Would Remote Mind Control Be Possible With Current Technology?

During phases the covert weapon employs conspicuous techniques intended to create and maintain learned helplessness in victims. Here is a Paper published by Physicians for Human Rights that states that learned helplessness was a foundational goal of the US “enhanced interrogations“ of suspected enemies following 9/11, as they believed it was the key to successful coercive control. It was hypothosised that an enemy forced into a learned helplessness state would loose all resistance, become passive and completely complient to interrogators.
Given the capabilities of the modern remote forced silent speech interface interrogation no longer poses a problem as desired information can just be harvested by asking the relivent questions and monitoring the internal dialogue for the answers. Once a victim is trapped on the interface I believe they are exploring ways to control behavior and cognition without or in spite of conscious resistance. They are looking to identify or create ways of controlling people remotely using the forced interface; by combining old techniques like “brain washing,” “thought reform” and “learned helplessness” with the amazing capabilities of modem technology I think they believe they have a chance.

Nuremberg Betrayed Human Experimentation and the CIA Torture Program

Contents
3 Executive Summary
6 Methodology
7 Introduction
22 CIA Torture
Experiments
30 Research on the Health
Effects of Torture
44 Applications of CIA
Research on Detainees
51 Conclusion
55 Recommendations
56 Appendix A: Legal and
Ethical Standards for
Human Subjects
Protection
60 Appendix B: Select New
Evidence since PHR’s
2010 Analysis
61 Appendix C: Select
Timeline of Relevant
Events
65 Endnotes

Acknowledgments
This report was written by Sarah Dougherty, JD, MPH,
senior anti-torture fellow at Physicians for Human Rights
(PHR) and Scott Allen, MD, FACP, medical advisor at PHR.
The report benefitted from review by PHR staff, including
Carolyn Greco, JD, senior U.S. policy associate; Vincent
Iacopino, MD, PhD, senior medical advisor; Donna
McKay, executive director; Marianne Møllmann, LLM,
MSc, director of research and investigations; Susannah
Sirkin, director of international policy and partnerships;
and Homer Venters, MD, director of programs. PHR
advisors and former employees contributed invaluable
expertise and guidance on this report, including Widney
Brown, JD; Nathaniel Raymond; and Stephen Soldz, PhD.
PHR intern Robert Erikson provided research assistance.
The report also benefitted from external review by
Deborah D. Ascheim, MD, member of PHR’s board of
directors.

The report was reviewed, edited, and prepared for
publication by Claudia Rader, MS, content and marketing
manager.

Support for this report was provided by the Open Society
Foundations.

Executive Summary

After the 9/11 terror attacks, as part of its counterterrorism efforts, the Bush
administration authorized the systematic torture and ill-treatment of detainees in U.S.
custody. In order to do so, it created a legal and policy framework to permit abusive
interrogation and detention practices and undid long-standing, internationally-agreed
protections for prisoners of war. The goal of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
“enhanced interrogation” program was to break detainees psychologically, using harsh
techniques designed to inflict severe pain and suffering. The program rested on the
flawed claim that torture could be useful in overcoming a person’s resistance to
interrogation and in facilitating the collection of intelligence. Physicians for Human
Rights (PHR) has previously documented that, as part of the CIA torture program, U.S.
health professionals systematically collected data involving torture and conducted
analysis to make this information generalizable to other aspects of the program. These
activities amounted to human subjects research, a term used interchangeably with
human experimentation. Analysis of new information indicates that the CIA torture
program was itself a regime of applied research on detainees and implicitly
conceptualized as such by the CIA. This constitutes one of the gravest breaches of
medical ethics by U.S. health professionals since the Nuremberg Code was developed to
protect individuals from nonconsensual human experimentation following Nazi
medical atrocities during World War II.

At the heart of the CIA’s research was an unproven theory that exposing detainees to
uncontrollable stress and trauma would disrupt normal mechanisms of resistance and
create “learned helplessness” and dependence.1 That, in turn, would induce total
compliance in detainees, enabling interrogators to secure their cooperation and elicit
accurate intelligence from them. The techniques proposed for this process were derived
from the U.S. military’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training
program to teach service personnel how to resist abusive treatment if captured. These
tactics were themselves a distillation of coercion methods used by Cold War communist
regimes to produce false confessions. While the underlying phenomenon of
helplessness and dependency had been studied by U.S. researchers trying to understand
the apparent “brainwashing” effect of such techniques, the new theory that torture
would produce learned helplessness – and that this would ultimately produce
intelligence – had never been researched or demonstrated to be “effective.” At the time
the CIA program began, the existing evidence suggested that coercive approaches to
Analysis of new information indicates that the CIA
torture program was itself a regime of applied research on detainees.
interrogation did not work and were counterproductive.2 Nevertheless, psychologists
contracted by the CIA promoted this theory, improvised and applied various torture
techniques, and reported outcomes in line with their contention that these techniques
facilitated detainee compliance and cooperation with interrogation.

This research was driven by implicit hypotheses of “efficacy” and “safety.” The CIA
sought to demonstrate that the tactics “worked” for interrogation and would not injure
the subjects beyond a certain threshold of harm, as delineated in secret “torture memos”
issued by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The August 2002 OLC
memos authorized the use of “enhanced interrogation” techniques, to be applied in an
isolated and sequential manner, and redefined “pain and suffering” such that the effects
had to be much more severe and/or lasting than previously permitted in order for the
techniques to be regarded as torture. This created a permissive, rather than prohibitive,
approach to torture. Relatedly, the memos also directed medical personnel to conduct
systematic monitoring of interrogations in order to calibrate pain and mitigate harm.

This role posed a conflict from the outset. Medical ethics absolutely prohibit the
involvement of health professionals in torture and ill-treatment, including even being
present when abuse is used or threatened. In addition, it is a violation of ethics to
mitigate harm in the context of facilitating the intentional infliction of physical or
mental pain and suffering. Torture cannot be made “safe,” nor was the Bush
administration interested in making it “safe.” Instead, it was interested in not exceeding
certain limits of injury.

Health professionals in the CIA Office of Medical Services (OMS) were ordered to ensure
interrogators did not exceed these limits – thus ostensibly maintaining the “safety” of
the subjects – with little idea in actual practice of how to do so. The extant literature was
restricted to SERE studies, which involved limited application of milder forms of the
methods for the purposes of increasing, rather than destroying, resilience. The SERE
subjects were volunteers from the U.S. military who were able to stop the infliction of
the torture techniques at any time. In addition, precautions were taken to prevent the
risk of harm, which was well-documented in the SERE literature.

By contrast, the people subjected to the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” were
indefinitely detained, did not provide consent, and were unable to stop the infliction of
physical or mental pain. In light of the vast gap between the SERE and CIA models and
populations, medical officers worked to monitor, collect, analyze, and disseminate data
on the effects of the torture tactics in real world applications to detainees. These
observations were used to formulate clinical protocols to modify the techniques and
guide medical monitors in future interrogations – conducting, in effect, a “safety trial.”

This research was part of an effort to contend that the torture tactics did not exceed the
elevated physical and mental pain thresholds established by OLC lawyers. At the same
time, the CIA’s research was driven by a need to create a legal defense for U.S. personnel
involved in the “enhanced interrogation” program, in the event of future torture
charges. OLC lawyers claimed that reviewing evidence gained in the course of interrogations
could establish that interrogators lacked the intent to inflict lasting
harm, and thus commit torture. The resulting findings were used to justify commission
of the crime and to protect perpetrators from legal liability.

The CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” program was based on a tenuous theory proffered
by contract psychologists with a financial vested interest. The subsequent deployment
of this crude program required constant invention, assessment, and modification in the
field – based on actual applications of torture techniques on non-consenting
interrogation subjects – to refine the approach and demonstrate the promised “safety”
and “efficacy.” In any other context, such an approach would be considered merely
improvisational. However, when the individuals improvising are scientists and the
subjects are humans, such improvisation is something more. When human subjects
undergo an intervention or interventions (particularly harmful interventions) and their
response is methodically measured and analyzed, and the results of the analysis are
disseminated – even internally within a program – the activity meets the U.S.
government’s definition of human subjects research.

The definition of research does not require that the methodology used be sound or that
investigators intend or are even aware that their investigation constitutes research.
Indeed, it appears the CIA’s research to establish learned helplessness as a theoretical
construct, and parallel efforts to try to prove that torture did not have lasting health
effects, all lacked a legitimate research purpose, design, and methodology. The premise
of “efficacy” conflicted with the extant literature on effective interrogation, which
showed that coercive measures were counterproductive and undermined intelligence
collection. Similarly, the premise of “safety” conflicted with the U.S. government’s own
SERE research, which showed a significant risk of harm even in the controlled
environment of training. Here, the CIA’s activities not only met the essential criteria for
human subjects research, they were explicitly conceptualized as such: a systematic
investigation – including data collection and analysis – to create generalizable
information in support of “enhanced interrogation” and detention.

