Drug Trade in Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town
Good Youtube video showing Tik (methamphetamine) smoking with some mandrax smoking thrown in at the end:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySLoAvfthIU
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An essay describing drug scenes in these 3 South African Cities:
Chapter 4
Perspectives on Supply: The Drug Trade in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town
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Ted Leggett
Published in Monograph No 69, March 2002
Drugs and Crime in South Africa
A Study in Three Cities
The following chapter interprets the findings of the 3-Metros study in light of the qualitative research the author has done in the area of drug markets. Illicit drugs are market commodities, and drug dealing is similar in many ways to other forms of business. Prices go up and down based on the same laws of supply and demand in both contexts. Drugs may be 'branded' and graded just like other sorts of products. There is competition for drug customers, and both volume and customer-loyalty discounts are offered in some cases. Elaborate market chains develop to bring illicit drugs to the consumer, sometimes involving credit, commission sales, exclusive supply 'contracts' and other mainstream concepts.
But drug markets are unique in many ways. Being illegal, the state is not available to settle disputes, and violence is often the alternative mechanism by which conflicts are resolved. Quality control is reliant on market mechanisms, which, due to their underground nature, can be slow to act even when the product turns deadly. The fact that some users are addicted impacts upon their ability to negotiate terms, as well as upon what they are willing to do make sure they have the product.
Those with an interest in reducing the harm drugs cause would be well advised to understand the way drug markets work. State action can have unintended side effects as the market moves to compensate for any imposed change. For example, in some cases, traditional supply reduction can be effective in reducing harm if applied at the weak point in the market chain. In other cases, however, reducing supply can make the situation much worse:
by forcing addicts into more serious forms of crime to afford the now 'scarce' (and thus more expensive) product;
by forcing suppliers to adulterate their product to maintain volume in sales;
by increasing violence among suppliers competing for limited markets; and
by diverting users into still more dangerous alternative drugs.
Before looking at the subject of drug markets in South Africa, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of the present study. Testing for drugs among arrestees does not provide information about drug users in South Africa as a whole, because many people who use and deal in drugs are not involved in other forms of crime. These people are unlikely to get arrested, especially if they have the resources to avoid sales and consumption in public places. Indeed, it is likely that many addicts in South Africa get their drugs entirely legally, by prescription. Therefore, while this study deals with a good cross section of those who have been arrested in the stations where the testing was conducted, it only involves a very specific segment of the drug-using public—those drug users who also engage in other forms of crime or who were foolish enough to get arrested for specific drug-related offences.
Just as the study cannot purport to discuss all drug users, it also cannot be said to canvass all drugs. It was not possible in this study to test for alcohol use, nor for the use of other common drugs, such as inhalants and steroids. Many prescription and designer drugs were also beyond the scope of the study.
Eleven percent of the total sample in this study was arrested primarily for drug-related crimes (excluding alcohol), but 46% of the arrestees tested positive for some substance. While there is no public baseline with which to compare this figure, it seems likely that there is a significant overlap between those who use drugs and those who commit crimes other than substance offences. Part of this may be explained by the fact that people who break the law are more likely to engage in a range of deviant and illegal behaviours, including drug use. They are also probably more likely than the average person to smoke, drive too fast, fail to wear their seatbelt, and engage in other sorts of risky behaviour. But there is also good reason to believe that a causal connection exists between some forms of crime and drug use.
Some drugs may be seen to lower inhibitions or otherwise contribute to the mental state in which crime is committed, but it is difficult to evaluate the importance of this effect in the present study. Only 6% of the arrestees said they were under the influence of drugs at the time the offence was committed, but over 20% said they were under the influence of alcohol. Self-reporting of drug use was found to be highly unreliable in this study, however, so it is not clear how accurate this information is. The need to 'justify' bad behaviour, even to a neutral interviewer, must be taken into account.
