Non-technical anti physicalist concerns

[skywise]

As some of you may or may not remember, I've made a couple of threads in the past presenting somewhat technical modal arguments against various physicalist views about consciousness. Here, I'm going to present some very common sense ideas that pose a problem for the view that consciousness is physical. I'm hoping to get some hard-line physicalist replies to this as arguing with you folks can only help make my papers on the subject better!

Anyone who wants to claim that consciousness is fully constituted by physical facts carries the burden of explaining how it is that physical facts constitute consciousness. This is straightforward enough. If there is good reason to believe that liquidity is fully constituted by physical facts (and presumably there is), then there should be an explanation which makes clear how physical facts are sufficient for something's being liquid. Likewise with consciousness.

The problem with consciousness is that it seems like no physical facts, however fine grained or complicated, will ever “add up” to the experience of blue (or pain, or any conscious experience). We might learn more about light and how the eye reacts to it. We might also learn interesting things about how the brain functions in relation to information gathered from the eye. We will probably even eventually be able to predict with great accuracy what color experiences, in fact, emerge from very specific brain processes. But, it will still seem entirely arbitrary to us that a particular brain process should give rise to the color experience that it does. It will still make sense to ask, “How is it that this brain process give rise to blue rather than red, or no color at all even?”

What makes a materialist answer to this question so difficult is that it must be given solely in terms of the physical facts. The materialist must say, “Don’t you see? These physical facts are all there is to the blue color experience.” But that remains unconvincing. In cases where the physical facts are genuinely sufficient, it is just a confusion to ask something like, “How do these physical facts give rise to liquidity?” In the case of conscious states, it seems like the physical facts could just as easily correspond to red, or no color at all. Someone with the view that consciousness is somehow non-physical, on the other hand, can appeal to laws of nature to explain the brute arbitrariness. Just like the answer to questions regarding gravitation like, “How does one body exert a force on another from far away?” can be given in terms of gravitation just being a fundamental law of nature, the dualist can likewise respond to questions about how physical processes give rise to phenomenal states by answering, “That physical processes of this kind give rise to phenomenal states of this kind is just an application of fundamental laws of nature regulating conscious states to physical processes.”

Granted, one might point out that scientific discoveries are often unpredictable. Surely it would be arrogant to suggest that just because we cannot explain consciousness in terms of physical facts now, no one will ever be able to. I am sympathetic to this kind of response. It basically amounts to the admission that, “I don’t know if consciousness is physical or not, but I’ll place my bets that it is and we just don’t know how yet.” Given how how difficult the problem of consciousness has proven, this seems like a perfectly reasonable reply. However, this reply is not open to anyone who claims to know for that consciousness is physical for the simple reason that it is an admission of not knowing. Likewise, this response isn't open to anyone who claims to have given a fully physical explanation of consciousness for the simple reason that their explanation is supposed to illuminate how consciousness is purely physical.

Let me know what you guys think about this.

 

[ebola?]

Do we have any hard-line "physicalists"?
...

>>The problem with consciousness is that it seems like no physical facts, however fine grained or complicated, will ever “add up” to the experience of blue (or pain, or any conscious experience).>>

Does a constellation of quark-gluon interactions ever add up into a biological cell in any coherent way?
...
Now it could also be the case that qualia bear completely capricious relationships to physical interactions...so NO ONE has the same "blue", but we've tricked each other with language and observation. That'd be odd.

ebola

 

[skywise]

Do we have any hard-line "physicalists"?

I know there used to be one guy around here who seemed to have taken Dennett, a paradigmatic hard-line physicalist, as his authority on all things consciousness. Then there were also some other posters who took a hard-line position against the modal argument I offered, repeating again and again that if it wasn't physical then it was "magic".

Does a constellation of quark-gluon interactions ever add up into a biological cell in any coherent way?

In short, yes. A modal thought experiment kind of way to see this is to imagine a world in which all of the quark-gluon interaction facts (i.e. sub-atomic facts) held. Plausibly, this would automatically bring along the biological facts with it. This is because the sub-atomic physical facts in our world fully constitute and are sufficient for the biological facts. But it seems like even in situations in which all the physical facts held, there is still some wiggle room for the phenomenal facts to differ or be absent. This suggests an explanatory gap unlike the one between other low-level physical facts and the high level ones that are constituted by them.

Now it could also be the case that qualia bear completely capricious relationships to physical interactions...so NO ONE has the same "blue", but we've tricked each other with language and observation. That'd be odd.