The CIA’s research evolved to fit the legal needs of the Bush administration in response
to internal and external pressures on the torture program. In particular, interrogators
were using multiple torture techniques in combination, with a far greater severity,
duration, and repetition than initially described to OLC lawyers. This was inflicting far
greater physical and mental injury to detainees, contradicting representations that the
techniques were safe. Health professionals faced increasing pressure to generate data to
justify and indemnify torture practices that were already in use, but that exceeded the
scope of authorization or were not yet approved. Accordingly, OMS medical guidelines
were created to reflect and incorporate the latest findings of CIA medical officers. In
response to requests by Bush administration officials to provide scientific and clinical
assurances of “safety” and legality, these findings were reinforced with additional data
to develop new legal memos. Over time, the severe physical and psychological harm of the
torture techniques, as well as an absence of proof of their effectiveness for interrogation purposes, undermined the
flawed theories of “safety” and “efficacy.” The torture program was eventually reined in
and ultimately ended – but not before great damage had been done to the human beings
at its center.

The available evidence documents, at a minimum, deployment by the CIA of coercive
techniques for interrogation that were unproven both in terms of “efficacy” and “safety.”
There was, at the very least, an ad hoc effort to assess these newly deployed techniques
on detainees in the field – at secret “black site” prisons. The documents newly in the
public domain, which form the basis of this report, detail activities by the CIA that meet
the definition of human subjects research. Without a more complete record, it is
difficult to say how formal or extensive this research was. What is clear is that this type
of research on prisoners or detainees is the very reason the Nuremberg Code protocols
were developed. In the course of facilitating the crime of torture, U.S. health
professionals committed a second and related crime: human subjects research and
experimentation on detainees being tortured, in violation of medical ethics and U.S.
and international law.

There must be accountability for both the crime of torture and the second and related
crime of human experimentation. There is also a pressing need for additional
information to come to light, with transparency as a critical first step toward
accountability for and prevention of grave human rights violations. Drawing on the
lessons of Nuremberg, we must never again permit the exigencies of national security –
or any other reason – to be used as justification for unlawful and unethical research on
human beings. In this uncertain political climate, it is even more crucial to shine a light
on this disturbing chapter and act now to prevent such crimes from being repeated.
Methodology

This Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) report is based on analysis of public source
materials documenting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition, detention, and
interrogation program. This includes review of thousands of pages of declassified U.S.
government records, reports, and other materials from the CIA, Department of Defense,
Department of Justice, and other U.S. agencies. Many of these materials were publicly
released, or released in substantially less redacted form, following the 2014 publication
of the summary of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on CIA
torture, as well as in response to Freedom of Information Act requests by human rights,
civil liberties, and media organizations. In addition, this report draws on more than 15
years of PHR’s research, investigation, and reporting in connection with the U.S. torture
program and the role of U.S. health professionals in detainee mistreatment and harm.
PHR analyzed the factual record, reviewed the state of knowledge about the physical and
psychological effects of so-called “enhanced interrogation” techniques at the time the
CIA program began, and conducted research on the ethical and legal protections for the
human subjects of research, including especially vulnerable populations such as
prisoners. In addition, this analysis references evidence cited in PHR’s 2010 publication,
“Experiments in Torture,”3 the first report to show human subjects research and
experimentation in the CIA program, as well as additional data that has come to light.
This report is limited to publicly available sources. Given the scope, complexity, and
secrecy of the CIA program, this analysis does not claim to provide a complete picture of
the public record, nor a definitive analysis of the CIA’s illegal and unethical research on
prisoners. To date, no evidence has been made public of a formalized research protocol,
plan, or ethics review. In addition, actual data from psychological evaluations, medical
monitoring, and other observations is not publicly available. Nevertheless, a research
regime can be inferred from CIA contracts discussing “applied research,” CIA medical
guidelines reflecting generalizable knowledge drawn from prior interrogation of
detainees, references to data collection, analysis, and dissemination in government
records, and documented activities of CIA personnel corresponding with human
subjects research and experimentation.

The analysis is made more difficult by the continued classification of the CIA program,
including the concealment of the names and titles of the health professionals who were
involved. Many relevant documents remain classified, and most of the declassified
documents that are available are heavily redacted,4 including nearly all information
regarding Office of Medical Services personnel. In addition, the U.S. government
continues to make incomplete, conflicting, and inaccurate representations regarding
the program.5

I. Introduction
After the 9/11 terror attacks, the Bush administration authorized the torture and ill-
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody as part of its counterterrorism efforts. In order to
do so, it created a legal and policy framework to permit abusive interrogation and
detention practices and undid long-standing, internationally-agreed protections for
prisoners of war (POWs). The goal of this so-called “enhanced interrogation” program
was to exploit detainees for intelligence collection purposes. The Bush administration
authorized the capture, rendition, and indefinite secret detention of individuals
considered to have links with terrorist organizations. It additionally authorized a range
of interrogation tactics long recognized by the United States as illegal, such as
waterboarding, isolation, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, forced nudity, extreme
temperature manipulation, and stress positions. Over time, these practices, as well as
their legal and operational justifications, spread from the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) “black sites” – secret overseas prisons – to military detention and interrogation
facilities.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the CIA faced pressure to obtain better intelligence from
human sources derived from more aggressive interrogation strategies.6 Psychological
expertise in human manipulation and exploitation was seen as especially critical to
these efforts.7 The Bush administration sought to “take the gloves off,”8 yet experienced
professionals within the intelligence community did not support the use of coercion or
torture.9 The CIA turned to psychologists James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen to design and
develop its interrogation operations.10 In December 2001, the CIA contracted with them
to review the Manchester Manual – a training manual of the terrorist organization al-
Qaeda discovered in Manchester, England – which ostensibly contained strategies for
resisting interrogation by countries compliant with the Geneva Conventions’
protections for POWs.11 Mitchell and Jessen drafted a white paper assessing that al-
Qaeda operatives were highly trained to resist hostile questioning.12 They proposed
providing a range of psychological consultation services, reflected in dozens of contracts
for “applied research,” development, and operational support. Individually, they each
received in excess of $1 million, in addition to $81 million paid to their consulting
company, Mitchell Jessen and Associates, between 2005 and 2009.13
In addition to Mitchell and Jessen, who ultimately designed, implemented, and oversaw
a vast regime of psychological torture and ill-treatment, a wide range of health
professionals were complicit in the program. Psychologists, physicians, physician
assistants, nurses, and medics participated in torture, monitored and collected data
ostensibly to manage harm, maintained abusive detention conditions and treatment,
and provided basic care to an institutionalized population.14 They were involved in the
following activities: withholding food, medical care, and personal hygiene; medically
clearing detainees for torture; medically treating detainees to return to abusive
treatment; sharing medical information with interrogators; advising on the application
Nuremberg Betrayed Physicians for Human Rights phr.org
8of techniques; directly committing acts of torture and ill-treatment; studying and
experimenting with the effects of torture; failing to stop and report abuse; and
concealing evidence of mistreatment.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has previously documented evidence that the CIA
engaged in activities constituting nonconsensual human subjects research and
experimentation on detainees being tortured.15 New evidence indicates that the CIA
“enhanced interrogation” program itself was a regime of human subjects research and
that the agency conceptualized it as such. This creates the most complete picture of this
illegal and unethical enterprise to date. In 2016, Mitchell co-published a book describing
his participation in waterboarding and other forms of torture and told interviewers he
had no regrets.16 Yet due to continued secrecy surrounding the program, the identities
of many other individuals involved, including health professionals, remain unknown.
Definition of Research and Experimentation

The system of protections for human subjects of research is enshrined in U.S. federal
policy in the form of the Common Rule and Code of Federal Regulations Title 45 part 46.
The latter contains a detailed definition of what constitutes human subjects research:
“Research means a systematic investigation, including research
development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge. Activities that meet this definition constitute
research for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or
supported under a program that is considered research for other
purposes. For example, some demonstration and service programs may include
research activities. […]

Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator
(whether professional or student) conducting research obtains

1 Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
2 Identifiable private information.

Intervention includes both physical procedures by which data are gathered
(for example, venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the
subject's environment that are performed for research purposes. Interaction
includes communication or interpersonal contact between investigator
and subject.

”17 [emphasis added]

To be considered a “systematic investigation,” the concept of a research project must
meet the following criteria: it attempts to answer research questions; it is
methodologically driven (that is, collects data or information in an organized and
consistent way; the data or information (whether quantitative or qualitative) is analyzed
in some way; and conclusions are drawn from the results.