Rather than further exploring this psychological effect, this chapter focuses on the nature of drug markets in South Africa, and the ways in which crime and drug use are linked in these markets. There are at least two ways drug markets generate additional crime: addicts may commit crime in order to gain money to support their habits (3% admitted to being 'in need' of drugs at the time of the offence), and dealers may use violence in order to impose order on an otherwise unregulated market. Both forms of drug-related crime are in evidence in South Africa, but, as we will see, they vary in both type and intensity based on the drug being dealt, the point in the market chain concerned, and the area where the transaction takes place.
Drug markets generally
Due to the segregation imposed during the apartheid regime, drug markets in South Africa are highly segmented along ethnic, class, and regional lines. Certain drugs are used primarily by specific ethnic and class groupings, and each segment of the market chain is likewise divided. While this is rapidly changing as people become more integrated, the ethnic generalisations captured in Table 4 still hold true in most areas. Drug use patterns also vary sharply by region, with the Western Cape in particular showing different market conditions. This means that South Africa has not one drug problem, but several distinct drug problems, each of which must be discussed and dealt with separately.
Table 4: Ethnic drug market segmentation
Production/importation Wholesale Retail Consumption
Dagga Black Black All groups All groups
Mandrax Indian/Coloured Indian/Coloured Indian/Coloured Indian/Coloured
Cocaine/Heroin Nigerian/Other Nigerian Nigerian/Coloured/East African (heroin) White sex workers/sex workers/White youth/Whites/Coloured
Club Drugs White White White White/Coloured/Indian
That this segmentation persists to this day, at least as far as consumption is concerned, is supported by the data in the present study. Thirty-nine percent of Indian arrestees and over half of all coloured arrestees tested positive for Mandrax, as compared to 9% of black and 13% of white arrestees. Thirty-two percent of whites, however, tested positive for cocaine, while only 7% of coloureds, and 2% of Indians and blacks tested positive. Thus, coloureds are five times more likely to test positive for Mandrax than blacks, and whites are sixteen times more likely to test positive for cocaine than Indians. In general, though, arrestees of all race groups use drugs, with coloureds being more likely than average to test positive (64%) and blacks being less likely (39%).
The testing data also shows how regionalised drug markets are. Thus, 31% of blacks in Kempton Park tested positive for dagga, compared to 53% in Phoenix, in the province where much of the drug is produced. Similarly, a third of the whites in Sea Point and central Durban, and 63% in Hillbrow, tested positive for cocaine, while, in many other areas, no arrestees tested positive for this substance. Fifty-six percent of coloureds arrested in Mitchell's Plain and 42% of those arrested in Sea Point were positive for Mandrax, while only one coloured person arrested in Hillbrow was positive.
But while race and class categories may provide convenient shorthand for South Africa's drug problems, a more accurate description is possible. South Africa has several distinct drug 'cultures', each of which has a market mechanism built around it. Individual markets for dagga, Mandrax, cocaine, and the other drugs will be discussed in turn.
Dagga entrepreneurs
Cannabis is a crop with a long history in South Africa. It is accepted by many as a plant with medicinal uses, and it is commonly grown with minimal effort in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. The extent of cannabis production in South Africa is almost impossible to estimate, but the quantity must be truly vast because no seizure or crop eradication programme has ever been able to budge the price. It has remained consistently cheap throughout the years, priced barely high enough to justify the efforts of cultivation, packaging, and sales. It is cheaper to get stoned on dagga in South Africa than it is to get drunk on beer. In addition, the South African taste for the drug is sophisticated enough to support massive importation of premium product from Swaziland and Malawi. Despite the high quality of local product, these imported varieties are preferred by many, in much the same way that some prefer imported cigarettes.
Dagga is consumed by people of all ethnic groups throughout the country, and 40% of those arrestees agreeing to be tested were positive for cannabis. The city showing the highest level was Durban, which is near some of the primary production areas, where 43% tested positive for the drug.
The producers are an army of small farmers, mostly poor and black, who supplement their subsistence agriculture with a patch of the easy to grow cash crop. These rural people are not part of some massive drug conspiracy—they are simply responding to market demand and are not generally organised beyond a local level. Collecting their product in 50 kg mealie bags or other large sacks and buckets several times a year, money can be earned for school fees, transportation costs, or other activities where cash is required. Despite the large amounts of product produced, few of these farmers get rich off the business, as the wholesalers who transport the product to urban areas pay them a tiny fraction of the street value.
