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Philosophy of Mathematics (The validity of Mathematics)

freejroll

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Joined
Apr 25, 2006
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People tend to assume that mathematics is point where we can all agree. That is to say, we can all agree that 1+1=2, regardless of our philosophical standing. Again, that is to say that mathematics is a philosophically neutral ground. I would like to examine this. (The main focus on my thread will begin with the epistemological and metaphysical claims. I’ll try to give a brief introduction, I don’t know how much it’ll help, though…)

This may seem absurd. It may seem obvious that everyone believes that 1+1=2. However, it might surprise you to learn that not everyone does. Radical monists would state that everything is one. Some versions of Hindu think that plurality is illusion, so on the ultimate level of being, everything is again one. This means 1+1=1.

This shows us that even the simplest arithmetical truths can be sustained in a world-view which acknowledges an ultimate metaphysical plurality in the world. It also must be that there is an ultimate metaphysical unity, since we have “sames.” Two sticks remain sticks even though there are two. In different equations, the number two is the same number, but at different times.
So beginning this thread, we have the problem of the one and the many. We will not talk about that here, though. But to be sure, it is an important problem, and it’ll be raised later.

Some mathematicians do not agree on the validity of certain proofs. For example, intuitionists do not accept the law of excluded middle or the proof by reduction ad absurdum. The human mind is where truth rests. Mathematics is concerned with mental constructions. Therefore proofs that we cannot grasp do not exist. If you aren’t aware of this, and would want an example, ask. Anyhow, this poses a problem.

There are disputes in geometric truth, truths of analysis, and even mathematical existence. I won’t go into this for the sake of a very long thread, but if you want, I can go into it as much as I know.
Anyway, mathematics seems to have at least two problem areas. They are epistemology and metaphysics.

Epistemology
Here we discuss how we come to the knowledge that 1+1=2. Do we know it a priori, or internally, without experience, or do we know it a posteriori, or externally, derived from experience. Plato claims that we gained it by reminiscence or introspection. Bertrand Russell says logical arguments. John Stuart Mill would say from repeated experience. A. J. Ayer says it’s a linguistic convention and not real “knowledge.”

A priori. 1+1=2 is a universal truth. Why should 1 stick plus 1 stick make 2 sticks, though? It might seem ludicrous, but this is a real problem. If we know it, internally, and without experience, why should the external world be contingent and offer us repeated examples of this. If the external world is made up of completely chance matter, why is there a connection? Why don’t sticks disappear and appear randomly while we are counting them? If the outside world has a degree of regularity mixed in with chance elements, why should that regularity coincide with the internal mathematical expectations of the human mind? When you make the Cartesian separation of a priori[/i[ and a posteriori you can’t get them back.

Further, if mathematics is a priori, why do paradoxes arise.. . especially in the form if contradictions… (See Burali-forti’s paradox, or Bertrand Russell’s paradox) or in the form of various counter-intuitive results (Peano’s space-filling curves, Lowenhein-Skolem theorem)… These paradoxes seem to show that saying that mathematics is a priori is not really reliable…

A posteriori. Because of the difficulties of the a priori explanation of mathematics, we have the a posteriori explanation. Mathematical knowledge is inductive. See my induction thread also for better knowledge of induction.. We know that 1+1=2 from repeated examples of one object plus another one making two objects. However, we haven’t seen 234343 objects plus 2343 objects making 236686 objects (I hope my math is correct lol). But we have generalized. But to say this, hints at the a priori answer. Further, why don’t we generalize that 23+1=24 instead of 23+1=25? You can really only say because you have generalized from other generalizations. You do this because you have generalized from previous experience of generalizing, etc…. See my thread on induction. Further, at some point, you might say that this is the way the human mind operates. We then fall into the a priori explanation and it’s problems.

Conventional answer. Mathematicians seem to accept this answer. Mathematics is in some sense a convention of the human language. It isn’t knowledge at all. 1+1=2 because we have agreed to use the words one and two in that way (see Wittgenstein). To say 1+1=2, we are saying A=A in a roundabout way (A.J. Ayer).

These seem like the a priori answer. Why should mathematics prove useful in dealing with the outside world? If it is pure convention… If the conventions are chose because they are useful, we have the a posteriori answer. The conventional answer isn’t really an answer. It’s only a shifting of the question.

Reading Godel’s proof would help you understand the difficulties of all of these answers. I won’t go into it here, because of the massiveness of this thread already.

Metaphysical
The one and the many. 1+1=2 means something. If someone told me that 1+1=2, say a baby for example muttering his first words, I wouldn’t believe that he understood that until he could demonstrate it (do word problems, show the symbols on a chalkboard, etc). So it would be safe to say that we can’t know 1+1=2 until we know many things in relation to that truth. So we are concerned with many experiences and truths in relation to that one.