Exactly. And if it is possible (however implausible) for the physical facts to be the same, but the phenomenal facts to differ, then the physical facts do not sufficiently account for the phenomenal ones. Notice that there does not seem to be even a remote possibility that biological facts bear completely capricious relationships to sub-atomic facts. Certainly it would be a lot more odd (crazy even) if this were the case. This is because its pretty clear that the sub-atomic facts completely constitute the biological ones. Also notice that it seems possible (if implausible) that any causal antecedents might bear completely capricious relationships to their consequents. (It seems possible, if highly improbable, that a green billiard ball might morph into Brigette Bardot if I roll it into a red one). There is room for capriciousness when dealing with fundamental laws of nature, but not so much when dealing with constitution.

 

[Ugster]

I've had discussions with materialists and it's always the same thing, they often conclude that all experience is explained by chemicals in the brain and this consequently makes spiritual or paranormal experiences invalid, and yet it would seem to me that just because we have an idea of how something works doesn't mean we know why it works. Experience IS, this can't be denied.

I read an interesting article that kinda pertains to this subject


Lemme dig it up..

http://deoxy.org/parashft.htm

 

[ebola?]

>>
In short, yes. A modal thought experiment kind of way to see this is to imagine a world in which all of the quark-gluon interaction facts (i.e. sub-atomic facts) held. Plausibly, this would automatically bring along the biological facts with it.>>

I could imagine a world in which a particular configuration of subatomic particles brings about a different result on more macro levels. Furthermore, just in our world, it is the case that particular subatomic configurations create particular higher-order trends, but the set of possible subatomic "soups" that could compose a skin cell, for example, is immense and incoherent.

This too is the case with the relationship between neural events and qualia. I don't think that there is a radical break between psychology and all other levels of analysis...except in terms of psychology's "private" nature. But then again, our conception of matter is built from perception in our private psychologies.

ebola

 

[Fausty]

I know there used to be one guy around here who seemed to have taken Dennett, a paradigmatic hard-line physicalist, as his authority on all things consciousness.

In ten years of on and off exposure to the literature on consciousness, I can't say I've ever run across this "physicalist" label before. Whatever that label means, I rather suspect that Dennett himself would chafe at it - he's not one for facile labels, in general.

As to him being a "physicalist" in some substantive manner. . . well, he's a theoretical philosopher. I'd perhaps look for more hard-science based theorists on consciousness in the class of researchers including Koch, D'Amasio, Crick, Pinker - or even Panskepp.

This is because the sub-atomic physical facts in our world fully constitute and are sufficient for the biological facts. But it seems like even in situations in which all the physical facts held, there is still some wiggle room for the phenomenal facts to differ or be absent. This suggests an explanatory gap unlike the one between other low-level physical facts and the high level ones that are constituted by them.

This is a common but serious misunderstanding of systemic "levels" and the interaction between algorithmic rule sets and n-order system states. To say that subatomic interactions are "sufficient for the biological facts" assumes, first, that we have a cohesive understanding of the full range of subatomic interactions. We don't.

Even if we did, however, we face the enormous epistemological gap introduced by the inherently stochastic nature of quantum interactions (as we currently understand them). In short, things get fuzzy when they get small. Building a deterministic bridge from that soup of fuzzy interactions to the level of biological systems as seen on planet Earth is way, way, way beyond even the most optimistic hopes of current systems theoreticians and specialists in the various fields.

But it's deeper than that.

In fact, there's ample mathematical support building up that this kind of "understanding the algorithms means we understand every possible permutation of a system governed by the algorithms" approach to expository work in systems theory is just plain wrong (which, admittedly, is better than being "not even wrong" - sorry, random theoretical physics joke ). The relationship between algorithmic "substrate" and system behavior is complex in a way for which we don't yet have proper language. Those familiar with Kolgomorov's work will not be surprised by this - there is in fact "information" (in the Shannon usage of the word) embedded in the manner in which the algorithms are expressed. We need not cite Wolfram's punishingly comprehensive overview of the scope of algorithmic inquiry, in A New Kind of Science, to push the point further - but I will anyway :D

In sum, particle physics doesn't "explain" biological systems any more than me saying "1 n/and/or 0" explains the LOLcat meme. Admittedly, the language and tools for exploring "inter-level" analytic questions is rather immature in the systems field presently. Still, there's all but universal agreement based on overwhelming theoretical and empirical data that expecting one "level" of a system to inclusively contain a complete set of information/algorithmic state matrices for other levels is. . . naive to the point of fantastical. All the world in a grain of sand - but worse.

Anyone who wants to claim that consciousness is fully constituted by physical facts carries the burden of explaining how it is that physical facts constitute consciousness.

Fair enough.

However, anyone who expects folks living in the physical world of empirically verifiable, testable, replicable science to "carry the burden" of explaining something needs to, first, rigorously define the topic at hand. You say physical reality can't explain "consciousness." I ask you: what is this thing you call "consciousness?"

