HEROIN MAINTENANCE: IS A U.S. EXPERIMENT NEEDED?*
Peter Reuter1
Robert MacCoun2
Introduction
Methadone maintenance has repeatedly been shown as the most effective available
treatment for a large fraction of heroin addicts3. Given that fewer than half of entrants stay in the
program for as much as one year and that most continue to use illegal drugs, the disappointing
implication of that statement is that the United States has a weak armamentarium for dealing with
the problem of heroin addiction4. Given that heroin addiction appears to be very long lasting,
with so many addicts from the 1970s still frequently dependent on the drug and involved in high
risk health and crime behaviors5, it is hardly surprising that there is a continuing interest in
finding alternatives that would bring some surcease to both the user and society.
* Paper prepared for conference “One Hundred Years of Heroin”, Yale Medical School,
September 1998. This work is excerpted from our book: MacCoun and Reuter Drug War
Heresies: Learning from Other Places, Other Times and Other Vices Cambridge University
Press. Financial support for the research reported here was provided by the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation through a grant to RAND’s Drug Policy Research Center. We also have benefited
from discussion with Michael Farrell and Wayne Hall.
1 School of Public Affairs and Department of Criminology, University of Maryland; RAND.
2 Goldman School of Public Policy and Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley; RAND
3 Indicative of methadone’s global reach, at least among wealthy nations of predominantly
European origin populations, the best book length review of methadone treatment is an Australian
volume: Ward, Mattick and Hall (1992)
4 For example, Hall, Mattick and Ward (1998; p.46) cite studies showing no more than 50 percent
in treatment even six months after entry. The classic study of methadone programs, showing the
wide range of services delivered and outcomes achieved, is Ball and Ross (1991).
5 Hser, Anglin and Powers (1993) report on a 24 year follow-up of a cohort of heroin addicts
recruited in 1962-1964. They found that of those interviewed in 1986, only 20 percent reported
having been heroin abstinent during the previous three years.
2
Heroin maintenance has long been one of those alternatives. Maintenance clinics were
part of the initial response to the Harrison Act and famously were shut down (a process of some
years during the 1920s) after a close fought legal battle was resolved in favor of the hawkish
Treasury. Some historians have pointed approvingly to the Shreveport and New Orleans clinics;
others have focused on the mismanaged New York clinic to suggest that they did little good and
much damage6.
But the idea of providing heroin to addicts as a humane harm reduction measure
has reappeared from time to time in the US drug policy debate, and, largely because of European
developments, is moderately prominent once again in the mid-1990s.So far attention has been on the possibility of conducting a demonstration or trial here;
immediate implementation of heroin maintenance on a large scale is not being discussed. Yet,
even the notion of a trial has been highly controversial. It is not merely drug hawks,
unsympathetic to the plight of dependent drug users, who believe this notion is both morally and
pragmatically flawed; even researchers, long involved in drug treatment and clearly very
concerned about addicts’ wellbeing, have been antagonistic. The prospects are bleak indeed.
We believe that a reasonable case can be made for a US trial. The recent Swiss trials, for
all the methodological weaknesses of their evaluation, provide evidence of feasibility and a prima
facia case for effectiveness. The downside risks of a trial in the United States seem slight and the
potential benefits substantial. However the Swiss evidence does not provide an adequate basis to
make a decision about the desirability of heroin maintenance as a policy option in the US.
Extrapolating from foreign experiences is difficult in any field of social policy and it is easy to
identify characteristics of programs, patients and context that render the Swiss trials weak
evidence for projecting what would happen here. Hence, the need for US based trials.
That is not to say that the critics are without a case. Some issues can be resolved without
a field trial. Heroin maintenance raises fundamental normative concerns; for some these trump
6 Musto (1987: Chapter 7) provides a good account of the operation of these clinics and the
3
any possible public health gains. Swiss pragmatism and American idealism may derive different
conclusions from one set of results about the effects of providing a highly addictive drug to those
who already crave it. In this paper, we identify some ethical issues, generally resolving them in
favor of allowing for the possibility of adopting heroin maintenance if it proves to be
substantially better than other modalities for a significant fraction of America’s 600-800,000
heroin addicts. There are also important political arguments that have been raised as objections to
a heroin maintenance trial; we see those as having more power. Finally, we consider
programmatic arguments, identifying the limits of small scale experiments to answer fundamental
questions.
The next section provides a brief review of Britain's long experience with heroin
maintenance, highlighting the fact that British doctors have made very little use of their right to
provide the drug in the last quarter century. The following section summarizes the
implementation of the Swiss field trials and describes the reaction to it, in Switzerland, the US
and elsewhere. That is followed by a discussion of normative and political issues. Finally, we
identify the potential for a heroin trial in the US.
