Think deeply about it (the nature of mind)

[Heuristic]

This isn't 100% true. It's medically documented that some stroke and other brain damaged patients have slowly (but in some cases completely) restored mental functions that they've initially lost, without restoring the actual neural tissue that they lost. It's also well documented that willingly exercising certain mental functions and thought patterns regularly will produce measurable physical changes in the brain's form and function over time.

Yes, I'm being a quibbling smartass

But an informed and intelligent quibbling smartass.

I'm well aware that's it's very easy to explain both of these phenomena in a way that supports a mind-supervenes-on-brain theory. I only mention this to illustrate that the mind-brain problem is not as settled as a lot of jaunty popular science books might lead one to think.

Not only very easy to explain with supervenience theory of the mind, but I also think some of the most amazing advances in medicine in the 21st century will be the discovery of targeted ways of using brain plasticity to allow recovery from various injuries and diseases. You may know a smidgen more about that than I do though.

I think the reason most prominent neuroscientists have their chips on materialistic monism is because this has practical implications for them; if true, it makes their jobs a whole lot easier. Plus, I think neuroscience is just a field that selects for people who have nothing emotionally invested in a dualistic explanation of the mind -- people predisposed to looking at the sentient human mind coldly and clinically, rather than as something magical and miraculous.

I'm decidedly not one of these people. Color me non-neuroscientist material; I want to believe the mind is more than the brain.

How about that the brain is much more than what we currently know about it?

I do not think there is any necessary contradiction between viewing the brain as the cause and seat of consciousness, and viewing consciousness as "magical" in a non-literal, but fully emotionally appreciative, sense. I've heard some in neuroscience say that comprehending even a portion of the complexity of the human brain brings with it increased awe and wonder.

I'm afraid that you have lost me here. It seems that your hypothesis - that the brain causes consciousness - and the data - that, in the absence of brain function, physical actions cease - are lacking a crucial link. What, exactly, are you claiming is the relationship between consciousness and physical functions? Are you saying that you expect consciousness to control physical actions, and the brain (which seems to me to control physical actions) to control consciousness? If so, it seems very circular.

I'm saying that if a person is conscious, we would expect to see certain indicia of consciousness. If all of those indicia are absent, then this is a serious strike against the idea that the person is conscious. Since all of those indicia are absent when a person's brain is no longer functioning, this is evidence that a person loses consciousness when he loses his brain.

That is exactly what I was saying. By "not inconsistent with", I meant that the hypothesis does an equally good job explaining the data. There is no reason that I can think of to prefer one over the other, given the observable data.

Except that you want to posit that an entity consciousness has some type of property not caused by the physical brain. This introduces an unnecessary complexity into the theory, and that is a mark against such a posit.

Everything we see fits very smoothly into the theory that has the brain as the cause of consciousness. I'm not sure why we need to posit additional properties of consciousness, or separate it out as an entity from the brain.

Simply that consciousness depends on the brain as much as the brain depends on consciousness.

I don't know what that means operationally though. Is there a way to stop consciousness WITHOUT stopping the functioning of the brain?

Consciousness may be a necessary part of a functioning human brain in that it follows from the physical activity of the brain, analogously (not exactly of course) to how temperature follows from the random kinetic energy of particles in a material. Temperature is a necessary part of that random kinetic energy, but it's something that is an indicator of that energy; it doesn't cause the energy.

So too for consciousness: we're looking for a causal explanation, and I simply don't see how consciousness can play a causal role in brain functioning. We know how very small parts of the brain actually operate, and we know how to cause those small parts to work, or not. Consciousness doesn't seem to play a role.

The causal relationships I exemplified showed that changes in consciousness result in physical changes. Though my examples described changes in blood pressure, heart rate, etc., I think we are safe in assuming that there are corresponding changes in the brain. This was my answer to your evidence that physical changes result in changes in consciousness.

But that would be incorrect, imho. There are changes in neural activity in response to a sexually arousing stimulus, or an anger/fear provoking stimulus. These changes CAUSE the physical arousal.