After a decade of poking around in this (fascinating) area of research, and after dropping out of a doctoral program with this as its focus, I've provisionally decided that this concept is not, itself, cohesive and representative of a discrete, well-bounded idea. In fact, I think the fatal squishiness (I love using that term, btw) of the idea of "consciousness" itself is an artifact of a deeper, systemic flaw in how humans conceptualize themselves and the world around them. Looking back at the history of the concept, in the spirit of Kuhn, we see that its roots lead straight back to the Descartesian fallacy that humans have some special goo in them that nothing else, anywhere in this universe or any other, has - it comes from God, you see. The very conceptual foundation of "consciousness" is rotten at its very roots, and has only become more so as a phantasmogorical filigree of theoretic glue has been smeared over these cracks, for centuries, until today we're left with nothing but an amorphous blob.

In short, "consciousness" is a spandrel.

Eagerly awaiting refutation via definitional precision!

Peace,

Fausty

 

[mulberryman]

^Wow, well put sir, even if it was so very hard to understand.

At the risk of spreading more goo, hey what if those string theorists are right, and there really are 10 dimensions,

http://www.tenthdimension.com/medialinks.php

All sorts of cosmically trancedental fuzzies might exist. Or maybe not might, but simply do. Everything could exist and nothing at all, all simultaneously regardless of how much possibility is wrapped up in its substance.

 

[TheDEA.org]

Let me know what you guys think about this.

There is a vast body of evidence that consciousness is the product of the physical wiring and chemical interactions of the neurons inside our skulls. We can easily alter consciousness through drugs and even surgical alterations of the brain. There isn't a single convincing piece of evidence that consciousness comes from non-physical phenomenon.

Good enough for me.

You seem to be pursuing a variant of the 'god of the gaps' theory, ie. if science can't explain a particular phenomenon, then that phenomenon must not be within the realm of physical science. Before physics, lightning was 'obviously' the work of the gods. Before germ theory, disease was 'obviously' the work of spirits, etc. Of course, that logic doesn't survive even a cursory examination. Just because you don't have a logically robust, evidence-based explanation for something doesn't mean you get to populate the gap in knowledge with an unsupported theory and insist that it has credibility in the absence of proven alternatives.

 

[skywise]

I could imagine a world in which a particular configuration of subatomic particles brings about a different result on more macro levels.

Really? I have a hard time imagining that. Presumably the subatomic facts of science are posited because they explain higher level atomic facts. I mean, we cannot actually observe most of these particles directly, so the only reason we have for positing them is their explanatory power, no? And if these are accurate explanations of the higher level facts that they are posited to explain, then I'm going to hold strong and say that the sub-atomic facts couldn't hold without the higher-level atomic facts holding. Why? Because the sub-atomic particles constitute the atom.

Anyway, this is fairly uncontentious view of explanation. Once we have explained that water is constituted by H2O, then there will be very few people who would claim that the same H2O might give rise to mercury on the macro level.

Furthermore, just in our world, it is the case that particular subatomic configurations create particular higher-order trends, but the set of possible subatomic "soups" that could compose a skin cell, for example, is immense and incoherent.

The claim about incoherence aside (which I ask for some explication on), this observation doesn't have any force against my concerns. No doubt there are lots of different low-level configurations that could give rise to the same high-level ones. All this shows with regard to qualia is that a single sensation can be constituted by a wide array of physical systems. For your analogy from the actual world to work, it would have to be the case that the exact same low-level configurations actually give rise to various high-level ones. To reuse my above example, if H2O actually gave rise to mercury and other times give rise to water, then you would have a phenomena from the actual world anlogous to what I am claiming about physical systems and consciousness.

This too is the case with the relationship between neural events and qualia. I don't think that there is a radical break between psychology and all other levels of analysis...except in terms of psychology's "private" nature. But then again, our conception of matter is built from perception in our private psychologies.

As mentioned above, the "radical break" being claimed isn't that only consciousness can be realized by multiple physical systems. That is obviously false. The break is an explanatory break, in that no physical facts seem to explain a blue color experience. Now, I think there is something to your invocation of sub-atomic particles. Namely, that much is still unknown regarding the sub-atomic world. To the extent that this is the point of your analogy, I'm with you. Much is still unknown about consciousness. But, I think thats as far as the analogy goes.

 

[skywise]

There is a vast body of evidence that consciousness is the product of the physical wiring and chemical interactions of the neurons inside our skulls. We can easily alter consciousness through drugs and even surgical alterations of the brain. There isn't a single convincing piece of evidence that consciousness comes from non-physical phenomenon.

Good enough for me.