The British Experience
In a 1926 report, the blue-ribbon Rolleston Committee concluded "that morphine and
heroin addiction … must be regarded as a manifestation of disease and not as a mere form of
vicious indulgence, Thus, if repeated attempts to withdraw a patient from cocaine or heroin were
unsuccessful, "the indefinitely prolonged administration of morphine and heroin (might) be
necessary (for) those (patients) who are capable of leading a useful and normal life so long as
they take a certain quantity, usually small, of their drug of addiction, but not otherwise." (as
quoted in Stears, 1997; 123). This led Britain to adopt, or at least formalize, a system in which
physicians could prescribe heroin to addicted patients for maintenance purposes (Judson, 1973).
federal efforts to close them.
4
With a small population of iatrogenically addicted opiate users (numbering in the hundreds) the
system muddled along for four decades with few problems (Spear, 1994).
The system was not very controversial through most of that period. When the Tory
government in 1955 considered banning heroin completely, in response to international pressures
rather than because of any domestic complaints about the system, the British medical
establishment fought back effectively and the government eventually abandoned the effort.
However, in detail the incident seemed to say more about the power of the medical establishment
and its dedication to physician autonomy than about the success of heroin maintenance (Judson,
1973, pp. 29-34).
Then, in the early 1960s, a very small number of physicians began to prescribe
irresponsibly and a few heroin users began using the drug purely for recreational purposes,
recruiting others like themselves (Spear, 1994). The result was a sharp proportionate increase in
heroin addiction in the mid-1960s, still leaving the nation with a very small heroin problem; there
were only about 1500 known addicts in 1967 (Johnson, 1975). In response to the increase, the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1967 greatly curtailed access to heroin maintenance, limiting long-term
prescriptions to a small number of specially licensed drug-treatment specialists7. General
practitioners were not unhappy to be rid of the responsibility for dealing with a population of
long-term patients who were difficult to manage and showed only modest improvements in health
over the course of treatment.
Addicts could now be maintained long-term only in clinics. At the same time oral
methadone became available as a substitute pharmacotherapy. British specialists proved as
enthusiastic about this alternative as did their US counterparts, though initially they did not
7 The British have long complained about foreign descriptions of their system and in particular
the nature of the 1967 changes (Strang and Gossop, 1994). The nuances of a system largely
dependent on informal social controls are difficult to capture. Pearson (1991) provides a succinct
version; Stimson and Oppenheimer (1982; Chapter 6) provide a fuller account. For current
practice, see Strang et al. (1996).
5
expect long-term maintenance to be the norm and injectable methadone played a significant role.
The fraction of maintained addicts receiving heroin fell rapidly. By 1975, just 4 percent of
maintained opiate addicts were receiving only heroin; another 8 percent were receiving both
methadone and heroin (Johnson, 1977). That reluctance to prescribe heroin remains true today;
less than 1 percent of those being maintained on an opiate receive heroin (Stears, 1997). The
strong and continued antipathy of British addiction specialists to the provision of heroin is a
curious and troubling phenomenon for those who advocate its use8.
British research on the efficacy of heroin maintenance is quite limited. One classic study
(Hartnoll et al., 1980) found that those being maintained on heroin did only moderately better
than those receiving oral methadone. "[W]hile heroin-prescribed patients attended the clinic
more regularly and showed some reduction in the extent of their criminal activities, nevertheless
they showed no change in their other social activities such as work, stable accommodation or diet,
nor did they differ significantly in the physical complications of drug use from those denied such
a prescription" (Mitcheson, 1994; p.182). There was moderate leakage of heroin from the trial;
37 percent of those receiving heroin admitted that they at least occasionally sold some of their
supply on the black market. An important factor in explaining the relatively weak results for
heroin maintenance may have been the effort to limit doses; the average dose received by the
patients, who had to bargain aggressively with their doctors, was 60 mg. of pure heroin daily9.
Mostly though there has been indifference in Britain for the last twenty-five years. This
may in part reflect the much greater cost of providing heroin to a maintained patient; NHS
reimbursement rules make this more difficult for the practitioner. The claims of one British
practitioner (John Marks, operating in the Liverpool metropolitan area) as to the efficacy of
heroin in reducing criminal involvement aroused controversy and hostility but little curiosity in
8 Trebach (1982; Chapter 7) provides an interesting account of why the shift to oral methadone
occurred, emphasizing the discomfort of medical personnel with supporting the act of injection
itself.
6
the British establishment. Observers from other nations, including Switzerland, were more
interested (Ulrigh-Votglin, 1997).
The Swiss Heroin Maintenance Trials
The Zurich government had attempted to deal with the city’s severe heroin problem in the
mid-1980s by allowing the operation of an open-air drug market behind the main train station.
