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Why Socialism?

bardeaux said:
There are objectively proven laws of economics just as there are objectively proven biological processes.

Here, I disagree. Because the economy is a complex and fundamentally chaotic (in the scientific sense, where small perturbations yield unpredictable results, and where emergent activity in general cannot be predicted from simple causal models), but also involving participants who are guided in part by how they understand their economic activity (thus introducing an element of self-referentiality into the system under study), it has so far been difficult to establish proper scientific laws too readily.

Supply vs demand, diminishing returns, income elasticities, Gibrat's law of growth, Verdoorn's law, comparative advantages.

Some of these examples are more apt than others. I'm pretty skeptical of many aspects of supply and demand curves set in relation, and I don't think price equilibriates to effect maximal production. At least in consumer markets, we need to come to grips with the raw irrationality of consumption decisions, and a lack of rationally structured internal assessment of utility derived. In the case of 'laws' of supply and demand, its more that given certain axioms about human behavior, one can derive inferences on how this behavior 'should' construct other aspects of markets. Gibrat's law is on firmer footing, particularly given how it lends itself to describing growth that we don't usually think of as strictly economic. Verdoorn's law has also been empirically validated to some extent.

ebola
 
Maybe biology was a poor example. Perhaps physics would have been a better comparison, which ranges from empirically digested phenomena to very debatable theoretical phenomena. Both sciences are dependent on environmental factors, and widely accepted theories are routinely smashed by new research.
 
Maybe biology was a poor example. Perhaps physics would have been a better comparison

I actually preferred biology, as physics currently excludes most (perhaps all) chaotic phenomena as its objects of study, while ecology is forced to contend with them.

Both sciences are dependent on environmental factors, and widely accepted theories are routinely smashed by new research.

However, the difference, I think, is that economics only rarely accepts revision via empirical testing, and then quite begrudgingly. That Marxist Political economy currently continues to coexist with Austrian school libertarian analysis is a testament to such. Refer also to the neoclassical frame's continued domination of econometrics despite an ever-accumulating body of empirical evidence from behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists that people only very rarely act as rational utility-maximizers.

But I think that social science finds its underpinnings in rules distinct from those of 'natural sciences' (or rather fails to only at these fields' fringes)...it doesn't makes sense to think of systems that include their constituents' interpretations of such systems as functional elements, particularly those that include the researcher, in the same way as we think about systems that do not (or that can plausibly be simplified as failing to do so).

ebola
 
So biology can't be analysed, theoretically tested and recorded?

Not in any way related to economics.


h'okay then. We shouldn't try to understand the market, we should just accept it's divine and miraculous workings.



How couldn't it be quantified? This would have x effect on production and x effect on consumption, as a very basic example.
The point I'm trying to make is that it's too volatile to be understood and explained forthright.
 
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Refer also to the neoclassical frame's continued domination of econometrics despite an ever-accumulating body of empirical evidence from behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists that people only very rarely act as rational utility-maximizers.

What do you mean by this? I'm sorry, my mind feels a bit cloudy right now. However, even if it wasn't I don't think I would know what you're talking about. You always make me feel stupid when I read the way you write, it's amazing.
 
Heh, that certainly wasn't my intent...maybe I need to reword things. :P
...
Well, this is a bit tricky to explain without knowing your familiarity with economics as a field. Basically, the models of neoclassical microeconomics depend on key assumptions about what drives human behavior. The neoclassicals maintain that people generally make choices on the basis of which options are expected to maximize 'satisfaction' (or utility, rather) via methodical, rational thought. For consumers, this is maximization of the amount of perceived good that one can derive by purchasing and consuming commodities with a given amount of money. For capitalists, this is choice of capital expenditures, organization of production, sales-tactics, etc. according to what maximizes profit. Usually it is assumed that people work in their best long-term interests.

However, in the last couple of decades, cognitive psychologists and their close cousins, behavioral economists, have run numerous experiments showing that people use rough heuristics to guide how they make decisions, and satisfaction derived is severely subject to the immediate context in which one operates. On a more fundamental level, it's implausible that satisfaction in qualitatively diverse domains can be aggregated and quantified; we have no means of "maximizing utility" in any sense as consumers. And then it seems that people make grave errors weighing long-term vs. short-term interests, particularly consumers but also capitalists.