“Generalizable knowledge” must include one or more of the following concepts: the
knowledge contributes to a theoretical framework of an established body of knowledge;
the primary beneficiaries of the research are other researchers, scholars, and
practitioners in the field of study; publication, presentation, or other distribution of the
results is intended to inform the field of study; the results are expected to be generalized
to a larger population beyond the site of data collection; and the results are intended to
be replicated in other settings.18

Accordingly, the key elements of human subjects research are:
1 Systematic investigation (data collection) about an interaction or intervention with a
living individual,

2 Designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.
Legitimate human subjects research can include studying the effectiveness of specific
medical treatments or procedures on patients, collecting data to better understand a
sociological problem, or assessing the susceptibility of certain demographic groups to
disease, among other applications. The term “human experimentation” is often used
interchangeably with “human subjects research,” as in this analysis, and involves the
systematic variation and study of a new or unproven practice. Research can be
considered experimental when it is based on untested ideas or involves methods or
devices that lack an established or accepted scientific basis, procedure, or clinical
standards. As a result, it entails inherent uncertainty about benefits, risks, and
effectiveness of the intervention.19 Note, however, that these definitions do not require
that an activity was contemplated or conceived of as research by the investigators in
order to constitute research, nor do they require a particular study design, the testing of
hypotheses, the use of control groups, or even a legitimate scientific purpose.
In addition, the evaluation of “service” programs – that is, formal or ad hoc efforts to
promptly improve a process rather than contribute to generalizable knowledge – can
constitute research if it meets the criteria detailed above. However, guidance exists to
help differentiate quality improvement processes that would not be subject to rigorous
human subject protections from research subject to ethics review by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB). While both processes involve the systematic collection of data,
several features preclude designation as quality improvement, including activities that
pose risk to human subjects or activities that are in fact designed to determine the
“safety” and “efficacy” of an intervention. The quality improvement designation
generally applies only when monitoring the application of low-risk interventions that
have already been well-established in the field as a solid, evidence-based practice –
which does not apply in the context of torture.

Nuremberg Betrayed Physicians for Human Rights.
Research Hypothesis for CIA Torture

CIA contract psychologists Mitchell and Jessen proposed using coercive techniques and
abusive conditions of confinement to break detainees down psychologically.20 They
claimed that torture could be useful in overcoming an individual’s resistance to
interrogation and in creating conditions that were conducive to intelligence collection.
The psychologists hypothesized that exposing detainees to uncontrollable stress and
trauma would disrupt normal mechanisms of resistance and create the condition of
“learned helplessness.”21 That, in turn, would induce total compliance and cooperation
with interrogation, causing detainees to voluntarily provide accurate intelligence. The
interrogator’s goal was to “establish absolute control,” “induce dependence to meet
needs,” “elicit compliance,” and “shap[e] cooperation.”22

Mitchell and Jessen formulated their research hypothesis in part from the U.S. military’s
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) counter-resistance training program,
which taught select U.S. service personnel strategies to resist exploitation if captured by
countries that did not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.23 The purpose of the training
was to build resistance to the extreme stresses of capture, interrogation, and detention
by exposing students to simulated scenarios in a controlled and constructive manner.
The physical and mental pressures used in the SERE curriculum carried a serious risk of
psychological and physical harm.24 In particular, SERE manuals in 2002 warned that
instructors needed to take steps to prevent learned helplessness from the tactics,
particularly waterboarding:

“Maximum effort will be made to ensure that students do not develop a sense of
'learned helplessness’ during the pre-academic laboratory…. The goal is not to
push the student beyond his means to resist or to learn (to prevent ‘Learned
Helplessness’).”25

Mitchell and Jessen proposed doing the reverse – using torture to produce “fear and
panic”26 and, ultimately, learned helplessness27 – and adapting this process for use on
detainees. Consistent with this implicit hypothesis, their research centered on whether
the psychological and physical pressures employed in SERE training could be used to
disrupt detainees’ resistance and produce compliance,28 and when the threshold of
learned helplessness had been reached.29

On December 15-16, 2001, Mitchell, already under contract with the CIA, met with a
select group of intelligence personnel and academics in the home of Martin Seligman,
the psychologist who first identified the learned helplessness phenomenon based on
electroshock experiments on dogs. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss
counterterrorism strategies based on the “psychology of capitulation” as applied to…..

continued https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X26000516

https://phr.org/our-work/resources/...-experimentation-and-the-cia-torture-program/
 
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The Evolution of C.I.A. Domestic Influence Campaigns from 1947 to 2023 Mandler, Kristofer Andrew May 13, 2023

This Thesis looks at the CIA’s known history of domestic influence over the United States. Disinformation claims that the CIA was banned from operations targeting the domestic population of the United States because illegal and disturbing domestic conduct. of theirs was exposed. This claim is false.


“Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the excessive secrecy surrounding CIA operations, little is known about its domestic activities. In its 1947 charter, the CIA was prohibited from spying against Americans, in part because President Truman was afraid that the agency would engage in political abuse. But the law didn’t stop the CIA from spying on Americans. During the 1960s, in clear violation of its statutory mission to co-ordinate foreign intelligence operations only, the CIA ventured into the domestic spying business through “Operation Chaos,” in which it spied on as many as 7,000 Americans involved in the peace movement.
Unfortunately, the exposure of intelligence failings before the 9/11 attacks caused policy makers to promote “information sharing” among intelligence and law enforcement agencies as a cure-all, creating the likelihood that the CIA would increasingly operate domestically. Today we know that the CIA is a participant in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which engage in both foreign and domestic terrorism investigations. And the USA Patriot Act eased restrictions on the sharing of information the FBI collects in grand jury investigations and law enforcement wiretaps with the CIA. An ACLU lawsuit revealed that the CIA has also used National Security Letters to demand Americans’ personal financial records without prior court approval. The CIA has acknowledged using National Security Letters “on a limited basis” to obtain financial information from U.S. companies. The history of the CIA’s abuse of power and the continuing lack of public accountability over CIA operations make such revelations concerning to civil liberties advocates. The CIA’s involvement in the NYPD intelligence activities targeting innocent Muslim communities in the Northeast reveal the CIA is once again treating Americans as suspected enemies.”


Given the strong efforts to discredit, disinform and misinform the world surrounding the current mass “mind control,” “brain washing,” oppression, harassment, technical sabotage, torture, sexual assault, assault and rarely even murder it could be beneficial to look at the history of some of the more vanilla CIA domestic influence efforts.

“DESCRIPTION
Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in 1947 to serve thePresident in an advisory capacity. Tasked with providing foreign threat assessments to assist the executive in decision-making, the C.I.A. initially collected intelligence on adversaries with no authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today, however, the Agency has hundreds of thousands of Twitter followers, a monthly podcast, and a virtual history museum. It is a publishing house for academic journals, books, and news organizations. Understanding how the clandestine Agency developed public-facing operations over the past seventy-five years requires analyzing the C.I.A.'s evolution. As such, the paper begins by examining the C.I.A. from its creation to its public exposure in the late 1960s. It then considers the congressional hearings that forced the Agency to change its operations. The third section highlights how the Agency worked to produce its own historical content and worked to influence American movies, Television, and the Internet. At the same time, the conclusion considers the transition of a clandestine intelligence service to a Congressionally approved propaganda machine actively shaping its image for the world to see.


THE EVOLUTION OF C.I.A. DOMESTIC INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS FROM 1947 TO 2023
by
KRISTOFER MANDLER
B.A., Metropolitan State University of Denver, 2019
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of the
The University of Colorado, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
History Program
2023


ii
This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by
Kristofer Mandler
has been approved for the
History Program
by
Greg Whitesides, Chair
Kariann Yokota
Marilynn Hitchens
Date: May 13, 2023


iii
Mandler, Kristofer (M.A., History)
C.I.A. and Domestic Influence Operations
Thesis by Clinical Associate Professor Greg Whitesides


ABSTRACT
Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in 1947 to serve the
President in an advisory capacity. Tasked with providing foreign threat assessments to assist the
executive in decision-making, the C.I.A. initially collected intelligence on adversaries with no
authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today, however, the Agency has hundreds of
thousands of Twitter followers, a monthly podcast, and a virtual history museum. It is a
publishing house for academic journals, books, and news organizations. Understanding how the
clandestine Agency developed public-facing operations over the past seventy-five years requires
analyzing the C.I.A.'s evolution. As such, the paper begins by examining the C.I.A. from its
creation to its public exposure in the late 1960s. It then considers the congressional hearings that
forced the Agency to change its operations. The third section highlights how the Agency worked
to produce its own historical content and worked to influence American movies, Television, and
the Internet. At the same time, the conclusion considers the transition of a clandestine
intelligence service to a Congressionally approved propaganda machine actively shaping its
image for the world to see.