Modern linguistic theory has pointed out that we can’t understand these symbols without some specification of it’s contrast. 1+1=2 only has meaning as part of a greater system (a plurality). 1+1=2, 1+2=3, and that 1+1=3 is false, etc. We should also understand it on a variational range. 1+1=2, one plus one equals two, I + I = II. We should also understand it distributed in larger units of linguistic behavior and human behavior (proofs using this, word problems, used in calculating your bills, figuring out prices, etc…)

We have to show the unity and stability in this vast amount of truths and experiences though. Some people ask, how can we know anything without knowing everything? This is a valid question. As we have seen, we must know the larger context in which the proof is embedded until we can understand the proof. But we don’t know all of the larger context. How can we? Therefore the next question is how do we not know that the next thing we discover will upset our knowledge.

Physics has changed during the Newtonian revolution, the Einsteinian revolution, and the quantum revolution. Mathematics has revised itself, too, at times (discovering irrationals by the Pythagoreans, discovering contradictions arising from reasoning with the naïve idea of set… russell’s paradox). How do we not know that we won’t revise mathematics again to change our proofs. 1+1=2 might not be true tomorrow!

In philosophy, if we art with an ultimate plurality we have to explain how unity arises. If we start with a unity, we have to explain how plurality arises. I realize this thread is huge. It took me a while to come up with it. I copied people’s ideas throughout the whole post and just put my own twist on them. I can provide references for most of this stuff if you want.
 
solitude_within, I made this thread for you :(

(for your question from my induction thread)

*shameless bump*
 
I like how they did it at school, 1 bannana plus another bannana equals 2 bannananananas. It was irrefutable; the bannanas were there.
 
To the O.P.

Well, you're playing a little bit fast and loose with the a priori, a posteriori distinction. All something's being a priori entails is that it can be known logically prior to empirical experience. All something's being a posteriori entails is that it can only be known logically after (or through) experience. Also, I don't think the distinction was made by Descartes.

Being a priori doesn't mean something is somehow "in the head". Platonists, ancient and modern, believe that mathematical entities are objectively existing objects independent of mathematical knowers. This view is compatible with and usually paired with the view that Math is an a priori discipline. Also, any problem in knowing why the physical world is mathematically regulated does not by itself suggest a problem with mathematical truths being a priori.

You briefly mention that certain paradoxes suggest that the a prioricity of Mathematics is not reliable. I'm not sure if you mean that these paradoxes suggest that the belief that Mathematics is a priori is unreliable or that a priori methods of gaining knowledge are unreliable. If you mean the first, you need to elaborate on the paradoxes and explain how they undermine the view that Mathematics is a priori. If you mean the latter, you're simply mistaken that being a priori entails certainty. It's true that lay people and some of the older philosophers (e.g., Kant) sometimes use 'a priori' and 'certain' interchangably, but this is a mistake. Obviously, you can be uncertain and incorrect about a very complex math problem. Yet this does not imply that you couldn't in principle come to know the answer to the problem without any empirical experience.

Last, I don't think its true that most Mathematicians are conventionalists. Godel, the famously anti-conventionalist champion of Platonism immediately comes to mind.

Anyway, sorry if some of this seems picky but it seemed to me that you were giving both realist and a priori views about Mathematics short shrift.
 
I am giving it short shift. Only because when I typed this I did it on Microsoft word first, and it was over 3 pages. I condensed the distinctions down and I may have made some things unclear. I figured the thread would be huge. I even thought it would be multiple pages. It wasn't as big as I anticipated.

I'll respond to your question when I get back from work. :)
 
swilow said:
I like how they did it at school, 1 bannana plus another bannana equals 2 bannananananas. It was irrefutable; the bannanas were there.

qwe said:
you didnt have to write all that. all you need to support "1+1=1" is some playdo

You two didn't read it lol
 
I'm going to try to respond to your thread. Some of your post is a little confusing to me because I can't find where I talked about that specific thing you are referring to in my thread. If you would quote me, it would help me a lot.

skywise said:
Well, you're playing a little bit fast and loose with the a priori, a posteriori distinction. All something's being a priori entails is that it can be known logically prior to empirical experience. All something's being a posteriori entails is that it can only be known logically after (or through) experience. Also, I don't think the distinction was made by Descartes.

Here is one part. I'm not sure about the first part of your paragraph (I alluded to this in my post). The second part (the distinction not made by Descartes) confuses me as well. I don't believe I stated that he made the distinction. I alluded to the cartesian separation, but that was discussing the separation of the mind and body or subject and object, and difficulty to "bring them back" once separated. Many times this is refered to as the "cartesian separation" of the mind and body or "cartesian dualism."

