Think deeply about it (the nature of mind)

[ebola?]

It's not a violation of parsimony if the inclusion of some data about the observer leads to other explanatory virtues, such as comprehensiveness or predictiveness or coherence with background knowledge.

We're getting into tricky ground here. I think that the move to include the observer in our observations applies to and renders more robust our ontological interpretations of physical theory, while remaining inapplicable to predictive validity or empirical comprehensiveness. The alternatives, such as the many-worlds approach or the idea that some physical interactions collapse the waveform for no knowable reason seem more convoluted to me (but still possible, clearly).

So the question is, should we apply the principle of parsimony to these sorts of parts of our theoretical machinery? I would say so, because if we were able to get at such things with observation, we would want to theorize with parsimony. Put otherwise, is there any logical argument that parsimony works less effectively as a guiding...heuristic ()...when we engage systems of logic divorced from empirical reckoning?

Adding in some entity consciousness, that is non-physical, yet spatially related and somehow necessary for a physical object to exist, not only fails to add any virtues to our explanation while adding complexity (thereby violating the principle of parsimony) but also seems to reduce coherence with background knowledge.

Two related points:
1. I don't think that the inclusion of consciousness, let alone an observer of some sort, necessitates the inclusion of the non-physical. Rather, the task is to expand physical explanations to be able to include engagement with observers, including their consciousness.
2. A science that is more empirically robust than what we're currently working with would include consciousness (as it is an empirical entity...one that each one of us is familiar with ).

As far as the criticism of theories that violate current assumptions goes, I think it depends on how the current assumptions are being violated (one can imagine violations that would produce less complexity in a theory, but at the cost of other virtues), and how well supported the assumptions are.

Yup. However, I was trying to make the point that all other things being equal, a priori reluctance to violate prior assumptions is invalid.

ebola

 

[Heuristic]

We're getting into tricky ground here. I think that the move to include the observer in our observations applies to and renders more robust our ontological interpretations of physical theory, while remaining inapplicable to predictive validity or empirical comprehensiveness. The alternatives, such as the many-worlds approach or the idea that some physical interactions collapse the waveform for no knowable reason seem more convoluted to me (but still possible, clearly).

Including the observer isn't something limited to quantum mechanics. We do so whenever we include a range of uncertainty for measurements, when we look for signs of confirmation bias, etc. And doing so does improve predictive power and comprehensiveness.

As far as an ontological interpretation of physical theory... I think that at most philosophical levels, this is just noise.

So the question is, should we apply the principle of parsimony to these sorts of parts of our theoretical machinery? I would say so, because if we were able to get at such things with observation, we would want to theorize with parsimony. Put otherwise, is there any logical argument that parsimony works less effectively as a guiding...heuristic ()...when we engage systems of logic divorced from empirical reckoning?

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the last part. In a deductive system I don't think parsimony is applicable, except as a stylistic preference. Here we're simply dealing with logical implications of statements and rules. We can draw them in an unnecessary complex way or in an elegantly simple way, but the validity of each won't depend on parsimony.

Two related points:
1. I don't think that the inclusion of consciousness, let alone an observer of some sort, necessitates the inclusion of the non-physical. Rather, the task is to expand physical explanations to be able to include engagement with observers, including their consciousness.
2. A science that is more empirically robust than what we're currently working with would include consciousness (as it is an empirical entity...one that each one of us is familiar with ).

I agree with both these points, as long as we interpret "empirical entity" very broadly to include empirical processes.

Yup. However, I was trying to make the point that all other things being equal, a priori reluctance to violate prior assumptions is invalid.

I agree, though if all else is equal, then the two theories are of precisely equal validity.