All this entails that the neoclassical argument that unrestrained behavior in markets will set prices to maximize production and utility gained through consumption doesn't work.

ebola
 
Heh, that certainly wasn't my intent...maybe I need to reword things. :P
...
Well, this is a bit tricky to explain without knowing your familiarity with economics as a field. Basically, the models of neoclassical microeconomics depend on key assumptions about what drives human behavior. The neoclassicals maintain that people generally make choices on the basis of which options are expected to maximize 'satisfaction' (or utility, rather) via methodical, rational thought. For consumers, this is maximization of the amount of perceived good that one can derive by purchasing and consuming commodities with a given amount of money. For capitalists, this is choice of capital expenditures, organization of production, sales-tactics, etc. according to what maximizes profit. Usually it is assumed that people work in their best long-term interests.

However, in the last couple of decades, cognitive psychologists and their close cousins, behavioral economists, have run numerous experiments showing that people use rough heuristics to guide how they make decisions, and satisfaction derived is severely subject to the immediate context in which one operates. On a more fundamental level, it's implausible that satisfaction in qualitatively diverse domains can be aggregated and quantified; we have no means of "maximizing utility" in any sense as consumers. And then it seems that people make grave errors weighing long-term vs. short-term interests, particularly consumers but also capitalists.

All this entails that the neoclassical argument that unrestrained behavior in markets will set prices to maximize production and utility gained through consumption doesn't work.

ebola
I get what you're saying. I've thought about this actually. This relates to my opinion that a functioning communist society would be the most efficient society, in regards to survival of the species. However, even if it is not better for the species or the planet, I do not believe in the restrictions that, while they may indeed be beneficial to our race, would impose upon our personal freedom of natural rights. In other words, our freedom to do as we wish as long as we do not restrict others to do as they wish. Thus, what is good for the advancement of the human race, may not be good for the human psyche.

I accept that our "freedom"-oriented consumerist lifestyle is ultimately wasteful and detrimental to our race and the rest of the planet, however I do not subscribe to the theory of controlling people or economies to fix this. However, thank you and I understood what you were saying perfectly that time. If you wish to discuss this more I would be happy to. I often think about how our government styles of the present will lead to our future doom, but at the same time there's no obvious answer. How can you impose a system to be efficient, devoid of human fault, constantly maximizing progress, while the human enforcers of this system fall prey to the same human fault which the system was designed for in the first place. Thus, our rush to think of a radically new system becomes more of the same. Human nature plays itself out no matter which philosophy is ascribed on a mass scale.
 
However, the difference, I think, is that economics only rarely accepts revision via empirical testing, and then quite begrudgingly. That Marxist Political economy currently continues to coexist with Austrian school libertarian analysis is a testament to such.
That intelligent design continues to coexist with evolution is a testament to such.
People spouting contradictory economic ideologies is not an indictment of econ as a social science. There's an important difference between what econ is as a science, and what people interpret its results to mean / what(if any) actions they proscribe governments to take. A pie takes a certain amount of ingredients, and makes a certain number of servings, which have a certain utility or value- econ can help us with understanding this pie, it cannot help us in determining who gets the pie, or what flavor it should've been made of, or whether the next best move is to make another pie or a cake.


ebola said:
Refer also to the neoclassical frame's continued domination of econometrics despite an ever-accumulating body of empirical evidence from behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists that people only very rarely act as rational utility-maximizers.
This ever-accumulating body of evidence is showing that 'rational' and 'utility' aren't as clear-cut as we like to pretend they are, but in no way alters the appropriateness of utility-centric models as the basis of econ (and this is as it should/must be, because all that econ is is the study of swapping goods, and trading goods presupposes value or utility otehrwise there's no point to the transaction. The empirical data you're referencing tells us interesting stuff about what utility is to people/society, not whether utility is sought to be maximized; it is and always will be)
 
That intelligent design continues to coexist with evolution is a testament to such.
People spouting contradictory economic ideologies is not an indictment of econ as a social science.