The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
Approved: Greg Whitesides


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. Section I 1947- 1967 1
II. Section II 1967 to 1989 14
III. Section III 1990-Present 22
IV. Section IV CIA in the Public 30
V. Section V Conclusion 33
REFERENCES 35


CHAPTER I
Congress established the C.I.A. in 1947 to provide a policy advisory service to the
President and provide foreign threat assessment. The C.I.A.s mission was to collect intelligence
on foreign adversaries with no authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today the
C.I.A. operates a Twitter with hundreds of thousands of followers, a monthly podcast, a virtual
history museum, and publishes several academic journals, books, and news organizations. How
was the C.I.A. tasked with foreign intelligence collection capable of transitioning to a public-
facing operation that advises creating movies, tv shows, and Tweeting pieces of real-time
operations to the public on anniversary dates? To understand how the clandestine Agency
transitioned to the Internet in under seventy-five years, this paper analyzes the C.I.A. in several
phases of its operation within the public sector. The first section of this paper will examine the
C.I.A. from its creation at the start of the Cold War to the beginning of its phase of public
exposure, which occurred with the Ramparts magazine expose. The C.I.A.’s public awakening
period covers a series of Congressional oversight attempts and public disclosures that created a
challenging image in the people's minds about the C.I.A. In the third phase, the C.I.A. carried out
a public image improvement campaign to improve its own depiction, which included Hollywood,
the C.I.A. on Twitter, and the Agency working actively to produce its historical content from
podcasts, libraries, and movies. The fourth section of this paper covers the period of the C.I.A.
on the Internet and their efforts to engage in the digital age. This work will outline the history of
the C.I.A.s public engagement and its domestic influence operations to its current campaign.
Which has become a Congressionally approved and funded creator of overt government
propaganda pieces designed to protect and shape its own image.

Established by the 1947 National Security Act, Congress initially limited the C.I.A. to covert intelligence gathering strictly overseas, although Cold War operations quickly challenged the original mandate. President Truman's announcement of his doctrine committed the United States to support peoples who were resisting subjugation by Communism1. This support required the C.I.A. to operate as more than a presidential advisory service; instead, the organization wanted to wage political, psychological, and covert paramilitary operations, including those against Soviet influence in Greece and Turkey. To avoid the appearance of using propaganda at home and to ensure that Americans were free of such government influence, Congress passed the 1948 United States Information and Education Act - popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act - to prevent the use of government-funded domestic information operations, which were one of the chief potential tools of the C.I.A. in a domestic setting. Additionally, Congress passed the 1950 Anti-Propaganda bill sponsored by Senator Tim Byrd (D-WV) to prevent the appearance of the United States from operating like the Soviet Union on domestic soil and trying to influence its people2. As such, the C.I.A. needed to find a way to operate with legal cover and self-funding capabilities that could not be detected by the Soviet Union and would keep their operations hidden from public exposure. Such legislation would come into play in 1949, providing the needed legal justification to allow the Agency the ability to perform domestic operations from Congress with the passing of the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act passed in 1949, provided the organization with the
necessary cover to engage in domestic influence operations. The act protected the C.I.A. from
disclosing its structure, functions, officials, titles, and salaries from Congress3. Perhaps most
importantly, it allowed the C.I.A. to fund and manage subsidiary companies free from
government oversight while providing extra legal protection to those involved in the event of
exposure. The C.I.A. quickly became an agency that could operate worldwide and on domestic
soil without concern that they would have to inform Congress of their actions or justify
budgetary demands. The Agency developed the ability to fund independent operations, creating
or sponsoring front groups such as free trade unions, labor unions, student associations, and civil rights organizations to help better the image of the United States and combat Soviet propaganda.

By the 1950s, in the words of C.I.A. Office of Policy Coordination Assistant Director Frank
Wisner, the organization was in control of a "Mighty Wurlitzer" capable of playing numerous
interest groups in the United States and worldwide like an organ4. The Agency began to operate
this Wurlitzer by conducting domestic influence operations to protect society from foreign
influence and subversion. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was among the earliest and most
significant fronts.

Funded by the C.I.A. for two decades, from 1947 to 1967, the Congress of Cultural Freedom sponsored a series of international art shows, exhibits, speakers, and creators that would display Western-style art and culture, sending a strong message to those in Soviet-controlled areas that Western culture was superior. In Who Paid the Piper? The Cia and the Cultural Cold War(1999), historian Frances Stonor Saunders emphasizes the importance of the C.I.A.'s effort to fund the Congress and highlights the intense feelings of many participating individuals; James Johnson Sweeny, the curator of the Paris Masterpiece Festival in 1952, for example, believed that "this was a great way to show off the talent of the western art and use it as a pushback against the totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or present-day Soviet Russia and her satellites.” This early anti-Soviet psychological warfare also allowed the C.I.A. to monitor the activities of those influential in world culture, such as famous musicians, artists, and writers. Due to the successes of the Congress of Cultural Freedom, the C.I.A. took it as a sign that other cultural engagements would be just as successful in their efforts. They began to fund a series of different cultural pieces such as movies, music, and student groups.

The Boston Symphony Orchestra and Hollywood became valuable tools to spread
American culture abroad. The orchestra gave the C.I.A. a vehicle to influence highbrow
intellectual culture in Russia and abroad, allowing them to directly target Moscow, one of the
premier members of the Orchestra world. With the success of the efforts in the orchestra world
The C.I.A. looked to Hollywood as a partner that it could utilize to create propaganda to combat
the Soviet culture and express the American way of life worldwide. The C.I.A. partnered with
former O.S.S. movie maker John Ford and worked to push the masculine American way of life
with actor John Wayne and world-famous studio boss and director Cecil B. DeMille, who had
already agreed to work with the newly created USIA5. The C.I.A. believed that it needed to
portray the American way of life as superior in every way. They wanted to push back against the
Soviet’s previously used tactics of displaying foreign cultures as degenerate. To continue their
work in the world’s cultural areas, the Agency set its sights on activist student groups targeting
women, popular politics, and African American relations.

Radio Free Europe was another CIA-funded front organization established in 1949 as an
offshoot of the National Committee for a Free Europe as a non-profit to encourage the free flow
of information from the American perspective into countries where the point of view was limited
to counteract Soviet influence efforts. Radio Free Europe worked to broadcast American music
and news to nations like Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which were under Soviet
control. The C.I.A. believed this was a way to push American culture into various Soviet-
occupied territories and work to push popular music, such as jazz, into The Warsaw Pact.
Famous jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong included in this effort, which was broadcast on
the Czechoslovak Service of Radio Free Europe, Dizzy Gillespie in Bulgaria, and Phil Woods on
the Russian service6. Many popular musicians at the time were also sent abroad to play in
various countries as part of a "Jazz Ambassadors" program to push back against the Soviet
propaganda campaign designed to target challenging race relations in the United States at the
time.

To fund Radio Free Europe covertly, the C.I.A. began the "Crusade for Freedom," which
operated from 1950 to 19607. This campaign was a way to raise funds for the Radio to prevent
the disclosure that the C.I.A. and Frank Wisner were behind the operation. The Office of Policy
Coordination (O.P.C.), where Wisner was the head of the department working on ways to
implement NSC 20/4, a National Security Council directive placed maximum strain on the
relationships of Soviet Satellites and Moscow8. This operation showed Wisner and the O.P.C.that engagement with interest groups in a covert way would have the most impact on pushing back against the Soviets and provide the best vehicle to deliver the message the C.I.A. wanted abroad, as well as provide a means to influence the domestic population with minimal effort. The
success of the music operation warranted the expansion of these tactics onto the big screen and Television.

The success of Radio Free Europe encouraged the Agency to work with Hollywood in
1954 on the movie adaptation of George Orwell's class book Animal Farm9. The movie received
production assistance from the Agency in the form of $500,000 provided to American Film
Producer Louis de Rochemont10. The 1954 film was produced to depict a society similar to the
Soviets. This film was used as a means of psychological warfare, a popular era trend. Just like
the Committees of Correspondence and the content of Radio Free Europe, Animal Farm depicted
the Soviet system in an unfavorable light and used a popular book as a movie in a new form of
influence operation.

The C.I.A. sought to influence feminist movements to encourage female activism
throughout the country to improve the global view of women's rights worldwide in America11. At
the time, this was a direct response to Soviet Women's groups that had begun to take an active
role in Soviet Politics. The idea was to create popular political support for women and advise and
provide training for women while rebutting Soviet efforts to influence and manipulate women in
the United States. Like the Student Association, this was an attempt to quietly influence youth and help demonstrate that American culture was better than the Soviet Union, hoping other countries would continue to see the United States as a better alternative. The committee was responsible for several Women's conferences worldwide to sponsor awareness
against the Soviets, preventing women from becoming communists. Gloria Steinem's
organization funded a group to attend the 1959 World Youth Festival to represent a non-
communist American perspective in Moscow12. The use of women's groups dovetailed with
attempts to reflect bettering race relations in the U.S.