Everything you've written here is completely compatible with the view that consciousness is somehow non-physical. A blue color sensation is caused by certain physical facts because there are psycho-physical laws regulating those physical facts to their corresponding experiences. But this is not the same as the view that the stuff going on in the brain constitutes the the blue experience in the same way eletrical discharge constitutes H2O (or cellular processes constitute reproduction). So, the facts can swing either way apparently. As far as the "lack of evicence" that consciousness is non-physical; this begs the question. The "evidence" I'm claiming as non-physical is the experience of seeing blue. You can argue that this phenomena can be explained as something physical rather than taking the phenomena as a brute non-physical fact caused by physical ones, but to assume is to beg the question.

You seem to be pursuing a variant of the 'god of the gaps' theory, ie. if science can't explain a particular phenomenon, then that phenomenon must not be within the realm of physical science. Before physics, lightning was 'obviously' the work of the gods. Before germ theory, disease was 'obviously' the work of spirits, etc. Of course, that logic doesn't survive even a cursory examination. Just because you don't have a logically robust, evidence-based explanation for something doesn't mean you get to populate the gap in knowledge with an unsupported theory and insist that it has credibility in the absence of proven alternatives.

Sure. Before we knew that lightining was electrical discharge, it seemed possible that lightning was the work of the Gods. But, once we started to know physical facts correlated with lightning it became pretty clear that lightning just was those facts. The disanlogy I'm pointing out is that we have accumulated a lot of information about the brain processes correlated with consciousness, but we still do not have the faintest idea how these processes could constitute "blue color experience". A blue color experience seems different in type from the physical/functional facts correlated with it. Now, you might think that once we know more about the brain, the physical/functional facts will at some point suddenly fully explain blue color experiences. I think this seems unlikely without some kind of upheaval in what physics is. It seems like any physical-electrical explanation of a blue color experience, no matter how sophisticated and specific, could just as easily go with a red color experience or no color experience at all. But, I suppose time will tell. For now its clear that all the facts we know about the brain do not yet sufficiently explain the experience of blue.

note: Contrast what I'm saying about color experiences with lightning. It does not seem arbitrary that electrical discharge goes with lightning because it is a sufficient explanation of lightning. You said that it was good enough for you that there is a lot of evidence showing that consciousness is a product of brain processes to show that consciousness is constituted by them. But would it be enough evidence for you if there was only a lot of evidence correlating lightning and electrical discharge to show that lightning just is electrical discharge? Presumably not. There's a lot of evidence showing that death is a product of a bullett through the brain, but surely you wouldn't take this to show that death is constituted by bulletts through the brain like lighting is constituted by electrical discharge. Would you?

 

[B9]

This is out of my frame of reference.

I reckon your answer ( do you really expect to get one? )will not lie within this frame of reference either.

hope you have a nice day anyway

 

[Fausty]

Really? I have a hard time imagining that. Presumably the subatomic facts of science are posited because they explain higher level atomic facts. I mean, we cannot actually observe most of these particles directly, so the only reason we have for positing them is their explanatory power, no? And if these are accurate explanations of the higher level facts that they are posited to explain, then I'm going to hold strong and say that the sub-atomic facts couldn't hold without the higher-level atomic facts holding. Why? Because the sub-atomic particles constitute the atom.

At the risk of repetitiveness, while it is uncontested that there is a relationship between the subatomic/quantum "level" and higher "levels" such as chemical interaction, there is simply no easy path from knowing the details of one to knowing the details of the other.

As Wilson (if memory serves) said, all our knowledge of the quantum level of existence won't help us understand why flowers and honeybees co-evolved as they have. These dramatically different "levels" of systemic analysis require entirely different conceptual and scientific toolsets. One does not "explain" the other.

Peace,

Fausty

 

[skywise]

^^^
I'm not trying to ignore your posts, its just a busy time right now. I'll respond within the next couple of days.

 

[skywise]

At the risk of repetitiveness, while it is uncontested that there is a relationship between the subatomic/quantum "level" and higher "levels" such as chemical interaction, there is simply no easy path from knowing the details of one to knowing the details of the other.

As Wilson (if memory serves) said, all our knowledge of the quantum level of existence won't help us understand why flowers and honeybees co-evolved as they have. These dramatically different "levels" of systemic analysis require entirely different conceptual and scientific toolsets. One does not "explain" the other.

Peace,

Fausty

Sure, its not easy to derive high level facts from subatomic facts. This much is uncontroversial. I think its a little bit more controversial that high level facts are in principle not derivable from a complete list of the low level ones. Obviously a human couldn't do such a derivation, but this is just an accidental fact about our limited computational powers. Arguably, the biological facts could be read off the sub-atomic ones by a being with god-like powers of deduction and a complete knowledge of the sub-atomic facts.

