challenged... probably why it is only rarely used anymore... vendors are most all VERY careful to require disclamers against human use be agreed to, ship only in bulk, and are careful to be totally shielded from all commentary implying intent of human use.
The highest level US court ruling at the present time is that in fact there is an IMPLICIT requirement of analogues as specified to have an "intent for human consumption" in order to automatically qualify as being on the same schedule of that which they are derived from / analogue of. It documented at Erowid... something to do with the order and placement of words "or" and "and" etc in the way the law was written.
Here
http://www.erowid.org/psychoactives/law/analog/analog_info1.shtml (a long page with lots of interesting info including views on the law/issues by Shulgin himself) the final sentence says:
Which concludes with the case against the defendant being dismissed and the law declared unconstitutionally vague... a result that has yet to be challenged in any way:
Perhaps more importantly in this case, the analogue definition as applied to AET [*239] is so vague as to permit arbitrary enforcement. In 1990, the DEA investigated defendant Forbes for allegedly distributing AET, but the U.S. attorneys' office declined to prosecute, citing DEA chemist Roger Ely's conclusion that AET is not substantially similar to DMT or DET. Now, in 1992, Forbes is prosecuted by the same office for the same alleged offense. Nothing changed in the intervening two years except the personalities of the government prosecutors and their hand-picked DEA chemists.
This prosecution illustrates precisely the evils attending delegation of basic policy decisions for ad hoc, subjective resolution by those who wield prosecutorial power. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109. The government has not scheduled AET as a controlled substance over the last 30 years and it has not prosecuted the chemical company that manufactured the substance and sold it to these defendants. The government presents no non-arbitrary reason why it has now decided [**23] to bring the full weight of the criminal process to bear on these defendants. Moreover, the statute has no specific standards channeling prosecutorial discretion, thus distinguishing this case from the drug paraphernalia cases. See, e.g., United States v. 3250 Brighton Blvd., 785 F.Supp. 141 (D.Colo. 1992).
Although I recognize the strong presumption favoring constitutionality of statutes and requiring courts to construe statutes in a constitutional manner, there is no construction possible here that would satisfy due process without re-writing the statute. See, Murphy, supra, at 6. Thus, for the reasons set out above, I conclude that defendants have clearly and convincingly rebutted the presumption of constitutionality in this case.
I hold that the definition of controlled substance analogue as applied to AET under the unique facts here is unconstitutionally vague. Without doubt, it provides neither fair warning nor effective safeguards against arbitrary enforcement.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and,
(2) This action shall be DISMISSED.
Also:
A list of published cases which are useful for interpreting the Analogue Act can be found at:
http://www.erowid.org/psychoactives/law/cases/federal/federal_analog2.shtml
"Controlled substance analogue"
In prosecution pursuant to 21 USCS §§ 802(32) and 813--under which "controlled substance analogue" is treated as controlled substance to extent it is intended for human consumption--witness' testimony that "cat" was sold at house while defendant was staying there and performing experiments with precursor chemicals was admissible, since testimony was highly probative as showing purpose to which precursor chemicals were likely put. United States v Hofstatter (1993, CA6 Mich) 8 F3d 316, 39 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1006, cert den (1994) 510 US 1131, 127 L Ed 2d 413, 114 S Ct 1101.