The Platzpitz was intended to minimize the intrusiveness of drug markets and to allow the
efficient delivery of services, such as syringe exchange, to those who needed it. The city closed
the Platzspitz in 1992 as a consequence of the migration of large numbers of heroin users from
other parts of Switzerland and its sheer unsightliness (MacCoun and Reuter, forthcoming;
Chapter 12).
Zurich authorities still sought an innovative approach and in January 1994 they opened
the first heroin maintenance clinics, part of a three year national trial of heroin maintenance as a
supplement to the large methadone maintenance program that had been operating for at least a
decade. In late 1997 the federal government approved a large scale expansion, potentially
accommodating 15% of the nation’s estimated 30,000 heroin addicts (AAP NEWSFEED,
December 25, 1997).
The motivation for these trials was complex. Two federal officials (personal
communication) suggested that it was partly an effort to forestall a strong legalization movement.
In their view the Swiss citizenry were unwilling to be very tough about enforcement but were also
offended by the unsightliness of the drug scene. Heroin maintenance was likely to reduce the
visibility of the problem, arguably an important consideration in Swiss drug policy. A 1991
survey found that only about 10 percent favored police action against all drug users but 57
percent favored suppression of open drug scenes (Gutzwiller and Uchtenhagen, 1997). For other
9 On the struggles between patient and doctor see Edwards (1969)
7
policy making participants, it was an obvious next step in reducing the risk of AIDS, which was
very prevalent among IV drug users in Switzerland.
The decision was taken after very public consultations at the highest levels. An unusual
“summit meeting” was held, at which the Swiss president10 and the heads of the cantonal
governments approved an experiment to test whether heroin maintenance would reduce heroin
problems. Public opinion was generally supportive; in a 1991 poll, 72 percent expressed approval
of controlled prescription of heroin (Gutzwiller and Uchtenhagen, 1997)11. The experiment was
widely discussed in the media before implementation. An elaborate governance structure was
established, including very detailed ethical scrutiny by regional ethics officers (Uchtenhagen et al,
1997). As an example of the care that was taken to protect the public health, enrollees were
required to surrender their drivers license, thus reducing the risk of their driving while heroin
intoxicated. Similarly, it was decided that once the government has provided heroin addicts with
the drug, it incurred a continuing obligation to maintain those addicts as long as they sought
heroin.
The original design involved three groups of patients receiving different injectable
opiates: 250 receiving heroin, 250 morphine and 200 methadone. The early experience with
morphine was that it caused discomfort to the patients and it was abandoned. Patients were
reluctant to accept injectable methadone. As a consequence the final report focused on injectable
heroin.
Participants in the trials were required to be at least 20 years old, to have had two years of
intravenous injecting and to have failed at two other treatment attempts. These are hardly very
tight screens. In fact most of those admitted had extensive careers both in heroin addiction and in
10 The Swiss presidency is not such an august position, being occupied in six month rotations by
each member of the 7 person cabinet elected by parliament. Nonetheless, the president does
represent at least temporarily the leadership of the federal government.
8
treatment; for example, in the Geneva site the average age was 33, with 12 years of injecting
heroin and eight prior treatment episodes12.
A decision to allow addicts to choose the dose they needed was critical; it removed any
incentive to supplement the clinic provision with black market purchases and eliminated a
potentially important source of tension in the relationship with clinic personnel13. A patient could
receive heroin three times daily, 365 days of the year14. The average daily dose was 500-600
milligrams of pure heroin, a massive amount by the standards of US street addicts15. Faced with
no constraint with respect to the drug that had dominated their lives and which had always been
very difficult and expensive to obtain, patients initially sought very high doses. However they
quickly accepted more reasonable levels that still permitted many of them to function in every
day life, notwithstanding the relatively short acting character of heroin16.
The patient self-injected with equipment prepared by the staff, who could also provide
advice about injecting practices as they supervised the injection. A daily charge of 15 Francs (ca.
$10) was charged to participants, many of whom paid out of their state welfare income. No
heroin could be taken off the premises, thus minimizing the risk of leakage into the black market.
11 Interestingly, the same survey found a noticeable increase in the percentage opposing
controlled prescription between 1991 and 1994 (from 24 to 30 percent); this was a period when
the trials were being debated publicly.
12 As of this writing, only one document describing the full three year multi-site evaluation has
been published. It is an 11 page "Summary of the Synthesis Report", which provides little
quantitative detail. Hence we use here more detailed data from specific sites.
13 British doctors prescribe less than one third of this on average.
14 Some patients were permitted to inject more than once in a single session.
15 At $1 per milligram, a low street price in recent years outside of New York, that would amount
to $500-600 per day in heroin expenditures alone. The actual figure is about one tenth of that.