But all this contentious speculation aside, I only started talking about sub-atomic facts because ebola brought them up. I could have just responded to him by saying, "To the extent that sub atomic facts don't "add up" to a biological cell is the extent they are not a good scientific explanation of that cell. You seem to grant this yourself with your Wilson quote about quantum level knowledge not helping understand flowers and the like. I can use this same kind of criticism about any physical theory of consciousness, not just subatomic level theories. No matter how high the level of physical explanation, it seems like it will never be able to explain a blue color experience the same way cell processes explain growth (or whatever). Assuming that there is such a thing to be explained as consciousness, this is very weird. We have some sort of scientific explanation of most (if not all) high level phenomena in terms of a lower level phenomena. Maybe we don't have a good explanation of water in terms of quarks, but we at least have one in terms of H2O. There seems to be no level of physical explanation even close to adequate as an explanation of consciousness.

As far as defining consciousness – anyone with a background in philosophy of language knows it is extremely difficult to give a necessary and sufficient definition of even the simplest terms. So, I'm not going to even try with consciousness. I want to point out, however, that just because a term is not sharply defined is no reason to suggest that it doesn't exist. "Baldness" is hard to define and it is easy to poke holes in just about any definition, but surely baldness exists. Anyway, on to my quick and dirty definition of consciousness. For an organism (or state) to be conscious is for there to be something it is like to be that organism (or in that state). So, people are conscious and typewriters plausibly are not. My experience of blue is a conscious state, my calculator's mathematical functioning is not. I find it obvious that there are conscious experiences just from my experience, all conceptualizing aside, even if it is hard to precisely define.

Oh, and as far as your bit on Dennett and physicalism: I'm trying to make non-technical posts in here so I used the less common "physicalist" description rather than "materialist" as its not clear to everyone what "materialist" means. Both are used in the philosophical and neuro-science literature. I'm not really sure how it's relevant that you haven't heard of these terms, or that Dennett doesn't like easy labels, but these are words used by Dennett's peers to describe his views and others like his (i.e. views that that once the physical functions have been explained there are no extra "consciousness facts" to be explained).

 

[Fausty]

Sure, its not easy to derive high level facts from subatomic facts. This much is uncontroversial. I think its a little bit more controversial that high level facts are in principle not derivable from a complete list of the low level ones.

I'd argue that there is ample purely theoretic support for this statement. It isn't a lack of computing power, or a lack of ability to understand the exact details of the underlying algorithmic structure. Rather, there is stochasticity to be found even in systems which are perfectly deterministic in the short run. This is an absolutely essential point to make, fundamental to any understanding of systems - and consciousness, or whatever the term is, is most clearly a system-level attribute.

If you would like to see the hard data behind the above statement, I'll refer you to Wolfram. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of ANKOS, the basic point I've highlighted above is well past being questioned in the theoretic systems literature at this point. It's as well-supported a theory as Godel's theory or set theoretic reconstructability theory.

To the extent that sub atomic facts don't "add up" to a biological cell is the extent they are not a good scientific explanation of that cell. You seem to grant this yourself with your Wilson quote about quantum level knowledge not helping understand flowers and the like. I can use this same kind of criticism about any physical theory of consciousness, not just subatomic level theories. No matter how high the level of physical explanation, it seems like it will never be able to explain a blue color experience the same way cell processes explain growth (or whatever).

No, what ebola's point about subatomic analysis - and Wilson's quote - highlight is exactly the opposite. Wilson's point, in particular is as follows: building scientific (i.e. "materialist," i.e. "physicalist") understanding of complex systems requires the study and analysis of these systems themselves and will not just flow automatically from work on the substrate systems from which they are constituted.

Studying neurophysiologic processes requires us to take as the subject of research the neural system as a whole - not just individual neurons, neurotransmitters, or cellular structures. This point is hardly controversial nowadays - Wilson made that quip (again, if memory serves) decades ago when people used to criticize population ecologists because they though all the "important" stuff about population behavior could simply be inferred from studying individual units. Those people were flat-out wrong, and their argument is now largely left in the dustbin of history.

If we were to follow your "we can't explain 'consciousness' because subatomic particles don't explain how I feel" argument seriously, we would have to also argue that the only "real" expository power for any system in our universe is to be found in the sub-sub-atomic realm of quantum string fluctuations, 10 dimensional brane resonances, or whatever is the newest stuff in that field. Anything not directly explicable by such theories would therefore be immune to "good scientific explanation," because you define "good scientific explanation" as only work which applies to the absolutely most granular level of any system in question.

In short, you're really arguing that any system is, by definition, magic. I think that's a bit of an unnecessary willingness to give up on fields including but not limited to biology, chemistry, economics, pharmacology, and neuroscience.