The American Society of African Culture - or AMSAC - was an organization of African
American writers, artists, and scholars sponsored by the C.I.A. to promote music and art to
reflect improving race relations and counteract Soviet propaganda targeting civil rights tensions
in the United States. Established after the Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in 1956 and
sponsored by the American Society of African Culture and African American intellectuals,
including James Ivy, editor of NAACPs Crisis magazine, and future American Ambassador Will
Mercer Cook. The AMSAC received funding from C.I.A. passthrough organizations such as the
J Frederick Brown Foundation and the Independence Foundation of Boston which both had the
same address and same Trustee listed after receiving immediate tax-exempt status13. This
funding was provided so that it could focus on promoting improving race relations and allowed
them to fund various cultural events abroad; like a large music festival in Lagos, Nigeria, where
American celebrities such as Nina Simone and Langston Hughes. The event was sponsored to
not only strengthen African American/African connections but spread American jazz music and…”


continued https://digital.auraria.edu/works/publication-dissertation/w9909-p7z28

A knowledgeable exam of online victim communities will offer a window into modern social media Intelligence manipulation and influence.

The efforts to protect this filthy inhumane program have been successful, as despite its horrific covertly delivered atrocities being conducted openly on non combative citizens, it is still going strong and is even likely expanding after over two decades. Can humanity just inherently be manipulated so easily or do we have the ability to resist?
 
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living in an age filled with seemingly unlimited electronic media access and exposure, a quick look back at the CIA’s interest and involvement in the media of a half a century ago could broaden our warning radar sensing for possible Inteligence interest in, involvement with and influence over modern media and the resultant power it wields over us. Manipulation of victims online social communities has proven powerfully effective at manipulating: Investigators, L.E., Researchers, Journalists, Health Care Professionals and general public opinion in order to psychologically armor and camouflage this disturbing illegal and immoral initiative.

ROLLING STONE ~ CARL BERNSTEIN ~THE CIA AND THE MEDIA (1977)

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA
How Americas Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central
Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up

After leaving The Washington Post in 1977, Carl Bernstein spent six months looking at the
relationship of the CIA and the press during the Cold War years. His 25,000-word cover
story, published in Rolling Stone on October 20, 1977, is reprinted below.

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA
How America's Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central
Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up
BY CARL BERNSTEIN
I
n 1953, Joseph Alsop, then one of America's leading syndicated columnists, went to the
Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by his
syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that printed his
column. He went at the request of the CIA.

Alsop is one of more than 400 American journalists who in the past twenty-five years have
secretly carried out assignments for the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents
on file at CIA headquarters. Some of these journalists' relationships with the Agency were
tacit; some were explicit. There was cooperation, accommodation and overlap. Journalists
provided a full range of clandestine services -- from simple intelligence gathering to serving
as go-betweens with spies in Communist countries. Reporters shared their notebooks with the
CIA. Editors shared their staffs. Some of the journalists were Pulitzer Prize winners,
distinguished reporters who considered themselves ambassadors without-portfolio for their
country. Most were less exalted: foreign correspondents who found that their association with
the Agency helped their work; stringers and freelancers who were as interested in the derring-
do of the spy business as in filing articles; and, the smallest category, full-time CIA
employees masquerading as journalists abroad. In many instances, CIA documents show,
journalists were engaged to perform tasks for the CIA with the consent of the managements
of America's leading news organizations.

The history of the CIA's involvement with the American press continues to be shrouded by
an official policy of obfuscation and deception for the following principal reasons:

* The use of journalists has been among the most productive means of intelligence-gathering
employed by the CIA. Although the Agency has cut back sharply on the use of reporters
since 1973 (primarily as a result of pressure from the media), some journalist-operatives are
still posted abroad.

* Further investigation into the matter, CIA officials say, would inevitably reveal a series of
embarrassing relationships in the 1950s and 1960s with some of the most powerful
organizations and individuals in American journalism.

Among the executives who lent their cooperation to the Agency were Williarn Paley of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, Henry Luce of Time Inc., Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the
New York Times, Barry Bingham Sr. of the LouisviIle Courier-Journal, and James Copley of
the Copley News Service. Other organizations which cooperated with the CIA include the
American Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting Company, the Associated Press,
United Press International, Reuters, Hearst Newspapers, Scripps-Howard, Newsweek
magazine, the Mutual Broadcasting System, the Miami Herald and the old Saturday Evening
Post and New York Herald-Tribune.

By far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the
New York Times, CBS and Time Inc.

The CIA's use of the American news media has been much more extensive than Agency
officials have acknowledged publicly or in closed sessions with members of Congress. The
general outlines of what happened are indisputable; the specifics are harder to come by. CIA
sources hint that a particular journalist was trafficking all over Eastern Europe for the
Agency; the journalist says no, he just had lunch with the station chief. CIA sources say flatly
that a well-known ABC correspondent worked for the Agency through 1973; they refuse to
identify him. A high-level CIA official with a prodigious memory says that the New York
Times provided cover for about ten CIA operatives between 1950 and 1966; he does not
know who they were, or who in the newspaper's management made the arrangements.

The Agency's special relationships with the so-called "majors" in publishing and
broadcasting enabled the CIA to post some of its most valuable operatives abroad without
exposure for more than two decades. In most instances, Agency files show, officials at the
highest levels of the CIA (usually director or deputy director) dealt personally with a single
designated individual in the top management of the cooperating news organization. The aid
furnished often took two forms: providing jobs and credentials ("journalistic cover" in
Agency parlance) for CIA operatives about to be posted in foreign capitals; and lending the
Agency the undercover services of reporters already on staff, including some of the best-
known correspondents in the business.
I
n the field, journalists were used to help recruit and handle foreigners as agents; to acquire
and evaluate information, and to plant false information with officials of foreign
governments. Many signed secrecy agreements, pledging never to divulge anything about
their dealings with the Agency; some signed employment contracts., some were assigned
case officers and treated with. unusual deference. Others had less structured relationships
with the Agency, even though they performed similar tasks: they were briefed by CIA
personnel before trips abroad, debriefed afterward, and used as intermediaries with foreign
agents. Appropriately, the CIA uses the term "reporting" to describe much of what
cooperating journalists did for the Agency. "We would ask them, 'Will you do us a
favor?'".said a senior CIA official. "'We understand you're going to be in Yugoslavia. Have
they paved all the streets? Where did you see planes? Were there any signs of military
presence? How many Soviets did you see? If you happen to meet a Soviet, get his name and
spell it right .... Can you set up a meeting for is? Or relay a message?'" Many CIA officials
regarded these helpful journalists as operatives; the journalists tended to see themselves as
trusted friends of the Agency who performed occasional favors -- usually without pay -- in
the national interest.

"I'm proud they asked me and proud to have done it," said Joseph Alsop who, like his late
brother, columnist Stewart Alsop, undertook clandestine tasks for the Agency. "The notion
that a newspaperman doesn't have a duty to his country is perfect balls."

From the Agency's perspective, there is nothing untoward in such relationships, and any
ethical questions are a matter for the journalistic profession to resolve, not the intelligence
community. As Stuart Loory, former Los Angeles Times correspondent, has written in the
Columbia Journalism Review: 'If even one American overseas carrying a press card is a paid
informer for the CIA, then all Americans with those credentials are suspect .... If the crisis of
confidence faced by the news business -- along with the government -- is to be overcome,
journalists must be willing to focus on themselves the same spotlight they so relentlessly
train on others!' But as Loory also noted: "When it was reported... that newsmen themselves
were on the payroll of the CIA, the story caused a brief stir, and then was dropped."
During the 1976 investigation of the CIA by the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by
Senator Frank Church, the dimensions of the Agency's involvement with the press became
apparent to several members of the panel, as well as to two or three investigators on the staff.
But top officials of the CIA, including former directors William Colby and George Bush,
persuaded the committee to restrict its inquiry into the matter and to deliberately
misrepresent the actual scope of the activities in its final report. The multivolume report
contains nine pages in which the use of journalists is discussed in deliberately vague and
sometimes misleading terms. It makes no mention of the actual number of journalists who
undertook covert tasks for the CIA. Nor does it adequately describe the role played by
newspaper and broadcast executives in cooperating with the Agency.

THE AGENCY'S DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS BEGAN during the earliest stages of the
Cold War. Allen Dulles, who became director of the CIA in 1953, sought to establish a
recruiting-and-cover capability within America's most prestigious journalistic institutions. By
operating under the guise of accredited news correspondents, Dulles believed, CIA operatives
abroad would be accorded a degree of access and freedom of movement unobtainable under
almost any other type of cover.

American publishers, like so many other corporate and institutional leaders at the time, were
willing to commit the resources of their companies to the struggle against "global
Communism." Accordingly, the traditional line separating the American press corps and
government was often indistinguishable: rarely was a news agency used to provide cover for
CIA operatives abroad without the knowledge and consent of either its principal owner,
publisher or senior editor. Thus, contrary to the notion that the CIA insidiously infiltrated the
journalistic community, there is ample evidence that America's leading publishers and news
executives allowed themselves and their organizations to become handmaidens to the
intelligence services. "Let's not pick on some poor reporters, for God's sake," William Colby
exclaimed at one point to the Church committee's investigators. "Let's go to the
managements. They were witting." In all, about twenty-five news organizations (including
those listed at the beginning of this article) provided cover for the Agency.
In addition to cover capability, Dulles initiated a "debriefing" procedure under which
American correspondents returning from abroad routinely emptied their notebooks and
offered their impressions to Agency personnel. Such arrangements, continued by Dulles'
successors, to the present day, were made with literally dozens of news organizations. In the
1950s, it was not uncommon for returning reporters to be met at the ship by CIA officers.
"There would be these guys from the CIA flashing ID cards and looking like they belonged at
the Yale Club," said Hugh Morrow, a former Saturday Evening Post correspondent who is
now press secretary to former vice-president Nelson Rockefeller. "It got to be so routine that
you felt a little miffed if you weren't asked."

