Your mind is just the physical hunk you call your brain

[BodhiSvaha33]

It is much, much more than an 'academic distinction'. It has implications for the form and function of the mind itself, how it should be studied, and even how it is defined. That is hardly a trivial distinction.

I don't see that it has implications beyond the obvious -- that sometimes the mind is best approached as an independent phenomenon (as we do when we type back and forth on a chat forum), and sometimes as a physical entity (as we do when we take drugs to alter consciousness).

I'm very fond of computer analogies for the mind, so to me this is no different than understanding that one should debug software problems, but break out the screwdriver for hardware problems. That doesn't mean the hardware and software are two fundamentally different things, just that it's convenient to treat them that way.

 

[alasdairm]

Argument 1:
P1. If x is identical to y then x has every property of y and y has every property of x.
P2. All x's & y's have the property of being necessarily identical to themselves.
P3. The mind does not have the property of being necessarily identical to the brain.
Therefore, the mind is not the brain.

aren't you basically saying: the mind is not the brain because the mind is not the brain?

alasdair

 

[Gahan]

I don't see that it has implications beyond the obvious -- that sometimes the mind is best approached as an independent phenomenon (as we do when we type back and forth on a chat forum), and sometimes as a physical entity (as we do when we take drugs to alter consciousness).

I'm very fond of computer analogies for the mind, so to me this is no different than understanding that one should debug software problems, but break out the screwdriver for hardware problems. That doesn't mean the hardware and software are two fundamentally different things, just that it's convenient to treat them that way.

Fundamentally different, no. But they are different.

Composition of the mind or brain, for one, is deeply impacted by this fact. If the mind=brain in the sense the arguments presented in this thread attack, then quite simply every single distinct mental device and/or structure would necessarily have a distinct physical counterpart that wholly produced its function. For this is what saying mind=brain means.

But we know now, through science, that this is not so. The conscious mind is an emergent and incredibly complex system, and it is produced not as a mirror image of the physical properties of the brain, but as a phenomenon in its own right.

The above would obviously affect the method of study of the mind. For one, it would condense psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience into one field of study. The observation that this is impossible is, in itself, proof that mind=/=brain, no zombies needed.

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

Fundamentally different, no. But they are different.

What is the difference?

Composition of the mind or brain, for one, is deeply impacted by this fact. If the mind=brain in the sense the arguments presented in this thread attack, then quite simply every single distinct mental device and/or structure would necessarily have a distinct physical counterpart that wholly produced its function. For this is what saying mind=brain means.

But we know now, through science, that this is not so. The conscious mind is an emergent and incredibly complex system, and it is produced not as a mirror image of the physical properties of the brain, but as a phenomenon in its own right.

You've completely lost me here. For one thing, I think the word "emergent" is as close to content-free as words can get. In plain English, are you claiming that many different minds could result from a single defined brain state? What would determine which mind you got?

The above would obviously affect the method of study of the mind. For one, it would condense psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience into one field of study. The observation that this is impossible is, in itself, proof that mind=/=brain, no zombies needed.

Not at all. This is like saying chemistry and physics should be condensed into one discipline. Chemistry may be ultimately reducible to physics, but we study phenomena at the appropriate level of detail, not at the finest resolution available. Matter of convenience and expedience.

 

[The_Idler]

aren't you basically saying: the mind is not the brain because the mind is not the brain?

alasdair

seconded. it was some poor reasoning.



And btw, "The Mind" is not the same thing as "The Brain"
A brain is made from matter,
a mind must be conscious, and therefore must be alive.

Dont get me wrong here, i dont believe in any of this shit outside of real physicality, and i do believe in total reductionism (ie somewhere there is a mathematical <- geometric <- physical <- chemical <- etc. reason for everything)
but ima say this
Mind and Brain are two different words, with two different meanings.

