Empathy with Animals

[skywise]

^^ Well, I was being sympathetic to your case with the santa clause example. Its not *really* quite quite like Santa or the flying spaghetti monster. You can say those two things are not possible without having to deny a premise that is evident in the *actual* world. You can't deny that mind and body can exist independently without disproving the evident premise that body exists independently of the mind.

It's incorrect to marginilize the possibility as only creating "logical room" to think that mental experiences can exist without a nervous system. Rather, if you accept the Cartesian premise (which thus far not you or anyone else to my knowledge has been able to refute) then it is *illogical* to believe that "necessarily if mental experiences then nervous system."

Also, showing that stimulating the brain causes certain experiences shows that the brain can effect mental experiences under certain conditions. It is illogical to say that from this it follows that mental experiences require a nervous system.

So, does the person who defended his claim by saying "its only logical" now think that completely illogical claims "aren't too much of a stretch"?

 

[Tranced]

I always try my best not to kill even insects.

I don't think that human emotions or size are any way to decide how you should treat an animal of any size (as some people do), it should be gauged by our ability to all experience life and the same reality.

 

[elemenohpee]

You can't deny that mind and body can exist independently without disproving the evident premise that body exists independently of the mind.

Maybe I should have been more specific when I made my argument. A more correct statement of my beliefs is that the ability to experience something is dependent on a FUNCTIONING nervous system. I don't think subjective experience can be had without a functioning nervous system. Would you object to this?

 

[skywise]

I think thats a pretty safe statement. So long as by dependent you mean "happens to be dependent in all organisms I know of". If you want to say that its not possible for a mental experience to exist without a nervous system then you have to deny the Cartesian premise or be faulted with bad logic. Similarly, if you want to say that its necessary (logically) that any mental experience be a situation where a nervous system is functioning (i.e. that mental experiences are identical to certain nervous system functions) then you again have to deny the reverse cartesian premise or be illogical.

Like I pointed out earlier, distinguishing between a functioning nervous system and just a nervous system doesn't get you anywhere. The logic of your argument turns on how strong you make your claim. If you want to say "necessarily" or "not possibly" then you're going to say something illogical. Also, if you want to say, "because in some cases mental experiences only occur when a nervous system functions then all cases of mental experience only occur when a nervous system functions" you are also liable for poor logic. The logic is just as poor even if
"some cases" are all cases we know of.

Also, outside of the whole logic end - epistemically you are at pains to even show how we know that anything doesn't feel without a nervous system. The only criteria I know of for a feeling is the feeling itself. You can't say that "nervous system functioning" is a criteria because as we've discussed its possible to feel without a nervous system.

 

[elemenohpee]

Taking into account my last post, this is how your cartesian argument reads to me:

Let's begin with the Cartesian premise that it is possible for the mind to exist without the body. If you don't like that one, the converse, that it is possible for the functioning human body to exist without the mind works just as well.[/b]

Which I completely disagree with. As I would assume you would.

 

[skywise]

I'm not sure what you're getting at with this "functioning human body" bit. I already showed you that if the mind is distinct from the body –functioning or not – then mental states are not identical to physical states. If they're not identical then to say its necessary for mind (and mental states) to not exist indepently of any body (functioning or not, brown hair or not, blue eyes or not) is illogical. Are you going back to the crazy 3 entitities (body, dynamic body, mind)? If so, you're in the same logical position only now you're inconsistent about what you find plausible to be distinct. At least there's a logical reason to posit the mental as distinct from the physical. There's no such reason to think that the functioning body is distinct from the regular body (rather "functioning" is just a property like "fat" of the single entity body). If you take functioning to be just an unneccesary property of being a body then your point is irrelevant. If you have a specific question I'd be glad to answer it but as it stands your argument is not valid and completely illogical.

And no! I wouldn't agree that its not possible. If its possible for the body to exist independtly of experience then its possible for a functioning body to as well (functioning is just a property of a body). It is illogical to think that its not possible unless you refute the unmodified premise I gave you.

I also think there are actual examples of what you find so unbelievable. Ever hear the phrase, "he's lost his mind?" Ever hear of "vegetables." The body is still functioning - yet the mind seems to be gone. Maybe you'll say its not functioning "correctly." Well, now you would have to say mental states are identical to a very specific and 'correct' configuration and movements of things in the body. If you can imagine something feeling pain (say a bird) without the specific functioning in our ideal nervous systems then already we see that its illogical to say that "if mental state, then necessarily physical state."

 

[elemenohpee]

You can believe whatever you want to believe, but you haven't convinced me in the least

 

[skywise]

^ Well, I guess we'll leave it at that then. Although, for the record, its not a matter of belief, or interpreting the evidence its a matter logic and the demands of coherent argumentation. If you accept the premise, you have to accept the consequences or you are incoherent (and you are no longer allowed to use the word 'logic' to back up anything or god will strike you with lightning )

 

[Pegasus]

I also think there are actual examples of what you find so unbelievable. Ever hear the phrase, "he's lost his mind?" Ever hear of "vegetables." The body is still functioning - yet the mind seems to be gone. Maybe you'll say its not functioning "correctly." Well, now you would have to say mental states are identical to a very specific and 'correct' configuration and movements of things in the body.

