Empathy with Animals

[elemenohpee]

You're right skywise, we can't quantify emotions or experiences like pain and fear. I'm working off of several assumptions here. One, the ability to experience something is dependent on a nervous system. For example, I don't think bacteria can "experience" something in the way we talk about it. No one is worried about how plants feel. Its just a bundle of chemical reactions. Going up the ladder, a sea anenome has a rudimentary nervous system. It allows it to interact with the environment a little better, but its certainly not questioning its own existence. Would you feel worse killing a bacteria, a sea anenome, or a chimp? Why? Only when we get into the higher animals do we see any indication that they even recognize themselves as an entity. Look up the mirror test for more info on that.
My second assumption is that the more complex the nervous system, the more the organism is able to "understand" what it is, who it is, how it fits into the world. A spider may feel pain and retreat from it, but its not thinking, "Fuck, how am I going to get to work with a broken leg?" There isn't a rabbit constitution, and no laws against murder, because the thought never crossed their minds. The fact that nearly all of us agree that murder is wrong shows that we think about things on a much higher level. Do you think a lion cares how bad it hurts you to get eaten alive?
Third, violence and murder have been around since the first RNA floating around in the primordial soup. Its called competition, its how we evolved. I don't really see anything wrong with using other organisms for our own purposes. However, since we have no way of measuring the level of experience, we should err on the side of caution. We should realize that higher animals deserve more consideration than others. Also, since we have the capacity to understand fear and pain on such high levels, we should strive to minimize them in those animals we do harm. The justification for this is a different story altogether. Just because a dog experiences things at a different level doesn't make it ok to go out and start killing dogs. We should only kill when its absolutely necessary to some goal of ours, whether it be science, food, etc.
As for the alien situation, it would depend on a lot of things. How complex is the organism? Are they trying to kill us? Do they already know a lot about themselves or do we need to do some research on them? etc. You couldn't use my arguments to justify wiping out a peaceful alien race.

 

[skywise]

You haven't convinced me for a couple reasons.

As 1: Granting that your As 1 is true (although I will question its necessity below) it doesn't follow that we feel worse about killing a chimp compared to a bacteria because chimps are "higher." It also doesn't follow that being "higher" in this sense makes something more deserving of life. All it establishes is that we feel worse killing a chimp because we recognize it as more like ourselves. A larger difference between an organism and its killer doesn't make a killer more just in killing. To establish your conclusions from As. 1 we would have to somehow show that experiencing something "like us" makes an organism higher and that "being lower" in comparison makes you less deserving of life.

Also, I don't see why we should think that the ability to feel is dependent on a nervous system. The only criteria we have for something being a particular feeling is the experience of the feeling itself. It is not an established necessary condition of "feeling" that it be caused by a nervous system.

As 2: If you use this to establish your stance then you've used a Sorites argument. At one point an organism's thinking is complex enough that it is wrong to kill it. At another point an organism's thinking is not complex enough that it is wrong to kill it. At some vague place in the middle of these two the division occurs. Its not quite a logical fallacy but vagueness is not a convincing way to establish a claim (especially when that claim relates to killing an organism). This also applies to As. 1 to some extent.

As. 3: I think this assumption is correct. Natural selection plays a big part in evolution and we have to kill some things to survive. However, it still does not follow that "higher organisms" deserve more consideration.

I also, excepting your "higher organisms deserve more consideration" claim, agree with your conclusions under As. 3. I just don't think the reasons you give in Assumptions 1 & 2establish these conclusions.

Also, regarding your questions about my alien counterexample. I know it depends on a lot of other things. The fact that it needed further qualification shows that the argument you gave in the first post doesn't give enough reason to think that its OK to kill something.

 

[Pegasus]

^So, uh, you wanna argue some free will?

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[elemenohpee]

You haven't convinced me for a couple reasons.

As 1: Granting that your As 1 is true (although I will question its necessity below) it doesn't follow that we feel worse about killing a chimp compared to a bacteria because chimps are "higher." It also doesn't follow that being "higher" in this sense makes something more deserving of life. All it establishes is that we feel worse killing a chimp because we recognize it as more like ourselves. A larger difference between an organism and its killer doesn't make a killer more just in killing. To establish your conclusions from As. 1 we would have to somehow show that experiencing something "like us" makes an organism higher and that "being lower" in comparison makes you less deserving of life.

I'm a firm believer in the subjectivity of our very existence. Like it or not, we are a self replicating, self aware being that has an interest in propagating itself. But if you don't accept that, then I could see how you would object.

Also, I don't see why we should think that the ability to feel is dependent on a nervous system. The only criteria we have for something being a particular feeling is the experience of the feeling itself. It is not an established necessary condition of "feeling" that it be caused by a nervous system.

Well its the only place we recognize it in. Its only logical that the two have something to do with each other.