Assuming that there is such a thing to be explained as consciousness, this is very weird. We have some sort of scientific explanation of most (if not all) high level phenomena in terms of a lower level phenomena. Maybe we don't have a good explanation of water in terms of quarks, but we at least have one in terms of H2O.

You are saying we have a good "understanding" of water because we know water molecules are composed of one oxygen atom, and two hydrogen atoms in a particular bonding formation. However, in truth almost everything we know about water comes from studying water, not from studying hydrogen and oxygen atoms. The sublimation of water, for example, cannot be quantitatively derived from an understanding of VESPR theory. This shortcoming is true both empirically, and theoretically.

We learn about water by studying water, and by digging in a bit to see what kinds of clues we can get from its constituent systems.

As far as defining consciousness – anyone with a background in philosophy of language knows it is extremely difficult to give a necessary and sufficient definition of even the simplest terms. So, I'm not going to even try with consciousness. I want to point out, however, that just because a term is not sharply defined is no reason to suggest that it doesn't exist. "Baldness" is hard to define and it is easy to poke holes in just about any definition, but surely baldness exists.

Fair enough. The absence of definitional rigor isn't a demonstration of the non-existence of a given concept. Still, we must acknowledge that the lack of any measure of definitional consensus when discussing "consciousness" is rather a red flag. After all, we don't have such issues when discussing, say, water - or fear - or sexual neuroendicrinology.

Anyway, on to my quick and dirty definition of consciousness. For an organism (or state) to be conscious is for there to be something it is like to be that organism (or in that state). So, people are conscious and typewriters plausibly are not. My experience of blue is a conscious state, my calculator's mathematical functioning is not. I find it obvious that there are conscious experiences just from my experience, all conceptualizing aside, even if it is hard to precisely define.

You've hit the nail on the head, for my way of thinking at least. The real problem isn't the lack of definitional rigor, in and of itself - that's just a symptom. The real problem is the lack of any way to effectively bound the set. We don't agree on what sorts of things are conscious, and what aren't. Pinker does some exceptional work on these questions. For example, conscious or not. . . or only sorta conscious (if this is in fact a continuous rather than binary variable):

- a newborn child
- an adult with no short or long term memory
- Phineas Gage
- a healthy, adult wolf
- a dolphin
- a vast, underground fungal network covering hundreds of acres
- the Earth (i.e. Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis)
- a human 4 hours after ingesting 10mg of LSD
- an octopus
- a juvenile elephant
- the Storm botnet
- a honeybee hive
- an adult human in REM sleep, during lucid dreaming
- an adult chimpanzee
- Skynet ( )

Point being, if we can't even agree on what is or isn't conscious - or the degree to which some things are more or less conscious, in a scalar sense, I suggest that we're dealing with a concept too ephemeral to be ready for any sort of serious, objective study. This doesn't mean the concept is by its nature ineffably non-physical - it just means the way we are thinking about the concept is too sloppy to even support the first steps of genuine understanding.

Defining consciousness as your subjective experience of the color blue is, to me, a bit too naval-gazing for good measure. Your experience of a particular phenomenon may be of interest, but it's not the same thing as "consciousness" - whatever that word means.

Oh, and as far as your bit on Dennett and physicalism: I'm trying to make non-technical posts in here so I used the less common "physicalist" description rather than "materialist" as its not clear to everyone what "materialist" means. Both are used in the philosophical and neuro-science literature. I'm not really sure how it's relevant that you haven't heard of these terms, or that Dennett doesn't like easy labels, but these are words used by Dennett's peers to describe his views and others like his (i.e. views that that once the physical functions have been explained there are no extra "consciousness facts" to be explained).

Again, I'm not familiar with the "physicalist" term in the neuroscience literature itself. Perhaps it's more common in the philosophical work - in which case I'd not claim to be even close to conversant in the field. As to Dennett himself not using that term to describe his position. . . well, it does seem somewhat relevant, doesn't it? I mean, you can call him a barking lunatic if you'd like - but if you want to summarize his own work, I'd suggest using terms that he himself finds appropriate might be a good place to start. Just my own way of going at it, in any case. I'm not sure which of his peers use that term - again, if it's common in philosophical writing, it's quite likely I'm just not well-read enough to have seen it.

In any event, if my own poor understanding of "physicalist" is idiosyncratic and the term is of more conventional use than "materialist" then by all means I vote we use the former!

Peace,

Fausty

 

[mulberryman]

non-technical, my ass. Jesus, how many words are on this page.