The wholesalers are mostly black men with connections to both the rural and urban worlds, who gather the large bags in a wide range of transport vehicles, including minibus taxis. They break the bags into smaller, but still sizeable, units, generally called 'arms'. These are distributed to retailers at out of the way locations, typically men's hostels. The retailer, who could be anyone with the connection, then repackages the dagga into still smaller units, typically paper wraps, plastic bank change bags, paper envelopes, or matchboxes. These are then sold in a variety of settings, from houses designated for the purpose, to street corners, petrol stations, and night-clubs. The actual street vendor may be an employee of the retailer, working for packets of dagga that he can then re-sell.
In this market chain, the wholesaler makes the most money. Although his mark up is less than that of the retailer, the quantities in which he deals are much larger. Most poorly paid are the producer and the street dealer, who work for subsistence-level income. At no point in the domestic market chain is much money made, however, as the markets is too diffuse and the unit cost too small. The real money is in export.
South Africa is believed to be one of the largest producers of dagga in the world, and international demand is very high. Since cannabis varies so much in terms of quality and is usually sold by volume, not weight, it is difficult to make direct price comparisons. The various estimates that do exist, however, suggest a mark up of hundreds of times the farm price. The real expenses are incurred in covertly transporting what is a bulky and distinctive smelling plant product overseas and in the human resource costs of distribution.
South Africa has become the single largest supplier of cannabis to the United Kingdom. Twice as many UK seizures of dagga had a South African origin in 1999 than the previous British supply leader, Jamaica.9 This drug trade with the British is not one-sided—while we export dagga to the UK, we import club drugs from it. These club drugs, such as ecstasy, are priced very low by international standards in South Africa. Their prices, like those of many other under-priced drugs, do not seem to vary with exchange rate fluctuations. All this suggests that some sort of barter is going on, with international syndicates trading our dagga for other drugs overseas. If so, cannabis may be more than a harmless local herb—it may be the lynchpin on which the whole drug economy is based.
Aside from this possibility, though, very little additional crime is associated with domestic dagga markets. The supply and the demand are both immense, and the stakes are not high enough to merit much violence. Costs are low so even habitual users are not compelled to engage in crime to get their drugs, and it is generally agreed that cannabis is not physically addictive.
One twist on this story is that cannabis use is associated with violent behaviour in the minds of some local African people. In a way similar to alcohol, the disinhibitory effect of dagga is seen as promoting violent behaviour in otherwise peaceful individuals. This perception is contrary to the standard western view of cannabis, which sees it as a relaxant, but studies on the cross cultural effects of alcohol suggest that the social impact of drug use may be largely socially determined. In some countries alcohol use is culturally associated with violent or sexual behaviour, while in others it is not, and the extent of the national alcohol problem is strongly influenced by these expectations.10 While alcohol surely has the same physiological effect in each context, cultural interpretations of this effect vary. Thus, whether being 'under the influence' provides an excuse for anti-social behaviour depends on the setting in which the alcohol is consumed and the cultural background of the user.
The cultural belief that cannabis leads to violence is not borne out in the present study, however. The offence profile of those who tested positive for cannabis is about the same as those who did not, except cannabis users were more likely to have been arrested for drug related offences. Cannabis users were not more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, but, like all drug users, were more likely to report a prior arrest history.
About 4% of dagga users admitted to selling the drug themselves at some point in the past. About 30% had purchased dagga themselves in the last 24 hours, and about 80% paid cash the last time they bought the drug. Most bought it from a regular source in their own neighbourhood either by visiting a known house or flat (50%) or on the street (34%).