Being a priori doesn't mean something is somehow "in the head". Platonists, ancient and modern, believe that mathematical entities are objectively existing objects independent of mathematical knowers. This view is compatible with and usually paired with the view that Math is an a priori discipline. Also, any problem in knowing why the physical world is mathematically regulated does not by itself suggest a problem with mathematical truths being a priori.

I'm not sure what this addresses in my post. I have my thoughts on it, but I want to know what you are addressing specifically. If you quote me, it would help me a lot.


You briefly mention that certain paradoxes suggest that the a prioricity of Mathematics is not reliable. I'm not sure if you mean that these paradoxes suggest that the belief that Mathematics is a priori is unreliable or that a priori methods of gaining knowledge are unreliable. If you mean the first, you need to elaborate on the paradoxes and explain how they undermine the view that Mathematics is a priori. If you mean the latter, you're simply mistaken that being a priori entails certainty. It's true that lay people and some of the older philosophers (e.g., Kant) sometimes use 'a priori' and 'certain' interchangably, but this is a mistake. Obviously, you can be uncertain and incorrect about a very complex math problem. Yet this does not imply that you couldn't in principle come to know the answer to the problem without any empirical experience.

I want to respond to this, but I don't have the time right now.

The paradoxes show that historically considered, supposedly a priori mathematical convictions are not always reliable. I'll elaborate on the paradoxes when I get a chance.


Last, I don't think its true that most Mathematicians are conventionalists. Godel, the famously anti-conventionalist champion of Platonism immediately comes to mind.

I even mentioned Godel lol.
 
mmm...I'm likely most close to the conventionalist understanding.
But I think that mathematical systems are built from our choice of axioms and subsequent moves to build useful conceptual tools.

They are true apriori, depending on the context of the universe at that point.

ebola
 
Reading the original post, though I am not as well read as other BLs here, a thought came to me...

Mathematics is just a abstraction away from reality, a way of categorising our everyday world. The two sticks (in the example), as objects, are two distinct sticks - slightly different colours, textures, etc. We use mathematics to generalise the world, therefore we have 2 sticks according to our number system. As we determine the rules for building this system, how can we then undermine it by saying something like 1+1=1. To me that suggests that they are in fact the same brown stick, not different sticks.

doobidan
 
freejroll

This quote from my post...

Being a priori doesn't mean something is somehow "in the head". Platonists, ancient and modern, believe that mathematical entities are objectively existing objects independent of mathematical knowers. This view is compatible with and usually paired with the view that Math is an a priori discipline.

... Is in response to these sections from your first post

freejroll said:
Epistemology
Here we discuss how we come to the knowledge that 1+1=2. Do we know it a priori, or internally, without experience, or do we know it a posteriori, or externally, derived from experience. Plato claims that we gained it by reminiscence or introspection....

Here you talk of a priori knowledge being knowledge known "internally" and say that Plato's view is that we come to know a priori truths through introspection. This language suggested to me that you were locating a priori knowledge, "in the head" and misrepresenting Plato. Plato is generally held to have thought that mathematical truth exists independently of the human mind and is accessed through reason. This isn't quite the same as "introspection" which suggests looking into one's self or one's mind.

Also, early in your post you assert:

freejroll said:
The human mind is where truth rests. Mathematics is concerned with mental constructions. Therefore proofs that we cannot grasp do not exist. If you aren’t aware of this, and would want an example, ask. Anyhow, this poses a problem.

This is not obviously true and many people, including Plato and Godel would disagree.

This section of my post...

skywise said:
Also, any problem in knowing why the physical world is mathematically regulated does not by itself suggest a problem with mathematical truths being a priori.

...refers to this part of your first post (which is listed under the a priori heading in your epistemology section):

freejroll said:
A priori. 1+1=2 is a universal truth. Why should 1 stick plus 1 stick make 2 sticks, though? It might seem ludicrous, but this is a real problem. If we know it, internally, and without experience, why should the external world be contingent and offer us repeated examples of this. If the external world is made up of completely chance matter, why is there a connection? Why don’t sticks disappear and appear randomly while we are counting them? If the outside world has a degree of regularity mixed in with chance elements, why should that regularity coincide with the internal mathematical expectations of the human mind?

You end this paragraph writing, "When you make the Cartesian separation of a priori and a posteriori you can’t get them back."

You are right in your later post that Cartesian separation is a separation of mind and body. But in your first post you refer to "Cartesian separation of a priori and a posteriori. This is what led me to point out that the a priori/a posteriori distinction does not originate with Descartes.


freejroll said:
The paradoxes show that historically considered, supposedly a priori mathematical convictions are not always reliable. I'll elaborate on the paradoxes when I get a chance.