16 Interesting comments on these dynamics are provided by Haemmig (1995). “People in the
project tend to take too much of the drug. Many seem to have a concept that their only real
problem in life is to get enough drugs. In the projects, for the first time in their lives, they can
have as much as they need. In the course of time it gets depressing for them to realize that they
have problems other than just getting enough drugs.” (p.377)
9
Initially enrollment in the trials lagged behind schedule but after the first year enthusiasm
among local officials increased sharply; consequently the trials ended up enlisting more than the
initial targets and in a greater variety of settings than expected. Small towns (e.g., St. Gallen) and
prisons volunteered to be sites and were able to enroll clients. Nonetheless some sites, such as
Geneva, were never able to reach their enrollment targets (Perneger et al., 199.
The project certainly demonstrated the feasibility of heroin maintenance. By the end of
the trials, over 800 patients had received heroin on a regular basis without leakage into the illicit
market. No overdoses were reported among participants while they stayed in the program. They
had ended up choosing dosage levels that allowed them to improve their social and economic
functioning17. A large majority of participants had maintained the regime that was imposed on
them, requiring daily attendance at the clinic. For example, in Geneva 20 out of 25 patients
received heroin on more than 80 percent of treatment days (Perneger et al., 199.
Outcomes were generally very positive; we address the question of the appropriate
controls below. Retention in treatment, a standard measure of treatment success, was high
relative to rates found in methadone programs generally; 69 percent were in treatment 18 months
after admission18. About half of those recorded as drop-outs in fact moved to other treatment
modalities, some choosing methadone and others abstinence based modalities. One observer
suggested that having discovered the limitations of untrammeled access to heroin, these patients
were now ready to attempt quitting. Crime rates were much reduced as compared to treatment
entry; self-reported rates fell by 60 percent during the first six months; this was supported by data
from official arrest records. Self-reported use of non-prescribed heroin fell sharply and the
percentage with jobs that were described as "permanent" increased from 14 percent to 32 percent
and unemployment fell from 44 percent to 20 percent. Self-reported mental health improved
17 The Geneva site reported that they reached stable dosages within the first month.
10
substantially. Only three new HIV infections, probably related to cocaine use outside of the
clinics, were detected. One interesting finding is that though many addicts were able to detach
themselves from the heroin subculture, they were unable to develop other attachments. Given
their weak labor force performance and estrangement over previous decade from non-addicts, this
in retrospect is hardly surprising but points to the long-term challenge for psycho-social services.
Cocaine use remained high during heroin maintenance.
The evaluation carried out by the Swiss government was led by Ambros Uchtenhagen, a
leading Swiss drug treatment researcher. The trial design, primarily a comparison of before and
after behavior of the patients and lacking a well-specified control group (Killias and Uchtenhagen
1996) limited the power of its findings. In the absence of a control group or random assignment,
the natural metric for assessing the program was the success of methadone programs with similar
patients, yet the heroin maintenance trial participants also were targeted with substantially more
psycho-social services than the typical methadone patient. Critics asked whether the claimed
success was a function of the heroin or the additional services (Farrell and Hall, 199. The
evaluation relied primarily on self-reports by patients, with few objective measures.
Only at the Geneva site was there random assignment between heroin and other
modalities19. As compared to the controls, experimental subjects in Geneva were substantially
less involved in the street heroin markets, were less criminally active generally and showed
improved social functioning and mental health. On a number of other dimensions the two groups
did not differ, though both improved; drug overdoses, precautions against AIDS and overall
health status. Unfortunately the meticulous evaluation of that site was limited by a small sample
size (25 in the experimental group and 22 controls) -- which biases analyses against rejecting the
18 Eighteen months was chosen as the assessment period because only a modest fraction had
entered treatment more than 18 months before the agreed upon termination date for the trials as
such.
19 Two sites apparently ran double blind studies but no results have yet been reported for those
sites.
11
null hypothesis of “no difference”-- and a lack of detail on the treatments received by the
controls.
It is difficult to know what is an appropriate control group to use for assessing these
results in even a crude sense. The Swiss trials involve experimental programs which are likely to
be undertaken by the higher quality program operators with more staff esprit and to be
administered with greater fidelity than routine methadone maintenance. Possibly it is most
appropriate to compare their outcomes with those of methadone when it was a new
pharmacotherapy in the early 1970s. Hall, Mattick and Ward (1998?) note in the same spirit that
programs which participate in Randomized Control trials of methadone maintenance show
substantially higher retention rates than other programs.
Unsurprisingly, heroin maintenance turned out to be far more expensive than methadone
maintenance. It required three times daily attendance and provision of injecting equipment, while
methadone is dispensed typically on a three times a week basis, with take-homes being allowed to
most experienced patients. Moreover the Swiss researchers report that it has, so far, been
expensive to provide sufficient quantities of pure heroin, given that there has previously been
only a tiny legitimate market for the injectable form. The evaluators estimated total daily cost per
patient per day at about 50 francs ($35), roughly twice the daily cost for a standard methadone
programme. Though the initial estimates are that the benefits per day of enrollment are 96 Swiss
francs (including only savings on criminal investigations, jail stays and health care costs), this
hardly settles the matter of whether these additional costs are justified, particularly since most of
the benefits accrue to a different government sector.