CIA officials almost always refuse to divulge the names of journalists who have cooperated
with the Agency. They say it would be unfair to judge these individuals in a context different
from the one that spawned the relationships in the first place. "There was a time when it
wasn't considered a crime to serve your government," said one high-level CIA official who
makes no secret of his bitterness. "This all has to be considered in the context of the morality
of the times, rather than against latter-day standards -- and hypocritical standards at that."

Many journalists who covered World War II were close to people in the Office of Strategic
Services, the wartime predecessor of the CIA; more important, they were all on the same
side. When the war ended and many OSS officials went into the CIA, it was only natural that
these relationships would continue. Meanwhile, the first postwar generation of journalists
entered the profession; they shared the same political and professnial values as their mentors. "You had a gang of people who worked together during World War II and never got over it," said one Agency official. "They were genuinely motivated and highly susceptible to
intrigue and being on the inside. Then in the Fifties and Sixties there was a national
consensus about a national threat. The Vietnam War tore everything to pieces -- shredded the
consensus and threw it in the air." Another Agency official observed: "Many journalists didn't
give a second thought to associating with the Agency. But there was a point when the ethical
issues which most people had submerged finally surfaced. Today, a lot of these guys
vehemently deny that they had any relationship with the Agency."

From the outset, the use of journalists was among the CIA's most sensitive undertakings,
with full knowledge restricted to the Director of Central Intelligence and a few of his chosen
deputies. Dulles and his successors were fearful of what would happen if a journalist-
operative's cover was blown, or if details of the Agency's dealings with the press otherwise
became public. As a result, contacts with the heads of news organizations were normally
initiated by Dulles and succeeding Directors of Central Intelligence; by the deputy directors
and division chiefs in charge of covert operations -- Frank Wisner, Cord Meyer Jr., Richard
Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Karamessines and Richard Helms
himself a former UPI correspondent); and, occasionally, by others in the CIA hierarchy
known to have an unusually close social relationship with a particular publisher or broadcast
executive. [1]

James Angleton, who was recently removed as the Agency's head of counterintelligence
operations, ran a completely independent group of journalist-operatives who performed
sensitive and frequently dangerous assignments; little is known about this group for the
simple reason that Angleton deliberately kept only the vaguest of files.

The CIA even ran a formal training program in the 1950s to teach its agents to be journalists.
Intelligence officers were "taught to make noises like reporters," explained a high CIA
official, and were then placed in major news organizations with help from management.

"These were the guys who went through the ranks and were told 'You're going to he a
journalist,'" the CIA official said. Relatively few of the 400-some relationships described in
Agency files followed that pattern, however; most involved persons who were already bona
fide journalists when they began undertaking tasks for the Agency.
The Agency's relationships with journalists, as described in CIA files, include the following
general categories:

* Legitimate, accredited staff members of news organizations -- usually reporters. Some were
paid; some worked for the Agency on a purely voluntary basis. This group includes many of
the best-known journalists who carried out tasks for the CIA. The files show that the salaries
paid to reporters by newspaper and broadcast networks were sometimes supplemented by
nominal payments from the CIA, either in the form of retainers, travel expenses or outlays
for specific services performed. Almost all the payments were made in cash. The accredited
category also includes photographers, administrative personnel of foreign news bureaus and
members of broadcast technical crews.)

Two of the Agency's most valuable personal relationships in the 1960s, according to CIA
officials, were with reporters who covered Latin America -- Jerry O'Leary of the Washington
Star and Hal Hendrix of the Miami News, a Pulitzer Prize winner who became a high official
of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Hendrix was extremely helpful to
the Agency in providing information about individuals in Miami's Cuban exile community.
O'Leary was considered a valued asset in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Agency files
contain lengthy reports of both men's activities on behalf of the CIA.

O'Leary maintains that his dealings were limited to the normal give-and-take that goes on
between reporters abroad and their sources. CIA officials dispute the contention: "There's no
question Jerry reported for us," said one. "Jerry did assessing and spotting [of prospective
agents] but he was better as a reporter for us." Referring to O'Leary's denials, the official
added: "I don't know what in the world he's worried about unless he's wearing that mantle of
integrity the Senate put on you journalists."

O'Leary attributes the difference of opinion to semantics. "I might call them up and say
something like, 'Papa Doc has the clap, did you know that?' and they'd put it in the file. I
don't consider that reporting for them.... it's useful to be friendly to them and, generally, I felt
friendly to them. But I think they were more helpful to me than I was to them." O'Leary took
particular exception to being described in the same context as Hendrix. "Hal was really doing
work for them," said O'Leary. "I'm still with the Star. He ended up at ITT." Hendrix could not
be reached for comment. According to Agency officials, neither Hendrix nor O'Leary was
paid by the CIA.

* Stringers [2] and freelancers. Most were payrolled by the Agency under standard
contractual terms. Their journalistic credentials were often supplied by cooperating news
organizations. some filed news stories; others reported only for the CIA. On some occasions,
news organizations were not informed by the CIA that their stringers were also working for
the Agency.

* Employees of so-called CIA "proprietaries." During the past twenty-five years, the Agency
has secretly bankrolled numerous foreign press services, periodicals and newspapers -- both
English and foreign language -- which provided excellent cover for CIA operatives. One such
publication was the Rome Daily American, forty percent of which was owned by the CIA
until the 1970s. The Daily American went out of business this year.

* Editors, publishers and broadcast network executives. The CIA's relationship with most
news executives differed fundamentally from those with working reporters and stringers,
who were much more subject to direction from the Agency. A few executives -- Arthur Hays
Sulzberger of the New York Times among them -- signed secrecy agreements. But such
formal understandings were rare: relationships between Agency officials and media
executives were usually social -- "The P and Q Street axis in Georgetown," said one source.
"You don't tell Wilharn Paley to sign a piece of paper saying he won't fink."

* Columnists and commentators. There are perhaps a dozen well known columnists and
broadcast commentators whose relationships with the CIA go far beyond those normally
maintained between reporters and their sources. They are referred to at the Agency as
"known assets" and can be counted on to perform a variety of undercover tasks; they are
considered receptive to the Agency's point of view on various subjects. Three of the most
widely read columnists who maintained such ties with the Agency are C.L. Sulzberger of the
New York Times, Joseph Alsop, and the late Stewart Alsop, whose column appeared in the
New York Herald-Tribune, the Saturday Evening Post and Newsweek. CIA files contain
reports of specific tasks all three undertook. Sulzberger is still regarded as an active asset by
the Agency. According to a senior CIA official, "Young Cy Sulzberger had some uses.... He
signed a secrecy agreement because we gave him classified information.... There was sharing,
give and take. We'd say, 'Wed like to know this; if we tell you this will it help you get access
to so-and-so?' Because of his access in Europe he had an Open Sesame. We'd ask him to just
report: 'What did so-and-so say, what did he look like, is he healthy?' He was very eager, he
loved to cooperate." On one occasion, according to several CIA officials, Sulzberger was
given a briefing paper by the Agency which ran almost verbatim under the columnist's byline
in the Times. "Cycame out and said, 'I'm thinking of doing a piece, can you give me some
background?'" a CIA officer said. "We gave it to Cy as a background piece a…

Continued https://docdepot.itsyourgov.org/doc...?from=/search?collection=News+Source+Document
 
Injury of sonic weapons to human body: A narrative review
Yue Li a, Guangming Yang b, Yongbo Zhao a, Bingcang Li b,⁎
Author information
Article notes
Copyright and License information
PMCID: PMC12892060 PMID: 40300918

Abstract
Sonic weapons are non-lethal weapons that some countries around the world are actively developing and equipping in their troop. Its injury to the human body is increasingly valued. Given that previous research on the injury, prevention, and treatment of sonic weapons to the human body were not systematic and comprehensive, after explaining certain acoustic concepts, these authors introduce infrasonic and intense sound weapons from aspects of weapon types and applications, injury mechanisms and characteristics, injury thresholds, biological effects, injury diagnosis, and injury prevention and treatment. Finally, ultrasonic weapons are briefly introduced, based on a small amount of public literature reports both domestically and internationally. This study aims to provide a reference for future prevention, and treatment of sonic weapons injury.
Keywords: Sonic weapon, Infrasonic weapon, Intense sound weapon, Ultrasonic weapon, Prevention and treatment