I don't see the issue here...

Obviously, people who "lost their mind" didn't actually lose all mental activity... The "correct configuration" you are talking about is not any specific configuration; it's a whole slew of non-destructive configurations.

Vegetables are people who would be dead, yet medical devices keep their body going. I don't think they work to prove your point at all, as they would not be "living" had medical technology not intervened.

 

[skywise]

^^ Ok, there are 3 things going on here and if we're going to continue the discussion (which I'd like to) we're going to need to make a sharp division between these 3 claims because otherwise, what I respond with may not be relevant to what people actually mean.

Would lmnop and Bollwevil like to say that 1) a particular mental experiennce is identical to a particular brain state, 2) the mind is identical to the body (functioning if you like), or 3) a type of mental experience is identical to a type of physical experience? Or would you like to say all 3?

Note, by identical I mean identical in the same way that heat is identical to molecular motion. And by necessarily correlated I mean correlated in the way that its necessary that if we have heat, we have molecular motion. And by possible I mean in the sense that its not possible for there to be heat without mollecular motion or mollecular motion without heat.

Also note that in order to say that its necessary or not possible for a mental state to exist without a physical state you would have to claim at least one of these. Which one depends on whether you want to say "necessarily, an organism with a mind has a body" or "if an organism has a particular mental sensation it is identical to a particular physical/brain state" or "necessarily types of pain correlate to types of physical/brain states."

I can refute all of these, but depending on which one you guys mean when you say "its not possible for an organism to feel something without a nervous system" I won't be able to do so to anyone's satisfaction.

And just to stave off confusion, saying that the relation between two things is a necessary one is logically equivalent to saying they are identical.

 

[skywise]

Also, maybe part of the misunderstanding is that we're not all on the same page about contingency and necessity? The fact that a human body functions is contingent. It can (and does sometimes) turn out otherwise. If it helps at all, you can think of all my arguments as arguments that any correlation between mental states and physical states is continengent, not necessary. This is to be contrasted between the necessity that 2 +2 = 4 and the necessity that heat is molecular motion.

You can believe that its not in fact the case that mental states exist independently of physical states without bad logic (although I gave other epistemic reasons one may not think this in a much earlier post). You can't believe its not possible, however, without showing that mental states are identical to physical states in all possible situations (including a situation where a body stops functioning, or functions by machines, or whatever). If there is one single situation (and in this case there are lots of situations) where its possible for the two to come apart then being a physical state is a contingent property of being a mental state and its possible that it could be otherwise.

I don't know if this was clear already but in reading some of the old posts I think maybe I had given the wrong impression of my position. I don't claim that its only logical to think that its *in fact* the case that mental states cannot occur independently of physical states. I'm only saying that if you say its impossible and can't refute the unmodified premise then you are at fault for poor logic.

 

[Pegasus]

^My position is that the two states do not come apart, and your examples of crazies and vegetables did not show that they ever come apart. In fact, I think the vegetable especially shows that the two are definitely connected, as the lacking of a clear mental state is obviously directly related to the lack of physical expression...

 

[skywise]

^ particular or types of states? Or both?

And by never do you mean that "in fact they never" or "it is not possible that they could?" If its the former then you don't have enough evidence to make the claim. If its the latter I'll show you the logical problem with the position tomorrow.

 

[Pegasus]

^ particular or types of states? Or both?

I don't understand the question here...?

And by never do you mean that "in fact they never" or "it is not possible that they could?" If its the former then you don't have enough evidence to make the claim. If its the latter I'll show you the logical problem with the position tomorrow.

It's more like "I suspect they never". A lack of evidence doesn't eliminate anything from being possibly truthful, remember. It just means I can't definitely say I'm right.

 

[skywise]

^ Ah, someone hasn't read the discussion or you wouldn't have asked me to keep that in mind. I won't argue with you because, as I've posted, I think we have good reason to "suspect they never." The only reason I started debating with lmnop was because he said "its only logical that they have something to do with eachother." I then pointed out that, accepting a notoriously difficult to refute premise, its actually only logical to believe in the possibility of them not correlating.

And the first question was whether you meant a particular feeling you have, say pain at T1, is identical to a particular brain state at the same time OR whether you meant the type of feeling pain is identical to a type of brain state. Anyway, it doesn't matter so long as you don't want to claim that its logically necessary for brain states to coincide with mental states in the same way that the correlation between heat and molecular motion is logically necessary.

 

[Pegasus]

^ Ah, someone hasn't read the discussion or you wouldn't have asked me to keep that in mind.

Yeah, I was just rereading and realized that. Oops.

The only reason I started debating with lmnop was because he said "its only logical that they have something to do with eachother." I then pointed out that, accepting a notoriously difficult to refute premise, its actually only logical to believe in the possibility of them not correlating.