As 2: If you use this to establish your stance then you've used a Sorites argument. At one point an organism's thinking is complex enough that it is wrong to kill it. At another point an organism's thinking is not complex enough that it is wrong to kill it. At some vague place in the middle of these two the division occurs. Its not quite a logical fallacy but vagueness is not a convincing way to establish a claim (especially when that claim relates to killing an organism). This also applies to As. 1 to some extent.

It is vague, I don't know if there's any way to get around that.

As. 3: I think this assumption is correct. Natural selection plays a big part in evolution and we have to kill some things to survive. However, it still does not follow that "higher organisms" deserve more consideration.

I also, excepting your "higher organisms deserve more consideration" claim, agree with your conclusions under As. 3. I just don't think the reasons you give in Assumptions 1 & 2establish these conclusions.

I guess I'm too much of a humanist. I tend to think there's something special about us. But not just us, us as the current release of intelligence evolution. But of course I'm horribly biased

Also, regarding your questions about my alien counterexample. I know it depends on a lot of other things. The fact that it needed further qualification shows that the argument you gave in the first post doesn't give enough reason to think that its OK to kill something.

Its definitely not a watertight justification. I'm just trying to find a pragmatic solution.

 

[Noodle]

I identify with other mammals more than insects.

In the wild I avoid bugs. If they enter my abode I sometimes give them a way out. Other times I squish them with glee.

 

[skywise]

lmnop: Thanks for taking the time to respond to me in detail.

The only thing I can't help but disagree with in your last post is when you said its "only logical" that nervous systems and feelings have something to do with eachother. On the contrary, if it were logical this issue would be a lot simpler and easier to deal with. Alas, its not logical and mind-body issues remain extremely confusing.

 

[elemenohpee]

The correlation between the nervous system and mental states has been pretty firmly established. Since you're on this board, I can only assume you've experienced first hand what a little tweaked chemistry can do to your conscious experience

 

[skywise]

^ Haha, yes I'm familiar. You're right that a correlation is firmly established. This is empirically established, however, *not* logically established. Also, a correlation is not enough to establish that pain only occurs (in an organism) when a nervous system is present. You need an idenity statement for that and establishing identity is much more difficult than establishing a correlation.

To establish an identity between a mental state 'M' and a physical state 'P' you have to show that Necessarily if M then P and the converse (nec. if P then M) are true. It is not by any means "only logical" that this is the case. If anything logic, Prima Facie seems to lead us to believe that a mental states are not in fact identical with brain states.

Let's begin with the Cartesian premise that it is possible for the mind to exist without the body. If you don't like that one, the converse, that it is possible for the body to exist without the mind works just as well. This is pretty indisputable - just look at a corpse if you have doubts. The Cartesian concludes from this that mind and body are distinct (not identical) entities. You cannot dispute this on logical grounds. If the premise is true, so is the conclusion.

Instead you would have to somehow explain away the Cartesian premise as illusory. This is very difficult - it seems like the body can exist independently of the mind. Similarly, it is Prima Facie logically possible that a mental state M could exist independently of a physical state P (having a nervous system) and that a Physical state P could exist without a mental state M.. If it is possible for M to exist without P or P without M then identity between the two does not hold (the identity must be necessary).

I could go into long detail about various modal complexities but all I really want to show is that you can't use lack of a nervous system to establish that an organism doesn't feel a certain thing unless you establish that feeling types are identical to physical types. A correlation is not enough. It is not "only logical" that they are identical but on the contrary, the claim that they are *not* identical is on solid logical footing. To dispute the claim of non-identity you have to find some very good reasons for us to reject a very comopelling premise.

 

[knight_marshall]

L2R, u did the right thing not comforting the lonely bird... if you leave your scent of a young animal often the parents will later reject it.

personally, these days i find it hard to empathise with anything. i'm generally rather happy to realise one day we will all be nothing more than rotting, fetid corpses. i just watched a romero movie sorry

 

[elemenohpee]

Let's begin with the Cartesian premise that it is possible for the mind to exist without the body. If you don't like that one, the converse, that it is possible for the body to exist without the mind works just as well. This is pretty indisputable - just look at a corpse if you have doubts. The Cartesian concludes from this that mind and body are distinct (not identical) entities. You cannot dispute this on logical grounds. If the premise is true, so is the conclusion.

This proves that a corpse can exist without a mind, but not that a fully functional human being can exist without a mind.

 

[L2R]

L2R, u did the right thing not comforting the lonely bird... if you leave your scent of a young animal often the parents will later reject it.

Oh, in that case, i should go tell guineapig that when he's beating off in bushes, that he should stop cleaning himself off with random ducklings.

i'm generally rather happy to realise one day we will all be nothing more than rotting, fetid corpses.

that's a kind of empahy

 

[skywise]

This proves that a corpse can exist without a mind, but not that a fully functional human being can exist without a mind.