1. Introduction
Sonic weapons are a type of non-lethal weapon that has increasingly received attention from people in modern warfare for their effects and injuries to the human body. Sonic weapons can be divided into infrasonic weapons, intense sound weapons, and ultrasonic weapons based on their frequency. Scientists in China have previously reported on the concept of infrasonic weapons,1, 2, 3, 4, 5 infrasound field characteristics,6 infrasound focusing and targeting,7,8 psychological effects of infrasound,9 biological effects of infrasound,10, 11, 12 the influence of infrasound on the central nervous system and neural-psychological aspects,13 military applications of infrasound,14 and physical protection against infrasound.15 For intense sound weapons, Chinese scientists have introduced its concepts and applications,16, 17, 18, 19, 20 the biological effects,12,21 and the effectiveness evaluation system.22, 23, 24 However, there are relatively few literature reports on ultrasonic weapons, with only sporadic reports on the physical characteristics of ultrasound12,21 and the basic principles of ultrasonic weapons.17

Given the lack of comprehensive and systematic research on the damage to the human body caused by sonic weapons and their prevention and treatment in previous reports, this article retrieves Chinese and English literature published from January 2000 to January 2024 through databases of SinoMed, CMCI, PubMed, Embase, Web of Science, as well as search engines such as Baidu Scholar and Microsoft Bing by using the keywords acoustic weapons, sonic weapons, infrasonic weapons, intense sound weapons, ultrasonic weapons, noise weapons, and prevention and treatment. The literature inclusion criteria were as follows: (1) literature collected from medical databases and internet search engines, and (2) original research papers and research reports. The literature exclusion criteria were: (1) literature that could not be accessed in full text or was not in Chinese or English; and (2) science-promoting papers. Finally, 24 Chinese and 32 English articles were included. The aim is to provide references for future development, protection, and medical treatment of acoustic weapons.

2. Acoustic concepts
2.1. Sound frequency

The number of vibrations per unit time by a sound source is known as sound frequency, also referred to as audio frequency, measured in hertz (Hz). Infrasound frequencies range from 0.001 to 20 Hz. Although infrasound is generally inaudible to the human ear, it can still be sensed and, at sufficiently high power levels, can be heard.25,26 Infrasound is commonly present in various industrial, transportation, and living environments, also generated by phenomena such as nuclear explosions, rocket launches,9,13 as well as natural occurrences like earthquakes, volcanoes, tornadoes, and waterfalls.27,28 Animals such as crocodiles, elephants, giraffes, and whales can use infrasound for long-distance communication.27,28 Infrasound has long wavelengths, such as 5 Hz for 68 m and 7 Hz for 48.5 m.22,29 Frequencies ranging from 20 Hz to 20 kHz are audible sounds, with the human ear being most sensitive to frequencies between 1 kHz and 3 kHz.25, 26, 27 Ultrasound refers to frequencies higher than 20 kHz, which are inaudible to the human ear, but can be heard by dogs, cats, turtles, and bats. Also, whales and dolphins use ultrasound for prey detection.25, 26, 27 Ultrasound is highly directional and can penetrate the body, allowing for medical imaging techniques to obtain structural information of internal organs.30 Sound frequencies can also be categorized as low-frequency (<400 Hz), mid-frequency (0.4–1 kHz), and high-frequency (>1 kHz).31 Both infrasound and ultrasound can induce resonance in the human body.25

2.2. Noise
Noise refers to sounds that are irritating, excessively loud, and detrimental to human health. It is generated by the irregular vibrations of sound-emitting objects. Noise can be classified as steady-state noise (with fluctuations in sound level not exceeding 3 dB) and pulse noise (short duration with high and sharp amplitudes).32 Similar to sound frequencies, noise can also be categorized as low-frequency, mid-frequency, and high-frequency.

The human auditory system has a higher tolerance for low-frequency noise, even at high sound pressure levels (SPLs), resulting only in temporary threshold shifts (TTS) rather than permanent threshold shifts (PTS).33,34 Low-frequency noise ranging from 150 to 155 dB can cause chest wall vibration, slight nausea, and dizziness. At 154–171 dB, it can lead to increased heart rate, flushing of the skin, swallowing pain, visual impairment, subcostal discomfort, coughing, sternum compression, and breathing difficulties.33 When mid-frequency noise reaches 120 dB, it can resonate with the nasal cavity or sinus and enhance their tactile sensation. At ≥142 dB, it can stimulate the vestibular system, and at 165 dB, it can cause itching.34 For high-frequency noise, TTS or PTS can be caused by SPL ranging from 80 to 120 dB, tactile sensations or itchiness can occur at 120 dB, vestibular reactions can be induced at 125 dB, balance disorders can be caused at 140 dB, and thermal effects can be generated at 160 dB.33 The combination of sound intensity and exposure time determine the level of damage, for example 135 dB for 7 min, 140 dB for 40 s, 145 dB for 4 s, 150 dB for 0.4 s, and 160 dB can cause perforation of the eardrum (it is previously believed that the perforation have a protective effect on the inner ear, but human data suggests that eardrum perforation provides no protection, whether unilateral or bilateral).35

2.3. Acoustic power
Acoustic power refers to the amount of sound energy passing through a specified area per unit time. When measured in terms of energy, it is referred to as sound intensity, expressed in W/m2. If measured in terms of pressure, it is referred to as SPL with the unit of Pa. The indicator of SPL is in dB.25 The conversion formula between dB and Pa is given by L=20𝑙𝑜𝑔10⁡
𝑃1
𝑃0

, where L is the SPL, P1 represents the sound pressure being compared, and P0 represents the reference sound pressure (often taken as 20 μPa). Acoustic power is directly proportional to the square of sound velocity, sound frequency, and amplitude. Therefore, ultrasound has high acoustic power, while explosion waves own high acoustic power due to their high amplitudes.31 When acoustic power exceeds 120 dB, it is considered high-intensity sound, causing discomfort to the human ear and potential hearing loss. At 140 dB (200 Pa), it can be painful to the human ear, above 160 dB (2 kPa) causes eardrum rupture, and 173 dB (9 kPa) for lung rupture.30,33

2.4. Acoustic propagation
Infrasound and audible sound propagate at the same speed,3 which is about 300–340 m/s in the atmosphere and 1480 m/s in water.7,21 The energy of sound wave undergoes attenuation and absorption during propagation, which is influenced by factors such as humidity, temperature, and pressure.19 The rate of sound attenuation is directly proportional to the square of its frequency, so higher frequencies result in faster attenuation.12 As a result, infrasound experiences less attenuation, allowing for long-distance propagation (thousands to tens of thousands of kilometers).7,21 On the other hand, ultrasound experiences significant attenuation, resulting in shorter propagation distances.29 The penetrating power of sound waves is inversely proportional to the sound frequency. For example, 7 Hz infrasound can penetrate through reinforced concrete walls several meters thick, as well as steel plates, seawater, and soil layers, while audible sound at 7 kHz cannot pass through a piece of paper.14,30

3. Infrasonic weapon
3.1. Types and applications of the weapons
Currently, there are 3 types of sonic weapons: sonic cannons, sonic bullets, and sonic guns, all composed of sonic generators, power devices, and control systems.14 The Chinese Academy of Sciences has developed a sonic gun with a frequency less than 20 Hz.36 The SPL of sonic guns developed by the United States (U.S.)18 and France20 can reach 160 dB. Infrasonic weapons can be classified into 5 categories based on their generation methods: (1) burst-type: compressed gas, high-pressure steam, or high-pressure gas is released in a pulse to excite the medium and generate sonic waves, with the advantages of small size, low frequency, and easy control, but with low sonic intensity and short range of effect; (2) explosive-type: infrasonic waves are generated by explosions, and about 50% explosive energy converts shockwaves, then decay to produce infrasonic waves; (3) tube-type: its structure and working principle are similar to a flute. Infrasonic waves are generated when the air inside the tube vibrates at the same frequency as the tube itself; (4) speaker-type: the working principle is similar to a speaker. Special diaphragms are used to generate infrasonic waves through vibration; (5) beat frequency-type: 2 sound wave generators with different frequencies are used simultaneously to generate infrasonic waves based on the difference in their frequencies.2 Compared to intense sound weapons, the development of infrasonic weapons is more challenging, due to the technical difficulties such as it is hard to increase the power output and duration of the infrasonic generator, to reduce the size and weight of the weapon system, to make wave beam more directional and focused.7,18,23
The US has secretly used infrasonic weapons in the Somali, the Bosnian, and the Gulf War. It is reported that infrasound attacks on the Bosnian Serb Army caused a large number of soldiers to faint and vomit within seconds, resulting in the loss of combat effectiveness.20 The US also suspects that its embassy personnel in Havana (Cuba) and Guangzhou (China) have been attacked by infrasonic weapons.27,28