And the first question was whether you meant a particular feeling you have, say pain at T1, is identical to a particular brain state at the same time OR whether you meant the type of feeling pain is identical to a type of brain state. Anyway, it doesn't matter so long as you don't want to claim that its logically necessary for brain states to coincide with mental states in the same way that the correlation between heat and molecular motion is logically necessary.

I still would say it is illogical not to think so, but I'm not sure if I could break down the observations to irrefutable, accepted perceptions, and then logically connect them all. For me, it is crystal clear...

I think when logic is attempted to be used like this, it is defeating the purpose. Surely, you used logic to see the two are "probably" related; just like in the determinism debate, you logically knew the ball would "probably" fall on the 101th time. The ball *might not* fall, but that's using logic to defeat logic, and comes off to me as being useless logic. Something doesn't sit well in me with saying "the ball might not fall", when you realistically know the ball is going to fall. Only one of those stances seems "logical" to me. (I think Hume was shortsighted about causation.)

 

[elemenohpee]

skywise, bear with me here while i try to make my point. Lets say I posit that outside reality does not, exist, my mental experience is a result of a scientist in another universe manipulating my brain. In other words, it only appears that this world exists, but really, I'm just information being pushed around on a huge computer somewhere. Here is an example of something that is IMPOSSIBLE to definitively refute. Logic fails us here, for there is no way to PROVE that it is not the case. Clearly such extreme forms of skepticism have their disadvantages. Which is why we come up with pragmatic answers to these tough questions, so we don't get stuck debating something unprovable all day long.
Now in the case of mental states, the ONLY place we see them is in nervous systems. They seem to get more complex the more complex the nervous system is. Furthermore, we can induce specific mental states by physically manipulating the nervous system. I'll grant you that the connection between the two is not strictly logical. But I still think its a damn good assumption, and I'll stand behind it. Do agree with this, without the whole formal logic aspect to it?

 

[skywise]

^ I agree that its a very, lets say, "plausible" thing to think given the evidence. The only thing I don't like, from an empirical standpoint, is that its a very hard thing to test. Since you're skeptical about mental experience without a nervous system I'll introduce a new term 'qmental experience' to illustrate. Qmental experience has all the properties of mental experience except it only occurs without a nervous system.

Now, lets imagine an organism that has qmental experience. They don't have nervous systems but are actually very good qthinkers, and its very qpainful when they die (and their death causes qanguish in their friends who qlove them). If we dismiss any organism without a nervous system as automatically barred from this type of experience (remember qmental experience is just like mental experience minus the nervous system) then we would be completely obvlivious to something of this sort. One could say, "Well, we don't have any evidence for something like qmental experience" but the point is, if we think having having a nervous system is necessary to feel these things we *couldn't* have evidence to make us recognize qmental experience if it did exist. This all arises out of making a contingent property (arising from a nervous system) our defining criteria for the existence of the thing (mental experience).

I know it sounds pretty out there, but you know, it wasn't too long ago that people of color weren't said to have mental experience equivalent to that of a white man (call it Wmental experience). We don't have omnicient knowledge and are dealing with a quantitatively limited sample (the minority of organisms we've discovered on a spec of dust in the universe). In my opinion, its an open question.

 

[skywise]

I think when logic is attempted to be used like this, it is defeating the purpose. Surely, you used logic to see the two are "probably" related; just like in the determinism debate, you logically knew the ball would "probably" fall on the 101th time."

Actually, you don't use logic to see that the two are "probably related." You use empirical evidence. It's not that people are "attempting to use logic like this" its that logic demands you to deal with certain consequences. Sometimes the consequences are what we would like (such as being able to say that heat is identical to molecular motion) and sometimes the consequences aren't as tidy (not being able to say that mental states are identical to brain states). Its self defeating if you are wanting to say a certain thing from the get go. If you're looking for truth preservation between premises and conclusions then its not self-defeating in the least.

 

[Pegasus]

Actually, you don't use logic to see that the two are "probably related." You use empirical evidence. It's not that people are "attempting to use logic like this" its that logic demands you to deal with certain consequences.

If you're looking for truth preservation between premises and conclusions then its not self-defeating in the least.

What would you call piecing empirical evidence together in an intelligent way? Refer back to the second part of that paragraph; I explained how I think it is illogical to use logic to override realistic expectations (such as gravity pulling a ball towards the earth). Such skepticism cannot be portrayed as "logical" (IMO).

Something doesn't sit well in me with saying "the ball might not fall", when you realistically know the ball is going to fall. Only one of those stances seems "logical" to me. (I think Hume was shortsighted about causation.)

Your argument is centered on, "We can't prove it, so you can't assume it", and my argument is based on, "So what? Until I have a reason to believe otherwise, it is only reasonable to assume my theory is correct. In the search for truth preservation, I would only be making a mistake if I refused to accept evidence to the contrary." There is nothing wrong with being incorrect (should the assumption prove to be incorrect); you didn't have enough evidence at the time to make a definitive statement. I don't see the necessity of trying to preemptively squash this possibility.