All very interesting, but I have to say this brings up another conversation I recall about whether or not consciousness itself is even a real thing, or simply an illusion. Imagine for example, a alien race of super-intelligent beings. Might they not think of us as conscious, as say one of us thinks of a mouse or a cow as not being conscious in the same way. But what if its all just smoke and mirrors?

Or to put it another way, maybe we only think that we think.

 

[skywise]

Fausty

I don't understand why you keep talking about determinism. Maybe you are using the term differently than I am used to seeing it? I understand determinism to be the view that every cause guarantees its consequent in the natural world. Data at the quantum level challenges this view, suggesting that a causal antecedent only makes its consequent probable. So, now instead of a deterministic picture of causality we have a probabilistic one.

This has nothing to do with the view that low level facts are sufficient for the high level ones they constitute. Your observation only brings attention to the fact that causal antecedents do not determine their consequents at the quantum level. Incidentally, this fact has the repercussion that high level causal antecedents can only be said to guarantee their consequents with a high level of probability. Notice that this fact about macro level causality comes along automatically with the low-level picture of probabalistic causality. This is because the low-level stuff constitutes the high level stuff.

If I was claiming that causal chains at the quantum level guaranteed particular effects at the macro (or quantum) level for everything but consciousness, then your complaints about the non-deterministic structure of the universe would be relevant. But this isn't what I'm saying. I happily agree that physical processes cause consciousness in the same probabilistic way that they cause any other physical effect. The only difference is that the particular effect of a blue color experience is a non-physical effect. That is, blue color experiences are caused (non-deterministically) by physical processes, but are not physical processes themselves.

If we were to follow your "we can't explain 'consciousness' because subatomic particles don't explain how I feel" argument...

I never said anything like this!

First of all I don't care about explaining consciousness in terms of subatomic particles. Maybe I shouldn't have brought up the thought experiment where we imagine a world in which all of the sub-atomic facts (including causal facts) are the same and see if we can imagine the macro-level facts being different. It's not essential to the point, and was only mentioned to deal with a particular statement on ebola's part that (I think) stems from his Quinean views about how we interact with the world.

The "argument" or, more accurately, concern is with views that say that consciousness is constituted by [insert physical facts] when these physical facts seem to be arbitrarily related to the experiences they are purported to be. You point out that we know about water from studying water, not H2O (I think this is somewhat dubious because water and H2O are the same thing, but whatever). Using this paradigm of explanation and applying it to consciousness, do you really think you could ever learn about [insert physical processes] by "digging in" to your blue color experiences? Now, you might just say , "Yes, that's exactly what happens when we observe the brain". But this just assumes that the brain processes are the color experiences. And to assume this in arguing against the skeptical concern that the brain processes don't seem to constituted by (let alone strictly identical to) these color experiences is to beg the question.


Furthermore, I never said we couldn't explain consciousness either. Even if my concerns are right, they still leaves open an explanation of consciousness in terms of physical systems causing or taking on non-physical properties. This explanation takes consciousness as fundamental instead of trying to reduce it to some lower level physical phenomena. It's also worth noting that I even left open the possibility that we could one day give a purely physical explanation of consciousness, although it is entirely unclear at the moment what that might look like.

With regard to your list of borderline cases for consciousness: it is a well known fallacy to suggest that fuzzy cases for a given concept imply that the concept has no application. As someone who loves movies, I could give you a giant list of things that may or may not count as movies (I'm thinking of various avant garde pieces of art). This shows that our concept of 'movie' is not entirely precise, but obviously does not imply anything deep let alone the non-existence of movies!

Defining consciousness as your subjective experience of the color blue is, to me, a bit too naval-gazing for good measure. Your experience of a particular phenomenon may be of interest, but it's not the same thing as "consciousness" - whatever that word means.

Look, man, since you seem to have very specific requirements for how words are used I'll give up the term 'consciousness' to mean whatever fuzzy, non-existent thing that you insist it means. But its still true that there exist blue color experiences and it is these (along with every other phenomenal feel such as pains, tickles, experiences of sounds, etc.) that I'm talking about.

, I suggest that we're dealing with a concept too ephemeral to be ready for any sort of serious, objective study.

Fussy complaints about definitional precision aside, I don't think the investigation of what I've been referring to as consciousness is doomed in terms of scientific investigation. Take pain, for instance. It's a damn good thing that doctors haven'tt just dismissed the idea of pain as the result of navel gazing and something to ephemeral for serious consideration! I for one am very grateful that doctors take subjective feels seriously and admit that the feeling of pain is real. Can you imagine if you went to the hospital in horrible pain and a doctor tried to tell you:

"I haven't been able to objectively verify this so-called "pain" you describe, so can't take it seriously. At the very least you'll have to get more clear about what you mean by 'pain' and cleanly distinguish it from your other weird ideas of "tickles" and "emotional pains" before I can even begin to try to investigate what you're talking about."