3.2. Mechanism and characteristics of injury
The main characteristic of infrasonic weapons’ harm to the human body is organ resonance. When the frequency of infrasonic waves is close to the inherent frequency of human organs, the organs can absorb sonic energy at the maximum extent, thus causing damage through resonance.13,20 Infrasound can also convert mechanical energy into thermal, biochemical, and bioelectricity energy, thereby damaging the molecular structure of cells.11,20 Infrasound stimulation can disrupt the brain and cause mental disorders, while stimulating somatosensory and visceral receptors can produce reflexive physiological responses. Based on these, infrasonic weapons can be divided into “neurological type” and “organ type”.12,13,20

Neurological infrasonic weapons have a frequency of 8–12 Hz, which is the same as the inherent frequency of the head.15,34 It is also consistent with the α rhythm (8–12 Hz, amplitude of 20–100 μV, commonly seen during relaxation) of brain waves, which also has β rhythm (14–30 Hz, amplitude of 5–22 μV, commonly seen during thinking), θ rhythm (4–7 Hz, amplitude of 20–150 μV, commonly seen when drowsy), and δ rhythm (0.5–3 Hz, amplitude of 20–200 μV, commonly seen during sleep).30 When infrasonic waves resonate with the head, dizziness, numbness in limbs, confusion, and abnormal behavior can be caused.30 The experiments in New Zealand rabbit have shown that exposure to 16 Hz/130 dB infrasonic waves for 20 min significantly increases δ rhythm, and exposure to 6 Hz/110 dB can convert α to θ rhythm, indicating that brain wave activity in animals can be significantly suppressed by infrasonic waves.13 Organ-type infrasonic weapons usually have frequencies ranging from 4 to 18 Hz, which correspond to the inherent vibration frequencies of various organs in the human body. The frequency for the torso is 7–13 Hz, the heart is 5 Hz, the chest cavity is 4–6 Hz, the abdominal cavity is 6–9 Hz, the abdominal wall is 10 Hz, the pelvic cavity and the chest wall are 6 Hz and 60 Hz, respectively.9,12,15,34 When the frequency of infrasonic waves is close to the inherent frequency of human organs, resonance occurs, leading to symptoms such as tinnitus, palpitations, muscle spasms, difficulty breathing, and even rupture of blood vessels and organ damage.9,15,18 When the frequency of infrasonic waves is less than 2 Hz, the human body responds as a whole rather than at the organ level.27,28,33

3.3. Injury threshold
The injury extent of infrasonic waves to the human depends on their power, frequency, and duration of exposure.25 When the power is the same, the frequency determines the type of damage, while the duration determines the injury degree, which is also closely related to the frequency and sound pressure.9,25 Due to the different structures and inherent frequencies of humans and animals, the same infrasonic parameters can have varying effects on different organisms.9 A test involving 15 males aged 20 to 25 years showed that exposure to 10 Hz/136 dB infrasound for 15 min resulted in symptoms such as headaches, dry mouth, difficulty swallowing, sweaty palms, and extreme fatigue. The average low- and mid-frequency hearing thresholds decreased by 10–15 dB, and some internal organs experienced noticeable vibrations. After the exposure stopped, most of the symptoms disappeared within 10–30 min, but the feeling of fatigue persisted.9 Infrasound of 12.5–20.0 Hz/105.0–113.5 dB for 6 h caused restlessness, muscle tremors, spasms, and decreased muscle strength in 67.8% of the subjects.13 Exposure to infrasound at 1–30 Hz/125 dB can cause ear pressure sensations and a decrease in task performance,13 at 95–110 dB for 20 min can make people drowsy and reduce work efficiency,34 16 Hz/95 dB for 30 min can increase diastolic blood pressure and heart rate.34 However, some infrasound is harmless to the human body. For example, 2–15 Hz/115 dB do not affect task performance,13 7.5 Hz/130 dB for 50 min has negligible effects on the human body,34 8 Hz/130 dB for 30 min has no adverse effects on most people,34 10–15 Hz/130–135 dB for 30 min cannot affect hearing or vestibular function,34 7 Hz/142 dB for 15 min does not cause dizziness or orientation disorders.34 Animal experiments have shown that infrasound at 172 dB can cause breathing difficulties and even suffocation in dogs, while at 6–9 Hz/195 dB can cause immediate death in monkeys and baboons.6,11 Exposure to infrasound at 16 Hz/105 dB for 10 min can shorten the tolerance time of rats to sound waves, and infrasound at 10 Hz/160 dB can interrupt tracking behavior in adult macaques, but it has no effect on hearing measurement, otoacoustic emissions (OAE), and auditory brainstem responses.34 Infrasound at 15–20 Hz/140 dB has no effect on pigs and macaques.34

It is usually believed that infrasound at 90 dB is generally not harmful,9 and 120 dB is the threshold level for infrasound damage.11 Even short-term exposure to infrasound at 140 dB is enough to cause harm to the human body,9,34 and at 150 dB for 2–3 min can cause irreversible damage and even death.6,9, 10, 11 The International Infrasound Professional Committee in Paris has set the allowable infrasound intensity of 2 Hz at 130 dB, 4 Hz at 128 dB, 8 Hz at 125 dB, and 16 Hz at 120 dB.6,11 According to the changes in red blood cell membrane permeability, adenosine-triphosphat, and succinate dehydrogenase activity, the impact of infrasound frequency is determined to be in the order of 16 Hz>8 Hz>4 Hz>2 Hz.9,10

3.4. Biological effects
The harmful biological effects of infrasound on the human body include: (1) vestibular effects, such as dizziness and nausea;27,28,34 (2) auditory effects, such as auditory pain, sensation of pressure in the middle ear, and annoyance;37 (3) visceral effects, such as nausea, chest tightness, and hallucinations;27,28,34 (4) cardiovascular effects, such as increased heart rate (averagely increasing 11/min) and elevated diastolic blood pressure (averagely increasing 1.2±0.27 kPa), but returned to normal after half an hour;9 (5) psychological effects, such as fear, sadness, depression, anxiety, lack of concentration, aversion, indifference, and sorrow;25 (6) chronic effects, such as rectal cancer, colon cancer, pancreatic cancer, etc.27,28,38

Infrasound also has certain benefits to the human body. For example, sonic massage of 4 Hz/170 dB can stabilize the progression of myopia,13 and sonic waves with frequencies ranging from 0.1 to 3 Hz can relieve pain.10 During anesthesia, moderate infrasound has sedative effects on central nervous system, and reduces adverse reactions caused by surgical stimuli.13 Sonic waves at 8–12 Hz can improve concentration, enhance learning efficiency, and increase alertness.13,34 If at 8–12 Hz/72–79 dB, permeability of tumor cell membranes can be changed, and the killing effect on glioblastoma cells can be enhanced with 5-fluorouracil together.13 Otherwise, the proliferation activity of mesenchymal stem cells in the bone marrow can be increased by infrasound which inhibits apoptosis.13 Also, the survival rate of guinea pigs during hypersensitivity reactions can be increased by exposure to 10 Hz/155–160 dB for 10 min,10 and cognitive impairment in rats with vascular dementia can be improved by infrasound.9

3.5. Injury diagnosis
Due to surprise attack (fast propagation) and crypticity (inaudible and invisible) of infrasonic weapon assault, combined with its long operating distance and strong penetration capabilities,12,18 it is difficult for people to realize they have been damaged by infrasound timely, until they experience symptoms such as dizziness, nausea, chest tightness, hallucinations, fear, sadness, depression, and anxiety, which are often referred to as “mysterious symptoms”.38 Still, it is difficult to determine the attack source and to diagnose quickly,38 unless symptoms occur simultaneously in batch soldiers during wartime or gathering crowds during peacetime, or a infrasound detection device (such as a infrasonic sensor) is available at the scene.
3.6. Injury prevention and treatment

It is quite difficult to protect against sonic weapons.2 The best protection is to minimize the infrasonic intensity and to shorten the exposure duration.11,15 Alternatively, it can be used to reduce resonance by absorption, isolation, and reducing energy during infrasound propagation. Although many materials can protect against medium and high frequency noise, the materials for protecting against infrasound and low-frequency noise are lacking at present.9 Due to the strong penetration capability of infrasound, the equipment made of ordinary materials cannot provide effective protection. It is reported that the anti-infrasound earplugs developed by Chinese scientists can effectively reduce human injuries.9 In addition, high-intensity music can mask infrasonic waves and provide some relief for certain symptoms,10,11 and low-intensity infrasonic waves can alleviate the damage caused by high-intensity sonic waves, which may be used to increase the tolerance of the human to infrasound damage by pre-stimulating effects in the future.9

Infrasound can activate the body's oxidative system, generate a large number of free radicals, and further exacerbate lipid peroxidation reactions, thus damaging biological membranes. Therefore, antioxidants, such as α-tocopherol, vitamin C, 2.3-dimethyl-2-sulfopropionate sodium, imidazole derivatives, etc., and free radical scavengers have therapeutic effects on infrasonic weapon damage.9, 10, 11 Glutamate receptor antagonists can effectively reduce the number of damaged neurons affected by infrasonic waves.11

Continued https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12892060/
 
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