White pipe and gangsterism
White pipe is a form of drug usage found only in South Africa. Mandrax (methaqualone and diaphenhydramine or diazepam) is crushed and smoked with a mixture of tobacco and 'magat' (low grade cannabis, often dried with a volatile solvent), usually in a broken bottleneck. Most dagga smokers who had tried a combination of drugs had tried white pipe, and many of those testing positive for dagga probably used it in smoking Mandrax. Mandrax usage is highly regionalised, with nearly half the arrestees in Mitchell's Plain, 35% in Phoenix, 30% in Bellville, and 29% in Sea Point testing positive, compared to 10% or less in all other areas. This broadly correlates with the ethnic profile of each of these areas—the Mitchell's Plain sample was 82% coloured, the Phoenix sample was 66% Indian, and the Bellville sample was 60% coloured. Sea Point was more mixed, but is a notorious drug area in a province known for Mandrax. Only 4% of Johannesburg arrestees tested positive for Mandrax, as compared to 36% of the Cape Town and 17% of the Durban samples.
White pipe is a South African innovation, and it is seated in the culture of certain South African populations, especially the coloured gangs of the Western Cape. Only one of those testing positive for Mandrax was not a South African citizen. The drug was previously pharmaceutically manufactured in South Africa, and production was later taken up by Project Coast as part of the apartheid government's chemical warfare programme.11 The Indian population most likely became involved with the drug when India was the primary supplier of illicit Mandrax to South Africa. Today, Mandrax is still manufactured in India, but supplies also originate in the Middle-East, perhaps in China, and other parts of Southern Africa. Underground domestic manufacture makes up about half the supply, and while precursors are monitored, the drug is quite easy to synthesise once the components are available.
One unusual requirement of the market is that Mandrax can only be sold in tablet form, despite the fact that it is crushed back into a powder before consumption in any case. Making tablets out of powder is the most difficult and dangerous part of the manufacturing process, because it requires a pill press—an expensive one ton piece of machinery that requires a skilled operator to use. The sources of pill presses are closely monitored in South Africa, but the market demand for tablets is so strong that this risk cannot be avoided.
The tablets are branded as a way of telling one manufacturer's product from another, although the most popular brands have been re-used to the point that these markings have meaning only in a given locality at a given time. Some of the more common brands are marked with a swastika (the so-called 'German mark'), stars (including stars of David), 'golf-clubs' (sometimes resembling the Volkswagen logo), and other symbols combining the letters 'M' and 'X'. Most are purple/blue/grey in colouring, but examples have been found in a range of colours.
Despite the fact that Mandrax is not difficult to manufacture, good sources are difficult to come by, and producers guard trade secrets jealously. Most of the big domestic manufacturing operations have been found in Johannesburg, despite the fact that the biggest consumer community is in the Western Cape. Major seizures have seriously limited supply and affected price at various times, and the production/importation segment of the chain is particularly vulnerable to law enforcement efforts.
Further down the chain, the target hardens. In some of the biggest consumer communities, Mandrax is controlled by gangs. Many of these gangs have existed as criminal organisations long before Mandrax appeared on the scene, with many street gangs tracing their pedigree back to the Second World War and some of the prison gangs claiming roots in the 19th Century.12 Thus the drug, while presently an important source of income, is not at the root of gangsterism, nor is it the source of the crime and violence in which gangsters participate.
Indeed, criminality is not just instrumental in gang culture; it is an end in itself. Young gangsters generate their identity in opposition to the law, and assert their masculinity through violence. They are fuelled on, rather than deterred, by police action aimed at putting them behind bars. They consume and sell the drug as part of their larger counterculture, but that counterculture is not dependent on the drug.
That having been said, wars for territory and customers are a major source of violence, especially in the Cape Flats and in the coloured suburbs of Johannesburg, such as Eldorado Park and Westbury. Mandrax is a dependence producing substance, which also means users may feel compelled to engage in criminal behaviour in order to secure the drug. For example, Mandrax was the drug of choice among many sex workers prior to 1994, when crack cocaine began to supplant it.
Despite the strong empirical connections between Mandrax and other forms of crime, those who tested positive for Mandrax in this study were not arrested for a particularly distinctive set of crimes. Over one quarter of those testing positive for Mandrax were arrested for drug-related crimes. Otherwise, their offence profile does not differ from that of the other arrestees. More than half were under the age of 25. About 17% said they were under the influence of drugs or drugs and alcohol at the time the offence was committed. Only 7% admitted selling the drug at some point in the past. 32% admitted to procuring Mandrax in the last month, with 83% paying cash for the drug. Most bought it in a house or on the street, with just over half buying in their own neighbourhoods. Surprisingly, 65% of coloured arrestees in Mitchell's Plain bought outside their neighbourhood, despite the availability of the drug in this area. This may be due to the fact that many of the arrestees were gangsters, and that they bought drugs for personal use at a wholesaler outside, rather than paying local retail prices.