The Response
Since political considerations are so central to this issue, we briefly describe here the
response engendered by the Swiss trials both at home and abroad.
12
Domestically the trials became the focus of the two wings of Swiss opinion, which used
the very open referenda process20. One group (“Youth Without Drugs”) obtained enough
signatures to place on the ballot a measure that would “exclude further controlled prescription
experiments and methadone, end attempts to differentiate between soft and hard drugs and focus
prevention programmes on deterrence only.” (Klingemann, 1996; p.733). Shortly after the
launching of the Youth Without Drugs initiative, an opposing group was created (with a
cumbersome name [“For a reasonable drug policy – tabula rasa with the drug mafia”]),
advocating a new Constitutional article stating that “the consumption, production, possession and
purchase of narcotics for individual use only is not prohibited.” They also obtained the 100,000
signatures necessary for putting their proposal on the ballot.
The federal government opposed both initiatives. In the vote on the abstinence initiative
in September 1997, almost four years after the “Youth without Drugs” group had gathered their
signatures, 70 percent of voters were against the proposition21. This strong majority provided
important support for the government in its decision on extending the trials into a second phase.
A second referendum on the legalization initiative was handily defeated in November 1998.
The heroin trials also proved controversial internationally. The International Narcotics
Control Board, a UN agency which inter alia regulates the international trade in legal opiates,
very reluctantly authorized the importation of the heroin required for the trials (Klingemann,
1996). The INCB required, when approving the initial importation of heroin, that the Swiss
government agree to an independent evaluation by the World Health Organization but that
evaluation had still not appeared by December 1998, even though the trials themselves were
completed in December 1996 (McGregor, 199.
20”The Swiss vote in more referendums than anybody else. Each year they are asked three of four
times to take part in national votes – not to mention referendums in the cantons and communes..”
The Economist, October 17, 1998; p.58
13
The INCB expressed its concern about the proposed expansion of the trials (INCB,
199. Its officials used unusually strong language for a United Nations agency, especially when
dealing not with a pariah country such as Afghanistan or Burma but a veritable bulwark of
international respectability, the home of the World Health Organization among many UN
agencies. The director general of the INCB said “Anyone who plays with fire loses control over
it.” He also claimed that it would send “a disastrous signal to countries in which drugs were
produced”; these nations were asking why they should cut back cultivation “when the same drugs
were being given out legally in Europe.” The Board's annual report more diplomatically regretted
the proposed expansion of the scheme before the completion of the WHO evaluation.
The Swiss trials sparked interest in other wealthy nations. The Dutch government
committed itself to launch a trial of injectable heroin for purposes of addiction maintenance
(Maginnis, 1997). This came after almost fifteen years of inconclusive discussions about such
trials, following a rather murky episode in which the Amsterdam municipal health authority had
attempted to maintain about 40 addicts on morphine (Derks, 1997). That Switzerland was willing
to take on the disapproval of the international community was undoubtedly helpful in pushing the
Dutch government to launch a trial involving 750 addicts.
In Australia, the trials also helped spark interest in a feasibility study in Canberra, which
has a substantial heroin addiction problem (Bammer and McDonald, 1994). Only the personal
intervention of the prime minister in 1997, overriding a decision by a council of state and federal
ministers, prevented the study from moving to the next pilot stage. There have been expressions
of interest from Denmark as well.
21 An earlier referendum confined to Zurich and focused merely on the continuation of funding
for the pilot scheme was also approved by over 60 percent of the vote (Associated Press “Swiss
Voters Approve Heroin Distribution Programs”, December 1, 1996)
14
Heroin Maintenance in The United States (post 1950)
Surprisingly, there was some discussion of a heroin maintenance trial during the period
1950-1970, when heroin dependence was a fairly invisible, and probably minor problem. Indeed
in 1957, the Interim Report of the joint Committee on Narcotic Study of the American Medical
Association and the American Bar Association recommended exploring the possibility of an
experiment in outpatient heroin maintenance (Bayer, 1976). However the most significant
episode of modern times occurred in the early 1970s, near the height of the US heroin epidemic,
when serious consideration was given to a trial of heroin maintenance in New York City. Though
the incident occurred 25 years ago, it is worth briefly describing because it illustrates the
continuity, perhaps even stagnation, of drug policy debates22.