My examples were meant to show that changes in consciousness result in physical changes, as I said above. It is true that "certain physiological responses occur before a person ever reports being aware of the stimulus". But does this mean that you assume that the brain is the mediator for all perceptual (and, presumably, conceptual) stimulus? If so, you are assuming that brain controls mind, in an effort to show that brain controls mind. Why not instead consider the possibility that the stimulus causes an emotional/consciousness-based reaction, which then affects the body?

In short, parsimony. So we've got a collection of observations, O, with o1, o2, o3... and we would like to explain those observations with a theory that is parsimonious, coheres well with background knowledge, and can produce testable predictions. A model that says the mind is caused by the brain, and coincident with the brain, does this better than a model where we try to posit consciousness as something apart from the brain that also, in some manner, plays a causal role in the brain's existence.

Though I am aware that we begin to react physically to some stimuli before they consciously register, I don't know that an emotional stimulus would make my brain, and not my mind/consciousness, react first.

I think there is data, based on self-reporting i.e. a subject reports feeling, perceiving, or otherwise being aware of something as the brain is stimulated or as physical reactions in the brain are observed, that shows the physical reaction to precede the mental reaction.

 

[complexPHILOSOPHY]

Although I don't really dissagree with the sentiment - that consciousness is beyond the grasp of science

which is consistent with the assertion that consciousness has not been empirically verified as a mere reduction into "collective electrical activity of the synapses of your brain."

1st I'm pedantic in what way are current neural models based on Newtonian physics? Perhaps classical, as there has been little effort to bring quantum physics into the equation, but not Newtonian. I mean Newton didn't know what an attractor was, or system in a state of self-organising complexity.

Newtonian physics is classical physics. In physics classes that I have taken, the two descriptions were used interchangeably. There are texts on calculus-based classical physics, entitled "Newtonian Physics".

It is a general description of the physics involved in current, prevailing cognitive neuroscience models and theories of consciousness. If you prefer I can call it, "Classic Mechanical Models of Mind." Would that make you feel more comfortable?

2nd Although I'm not sure this applies to your post, I want to make clear that the majority of people who research these issues talk about neural corrolates, not causation. There is for the most part no claim in psychology or neuroscience that brain states cause mind states. It's the philosophers who do that.

I did not assert, or even conjecture whether or not certain scientific fields have made factual claims relating "mind states" to "brain states". I was actually deconstructing that notion. There is no clear relationship between the physical architecture of the brain itself and the generation of consciousness. I would agree with you that most experiments and observations generally reveal correlations between the brain and consciousness, as opposed to causal relationships.

It seems that you absolutely agree with what I was describing, however, for some reason, you felt compelled to restate the same paragraph that I wrote as though you do agree, but surreptitiously embedded it within this awkward contrarian perspective. Would you agree, or do you think I am terribly incorrect?

P.S. I love you

 

[MyDoorsAreOpen]

This thread's getting a retitle. OP, if you're still around and still care, PM me.

 

[MyDoorsAreOpen]

But an informed and intelligent quibbling smartass.

I'd like to think medical neuroscience was good for something.

Not only very easy to explain with supervenience theory of the mind, but I also think some of the most amazing advances in medicine in the 21st century will be the discovery of targeted ways of using brain plasticity to allow recovery from various injuries and diseases. You may know a smidgen more about that than I do though.

Oh it's already been done for some time. People regain lost nervous system functions over time, with little more than willpower, the right kind of persistent exercise or therapy, and healthy lifestyles. I take my piracetam and fish oil every day, and I've felt my brain grow, I'm not joking.

I think we will discover new drugs that enhance neural regrowth and repair in the near future, and that will be a real godsend to sufferers of a lot of ailments. One that regrew afferent interneurons and stopped chronic pain would be amazing, for example.

How about that the brain is much more than what we currently know about it?

Yeah that I think we can agree on.