Oh, and 'materialist' and 'physicalist' are not synonymous with 'scientific'. It is perfectly scientific to think that there exist things that are not constituted by lower-level physical stuff. These are the things that science takes as fundamental. These include: space, time, causality, every law of nature, and basic non-divisible physical particles (if they exist). As a matter of fact, the scientific evidence is neutral on whether a conscious state is constituted by physical stuff or caused by it. The kind of non-physicalist views of consciousness that I have in mind can be accommodated by science, they just relocate conscious states as a fundamental type caused by physical stuff rather than a high-level type constituted by low level physical stuff.

 

[skywise]

non-technical, my ass. Jesus, how many words are on this page.

All very interesting, but I have to say this brings up another conversation I recall about whether or not consciousness itself is even a real thing, or simply an illusion. Imagine for example, a alien race of super-intelligent beings. Might they not think of us as conscious, as say one of us thinks of a mouse or a cow as not being conscious in the same way. But what if its all just smoke and mirrors?

Or to put it another way, maybe we only think that we think.

Some people have suggested that consciousness is just an illusion, like you say. It's going to need more support then what you're offering here, though. The fact that it's very difficult to know if anyone but yourself is conscious suggests that 3rd person, physical information doesn't really explain consciousness. That said, we are pretty well justified in believing, at least, that other people are consciousness on the basis that we seem to be and that they likewise claim to be. It gets more difficult with slugs and the like, but this doesn't suggest that there is no such thing as conscious. I mean, if you're punched in the face, it hurts right? It seems difficult to plausibly claim that it doesn't "really hurt", but only "seems to".

P.S. I blame that superfluous technicality of the thread on ebola and fausty. Had they not tried to confuse me by bringing up "quark-gluon interactions" and the like I could have stuck with simple words like 'water' and 'H2O'!

 

[mulberryman]

^ Ahh, true, this is the assumption that your are conscious, so and therefore others must be as well. Yes, this is all sound and logical, but, by what determination by which do you really know that you yourself is actually conscious?

I can say, I certainly feel like I am conscious, and if someone punched me in the face, it would likely hurt, but is that really enough to know for certain that I am really conscious?

I can demonstrate some paradoxical appeal for this approach. Consider, were you conscious before you were born or conceived? Will you still be conscious after you cease to be alive? (or maybe if you cease to be alive, if those good fellows at the Methuselah Foundation aren't just blowing a lot of hot air) If we only think that we think, then what happens when those brain cells die and all that electricity dissipates? The answer, of course, would be that since we never were actually thinking, but only thinking that we were thinking, we never actually would stop thinking after all, since we never actually started thinking in the first place.

Sounds quite nonsensical, I know, but what about ppl who have amnesia? What happens when ppl have blacked-out periods, like when combining benzos and alcohol, for example, or even just simply sleepwalking. All those reports of ppl who took ambien and then driving to McDonald's in the middle of the night and eating a whole sh*t-load of burgers and then not remembering it the next morning? Were they still conscious, or perhaps they were merely seeing through the illusion, seeing the whole of identity and ego and id, and bliss and pain, and emotional attachment for the house of cards that it just might really be.

 

[skywise]

^^ All I mean by an organism "being conscious" in this thread is that there is something it is like to be that organism. So, yes, if it hurts when someone punches you then your are conscious as I am using the term. Why? Because you can feel something. There is something it is like for you to be punched.

"Consider, were you conscious before you were born or conceived?"

No. Or at the very least I have no reason to believe that I was.

"Will you still be conscious after you cease to be alive?"

I would answer, "No". Or at least I don't think there is any good evidence to suppose that I will be.

Sounds quite nonsensical, I know, but what about ppl who have amnesia? What happens when ppl have blacked-out periods, like when combining benzos and alcohol, for example, or even just simply sleepwalking. All those reports of ppl who took ambien and then driving to McDonald's in the middle of the night and eating a whole sh*t-load of burgers and then not remembering it the next morning? Were they still conscious, or perhaps they were merely seeing through the illusion, seeing the whole of identity and ego and id, and bliss and pain, and emotional attachment for the house of cards that it just might really be.

Well, being unable to remember an experience isn't really good evidence that you never had the experience at all. I suspect that there are things I've experienced but have just forgotten. But, yeah, I would still agree that there are non-conscious aspects of human existence. One might plausibly suspect that there is nothing it is like to be in a coma (there is no experience going on). And of course there are a whole lot of in-between cases. But it still seems hard to deny that there are experiences at all (which is all I mean by consciousness). I don't "assume" that I feel pain if I'm punched, I feel it.