Crack and bad buildings
Prior to the democratic elections in 1994, cocaine and crack cocaine were not commonly available in South Africa. The first arrest for crack cocaine occurred in 1995, a full decade after crack's peak in the United States. This phenomenon is not due to international cocaine barons observing sanctions, nor is it due to impenetrable borders—both the state and the opposition smuggled on a large scale throughout the later apartheid era. Rather, it was due to a lack of a community of pushers resident in South Africa, people with the international connections to procure the drug and the experience to know how to best market it.
This market vacuum was filled when Nigerian nationals arrived in central Johannesburg just as democracy was dawning. They settled in the residential hotels of Hillbrow, where they found themselves next door to sex workers, who were largely addicted to Mandrax at the time. This connection became the basis for a crack market that would grow exponentially in the coming years. Nigerian dealers have proliferated to every corner of the country. In this sample alone, Nigerians were arrested in Hillbrow, Mitchells Plain, Khayelitsha, and Sea Point.
Nigerian nationals had long been involved in the transnational trade in cocaine and heroin, and crack is a drug that almost appears to have been designed for sex work. Addicted sex workers would much rather smoke drugs with their clients than have sex with them, and so have a strong incentive to spread the drug. Soon crack could be found in every fair sized city in South Africa.
Nigerian dealers succeeded where others failed because they do not consume their own drugs, although they do enjoy local cannabis. None of the 57 Nigerians in this sample tested positive for cocaine, although 26% of those who consented to testing showed positive for cannabis. They treat crack as a business, and, unlike gangsters, do not have any special point to prove about their masculinity. They are generally not as violent as the local people and try to keep a fairly low profile while they reap their profits. Nigerian nationals are also involved in legal forms of trade, including retail and wholesale operations, as well as street trade. They are also involved in other forms of crime, such as fraud and dealing in stolen property. None of the Nigerians in this sample were arrested for violent crime, with theft, drug offences, fraud, and illegal alien status being the most common offences.
Nigerian syndicates are not organised along 'gang' lines or even in immutable syndicates. While individual loyalties exist between wholesalers and retailers, most Nigerian dealers operate as free agents, ultimately responsible only to themselves. They are, however, protected in a general way by the entire local Nigerian community. Their activities are organised and regulated in the residential hotels they occupy by democratically elected 'building committees', with a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and a 'task force' to enforce the decisions of the body. The committee manages a 'legal fund' to provide bribes or legal fees for any participating Nigerian arrested. The decisions of the committee are binding only on Nigerians, but are enforced by fines and stronger measures. While this level of authority and organisation might be taken to imply a syndicate that could be dismantled by traditional law enforcement, the truth is that these structures are extremely malleable, and the removal of any particular individual or group will have little effect on the functioning of the institutions themselves.
On the demand side, crack is a drug of unlimited potential. Unlike other addictive drugs, like heroin and Mandrax, crack has no natural saturation point. A heroin addict is happy with a maintenance dose of his drug, and excess Mandrax use simply renders the user unconscious. Crack users have no ceiling on their use, and tend to consume the drug until there are no more resources left with which to purchase it. One respondent in the present study claimed to have spent R3 000 on crack in the last seven days.
As the Nigerians' best customers, sex workers represent the core of the demand and are also a pivotal part of the distribution process. While only one segment of sex workers is involved in promoting cocaine (urban, largely white, addicts), they provide a point of linkage between their patrons, who come from all backgrounds and neighbourhoods, and the dealers. A crack addicted sex worker has two choices when she manages to secure a client—she can have sex with him and use that money to buy her drug, or she can sell him crack as an 'aphrodisiac'. Since the client is already 'taking a walk on the wild side' by picking up a hooker, he may be persuaded to take his deviant behaviour a little further. The sex worker, as a preferred client, gets the biggest rocks from her dealer, and, after procuring the drug, may cut the client's rock in half with a razor blade and keep half for herself. The client, who is unconnected, still receives a rock as big as the one he would have acquired if he had bought on his own on the street, and the sex worker receives a little bonus.