Yeah, and what I meant is that there are multiple theoretical frameworks, each with axiomatic, logical justification, and each with some (but insufficient) empirical study buttressing their perspective.

in no way alters the appropriateness of utility-centric models as the basis of econ (and this is as it should/must be, because all that econ is is the study of swapping goods, and trading goods presupposes value or utility otehrwise there's no point to the transaction.

Even if we think ourselves to maximize utility, we most often fail to do so, as decision science demonstrates. And then due to theoretical concerns, "utility" does not appear to be a quantifiable object that can be maximized in the first place.

ebola
 
No, we do not maximize utility 100%, nor is that required for models to work. We do work towards it though, no matter how much this is muddied up.

All of these objections and uncertainties you raise are valid but they're addressed and controlled/accounted for in generic economic discussions/models (and thus are irrelevant to bring up here).
 
bmxxxx said:
People spouting contradictory economic ideologies is not an indictment of econ as a social science.

...Of course it is. The lack of any real overarching, agreed upon theory absolutely helps to classify economics as a social science (not to mention the fact that economics is inseparable from the field of sociology.)
 
...no, it's not. If all it took were outliers to discredit a field of study, which would be left?

And it's not the lack of an 'overreaching, agreed upon theory' (econ has one ;) ) that puts economics as a social science, it's its very nature (obviously; economics is the study of how people trade w/ one another, and necessarily requires 'sociology' as a foundation)
[is 'social science' a pejorative? I feel like it's spoken as such, but it does apply to econ and does not degrade it as a result IMO]
 
bmxxx said:
No, we do not maximize utility 100%, nor is that required for models to work. We do work towards it though, no matter how much this is muddied up.

I think that I was arguing for something more specific that does undermine the neoclassical model of supply and demand (and other mainstream economic models in that use supply and demand similarly). Utility in principle cannot be maximized, as qualitatively disparate types of "goodness" cannot be rendered commensurably quantified and added up to some magnitude of "aggregate utility". Though we think that we shape our decision making processes in pursuit of this type of utility maximization, we cannot do such due to a priori constraints on our ability to understand ourselves. Thus, a demand curve cannot be constructed in terms of how consumers make trade-offs between different possible expenditures to maximize utility yielded. Sure, there's a demand curve that we can analyze as implicit in situations where consumers respond to price-signals, and it reflects something, but not utility maximization. In this light, 'laws of supply and demand' don't reflect decision making in the way purported by mainstream economics and fail to describe which prices will effect the most efficient production.

Now, mainstream economic frameworks have a much easier time accounting for consumers' cognitive errors and adjusting their models (in cases where some standard of 'proper' reasoning may be established as a point of comparison). Mainstream economic models can also account for how demand is shaped by social processes but cannot use dynamics internal to their models to explain why these changes occur.

All of these objections and uncertainties you raise are valid but they're addressed and controlled/accounted for in generic economic discussions/models (and thus are irrelevant to bring up here).

I think that the discussion has progressed such that specifics would prove useful. I'll admit that my education in mainstream economics was comparatively shallow, as my specialization was in sociological political economy instead.

...no, it's not. If all it took were outliers to discredit a field of study, which would be left?

multiple perspectives set in contrast, none adjudicated as more useful than another. Not only is this the case between disciplines of social science but also within "economics" as a field that studies the economy in 'its own ways'.

is 'social science' a pejorative? I feel like it's spoken as such, but it does apply to econ and does not degrade it as a result IMO

I don't consider it pejorative ("the study of people in groups is bad!"...lol, wut? :P), but social sciences lend themselves to epistemologies and ontologies distinct from those of 'physical sciences'.

ebola
 
I think I get what you mean re utility, but let me ask- whether or not wanting 'substanceD' is truly me maximizing utility, or just me maximizing a 'utility whim' that may/may not be my maximal utility, doesn't this still allow the models to do any/everything they are intended to? As in, even if the models are showing that we're all maximizing our 'utilty' on alcohol, when it shoulda been weed, isn't the difference in 'true utility' between weed and alcohol practically irrelevant in the context? Ie, normative v prescriptive?
[apologies if I'm completely missing your point, but I'm taking it to mean, in essence, that people are not truly aware of how to maximize* personal utility gained from transactions; however, this really just means that, in the models, it's not "true utility" we're discussing, but "perceived utilty", at which point I can definitely agree that econ models can only approach the latter of the two but, in reality, to understand the former is hardly a matter of #'s and science.
*=I do believe, contrary to what you stated, that 'true' utility is real and aggregable, despite such a value being uberly impossible to ascertain in any practical manner]

