Foreigner
Bluelighter
https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one
Please read the whole article before participating in this thread. It's very fascinating.
The author, via neuroscience, paints some interesting conclusions about the assumptions we make regarding consciousness. One of his most interesting points is that our experience of having a body and a static self is a sort of controlled hallucination based on past beliefs and expectations, when the truth is that nothing is static. Even what one thinks of as ones self is not 'one thing' but a huge variety of inputs and reactions being measured and reassessed every moment. It's all a regulatory process that arises from the meat trying to maintain itself in orientation to other objects in the world.
Ironically, predictive models explain consciousness better than sensory models for this reason. Rather than I think therefore I am, it's more like I predict myself and therefore I am. You assume you're a you and that you're in there somewhere, so it continues to arise in a self-affirming way, even though it has a fluidic, mutable nature.
The author ends up reducing consciousness to the brain and materialism only, but I thought it could be fun to have a consciousness discussion based on these principles because the 'hard problem' is pervasive in all of philosophy. In materialism, this author's theory makes a lot more sense to me than anything I've heard previously.
What is the best way to understand consciousness? In philosophy, centuries-old debates continue to rage over whether the Universe is divided, following René Descartes, into ‘mind stuff’ and ‘matter stuff’. But the rise of modern neuroscience has seen a more pragmatic approach gain ground: an approach that is guided by philosophy but doesn’t rely on philosophical research to provide the answers. Its key is to recognise that explaining why consciousness exists at all is not necessary in order to make progress in revealing its material basis – to start building explanatory bridges from the subjective and phenomenal to the objective and measurable.
Let’s begin with David Chalmers’s influential distinction, inherited from Descartes, between the ‘easy problem’ and the ‘hard problem’. The ‘easy problem’ is to understand how the brain (and body) gives rise to perception, cognition, learning and behaviour. The ‘hard’ problem is to understand why and how any of this should be associated with consciousness at all: why aren’t we just robots, or philosophical zombies, without any inner universe? It’s tempting to think that solving the easy problem (whatever this might mean) would get us nowhere in solving the hard problem, leaving the brain basis of consciousness a total mystery.
But there is an alternative, which I like to call the real problem: how to account for the various properties of consciousness in terms of biological mechanisms; without pretending it doesn’t exist (easy problem) and without worrying too much about explaining its existence in the first place (hard problem)
Please read the whole article before participating in this thread. It's very fascinating.
The author, via neuroscience, paints some interesting conclusions about the assumptions we make regarding consciousness. One of his most interesting points is that our experience of having a body and a static self is a sort of controlled hallucination based on past beliefs and expectations, when the truth is that nothing is static. Even what one thinks of as ones self is not 'one thing' but a huge variety of inputs and reactions being measured and reassessed every moment. It's all a regulatory process that arises from the meat trying to maintain itself in orientation to other objects in the world.
Ironically, predictive models explain consciousness better than sensory models for this reason. Rather than I think therefore I am, it's more like I predict myself and therefore I am. You assume you're a you and that you're in there somewhere, so it continues to arise in a self-affirming way, even though it has a fluidic, mutable nature.
The author ends up reducing consciousness to the brain and materialism only, but I thought it could be fun to have a consciousness discussion based on these principles because the 'hard problem' is pervasive in all of philosophy. In materialism, this author's theory makes a lot more sense to me than anything I've heard previously.
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