Your mind is just the physical hunk you call your brain

[skywise]

I'm going to post at least two arguments for thinking this is not the case. I'll post one now, and the other(s) within the week.

Argument 1:
P1. If x is identical to y then x has every property of y and y has every property of x.
P2. All x's & y's have the property of being necessarily identical to themselves.
P3. The mind does not have the property of being necessarily identical to the brain.
Therefore, the mind is not the brain.

To understand this argument you have to understand the term 'necessarily identical'. For something to be necessarily identical, the identity must hold across all possible worlds. There can be no possible situation in which x is not equal to y. A helpful example is 2+2=4. This identity is necessary because there is no possible situation in which it is false. This can be seen by trying to imagine a situation in which 2+2 does not equal 4. It cannot be done, because denying that 2+2=4 leads to a contradiction. As it turns out, there is no such thing as an identity that is not necessary. If x = y then there is no possible situation in which x is not y.

So, if we apply this to the mind/body problem we can test whether or not the mind is necessarily identical to the brain by trying to imagine a situation in which we have minds without brains or brains without minds. I've just done both by imagining ghosts & zombies respectively. So, the mind is not necessarily identical to the brain therefore the mind is not identical to the brain period.

This argument works equally well against claims that 1) mind = brain 2) each individual instance of a mental state = an individual brain state 3) mental types are identical to physical types

 

[Zarathaster]

Not necessarily true. If you think of your brain as a computer and your consciousness as a byproduct of its computations then our mind is wholly contained in the physicality of your brain. Similarly a computer program would be wholly contained within the memory and computational pathways of that computer. If this is indeed the case, then your brain would contain in any and every instance all the information necessary to replicate your mind at that instant. I see no reason to immediately reject this notion other than the unpleasantness of its logical conclusions (you are an organic machine, subject to causality like everything else in the universe, and in no way special relative to the rest of 'reality'). Id rather this not be true, but neither do I like to base my notions of what is and isn't true on what I want and don't want to be true.

 

[skywise]

^^ What you just put forward is not the same as the argument I was attacking. You are saying, "Consciousness is a by-product of the brain."

We can make this statement more relevant by modifying it to say "The mind is an effect of the brain." This is different from the thesis I was attacking which was "The mind is the brain." In fact, by characterizing the mind as a "by-product" or effect you have already given up the claim that they are the same thing. Think of a paradigm identity statement: Clark Kent is Superman. This is obviously different from "Clark Kent is a by-product of Superman." The latter claim is false, the former is true. Similarly, the true claim "my post is a by-product of my typing" is very different from the false claim that "my post is my typing."

 

[Zarathaster]

But youre basically setting up a straw-man argument. The mind isn't the brain because the brain is a bodily organ and the mind is ... a consciousness? If the brain contains within it everything that is necessary to create the mind in its entirety, then, functionally, the brain is the mind. I.e. if the mind is reducible to a physically expressible computation (like any other form of computation known to us), than what would be the implication of saying that the mind != the brain?

 

[skywise]

Argument 2

I'll just post Arg. 2 now in hopes that it will further clarify the identity thesis that is being rejected. This is known as the Multiple Realizability Argument (the earlier one is known as the Modal argument btw).

P1. All mental kinds are multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds.
P2. If a given mental kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then it cannot be identical to any specific physical kind.
P3. Therefore, No mental kind is identical to any specific physical kind.

Premise 1 just says that a single mental kind, pain, can be realized by many different physical kinds. For example, it can be realized by the a bird, a human , a crocodile, possibly a bug or even a robot etc.

P2 is made more clear by understanding that if mental states were identical with brain states then there would have to be some physical-chemical kind common to the wide variety of pain-bearing species, and correlated exactly with each occurrence of the mental kind. Otherwise, we will have cases where the same mental state (say, a pain) occurs without the supposedly identical physical state. It doesn't make sense to identify a single thing (pain) with a disjunction of things. If you have Clark Kent, you have Superman and you can't have Clark Kent if you don't have Superman but have something else. If two things can come apart then they are obviously not identical.

 

[skywise]

But youre basically setting up a straw-man argument. The mind isn't the brain because the brain is a bodily organ and the mind is ... a consciousness? If the brain contains within it everything that is necessary to create the mind in its entirety, then, functionally, the brain is the mind. I.e. if the mind is reducible to a physically expressible computation (like any other form of computation known to us), than what would be the implication of saying that the mind != the brain?

The theory of functionalism is not the same as the theory of mind/brain identity. Functionalism says that the mind is causally related to the brain, not that the mind is one and the same as the brain. Argument 2, the multiple realizability argument, ushered in functionalism and spelled the end of mind/brain identity as the most widely accepted view.