EDIT- put another way, maybe it's better to view utility as less of an objective, "truly good" for the person, and a subjective, "believed-to-be-good" for the person. This is interesting and relevant, but doesn't change the modeling, so long as it's a constant (and, of course, this constant sucks because of its variability, but such is 'choice'/fickleness and, in the context of economic modelling, we're dealing with that and thus reflect that in the models. Utility, then, isn't what's truly best for someone, but what they think is best and base their actions upon, ergo the, perhaps loose, usage of 'self-interest' at the crux of the demand-side of the models still accomplishes what it intends to, even if the end result is "perceived utility" and not "true utility".
 
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I think I get what you mean re utility, but let me ask- whether or not wanting 'substanceD' is truly me maximizing utility, or just me maximizing a 'utility whim' that may/may not be my maximal utility, doesn't this still allow the models to do any/everything they are intended to?

Not quite. We have to think of the entire demand-side process, from purchasing decision-making to satisfaction post-consumption. If we say a 'utility whim' is maximized, we simply state that people purchase what is most desired. While people usually think themselves to guide their decisions to 'maximize utility'* in the medium-term, the effects of the purchase and subsequent consumption (and its after-effects) will vary wildly by situation and psychological state at every temporal step along the way. In the context of the purchase, the decision will usually be made via vague intuitions, contextual cues, and the like. It's rare if not completely infrequent for consumers to think as might follow:

"I have x dollars to dispose over y time-span. There are (a, b, c, d, e, f, . . .) products available for purchase. The expected yielded pleasure from each possible selection from the set of possible purchases is as follows: . . ." We can't even answer this question in ordinal terms. This approach is obviously intractable, as these products provide qualitatively different effects on affect, also dependent on interrelation to consumption of other goods, but also psychological state, social context, immediate environment, etc.** That, and nearly no one things thinks out in this way.

So not only do we lack means to accurately predict utility yielded but also the very cognitive machinery necessary to guide our errors via flawed beliefs about utility levels.

As in, even if the models are showing that we're all maximizing our 'utilty' on alcohol, when it shoulda been weed, isn't the difference in 'true utility' between weed and alcohol practically irrelevant in the context? Ie, normative v prescriptive?

I'll concede that this type of maximization of utility-whim occurs in terms of maximization of likelihood to purchase. . .and nearly always along with it, maximization of satisfaction at the moment of choice of purchase. Is this not a mere restatement that those commodities which most strongly motivate to purchase are most high in demand? This does not clearly link utility maximization to purchasing decisions.

'true' utility is real and aggregable, despite such a value being uberly impossible to ascertain in any practical manner

On what grounds do you believe this?

doesn't change the modeling, so long as it's a constant

But we need to step back for a moment and ask what, in particular, are we modeling?

*Let's try pretending that this were possible for a second. We could call "maximized utility" a point in a multidimensional space of emotions/feelings/sensations/etc. where one experiences maximal pleasure. But even this is problematic, as "pleasure" is actually a composite of many types of experiences, each holding distinct import and relation to other experiences depending on context (internal and external).

**The case is simpler with substitutable goods, but the context of purchase and consumption of other, non-substitutable goods will shape the type of pleasure yielded in consumption, problematizing the very distinction between substitutable and non-substitutable goods.

ebola
 
What is the point in measuring consumer efficiency? Is it like a contest of which sheep act the best?

Sorry :p
 
capital.jpg
 
By "sheep", are you referring to anyone under any economic system what-so-ever? Because you can measure consumer efficiency in all economies.

No, I said "Like". Like, you want the nice white sheep that produces wool regularly. Not the irregular black-wooled sheep. It was an analogy, not a direct calling of consumers "sheep".

Bit_pattern: Excellent point, but thus far implemented socialist systems haven't managed equality of wealth as well as socialist-capitalist systems. edit: Which (socialist-capitalist systems) have been responsible for those same things. Still, the best systems in the world are socialist/capitalist.
 
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