It actually shows that the body is distinct from the mind. And yes, presumably, it shows that the body is distinct from the person as well. If there is a mind/body distinction the thought that "if an organism doesn't have a nervous system then, necessarily, it doesn't feel a certain type of feeling" is not sound.

There are ways to get around this of course. Its logically possible that Santa exists too but that doesn't mean we have sufficient reason to believe so. Similarly, you could say that we have no sufficient evidence to believe any organism we might kill on earth without a nervous system can feel. I was just trying to point out that logic doesn't actually help you establish that you need a nervous system to feel.

 

[elemenohpee]

Do you believe that a person could be functioning normally, while not having any mental experience to speak of?

 

[skywise]

Of course I don't and I don't see that it's relevant to the discussion. I have no desire to make such a crazy claim. Presumably when both you and I use the phrase "person functioning normally" it entails some sort of mental experience. I don't need to dispute that to show that the mind is distinct from the body. We can say that a normally functioning human consists of both body and mind but that doesn't mean that body and mind aren't distinct entities. A normally function human consists of a heart and lungs too but hearts aren't identical to lungs.

For body and mind to be identical they have to *necessarily* be identical. And when I say "necessarily" I mean it as a logical operator. There cannot be any possible situation in which body and mind can exist independently for them to be identical. If there is, such as when a person dies and they stop "fully functioning", then body and mind are not identical. Thus it is logically possible for an organism to have a mind and all its properties (thinking, feeling) without a nervous system.

 

[uacvax]

L2R, u did the right thing not comforting the lonely bird... if you leave your scent of a young animal often the parents will later reject it.

personally, these days i find it hard to empathise with anything. i'm generally rather happy to realise one day we will all be nothing more than rotting, fetid corpses. i just watched a romero movie sorry

I used to hear this a lot too but one day I read online that ducks or birds have really poor senses of smell, if they have one at all

 

[elemenohpee]

There cannot be any possible situation in which body and mind can exist independently for them to be identical. If there is, such as when a person dies and they stop "fully functioning", then body and mind are not identical.

You missed my point, when a person dies, their body does not still exist in the same sense. The physical structure is still there, but the dynamics of that structure is what makes us alive, what creates the mind. In order for your reverse cartesian premise to work, you would have to demonstrate that a PHYSICALLY functioning human could exist without the mental aspect.

 

[skywise]

Ok, you're altering whats usually meant by body but I'll play along just to show that it doesn't make a difference anyway. If we have a mind, what you call a body (from here on just 'body'), and an old fashioned body (lets call it a schbody) then you still ahve the same problem. You have to establish that mind and body are identical. Presumably being a schbody (a physical structure) is an essential property of being a body (a dynamic physical structure). In order for mind to be identical to body mind would have to have all the essential properties of body, including being a schbody! If a schbody exists independently of body and mind then they are not identical and its logical for a mind to exist without a body, schbody, nervous system and so on.

Also, it just struck me that you might not have meant that the dynamic body is a distinct entity from the regular body. Even so, if you were just making the less weird observation that "dynamism" is a property of a body while its alive and is not when its dead then your observation still doesn't make a difference. It's obvious enough that not all properties of a given thing are essential. My haircut, for instance isn't essential to me. I can shave my head and I still exist. The fact a non-essential property, dynamism, leaves a body when a person dies wouldn't make the mind any less distinct from the body. If you want to claim that dynamism is essential then you have three entities and are in the position I described above.

 

[elemenohpee]

So why DO you think we see such a correlation between mental phenomena and brainstates? Is it just a coincidence? I may not have an airtight proof, but I think its a pretty good assumption. In the scientific sense at least, it has proven to be a useful assumption.

 

[skywise]

I'm not too sure how to answer that question. It'd be like if you asked me why my hair is brown. If educated enough I could give some sort of evolutionary response to both questions but that would be more "how" than "why".

Also, like I alluded earlier, the fact that its not logically necessary that an organism needs a nervous system in order to feel doesn't rule out the possibility that *in fact* all organisms that feel have a nervous system. Both are possible and I am certainly with you that when we look at the world it seems like things that feel have nervous systems. Of course, we could be wrong about that. Also, even if it turns out that we are right, and all feeling creatures do have nervous system, it still is logically possible for something to feel without a nervous system.

I just hear people over-extend and misuse logic to add clout to their arguments a lot and wanted to point out that it is plenty logical to believe that an organism can feel without a nervous system.

 

[elemenohpee]

The flying spaghetti monster is possible too. But I have no problem saying that it doesn't exist. I don't think its too much of a stretch to deny it, nor do I think its too much of a stretch to say that mental experiences require and are a result of a nervous system. The fact that we can induce certain experiences by physically stimulating the brain should be pretty convincing evidence of that. But if you want to leave the question open, I guess there is logical room for that.