i'm having trouble finding that thread, i'll elaborate a bit here. it might be bit short, i'm a bit strapped for time as of late. sorry for the off-topic though (/cheeky smile)
heideggers ethnic sympathy's for the 'german homeland' and its language are well known (and have served for wild speculations as to his membership card of the NSDAP). he is very fond of the german language (most notably in the poetry of Hölderlin) and (rural) culture (sentimental pastorism lol).
its a difficult point though, he is clearly very careful about the idea of a shared reality, yet, does not seem to dismiss a universalism entirely. but its heavily nuanced. in On The Way to Language he often speaks about the 'beckoning to and from Being' and listening to its emptyness, its calling. but Being itself is a kind of a non-concept. his venture to say more about it ended in an unsatisfying 'nothingness', which he considered a kind of failure or at least disappointing. the point being (in my interpretation) of an amorphous state of logical collapse. on this verge, thoughts are no longer thoughts, but, perhaps, can be likened to pencil streaks. they have no concrete content whatsoever and lie more in a realm of non-linguistic experiences then anything else. this can be seen as the empty space or opening that makes any dialogue possible. yet it is an amorphous entirety of the material. its the ineffable, the silent, and the enduring.
and then there is the 'forgetfulness of Being': through the binary oppositions of our greek heritage (true-false, subjective-objective and so on). the distinctions one makes do account for our experience of the world. or rather; our not experiencing it, our bracing ourselves against it. its not a strong relativism, as these can be 'unlearned' (or: Being brought to rememberance), at least to a certain degree. which seems to point us to a certain source, yet this source is nothing. and nothing is again a relative term in opposition to something.
in the words of Wittgenstein about a poem of Uhland: "if you do not try to utter the unutterable, then nothing gets lost. but the unutterable is uttered -unutterably- in what is uttered." if one tries to, it seems one always gets caught up in ones words and these themselves seem to be the problem. which then points us in the exact opposite direction of relativism. it seems as there is both, and both in an absolute way. this is on the complete verge of thought into nonsense though, a place where even experienced philosophers begin to falter. 'thinking the unthinkable'
Derridas can also be taken as speaking of this in his notion of the 'repeats' which is inherent to language, and a fundamental basis for the mere existence of it. in this repeat we are shown an emptiness of the words we use. for instance, i can repeat a sentence without its meaning, as an illustaration for a type of sentence.
now when we repeat someone elses words in the exact same tone and manner as the other person, this gets a parodic effect. but one cannot conceptualize or grasp the precise distance as to the why of this effect. it has to do with a dispersing of a subject-object dichotomy. it seems to come into a 'pure externality' of language, with which the original speaker is confronted. language as pure object; yet such a 'language' as object does not exist its no longer language, yet it is.
but to say the ontological schema is the same is, i think, wrong. the perspective you speak of is the ontological scheme. you will, for instance, not see or grasp the meaning of chakras through, say, Heideggers ontology. what does seem to be possible, to a certain extent, is to 'absorb' one into the other (partially). though this destroys it as it was and does not give one acces to the other mode of thinking, as it is to, or sees, itself. you can use ones eye as a metaphor for ontological scheme. without it, you do not see anything. any scheme lays a claim on 'the absolute', which is by definition, the same for all, as it is, well, absolute. yet this absolute does not appear distinct from the ontological scheme you use, its simply invisible, save in relation to the words/concepts/scheme one uses. does this make it any less absolute? paradoxically, no! the absolute is not absolute to itself, only relative to the not-absolute, that being its 'access road', which actually is the absolute. which refers back my (apparently rather clear) post on Sisyphus and desire etc.
(might be a bit jumbled, this one)