And the modal argument is definitely not a straw man argument. It is perfectly valid. Read over the premises and conclusions again if you don't understand it. It says that the brain has a property that the mind doesn't: the property of being necessarily identical to the brain. Likewise, the mind has a property the brain doesn't: being necessarily identical to the mind. If two things are identical then they must have all the same properties. Minds/Brains don't so they must not be identical. Ta da.

edit :Maybe the difference between what you're saying and mind/brain identity can be shown as follows:

As everyone knows, "Water is identical to H2O" is true. This is a very different statement from "Water is identical to a physically expressible computation." If you had a different physical thing, say Q2B, it would not be the same as water even if it carried out the same functions as H2O. Functionalism is not the same as identity.

 

[Zarathaster]

Alright, I think I understand what youre getting at much better now, but Id say theres a very basic epistemological difference in our perspectives. You separate functionalism from identity, but to me they're one and the same. I mean, if for every possible mode of interaction and experimentation, given any level of technology, H20 and Q2B are indistinguishable, then I'd argue that H20 and Q2B are, for our purposes, identical. Of course, to some degree - say to a god's eye that can see into the essence of things, the noumena if you will - there is a difference. But that difference is utterly beyond our powers of perception, so why even pretend we can talk rationally about such things? To me, the essence of things is tied to the information attainable by human minds of such things. Whatever lies beyond that barrier of perception and phenomena cannot pertain to the realm of human understanding. (Alas, Leibniz and Kant must be yawning in their graves)

Your point about the implications of the decoupling of mental states and physical states gives much food for thought though. The possibility of a mental state that is realizable by multiple physical states would open the doors to a whole realm of possibilities. A.I. that could feel real pain. True human communication... Especially since it seems like the type of thing that science might be able to prove/disprove. Maybe.

 

[Pander Bear]

I've just done both by imagining ghosts & zombies respectively. So, the mind is not necessarily identical to the brain therefore the mind is not identical to the brain period.

flaw:imagining zombies and ghosts does not prove your argument. You just took a brain/mind, and subtracted parts to create something new that doesn't exist. I can imagine a pink unicorn, but that doesn't mean there must be pink unicorns for me to imagine them.

 

[ebola?]

>>As it turns out, there is no such thing as an identity that is not necessary. >>

Why might this be?

ebola

 

[skywise]

flaw:imagining zombies and ghosts does not prove your argument. You just took a brain/mind, and subtracted parts to create something new that doesn't exist. I can imagine a pink unicorn, but that doesn't mean there must be pink unicorns for me to imagine them.

The modal argument is not so crude. Of course that something is imaginable doesn't show, by itself, that it is so. You can imagine pink unicorns even though they don't, in fact, exist. What their conceivability tests is whether or not it is 1) logically possible for them to exist or 2) logically necessary that they do not exist. Unicorns are a logical possibility, thus it is only a contingent fact that they do not exist. In contrast, it is not a logical possibility (and thus a necessary fact) that 2+2 does not = 5. Since it is true of any x that it is necessarily identical to itself, and the mind is not necessarily identical to the body, then it follows that the mind is not identical to the body at all. Your counterexample is irrelevant.

 

[Fishface]

Your counterexample is irrelevant.

Just like this thread

 

[Kul69]

I can imagine a situation where anything can be possible to conceive.

It's a situation in which a multiverse exists that contains an infinite number of universes in which everything that is possible or impossible is impossible and possible to conceive in another universe. In any given universe anything could be possible or impossible to conceive of. By existing in a universe in which the above is conceivable I can conceive of anything being possible.

Just because I can imagine something being possible doesn't mean it's real outside of my imagination. Show me a mind without a brain or a brain without a mind and then you'll have something worth discussing. Until you can prove it exists what's the point in imagining it could exist? It doesn't prove a god damn thing and that's why you've received the replies you did.

You could say that since everything is possible to conceive of being both possible and impossible (proven above) everything is true. Basically 1=3 is true according to you just because I can imagine a universe that contains 3 identicle universes. So, the value of 1 in one universe is repeated 3 times so 1=3 if I'm outside of the repeating universe. If I have one apple in one universe I really have 3, right? As long as I'm outside the universe and observing that 1=3. So, 1=3. However, 3!=1 because 3=9 if I'm observing this tripled universe. If I expand my perspective though to an infinite number of universes 3=1 and everything becomes possible and "true" according to your rules. Truth becomes a matter of perspective but in reality all things are true and possible because there are an infinite number of universes. There can also be an infinite number of multiverses and an infinite number of multiverse containers and so on.

I'd say the only real point here is that nothing is impossible until we prove it's impossible but that would be impossible to do because it's possible that anything is possible and we just aren't seeing the whole picture.