 

[The_Idler]

I'm very fond of computer analogies for the mind, so to me this is no different than understanding that one should debug software problems, but break out the screwdriver for hardware problems. That doesn't mean the hardware and software are two fundamentally different things, just that it's convenient to treat them that way.

Now I HATE computer models in psychology, but this one applies.

Hardware = Brain
Software = Mind
You could even go as far to say that-
Wetware = Ego (or control centre or command centre or central command or executive centre or whatever) to represent our conscious thinking

so you can have a "brain". it does nothing.
if you have a brain and mind (hardware and software) it can perform functions.
if you have a brain a mind and an ego (a whole "conscious" system), you have a "user" of the "hardware" and "software", mind and brain,
and thus, we have consciousness.

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

Wetware = Ego (or control centre or command centre or central command or executive centre or whatever) to represent our conscious thinking

Interestingly, modern neurology has proven fairly conclusively that there is no such thing. Consciousness Explained by Dan Dennett is a good book on this topic. Check out the experiments of Ben Libet and W. Grey Walter.

It seems like there is a central controlling will or point of view, but in actual fact there isn't. Consciousness is a feedback loop designed to assess the results of action, not initiate it. I think the analogy Dennett uses is that the brain is like a huge corporation with no CEO, where all decisions are made via an ongoing shouting match among upper management; then a report is generated that glosses over most of the process and just describes the outcome. Self-awareness is the report.

This happens to jibe with what various mystical traditions, including Buddhism, have been claiming for thousands of years: if you look for the self long enough, you find it simply isn't there.

 

[The_Idler]

k haha yes a single "conscious control centre" is almost certainly BS, but i thought of the idea of Ego fitting in nicely with that analogy i had going there =]

But of course there isnt an ego.
this is because it is simply a concept. It doesnt matter if it doesnt exist, it is only representing our consciousness in my analogy, something which we can, at least, be sure of (you can, anyway).

Of COURSE there is not central control or will.
Of COURSE everything we ever do or think is caused involuntarily by chemicals and electricity, but the consciousness we experience, and the actions of the brain are the MIND

the MIND is activity of the BRAIN.
and we can also have an "objective" attention to this mind, itself. Therein, most problems lie.




i say most problems, i actually mean most of the problems ever encountered by anyone in the universe.
without our supposed consciousness, we would not have to deal with problems, we would just do.
however, we have consciousness, and this allows us to "objectively" review our own MINDs, and thus question any and all thoughts or actions.

 

[skywise]

Ebola: Why identity is a necessary relation (if it actually holds)

There are at least two ways to explain why this is the case, an intuitive way and a more precise but also more complicated way. Since I'm already being flooded with replies that seem to show no understanding of the original argument 1, I'm not going to bother with the more complicated explanation. If you're interested in hearing it just post and I will write it up as time permits.

1) If x is identical to y it does not seem, intuitively, that there would be a possible situation in which we had x but not y or had y but not x.

For the sake of example and because I don't know your real name lets just pretend it is 'Charlie'. Can you come up with a situation in which you, ebola, were not also Charlie (pretending this is your name)?

Of course you can give me a situation in which you were not called 'ebola' or 'Charlie' (or a situation where someone else had these names). But this is not a situation in which you, the man called 'ebola' & 'Charlie', were not yourself. You might also be able to come up with a sense that ebola was not Charlie (or ebola was not ebola) by imagining a situation in which you acted out of character or were a different kind of man. But this is a metaphorical way of talking. You will not have found a situation in which you, ebola, literally were not the same person.

Because you are identical to yourself, and you are called both 'Charlie' and 'ebola', there is no possible situation in which we have Charlie but not ebola or ebola but not Charlie. You're one and the same person! Therefore, if ebola is identical to Charlie there is no possible situation in which they are not identical. To say that there is no possible situation in which something is not identical to itself is the logical equivalent of saying that the identity is necessary.