In addition, it is good crack etiquette to supply your female companion with rocks. Often, the client will forget all about sex and focus on the drug. If he remains interested in sex, he may not be able to perform, because crack use causes impotency in many men. If he does manage to perform, the sex worker is in trouble, because crack also retards orgasm, meaning sex on crack tends to be prolonged. It is a gamble many sex workers are willing to take. Once the client is hooked on the drug, he will probably seek out the sex worker in future to procure more drugs. She does the buying, supplies a safe place to smoke, and provides company for the new addict.
Sex workers rely on the residential hotel system because they find it very difficult to find more permanent accommodation. They work on a cash basis, where every pink R50 note equals a rock of crack or a night indoors. Many addicts price their services in terms of these commodities—R100 for vaginal sex, R50 for oral sex. It is a rare crack-addicted sex worker who can find the will to save up for deposit on a flat, and a rarer one still who can convince a landlord that they are a good risk. They need to be located in the inner city close to the areas clients know to frequent. And the residential hotels suit the Nigerians as well, as they are able to move frequently, remain anonymous, and house and evict their stable of sex workers at will. The high association between cocaine use and sex work is shown in this study by the fact that only one of the ten women arrested for 'other sexual offences' during Phase 2 of the project tested negative for cocaine.
For a person to test positive for cocaine after arrest indicates either coincidence or high rates of usage. Cocaine remains in the system in testable amounts for three days at most. Thus, most of the cocaine positive individuals are likely to be cases of chronic use. Half of those who admitted to using cocaine in the past 30 days said that they used it every day.
More whites tested positive for cocaine than any other group (32%), with coloureds coming second (7%). White females tested highest of all, with 65% testing positive. Based on the locations of their arrests, most of the women were probably sex workers, whether this was the crime for which they were detained or not. In areas populated mainly by coloureds, gangsters sell both Mandrax and crack, as well as controlling local prostitution. Hillbrow, CR Swart, Sea Point, and Mitchells Plain contained the vast majority of cocaine positive cases, all station areas associated with prostitution or gang activity.
Crack is often part of a pattern of poly-drug use, with 65% of those testing positive for cocaine also testing positive for cannabis, and 48% testing positive for Mandrax. Dagga and Mandrax, either separately or in combination, are often used by sex workers as a way of coming down off a crack binge. Dual use is also common among gangsters. All the Mitchells Plain cocaine users also tested positive for Mandrax.
Other drugs
Fairly low levels of other drugs were detected. Combining all three phases, 71 people tested positive for benzodiazepines (2.5%), 23 people tested positive for amphetamines (.8%), and 68 people tested positive for opiates (2.4%). This is not surprising. The only benzodiazepine that is commonly sold on the streets in South Africa is Rohypnol. It is primarily used by white youth, particularly those in the dance scene, but may be expanding outside this market. South Africa has also never had much of a speed problem, with the exception of the above mentioned ravers, who consume vast quantities of amphetamine-type substances. But these young people are generally fairly well off, and are not likely to be arrested for non-drug related offences.
Heroin is only now budding into a problem in South Africa, again among white youth and urban (mainly white) sex workers. Wellconal, a synthetic opiate that was used intravenously during the apartheid era, largely by whites and sex workers, is in decline. This is due to the fact that most long-term users are dead.
It is true, however, that a number of over the counter and prescription drugs will cause positive results in these drug categories using the EMIT enzyme immunoassay. Benzodiazepines are commonly prescribed throughout the world, including South Africa. A range of legal over the counter cold remedies, asthma medication, and diet pills will produce urine positive for amphetamine. Poppy seeds, codeine, many cough syrups, and most prescription pain medicine can lead to positive tests for opiates.