So, in summary... nothing is impossible.

 

[skywise]

Zorchaster - Leibniz & Kant

Your invocation of Leibniz' (controversial) identity of indiscernibles suggests you have confused functional equivalence with qualitative equivalence. Two objects can be functionally equivalent, that is perform the same causal function, and still be distinguishable. A bored engineer, for example, could create 2 machines that both performed the exact same function of adding (and no others) out of completely different materials. Likewise, Q2B could perform all the same functions as water (quench thirst, put out fires etc.) but be perceivably different in molecular structure. In the case of the mind, two qualitatively and perceivably different physical processes, like a bird brain process & a human brain process are physically not identical but realize the same causal function of causing pain.

Edit: I'll get to ebola & probably Kul69 later today. Ebola's question is particularly important to understanding the modal argument and should be pretty easy to understand provided I take my time to explain it clearly.

 

[Pander Bear]

Your counterexample is irrelevant.

Only because the example you proffered is equally irrelevant. Your conceptualizations are not things in and of themselves, they are derivations from a human mind/brain.

zombie =brain - mind
ghost = mind - brain


This is all descartes, btw, I'm not entirely winging it here.

Do you have a positive argument for what the nature of the mind is? I'm a materialist, and count the mind as an emulation of lower physical structures of the brain. I'd say that it's just pretty much impossible to describe consciousness via consciousness. Its like trying to examine the ground directly underneath your feet at a given time.

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

The modal argument is not so crude. Of course that something is imaginable doesn't show, by itself, that it is so. You can imagine pink unicorns even though they don't, in fact, exist. What their conceivability tests is whether or not it is 1) logically possible for them to exist or 2) logically necessary that they do not exist. Unicorns are a logical possibility, thus it is only a contingent fact that they do not exist. In contrast, it is not a logical possibility (and thus a necessary fact) that 2+2 does not = 5. Since it is true of any x that it is necessarily identical to itself, and the mind is not necessarily identical to the body, then it follows that the mind is not identical to the body at all. Your counterexample is irrelevant.

By this logic we can easily "prove" that a computer's functionality is not just the operation of its physical components. The user interface is not necessarily identical to the memory state -- it is logically possible to have a functional computer that has any physical configuration, or none.

This is the perfect illustration of the shortcomings of pure logic when applied to the real world. It creates all kinds of absurdities, philosophical ghosts and zombies being the prime examples in this context...

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

Only because the example you proffered is equally irrelevant. Your conceptualizations are not things in and of themselves, they are derivations from a human mind/brain.

zombie =brain - mind
ghost = mind - brain

Precisely. It's only by starting from an implicit premise of dualism that the OP's argument makes any sense at all. If people weren't trapped in Descartes' rut when thinking about consciousness, we wouldn't even have these ridiculous discussions.

Of course the mind is the brain. It's as plain as anything can possibly be. I find it deeply ironic that we need to convince anyone on a drug forum that the mind is physical

 

[Gahan]

I'll just post Arg. 2 now in hopes that it will further clarify the identity thesis that is being rejected. This is known as the Multiple Realizability Argument (the earlier one is known as the Modal argument btw).

P1. All mental kinds are multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds.
P2. If a given mental kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then it cannot be identical to any specific physical kind.
P3. Therefore, No mental kind is identical to any specific physical kind.

Premise 1 just says that a single mental kind, pain, can be realized by many different physical kinds. For example, it can be realized by the a bird, a human , a crocodile, possibly a bug or even a robot etc.

P2 is made more clear by understanding that if mental states were identical with brain states then there would have to be some physical-chemical kind common to the wide variety of pain-bearing species, and correlated exactly with each occurrence of the mental kind. Otherwise, we will have cases where the same mental state (say, a pain) occurs without the supposedly identical physical state. It doesn't make sense to identify a single thing (pain) with a disjunction of things. If you have Clark Kent, you have Superman and you can't have Clark Kent if you don't have Superman but have something else. If two things can come apart then they are obviously not identical.

Since when has anyone actually argued the mind IS the brain? I have never heard that argued before--only, as you put it, that the mind is an effect of the brain.

 

[BodhiSvaha33]

Since when has anyone actually argued the mind IS the brain? I have never heard that argued before--only, as you put it, that the mind is an effect of the brain.

An academic distinction, at best.

 

[Kul69]

Since when has anyone actually argued the mind IS the brain? I have never heard that argued before--only, as you put it, that the mind is an effect of the brain.

Good point.

 

[Gahan]

An academic distinction, at best.

It is much, much more than an 'academic distinction'. It has implications for the form and function of the mind itself, how it should be studied, and even how it is defined. That is hardly a trivial distinction.