The Vera Institute, then a young but already well respected social policy research
institution with its roots primarily in criminal justice, initiated plans to test heroin maintenance in
the United States, having been impressed by the apparent success of the British in keeping its
own heroin addict population to manageable numbers23. It proposed a pilot program for New
York City in which heroin would be provided to addicts for an initial period of perhaps three
months, before switching them to methadone or an abstinence regime. The rationale was to use
the heroin as a means of persuading recalcitrant addicts to enter programs. If a first batch of 30
patients performed well in this regime, then a second set of 200 patients would be selected and
randomly assigned to either the same regime or to methadone maintenance. Only then would a
large scale implementation be tried.
Though far from a long-term heroin maintenance scheme, this generated extremely
hostile reactions from all quarters. Harlem's Congressman Charles Rangel said: "
t is
22 A lengthy informal description, emphasizing the politics, can be found in Judson (1973;
pp126-140).
15
imperative that we dispel some of the myths about the British system of drug treatment so that the
American people will open up their eyes and recognize heroin for what it is--a killer, not a drug
on which a human being should be maintained…" The head of the predecessor agency to DEA
asserted: “t would be a virtual announcement of medical surrender on the treatment of
addiction and would amount to consigning hundreds of thousands of our citizens to the slavery of
heroin addiction forever." Vincent Dole, one of the two developers of methadone, published a
Journal of the American Medical Association editorial attacking the notion on many grounds,
such as the impossibility of finding stable doses or the implausibility that a small scale
demonstration could establish the feasibility of providing services to 250,000 heroin users. Even
the reliably liberal New York Times published negative stories, for example citing a Swedish
psychiatric epidemiologist as suggesting "you could easily get up to three or four million addicts
in five years. Heroin maintenance? Only those who don't know anything about addiction can
discuss it."24
Each of these critics could be discounted for representing a specific interest group or bias.
Rangel represented the most hard hit population group, African-Americans, who had a deep
suspicion that drugs were being employed to reduce black anger following the urban riots of the
late 1960s. Law enforcement agencies are notoriously conservative. The researcher responsible
for developing a substitute medication for heroin was hardly likely to be an enthusiast for
returning to the original drug. Sweden was, as a nation, harshly anti-maintenance, even against
methadone. But with so many different enemies, ultimately the proposal had no friends. It
simply disappeared.
23 Judson reports that originally a Vera research group had viewed the British maintenance
regimes as unsuccessful and had projected very large increases in the number of addicts. When
those increases were not realized, they changed their view of the British programs.
24 All cites taken from Judson (1973, pp.131-132).
16
A few years later the National League of Cities considered endorsing trials of heroin
maintenance in several cities. After much debate, the NLC reaffirmed its support for such trials
but as Senay, Lewis and Millar (1996) report "thereafter the topic receded into obscurity" (p.192).
They also report that later research proposals died either because of scientific review, which
David Lewis (a participant in the original Vera proposal) thought was correct25 or, in one case,
because the NIDA National Council (intended to advise the institute on policy issues) overruled a
scientific panel.
In the United States political reaction to the recent Swiss trials was illustrated by hearings
held by a House subcommittee.26 The Subcommittee called as witnesses from Switzerland two
doctors with long records of hostility to both needle exchange and heroin maintenance. One
(Ernst Aeschbach) was on the board of the "Youth without drugs" group, the principal group
responsible for an initiative to end heroin prescribing (chapter 12). The other (Erne Mathias)
asserted that there was a conspiracy, initially supported by the East German or Soviet intelligence
agencies, to create narco states in Europe; Switzerland had been targeted when the Netherlands
acquired too controversial a reputation. Most members, both Democratic and Republican, were
delighted with the Swiss witnesses, who were supported by two hawkish US witnesses who also
condemned the trials. Sample comments included: “Giving away free needles or doctor-injected
heroin is simply, ….a fast track to moral corruption and the first step towards genuine
disintegration of public security.”27 No Swiss researcher or official associated with the trials was
given an opportunity to testify.
25 Charles O’Brien, a member of the review committee, confirms that the proposals failed on their
scientific merits.
26 The National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House
Government Reform and Oversight Committee.
27 Congressman Hastert (R-Ill.), [elected Speaker in 1999] introducing the hearing. Readers
unused to reading Congressional statements should be warned that they are often inflammatory.
However, even by contemporary Congressional standards, these seem extreme.
17
Still the proposal recurs. David Vlahov, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of
Public Health proposed once again in 1998 to undertake a trial.28 The usual chorus of
disapproval was instantaneous. Maryland's Democratic governor said: "It doesn't make any
sense. It sends totally the wrong signal." The Lieutenant Governor expanded on this slightly.