If you apply this understanding to the mind/body problem you should be able to understand why the mind is not identical to the brain. Just like you can't imagine a situation in which ebola is not Charlie (or ebola is not ebola, or 2+2 is not 4) you shouldn't be able to imagine a situation in which the mind is not the body if they are actually one and the same thing! This is because if we are only talking about a single "thing" it is not possible for it to not be itself. If we are talking about two things that are causally related (like the brain & the mind) then we can imagine lots of situations in which they come apart because they are not the same thing.

 

[skywise]

Kul69 & Gahan

So, um...first you made a big abstruse post arguing against the thesis that the mind is not identical to the brain. Then you later posted "good point" to Gahan rhetorical quesiton, "Since when has anyone actually argued the mind IS the brain?" This needs some explaining.

To answer yours and Gahan's quesiton: Since the 1950s up until today. Although these days mind/brain identity has given up its throne as the most popular view to functionalism among philosophers (and apparently many scientists). I think what you, Gahan, don't realize is that it was an aspiration 50 years ago to reduce mental phenomena to just physical (and before that behavioral) phenomena. The arguments in this thread are partly what convinced everyone that this was a futile aspiration. Also, on Bluelight, lots of people are physicalists like Atlas, lmnop, and all the people who post things like "love, fear etc. are just processes in your brain" to show that they are somehow illusory or unreal.

To your earlier reply as far as I can understand it:

1) I'll go with you as far as to say that I *think* I can also conceive of "a multiverse that exists that contains an infinite number of universes in which everything that is possible or impossible is impossible and possible to conceive in another universe."

But it doesn't follow from this that I can conceive of anything being possible. I'm barely sure I can conceive of other worlds where such conceptions are possible but I'm dead sure that I can't conceive that 2+2=5. Generally I think that only crazy people think such conceptions possible. But hey, if you think it is possible that 2+2= 5 I'm not going to argue with you.

(To be more sympathetic, I think your idea has a simple logical mistake. Even if you can imagine a situation where other people conceive something it doesn't follow that you can also conceive it too. The conceiving is not transitive from your imagined person to yourself).

You then beat a dead, irrelevant horse, by stating that just because something is imaginable doesn't mean it's the case. Well, no shit Kul69 but that has nothing to do with argument 1. If there is something about the argument you have trouble understanding, ask me to clarify. I repeat, Argument 1 does not entail "What's imaginable is true." If you can approach this argument with an open mind, actually try to understand it, and ask questions as needed I guarantee you will see this. It's strict, accurate logic and not nearly as sloppy as your post assumes.

 

[skywise]

By this logic we can easily "prove" that a computer's functionality is not just the operation of its physical components. The user interface is not necessarily identical to the memory state -- it is logically possible to have a functional computer that has any physical configuration, or none.

This is the perfect illustration of the shortcomings of pure logic when applied to the real world. It creates all kinds of absurdities, philosophical ghosts and zombies being the prime examples in this context...

Um.... no. By the logic you refer to we can easily prove that a computer's functionality is not identical to its physical components. It says nothing against the idea that the computer's functionality is identical to the operation of its physical components. Notice the difference between the physical components and the operation. We can replace the memory in the computer (the physical component) and still have the UI because the identity is between the UI and the operation of the memory state, not the UI and any particular physical memory.

 

[skywise]

Very Lame Objection

Precisely. It's only by starting from an implicit premise of dualism that the OP's argument makes any sense at all. If people weren't trapped in Descartes' rut when thinking about consciousness, we wouldn't even have these ridiculous discussions.

Of course the mind is the brain. It's as plain as anything can possibly be. I find it deeply ironic that we need to convince anyone on a drug forum that the mind is physical

Let's apply the argument to a different situation to show why one should be embarrassed to have so confidently stated such a stinker objection.

Clark Kent is identical to Superman

P1) If Clark Kent is identical to Superman then Clark Kent has every property that Superman has and Superman has every property Clark Kent has.
P2) Clark Kent (like all things) has the property of being necessarily identical to himself
P3) Superman has the property of being necessarily identical to Clark Kent

4) Therefore, Clark Kent is Superman

We can test P3 in the exact same way that we tested whether the mind had the property of being necessarily identical to the body. This test was to see if we could conceive of a situation in which Clark Kent is not Superman. *thinks about it* Nope, sure can't.