Thus, the positive tests in this area must be scrutinised carefully in light of what we know about current consumption patterns. Positives that show a random distribution are probably false positives. Where patterns are shown, however, new consumption patterns may be revealed. These areas call out for further research.
For example, over half of those testing positive for benzodiazepines were coloured, and about 6% of coloureds, or 37 people, tested positive for benzodiazepines. Over 90% of these cases were in Cape Town, and 92% also tested positive for Mandrax. Since Cape gangsters are not known for popping Valium, this anomaly requires some explanation. These positives are probably due to the presence of diazepam in Mandrax, which is occasionally used as an alternative to diaphenhydramine as a synergist with methaqualone. The remaining 12% may be due to differences in metabolisation rates between methaqualone and diazepam. On a national level, 78% of the positive benzodiazepine cases were also positive for methaqualone. The remainder are either false positives, or either licit or illicit use of benzodiazepines. There are only 16 cases that fall in this category (representing about half a percent error) in any event.
The majority of the amphetamine users—14 out of 23—were Indian males from Phoenix. Recent research in Durban has indicated that there is indeed a growing use of club drugs among Indian youth in the area, largely due to one particular club frequented by all races near the Durban station. Club drug dealers line the approach to this popular dance spot, and Indian youth in particular are drawn to what had previously been a white cultural preserve—the rave scene. This is one unfortunate consequence of integration in the post-apartheid era.
But there is one serious problem with this explanation. The median age of these respondents was 32. While five were arrested for drug related offences, the rest were involved in a range of crimes, including several violent crimes. Half were married, and most were either unemployed or had very low incomes relative to their responsibilities. This is not the typical profile of a club drugs user.
It is entirely possible that amphetamine and methamphetamine have found their way into South African markets at last. Both drugs are easy to synthesise once the precursors are available, and it is the Indian community, via their connections to the subcontinent, that led the way in importing the leading South African synthetic—Mandrax. But while these men admitted to using a range of substances (ten out of 14 admitted Mandrax use and three had tried crack), all denied using amphetamines or designer drugs. Further research is clearly needed in this area.
The data around opiates are even more puzzling, if one assumes that the opiate positives were indeed heroin and not codeine or morphine. While the number testing positive for opiates as a percentage of the general population within that ethnic group show that whites (10%) are more likely to test positive than blacks (2%), it is remarkable that any blacks tested positive at all. Thirty-eight out of 68 testing positive for opiates were black (56%), but this is less than the blacks share of the overall arrestee population (65%). If an across the board false positive rate of 1% to 3% were, in fact, the case, then only the white positives require an explanation.
Of all the arrestees to test positive for opiates, only six admitted having tried heroin—all were white. Indeed, only two opiate-positive whites denied use, and they may also have been false positives. All of those who admitted using heroin and tested positive for opiates fit the profile of a user. Three were white youth in their 20s from Pretoria who were arrested in Hillbrow, two males with full-time jobs and one female with a long history of multi-substance use. The others were older people with long drug histories who admitted to being under the influence and in need of drugs at the time of the offence.
Conclusion
The results of the urinalysis strongly support the qualitative data on drug markets gathered in previous studies. While the markets remain highly segmented, crossover effects—such as that possibly seen with Indian male amphetamine positives—may be starting to occur. This is bad news, because it creates new markets for drug merchants and increases competition between distribution chains, which can lead to violence.
A good example of a crossover is the sale of ecstasy by Nigerians. In Durban, for example, the central white 'bouncer mafia' dominated the ecstasy trade for many years. Traditionally, bouncers and other white security people control the club drugs trade because they control the clubs—they decide which drugs and which dealers to allow on the dance floor. Thirteen members of this syndicate (which included former policemen, prominent businessmen, and well-known athletes) were arrested in 1998. While this did not interrupt the flow of drugs, it did open a window for users to seek other sources. The Nigerians had been supplying ecstasy to their white female associates for some time, and were able to offer the drug in Durban at a substantial discount off the club price. Soon, clubbers had the cell phone number of Nigerian suppliers and procured their drugs before entering the club.