I do not think there is any necessary contradiction between viewing the brain as the cause and seat of consciousness, and viewing consciousness as "magical" in a non-literal, but fully emotionally appreciative, sense. I've heard some in neuroscience say that comprehending even a portion of the complexity of the human brain brings with it increased awe and wonder.

It doesn't have that effect on me, but to each his own.

 

[swilow]

^ It's always chapped my ass the way people with only layman's knowledge or interest in philosophy, spirituality, and science often get treated to the P&S equivalent of what those Lounge folks call a raping, for having the temerity to ask a few simple questions in the terms they're familiar with.

That said, OP, everyone's going to take a different approach to anything you write, and you have to be ready for that.

My only qubble with the post was that the ideas- valid, as they are ideas- seemed non-connected.

I would defintely not want to inflct any lounge-lke "raping", and if I did so, I apologze to the OP

 

[slimvictor]

I'm saying that if a person is conscious, we would expect to see certain indicia of consciousness. If all of those indicia are absent, then this is a serious strike against the idea that the person is conscious. Since all of those indicia are absent when a person's brain is no longer functioning, this is evidence that a person loses consciousness when he loses his brain.

It seems to me that your definition of consciousness may be leading you to a conclusion that you already favor. Of course, it is difficult to define consciousness scientifically, so I probably can't do any better. However, I want to raise the point that, as Wittgenstein (I think) put it "we take the limits of our vision for the limits of the world".

Except that you want to posit that an entity consciousness has some type of property not caused by the physical brain. This introduces an unnecessary complexity into the theory, and that is a mark against such a posit.

Well, if you have already decided that only a hypothesis involving consciousness being caused by the brain is maximally parsimonious, it would be pretty much impossible to argue with you, right? And yet, this depends on your definitions of consciousness and brain function. Again, I wonder if your definitions lead to your conclusions.

Everything we see fits very smoothly into the theory that has the brain as the cause of consciousness. I'm not sure why we need to posit additional properties of consciousness, or separate it out as an entity from the brain.

You make it sound like we have the properties of consciousness mastered, and that we all agree. I doubt that this is the case. Again, could it be that your definition of consciousness is limiting what you are able to see/conclude?

I don't know what that means operationally though. Is there a way to stop consciousness WITHOUT stopping the functioning of the brain?

I believe so, though it depends exactly what you mean by "the functioning of the brain". Yogis and advanced meditators are able to use consciousness to alter brain function (as we all are, though they are more adept at it), and they can enter a state of no consciousness while their brains continue to regulate their bodies (i.e. continue to function at a basic level). Importantly for our discussion, their consciousness causes the shift in brain waves.

We know how very small parts of the brain actually operate, and we know how to cause those small parts to work, or not. Consciousness doesn't seem to play a role.

We actually know very little about how the brain works, as you seem to agree. We certainly seem lack an understanding of the big picture, including the question of Why.

I think there is data, based on self-reporting i.e. a subject reports feeling, perceiving, or otherwise being aware of something as the brain is stimulated or as physical reactions in the brain are observed, that shows the physical reaction to precede the mental reaction.

Not the case with the yogis. The decision to meditate, or to control their heartrate, etc., precedes the physical changes.
I once purposely decided to cry, and thought about sad things, resulting in me crying. The decision and activities of my consciousness resulted in changes that were physical, including the production of tears.
You could say that a physical state somehow precedes or controls the conscious desire to cry, or to meditate, but then I would say that your argument seems self-serving.

 

[complexPHILOSOPHY]

We actually know very little about how the brain works, as you seem to agree. We certainly seem lack an understanding of the big picture, including the question of Why.

I do not think science ever answers the question, "why". Generally, the objective is "how". Would you agree? I think "why" is a philosophical question. Can you think of an example in which science has definitively proven "why" something is?

 

[slimvictor]

I do not think science ever answers the question, "why". Generally, the objective is "how". Would you agree? I think "why" is a philosophical question. Can you think of an example in which science has definitively proven "why" something is?