Please do elaborate. Given what you've written here, I don't see why this is a problem. Arguably, no type of conviction is always reliable.

freejroll said:
I even mentioned Godel lol.

Yes, but you did not mention hims as a Platonist. Rather, you suggested that reading "the Godel proof" would help us understand the difficulty of all of the epistemological views of Mathematical knowledge you mentioned. I mentioned him for the purpose of offering a high profile Mathematician who is not a conventionalist.
 
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doobidan said:
Mathematics is just a abstraction away from reality, a way of categorising our everyday world. The two sticks (in the example), as objects, are two distinct sticks - slightly different colours, textures, etc. We use mathematics to generalise the world, therefore we have 2 sticks according to our number system. As we determine the rules for building this system, how can we then undermine it by saying something like 1+1=1. To me that suggests that they are in fact the same brown stick, not different sticks.

doobidan

This view about Mathematics is not obviously true. You might think that Mathematical entities are more real than those things we perceive via our 5 senses. This is Pythagoras' view.

Less counterintuitively, you might think that Mathematical entities are independent of and just as real as things we perceive through our senses. In defense of this view Godel wrote:

It seems to me that the assumption of [mathematical] objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence. They are in the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions.... ("Russell's mathematical logic")
 
how about seeing 2-d with one eye + seeing 2-d with the other eye
and ending up with seeing 3-d with 2 eyes
2+2=3


its all relative
 
>>
This view about Mathematics is not obviously true. You might think that Mathematical entities are more real than those things we perceive via our 5 senses. This is Pythagoras' view.>>

I would argue that the empirical view of math is true in a single loose sense:

Mathematical cognition borrows from living experience metaphorically. I think that's how it gets off the ground (or rather how we become proficient and how it was originally discovered/invented). This is corroborated by physiological data: mathematical cognition depends on neural circuits that run from sensory-motor areas to frontal corticies.

However, I would say that the "two sticks" scenario kind of begs the question. If we abstract math from manipulating objects, what is it that we extract, and how do we know when to transport it to other situations? Why do ALL humans come up with similar abstractions in these situations?
 
Why should mathematics prove useful in dealing with the outside world?
our understanding of mathematics grew out of our search for knowledge about the world, and our using materials in the world

thats why the conceptual structures we call mathematics correlate with the outside world...
 
However, I would say that the "two sticks" scenario kind of begs the question. If we abstract math from manipulating objects, what is it that we extract, and how do we know when to transport it to other situations? Why do ALL humans come up with similar abstractions in these situations?

How would you describe the concept of addition to a child without reference to any external objects? Once you teach the child the symbols (abstraction), it can then transfer the same process to different scenarios, and we learn when to apply these processes (i.e. when I want to know the quantity of something). With some extra work, we have subtraction, multiplication, division, calculus, etc..

ALL humans come up with similar abstractions because they are human.

You might think that Mathematical entities are more real than those things we perceive via our 5 senses. This is Pythagoras' view.

I don't agree with this view. I feel that once discovered they become entities in their own right but only when discovered. They never become "more real".

doobidan
 
ebola? said:
>>Mathematical cognition borrows from living experience metaphorically. I think that's how it gets off the ground (or rather how we become proficient and how it was originally discovered/invented). This is corroborated by physiological data: mathematical cognition depends on neural circuits that run from sensory-motor areas to frontal corticies.

I think it's true that people usually (always?) learn Mathematics via sensual experience (this single apple, plus this single apple = 2 apples, etc.). But the view I was challenging in the post you quoted was the view that Mathematical entities (metaphysically) just are mental abstractions and "categorizations" of the "real" world.

doobidan said:
How would you describe the concept of addition to a child without reference to any external objects? Once you teach the child the symbols (abstraction), it can then transfer the same process to different scenarios, and we learn when to apply these processes (i.e. when I want to know the quantity of something). With some extra work, we have subtraction, multiplication, division, calculus, etc..

ALL humans come up with similar abstractions because they are human.

I don't agree with [Pyathagoras'] view. I feel that once discovered they become entities in their own right but only when discovered. They never become "more real".

It could be that the teaching/learning methods you are referencing are just that - methods for teaching and learning Mathematics. The fact that we learn Mathematics by analogy to things in the real world does not, by itself, imply anything about what Mathematics is. Humans learn all kinds of things by abstraction (I learned about gravity as a physical principle by watching specific examples of things falling), but that doesn't suggest that these things aren't more or just as real as individual things, and it certainly doesn't suggest that these things didn't exist as "real entities in their own right" until they were discovered!
 
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