"It's much better to tell young people that heroin is bad. This undermines the whole effort." Even
Mayor Kurt Schmoke, a leader in liberal drug policy, distanced himself from the proposal and
censured his health commissioner for endorsing it. It was also reported that "many addiction
experts say funding for traditional drug treatment falls far short of the demand, and heroin
maintenance is a dubious distraction from proven remedies for drug abuse."29
Considerations for Deciding on a United States Trial
Perhaps the principal accomplishment of the Swiss trials was simply to show that heroin
maintenance is possible, a matter which previously had been in question. For example, Kaplan
(1983) doubted the feasibility of even an experiment in heroin maintenance, raising a host of
possible objections, from community rejection of sites at which addicts could be found nodding
off (p.175) to heroin diversion by employees. At least in the context of a wealthy, well-ordered
society, the Swiss have shown that it is possible to maintain large numbers of otherwise chaotic
addicts on this drug in a way that the community finds acceptable and without any dire
consequences to the health and safety of the community or participants. Indeed, the addicts'
ability to operate in society appears to have been enhanced.
Normative Issues
Feasibility is not desirability. Heroin maintenance has a contradiction at its heart. Having
chosen to prohibit the drug, society then makes an exception for those who cause sufficient
damage, to themselves and society, as a consequence of their violation of the prohibition.
28 "Test of heroin maintenance may be launched in Baltimore" Baltimore Sun 10 June 1998
29 All quotes from "Heroin maintenance quickly stirs outrage" Baltimore Sun 12 June 1998
18
Society's decision is only to set the damage level that entitles a user to access. It can require that
an addict cause a lot of damage in order to gain access; that is expensive (in terms of crime and
health risks) and inhumane. However if the barrier is set low, then access to heroin becomes too
easy and the basic prohibition may be substantially weakened.
Linked to that is a revulsion against the government itself providing the prohibited drug.A purely private market would probably raise far fewer objections but is implausible. The
impoverished condition of so many American heroin addicts and society's desire to require that
the drug be provided in the context of other services aimed at helping them overcome problems
other than the addiction itself mean that the state will certainly have a central role in the funding
and regulation of heroin maintenance, if not in its provision. Thus the innovation is more
disturbing than merely removing a restriction on the right of private provision.
We present this as a normative argument distinct both from the political issue of whether
such a role can obtain popular support and the related argument that heroin maintenance would
reduce the effectiveness of the basic prohibition by "sending the wrong signal" (MacCoun, 199.
The state has moral as well as programmatic purposes; providing a prohibited substance that has
caused so much harm will appear to some as normatively inconsistent, no matter what benefits it
yields. Similar normative concerns are often voiced about the inconsistency of current policies
toward alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, though to little effect.
In highlighting this problem, we should also identify a potential misunderstanding. There
might be a concern that "normatively inconsistent" messages will lead to increased drug use and
drug-related harms; if so, it can be answered empirically, and the Swiss trials and possible U.S.
trials becomes relevant. On the other hand, the view that inconsistent government messages are
intrinsically undesirable (irrespective of their consequences) is a purely normative matter that no
empirical study can address.
Heroin maintenance presents other conceptual problems. Providing heroin in accord with
the desires of the patient may allow for the delivery of psycho-social services that do indeed assist
19
the addict in dealing with his or her problem. But a case can be made that heroin maintenance of
itself is social policy not medicine; indeed, the INCB's objections to authorizing the shipments of
opiates to Switzerland emphasized just that. Arguably, interventions that blur the boundaries
between social policy and therapeutic treatment exploit and perhaps weaken the bonds of
legitimacy and trust that underpin the medical relationship.
These are issues that can be addressed without an American field trial. For some decision
makers these are troubling considerations that might nonetheless be waived if it were shown that
the reductions in disease and crime were large enough. But other decision makers might feel that
there are no findings of efficacy that could surmount the obstacles presented by these moral
concerns—though it should be noted that similar objections against methadone largely gave way
in the face of overwhelming evidence of reduced criminality, morbidity, and mortality.
Political Considerations
Another class of concerns that vitiate the need for a trial is political. Methadone
advocates and researchers express a concern that heroin maintenance would undermine public
support for maintenance therapy more generally, in particular for methadone. New York Mayor
Giuliani’s August 1998 attack on methadone maintenance for its failure to move addicts to
abstinence30 is a reminder of how thin is the foundation of public understanding on which those
programs rest, notwithstanding that he backed away from this position six months later. After all
it was only ten years ago that the White House Conference on Drug Abuse (198 produced a
report which opposed methadone maintenance. A population which doubts the morality of
providing a relatively unattractive narcotic such as methadone is likely to be extremely skeptical
about providing the demonized heroin. If it were offered, then methadone maintenance might
come under renewed attack.
30 New York Times August 1998 Details
20
Wayne Hall (personal communication) argues that in Australia the controversy over a
small scale heroin maintenance trial in Canberra has given new ammunition to those who oppose
both methadone maintenance and needle exchange. It is easy to caricature the idea of heroin
maintenance and that caricature rubs off on programs that have similar goals, to reduce drug
related problems without simply persuading or forcing addicts to quit habit forming illegal drugs.