My point exactly. We are in agreement.
Science can answer some questions beautifully, but not the big ones.
I think it is worth keeping that in mind for the purposes of this discussion.

 

[MyDoorsAreOpen]

I do not think science ever answers the question, "why". Generally, the objective is "how". Would you agree? I think "why" is a philosophical question. Can you think of an example in which science has definitively proven "why" something is?

Amen. Science simply tests what things do, and uses the results of these tests to make predictions about what other things do. Interpretations of scientific test results certainly address 'why' questions. But as soon as you use the word 'why', you're already veering off into philosophy (albeit with scientific evidence deftly used as a starting point).

Not to get too far off topic, but this is a very good argument for why evolutionary psychology belongs classed with the humanities, not the sciences, and why psychology in general is a hybrid science-humanities discipline.

Bottom line, I'd say the question 'why' is utterly inseparable from the inner machinations of a self-aware observer, and asking this question in any venue automatically draws the observer(s) and their subjective observations into the mix. Whenever science writers use this word, they're already, whether they realize it or not, plumbing the science for applications and implications to the human endeavor.

 

[Heuristic]

I'd like to think medical neuroscience was good for something.

The Kandel book makes for a great doorstop. It also alters the earth's tilt if you drop it.

Oh it's already been done for some time. People regain lost nervous system functions over time, with little more than willpower, the right kind of persistent exercise or therapy, and healthy lifestyles. I take my piracetam and fish oil every day, and I've felt my brain grow, I'm not joking.

I usually pop some ibuprofen when I feel my brain grow. Seriously though, how can you feel your brain grow?

I think we will discover new drugs that enhance neural regrowth and repair in the near future, and that will be a real godsend to sufferers of a lot of ailments. One that regrew afferent interneurons and stopped chronic pain would be amazing, for example.

Pretty remarkable. 100 years from now certain forms of dementia will probably be effectively treated with a once-daily generic pill.

It doesn't have that effect on me, but to each his own.

Ever see the photograph Piss-Christ? It's actually a very beautiful photograph. Cerrano, by using very "vulgar" materials--a cheap plastic crucifix and a jar of urine--deliberately produced a very beautiful photograph, in a way, he claimed, that parallels the Christian story of the co-existence in Christ of the "vulgar flesh" and the "divine spirit." I could be completely wrong, but there's something about that in the coexistence of brain and mind. We have very ordinary, mundane matter shaped into a certain structure by an unbelievably complex series of events, which then produces the ability to feel awe, wonder, love, excitement, fear, dread, aggression, the sense of color, the feeling of breathing, and so forth. It's pretty astounding to me.

It seems to me that your definition of consciousness may be leading you to a conclusion that you already favor. Of course, it is difficult to define consciousness scientifically, so I probably can't do any better. However, I want to raise the point that, as Wittgenstein (I think) put it "we take the limits of our vision for the limits of the world".

Or as his contemporary Frank Ramsey said, "what can't be said can't be said, and it can't be whistled either."

It's not my definition of consciousness, but rather the insistence on including some type of falsifiable predictions as part of the theory.

Well, if you have already decided that only a hypothesis involving consciousness being caused by the brain is maximally parsimonious, it would be pretty much impossible to argue with you, right? And yet, this depends on your definitions of consciousness and brain function. Again, I wonder if your definitions lead to your conclusions.

If there were something that the activity of the brain couldn't account for, or that would require us to start postulating activity of the brain that doesn't cohere well with background knowledge, then the case for introducing new entities becomes stronger.

You make it sound like we have the properties of consciousness mastered, and that we all agree. I doubt that this is the case. Again, could it be that your definition of consciousness is limiting what you are able to see/conclude?

I think it's been nailed down to the brain reasonably well, to the point where we can divide the brain into a fairly large number of sections of varying size which perform different functions that make up consciousness.

I just don't know of a way for a non-physical entity to have physical location. That seems like a contradiction to me.