I can imagine being in a situation, like Lois Lane, where it appeared to me that Superman could have been someone else. But this would only be due to my ignorance of what was actually the case, not due to a real possibility that Clark Kent is not Superman. Once I know that Clark and Superman are the same guy it is easy to see that if I have Superman then I have Clark and vice versa. There is no possible situation in which one person exists and the other does not because there is only one person! It's not logically possible to have the x referred to as 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' and at the same time not have x. Why? Because x & not x is a contradiction and therefore inconceivable!

The argument makes sense apart from the mind-body problem. It does not pre-suppose dualism in the slightest. All it supposes is that if two words refer to one and the same thing then you will not be able to conceive of the one without the other because you cannot conceive the logically impossible. The logically impossible is characterized as that which leads to a contradiction.

 

[skywise]

Atlas & Alasdair

Only because the example you proffered is equally irrelevant. Your conceptualizations are not things in and of themselves, they are derivations from a human mind/brain.

zombie =brain - mind
ghost = mind - brain


This is all descartes, btw, I'm not entirely winging it here.

Do you have a positive argument for what the nature of the mind is? I'm a materialist, and count the mind as an emulation of lower physical structures of the brain. I'd say that it's just pretty much impossible to describe consciousness via consciousness. Its like trying to examine the ground directly underneath your feet at a given time.

I'm not sure what you are getting at in this post. If it is the same thing as Alasdair or the arrogant guy that quoted you posted then my rude reply above applies to your argument (although the rudeness is directed solely at him). Arg 1 does not pre-suppose dualism. It supposes that identity statements, if true, have to be logically necessary. To be logically necessary is to be such that to say otherwise involves a contradiction. The argument supposes that contradictions are not conceivable (can you conceive of x & not x?). Since we can conceive of bodies without minds (or brain states without mental states) then it seems like if they are identical this identity must be contingent. But, identity statements are necessary relations if true. Therefore, minds cannot be identical to bodies at all.

If it weird that you bring up Descartes seemingly as supporting your objection against my Argument 1. The reason for this is that Arg. 1 is basically a much more sophisticated version of a famous argument from Descartes' meditations for the non-identity of the mind with the body. Maybe you're thinking of Kant since you talk about things in themselves? Anyway, if you can clarify I will try to respond.

And no, I haven't worked out a positive view of the mind. It is a very controversial and difficult subject in the philosophy of mind. I *did* post a second negative argument that you have yet to respond to. If you are an identity theorist then you have to dispute my second argument too, even if you dismiss the first.

 

[skywise]

Any takers against Argument 2?

So far, most everyone has been disputing Argument 1. Yet, if you guys think that the mind is the brain, mental states are brain states, emotions are just chemical reactions in your brain, etc. then you also have to take on argument 2 (which is both harder to dispute and easier to understand than the first).

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

Um.... no. By the logic you refer to we can easily prove that a computer's functionality is not identical to its physical components. It says nothing against the idea that the computer's functionality is identical to the operation of its physical components. Notice the difference between the physical components and the operation. We can replace the memory in the computer (the physical component) and still have the UI because the identity is between the UI and the operation of the memory state, not the UI and any particular physical memory.

Very well, so are you saying the mind is not identical to the brain, but is identical to the operation of the brain? That works for me. As long as there's a 1:1 mapping between a particular brain state and a particular mind state, we are not talking dualism.

The point I was making is that any logical argument disconnecting brain and mind would have to apply equally to the circuits and UI of my computer. If we agree on that, the rest is semantics... maybe interesting to philosophers but no one else.