The white dealers in Durban soon found it more convenient to co-operate with the Nigerians and avoid the heat themselves. The unfortunate side effect of this is that the Nigerians also deal much harder drugs, like crack and heroin, and there has been a notable rise in the use of these drugs among white youth. The white dealers were part of the rave culture and found their social network in the clubs. This provided a sense of trust and accountability that is lacking with the business-minded Nigerians.
Thus, the drug markets are becoming more complex and soon will defy large-scale solutions. As problems become more localised, they will become increasingly difficult for centralised government to resolve.
In all cases, the correct form of state intervention depends on the nature of the drug market concerned. Many interventions make no sense because they are focused at the wrong point in the market chain. Hitting the market where it is strongest wastes resources and aggravates the problem. Instead, efforts should be aimed at the points where the market is vulnerable and where the real damage is being done.
For example, attacking the dagga supply is like spitting in the ocean. The amount of expense and effort that would be required to prevent cannabis from being grown in South Africa is prohibitive. Crop eradication and other source-oriented measures only serve to perpetuate poverty, robbing a household of a source of income while failing to make any significant impact on the problem. Rather, enforcement efforts should focus on preventing dagga from leaving the country. While exports may, at first glance, appear to be 'somebody else's problem', the funds raised by overseas sales are used to purchase hard drugs for import into the country. By targeting exporters, we will be hitting the real criminals—people making masses of money by poisoning this country.
The same reasoning holds for Mandrax. Getting tossed in jail is a rite of passage for button-dealing gangsters. Jailing those who retail the product only provides temporary incapacitation of that particular dealer (and there are thousands like him out there), while not providing any significant deterrent. But Mandrax is a drug where supply is vulnerable, where the price of the drug has varied in the past after a major seizure. Thus, Mandrax should be attacked at the top, among the producers and importers, and precursor monitoring is especially important for this drug.
In contrast, trying to take out the 'top man' in a Nigerian syndicate is an exercise in futility. A Nigerian 'syndicate' is, in fact, an organic network where new vacuums are easily filled. The fact that Nigerian nationals and residential hotels are still at the core of the crack epidemic does allow several options, however. The Nigerian dealers are easy to identify, and most are here illegally. The hotels, which provide the essential link between the dealers and the sex workers, are mostly in rates arrears and in stark violation of health and building codes. These buildings could be closed administratively or seized under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act. Once acquired, these buildings could be converted into social housing by selling the units to local people in exchange for their housing grants. Funds raised in this way can be used to improve and keep up the buildings, and the new residents will fight to keep their property crime free.
Another way of removing the power of the drug lords is to decriminalise sex work. Due to the illegal nature of their work, prostitutes are defined as criminals from the outset, and have little incentive to acknowledge drug laws. Driven underground, they are difficult to access for needed social services. Investors are hesitant to put money into this industry, keeping the indoor industry small and forcing more women to work outdoors. Outdoor sex workers are far more likely to be involved in drugs, and are exposed to much harsher conditions, than indoor sex workers. By taking sex work off the street and out of the residential hotels, serious damage could be done to a key mechanism for the distribution of crack cocaine in this country.
While many questions remain, this study reinforces qualitative work that argues for a more nuanced approach to the drug problem. South Africa is still very early in its struggle against the primary chemicals that have confounded the best in Western law enforcement. Targeted intervention at this stage could save the country a fortune in future law enforcement costs, health and social services expenses, and lost lives.
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graghic mandrax smoking at the beginning and end (26:15-26:20 into vid):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtCClK5bWkU
![:\](https://bluelight.org/xf/BL_Images/Orig_Emoji/wrygrin.gif "wry grin :\")
But in answer to the above question "meth mouth" is a well documented syndrome in dentistry and common problem among tweekers. The factors that you mentioned are major contributors of the dramatic touth decay seen in tweekers as are the increased intake of high sugar drinks by meth addicts as well as the xerostoma that is a common side effect of the use of this drug. It might even change the pH of saliva (related to the sympathomimtetic stimulation not the HCl thats used to crystalize meth) but my dentists says that if the drug does in fact decrease salivary pH, the contribution of this to causing meth mouth is unclear.