I believe so, though it depends exactly what you mean by "the functioning of the brain". Yogis and advanced meditators are able to use consciousness to alter brain function (as we all are, though they are more adept at it), and they can enter a state of no consciousness while their brains continue to regulate their bodies (i.e. continue to function at a basic level). Importantly for our discussion, their consciousness causes the shift in brain waves.

I enter a state of no consciousness every time I fall asleep. If consciousness is caused by brain activity, then when we say that consciousness causes X, we're also talking about the brain activity that causes consciousness causing X. So we still come down to a physical root.

We actually know very little about how the brain works, as you seem to agree. We certainly seem lack an understanding of the big picture, including the question of Why.

Eh, there are two types of why: causal and intentional. The first asks how, and the second asks "for what purpose." The second why isn't always applicable, and the first why isn't always what we want to know. But, the second why has been popularized both by religion and a now famous beer commercial, which may give it an edge over the seemingly more mundane first why.

Not the case with the yogis. The decision to meditate, or to control their heartrate, etc., precedes the physical changes.
I once purposely decided to cry, and thought about sad things, resulting in me crying. The decision and activities of my consciousness resulted in changes that were physical, including the production of tears.
You could say that a physical state somehow precedes or controls the conscious desire to cry, or to meditate, but then I would say that your argument seems self-serving.

I'd point out that the decision itself has physical causes and correlates (though, if I dig, there's evidence that even decisions precede our awareness of them; it's still you doing the thinking and deciding, of course).

I like cognitive-behavioral approaches to psychology, and I also like mindfulness approaches and enjoy meditation. I'm not hostile to the idea that we control ourselves. We're arguing about what "we" are composed of. Whether it's the brain, or some type of spirit, doesn't change anything important about who we are.

 

[ebola?]

There have been many theories conjectured and asserted but none empirically verified.

Sorry if redundant (didn't read the whole thread). Wouldn't most of the answer to the question lack empirical verifiability in principle? ...I mean, barring telepathy, and even then, we'd need to assume that matching descriptions in prose, drawings, etc. validly indicate similar qualia.

I would certainly concur that consciousness could be considered an emergent property of the physical architecture of the human brain, however, there is no real evidence of exactly what this architecture is.

Would it necessarily be some pattern of physical matter, and thus in principle observable? Or could it be that a seemingly random collection of events at the physical level of analysis could give rise to a coherent system at the phenomenological level?

On the other hand, I don't think that the preceding assertion may be proven...although it seems to cause the fewest logical problems of current competing assumptions.

ha, wasn't there once a "don't post while high" rule in here?

There still is and...*yells "oh shit" and leaves*

ebola

 

[ebola?]

This "new paradigm of science based on the primacy of consciousness" is only the case if one accepts the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, i.e. the one in which Schrodinger's Cat remains in a superposition of dead/alive states until a conscious observer causes a collapse of the superposition.

And the Copenhagen interpretation doesn't necessarily entail that consciousness exerts causal forces on matter, perhaps even in Goswami's picture (not familiar enough and don't trust the out-of-context quote). . .

re: parsimony:

However, why would it be unparsimonious to engage the observer as part of the experimental complex that is/'produces' data? I don't think that there is a clear criterion (or set thereof) to say that some statements hold greater parsimony than others. It appears to me that those theories that violate current assumptions more readily face criticisms of lacking parsimony, all else equal.

ebola

 

[slimvictor]

It came up earlier in our discussion, but Heuristic mentioned s/he doesn't believe in subliminal advertising (or something to that effect).
I just saw an interesting video on the effects of subliminal messages:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f29kF1vZ62o

Not a double-blind study, but interesting evidence nonetheless.

 

[slimvictor]

It appears to me that those theories that violate current assumptions more readily face criticisms of lacking parsimony, all else equal.
ebola

Exactly. The status quo becomes the only correct way to think of things, because anything else would require the revision of many prior assumptions/conclusions. But one mistake anywhere in the edifice can lead to a house-of-cards phenomenon, where it all comes crumbling down...

