If you're really paranoid. Just run from a liveCD. No need for a HDD and as soon as you hit the power button everything is gone.
nope.
If you're really paranoid. Just run from a liveCD. No need for a HDD and as soon as you hit the power button everything is gone.
nope.
Do you use wifi on your lappy or are you directly connected via a cable?I would make backups of your router settings so you can check them for anything odd aswell, before resetting the firmware and reconfiguring it.
What's left in residual memory can be wiped with a power off/on.
nope.
it's quite unsafe to believe you have security, when you don't.
hahahah. pv is great for computer paranoia.
busybox is what runs on a lot of routers, or other custom linux based firmware, some manufacturers release the source, others don't, but the firmware can be reverse engineered.
most of them are really easy to break into, and a piece of cake if you have access to the local network.
implies you have a hard drive or a medium to store data.
thxyes
no (wifi enabled?)
yes (if wifi is enabled)
Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality
cryptographic keys, and they have unacceptable speed and accuracy
when performing cryptographic operations. (They are also large,
expensive to maintain, difficult to manage, and they pollute the
environment. It is astonishing that these devices continue to be
manufactured and deployed. But they are sufficiently pervasive that
we must design our protocols around their limitations.)
— Kaufmann, Perlman and Speciner
nope.
it's quite unsafe to believe you have security, when you don't.
ok fair enough up to a week in liquid nitrogen, just make sure to turn your pc off? and i doubt anyone short of government would/could go to these lengthsData remanence has also been observed in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). Modern DRAM chips have a built-in self-refresh module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from fading away from the capacitors in their integrated circuits. A study found data remanence in DRAM with data retention of seconds to minutes at room temperature and "a full week without refresh when cooled with liquid nitrogen."[9] The study authors were able to use a cold boot attack to recover cryptographic keys for several popular full disk encryption systems, including Microsoft BitLocker, Apple FileVault, dm-crypt for Linux, and TrueCrypt.[9](p12) Despite some memory degradation, they were able to take advantage of redundancy in the way keys are stored after they have been expanded for efficient use, such as in key scheduling. The authors recommend that computers be powered down, rather than be left in a "sleep" state, when not in physical control of the owner. In some cases, such as certain modes of the software program BitLocker, the authors recommend that a boot password or a key on a removable USB device be used.[9](p12) TRESOR is a kernel patch for Linux specifically intended to prevent cold boot attacks on RAM by ensuring encryption keys are neither user accessible nor stored in RAM.
true.it's easy to be complacent.
Gutmann notes that data written to RAM for extended periods may become “burned in,” allowing it to be easily recovered later. We describe a different effect: data written even momentarily to RAM persists for a non-trivial period of time. We exclusively rely on the latter effect to recover data. This allows us to recover keys even if, following Gutmann’s advice, those keys are stored only briefly at any single location within RAM.
We found that information in most computers’ RAMs will persist from several seconds to a minute even at room temperature. We also found a cheap and widely available product — “canned air” spray dusters — can be used to produce temperatures cold enough to make RAM contents last for a long time even when the memory chips are physically removed from the computer. The other components of our attack are easy to automate and require nothing more unusual than a laptop and an Ethernet cable, or a USB Flash drive. With only these supplies, someone could carry out our attacks against a target computer in a matter of minutes.
A compromise of sensitive data may occur if media is released when an addressable segment of a storage device (such as unusable or "bad" tracks in a disk drive or inter-record gaps in tapes) is not receptive to an overwrite. As an example, a disk platter may develop unusable tracks or sectors; however, sensitive data may have been previously recorded in these areas. It may be difficult to overwrite these unusable tracks. Before sensitive information is written to a disk, all unusable tracks, sectors, or blocks should be identified (mapped). During the life cycle of a disk, additional unusable areas may be identified. If this occurs and these tracks cannot be overwritten, then sensitive information may remain on these tracks. In this case, overwriting is not an acceptable purging method and the media should be degaussed or destroyed.
Don't mean to be the bearer of bad news but a virus contained in the bios or boot sector of a separate partition would not be removed after a format: article
Aye, i accept bad sectors are a weak point, but realistically what are you going to get? i think you'd have to be very lucky to ever gain anything useful from it, few file headers maybe? guess you've heard of the great 0 challenge... nobody won. Say there was still sensitive info left on the platter thad was deemed unusable from the drive, how would this be recovered? my old harddrive was fucked, full of bad sectors. overwrote it with 0's and a hex editor showed 0 all the way through. is the hex editor just ignoring the bad sectors? neither encase nor FTK could get fuck all from the drive image.it isn't a fabrication. It's also not the only bit of research done into persistence effects, which have been investigated for decades, so there are many more attacks than the one described above.
you don't need to be a government to do it...
that paper is also specifically talking about encrypted data so it doesn't help much to encrypt your stored data.
thats just one aspect of the whole picture of 'security' for the simple situation of using a livecd, the point really is that most people aren't aware of every single possibilty to consider and just make assumptions based on spurious info, and it can be doing people a disservice to suggest that if they a get a livecd and turn their pc off afterwards then they are safe.
re: zeroing harddrives, it's not that simple either![]()