 

[The_Idler]

"zombie =brain - mind
ghost = mind - brain"

yes mate, thats a nice explaination for the concept of zombies and ghosts....

but urrrm, theyre not real.
well zombies are possible, but we all know that a mind cannot exist without a brain.

 

[Rod-Everrard]

No, you ASSUME the mind cant exist without it.

 

[ebola?]

>>Since I'm already being flooded with replies that seem to show no understanding of the original argument 1, I'm not going to bother with the more complicated explanation. If you're interested in hearing it just post and I will write it up as time permits.>>

Not to play the credential game (it's moot), but I have a degree in philosophy. While my background is not in analytical philosophy, I've written on Quine, Kant, and Wittgenstein. I've taken philosophy of mind from a mostly analytical perspective (we knocked that shit down eventually. )

The short of it:
you needn't pull any punches.

A substantive reply is to follow.

ebola

 

[ebola?]

To lay it on the table, I will approach this from a pragmatist's perspective (see Dewey, James, Quine, etc.).

>>
1) If x is identical to y it does not seem, intuitively, that there would be a possible situation in which we had x but not y or had y but not x.
>>

But, in terms of possible worlds, this strict correspondence may only be maintained for "simple" concepts or objects, ie those that may not be broken down into others. 2 lines of argument follow:

1. Let's take the example of water. We can imagine a possible world where a wet, largely inert, and opulent polar solvent serves as the basis of life on an alternate Earth, but it is NOT h2o. We may alternately imagine a world where h20 is a sandy solid at room temperature.

This is a restatement of Atlas's argument.

Water is not a simple object. Are the brain and mind?

2. I don't think that concepts are inert "things" that exist outside of the subject-environment interaction. Social context, goals, novel interactions and events, etc. anchor and re-anchor what concepts mean vis-a-vis both the environment and other concepts. Concepts are their use. Thus, there can be no simple concepts of the sort you need.

>>
For the sake of example and because I don't know your real name lets just pretend it is 'Charlie'. Can you come up with a situation in which you, ebola, were not also Charlie (pretending this is your name)?>>

But what if we interrogate the assumption that I am a unitary entity? Perhaps the ebola that posts is a different self from the Andy that teaches social theory which is a different self from the Charlie that I'm imagining for your example
Sure, they all are capable of doing similar searches of my memory, but they're not identical, nor are the proclivities of my selves. I am speaking quite literally.

Ironically, all these minds share a single body with the same brain.

What if the flux is even more ubiquitous? What if I am born anew to each moment, but born into a set of memories that creates the illusion of continuity of self?

>>
Because you are identical to yourself, and you are called both 'Charlie' and 'ebola', there is no possible situation in which we have Charlie but not ebola or ebola but not Charlie. You're one and the same person! Therefore, if ebola is identical to Charlie there is no possible situation in which they are not identical. To say that there is no possible situation in which something is not identical to itself is the logical equivalent of saying that the identity is necessary.>>

Not "necessarily".
Your example works well for specific people (in terms of proper names) who conform to your assumptions of personhood. What about specific objects? What about conceptual categories?

>>
If you apply this understanding to the mind/body problem you should be able to understand why the mind is not identical to the brain.>>

Oh, I'm with you on this. I just don't think that this fact stems from a condition where all identities are necessary. It's kind of like nuking NY to eliminate a single trash collector. I do think that some identities are empirical, but in the pragmatist sense, not the way a logical positivist (like yourself?) would use the term.

>>2+2 is not 4>>

This is an interesting one. While I think that the axioms that allow for the derivation of this statement (and all arithmetic) are "necessary" if we are to get a coherent system of logic off the ground, I don't think that they are necessary in any transcendental way. If we shed our logical assumptions, we open the door to experience (usually framed as mystical) that cannot be captured by logical description.

Thanks for making me think!

ebola
np: mindless self-indulgence (as is seen in this post)

 

[ninjadanslarbretabar]

sorry, i haven't read the tread but i think that now a days some call that "physical hunk" the CNS (central nervous system)