 

[wykydtron]

When a person says that the mind is just the brain or that it is an emergent phenomenon of the brain or some other such thing, what does it actually mean? Does it actually make sense to anyone? When I hear a sound, how can what I'm hearing actually be my brain. I understand that a person can point to some sort of neural process that has some connection with what I'm hearing, but that seems like it's a long ways away from it actually being what I'm hearing. The same goes for all experiences.

Also, suppose that the physical world doesn't exist, and instead we experience what we experience "as though" the physical world exists.

 

[ebola?]

When a person says that the mind is just the brain or that it is an emergent phenomenon of the brain or some other such thing, what does it actually mean? Does it actually make sense to anyone? When I hear a sound, how can what I'm hearing actually be my brain.

They mean something just a little different from you in saying "brain".

Also, suppose that the physical world doesn't exist, and instead we experience what we experience "as though" the physical world exists.

Either
1. experience of the world 'as though' it exists materially confers that very materiality to which you refer or
2. you restated the Cave/Matrix allegory, and this applies to most everything we 'know'.

ebola

 

[Heuristic]

re: parsimony:

However, why would it be unparsimonious to engage the observer as part of the experimental complex that is/'produces' data? I don't think that there is a clear criterion (or set thereof) to say that some statements hold greater parsimony than others. It appears to me that those theories that violate current assumptions more readily face criticisms of lacking parsimony, all else equal.

It's not a violation of parsimony if the inclusion of some data about the observer leads to other explanatory virtues, such as comprehensiveness or predictiveness or coherence with background knowledge.

Adding in some entity consciousness, that is non-physical, yet spatially related and somehow necessary for a physical object to exist, not only fails to add any virtues to our explanation while adding complexity (thereby violating the principle of parsimony) but also seems to reduce coherence with background knowledge.

As far as the criticism of theories that violate current assumptions goes, I think it depends on how the current assumptions are being violated (one can imagine violations that would produce less complexity in a theory, but at the cost of other virtues), and how well supported the assumptions are.

 

[wykydtron]

They mean something just a little different from you in saying "brain".

Are you actually saying that they mean something a lot different from what I mean? What do they mean? I understand that when light hits my retina, the information is encoded into neural signals or whatever, and that this information undergoes processing that is unbelievably complex and interacts with structures that have developed over my lifetime as well as over millions of year of evolution, and that every process makes sense or has some "meaning", but I don't understand how this could ever BE the experience of seeing.

Either
1. experience of the world 'as though' it exists materially confers that very materiality to which you refer or
2. you restated the Cave/Matrix allegory, and this applies to most everything we 'know'.

I meant 1. How can I reconcile my notion of what it means to exist physically, with what you've just said?

 

[ebola?]

Are you actually saying that they mean something a lot different from what I mean? What do they mean? I understand that when light hits my retina, the information is encoded into neural signals or whatever, and that this information undergoes processing that is unbelievably complex and interacts with structures that have developed over my lifetime as well as over millions of year of evolution, and that every process makes sense or has some "meaning", but I don't understand how this could ever BE the experience of seeing.

The way I 'understand' (okay...assume) it is that those who equate the mind with the brain actually engage something like a 'brain-mind' (well, 'body/mind'), really. Thinking accordingly, your lived experience/qualia/phenomenology are your perceptions of what your nervous system (particularly the CNS) does. A biologist's set of observations, in terms of cellular activity, is an alternate view of that same system.

I meant 1. How can I reconcile my notion of what it means to exist physically, with what you've just said?

I don't yet know how you conceive of physicality, but from what I've inferred (likely incorrectly), you can't. I believe that the body-mind camp actually works with an ontology distinct from yours.

re: heuristic on parsimony:

I'll have to devote more time and thought than I currently have and get back to you.

ebola

 

[chairmanma084]

but seriously, i'd like to read a follow up post by the OP. there is some dot connecting still needed for this barn to be built.

no you don't, not really.

read OP's other posts. they are full of complete faggotry and nonsense.