Moreover the claim of a heroin “crisis” that served as justification for taking a trial seriously may
have backfired by supporting calls for greater toughness in a country which sometimes waves the
banner of harm reduction over its drug policies.
A related political argument focuses on the allocation of research resources. The budget
for treatment innovations is limited; one can reasonably question whether, given the political
obstacles to heroin maintenance, the marginal dollar should go into trials of a program that is
unlikely to be implemented. This is certainly a conservative view of social innovation generally.
A research program on heroin maintenance is clearly a long-term effort. Predicting the political
climate for maintenance ten years from now is a very risky enterprise.
Moreover the Swiss experience demonstrates is that in a wealthy society which values
order and sobriety it is possible to build a base of popular support for heroin maintenance.
Switzerland is a somewhat paternalistic society and its citizens may be less troubled by some of
the normative issues discussed here, though there is little positive evidence to support that.
Sigelman (1986) describes a welfare system which is mixed in this respect. The United States is
at the opposite end of that particular spectrum, with its ideology of individualism and distaste for
state support generally. But this poses the political question in a more positive light; what one
can learn from Switzerland about how to build popular support for a heroin maintenance trial.
Programmatic Concerns
National stereotypes are an important consideration in the argument for a US trial.
Americans see Switzerland as a fairly homogenous and orderly society, where program operators
can be trusted and even heroin addicts are probably given to following rules. Though Swiss
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addicts in fact have high rates of criminality, they are (like European addicts and criminals
generally) vastly less violent than their American counterparts. The kind of fraud that has
characterized the US methadone industry from time to time is at least not reported and not raised
as a serious problem even by methadone opponents. Thus the need for a demonstration to
determine whether inter alia American program operators could be monitored and coerced
effectively enough that diversion would be a minor problem and whether American addicts would
be capable of meeting the demands imposed by a three times a day clinic attendance.
Such a trial could also be structured to answer a charge of some critics that heroin
maintenance is simply not an important policy innovation because it will bring in few addicts not
currently in treatment (Farrell and Hall, 199. The initial Swiss recruitment difficulties suggest
that few addicts will enter heroin maintenance programs, no matter how attractive they sound in
theory. For example, the Geneva site found that only one member of the control group entered
the heroin program when access was provided. Conducting the trials in smaller cities, where they
could reach a significant proportion of the total heroin addict population, would permit
assessment of their attractiveness.
Ironically, evidence that puritan critics are incorrect in claiming that these programs
amount to providing chocolate to chocolaholics is that they are not attractive enough to the
intended clients to make much of a difference. The programs can be effective and immoral or
ineffective and moral. The maintenance regime, with its highly routinized provision of the
mythologized drug in a sterile environment, may fall betwixt and between for most heroin
addicts. It takes the glamour from the drug that has dominated their lives, without providing any
cure for their addiction. Some informal inquiries among Zurich addicts early in the trial elicited
the response that heroin maintenance was a program for “losers” (Hall, personal communication).
It may do little more than improve the performance of a small fraction of those who would
otherwise choose methadone but prove erratic participants in that modality. The second stage
expanded Swiss program will help answer that question.
22
Even if the evaluation results hold up on tighter inspection and heroin outperforms
methadone in terms of improving health and reducing crime among participants, some important
empirical questions about population effects may remain unanswered. The Swiss evaluation has
been patient focused. This elides one of the basic concerns of opponents, namely that broad
availability of heroin maintenance will increase the attractiveness of heroin use or even of drug
use more generally. Answering that question requires more than pilot programs, since it is
precisely a function of scale. Evaluations of small-scale pilot projects have inherent limits, a point
made by Vincent Dole (1972) in the context of the Vera initiative. Again, that argues for trials in
a smaller city where experimental programs might have observable population effects.
It is worth noting though that large-scale expansion of heroin maintenance, if it
substantially reduces addict involvement in heroin use and selling, may also have the benign
effect of making heroin less accessible to new users. Markets are now primarily supplied at the
retail level by long-term addicts; if these mostly withdraw, then non-addicted users, particularly
experimenters, may have difficulty finding a regular source with substantially shrunken street
markets.31
One can argue that the reduction in harmfulness might make heroin use more attractive
(see MacCoun, 199. In particular, someone who initiates with black market heroin when heroin
maintenance is available might reason that if she does become dependent, her habit will be
supported by doses of predictable purity and potency, at a modest price, from a reliable and safe
source. At the margin, this is possible, though it is hard to imagine someone with the
foresighteness to reason this way who would knowingly choose to become "enslaved" to a drug,
no matter the source. Moreover, such a person would have to knowingly accept the substantial
risks of using black market heroin for a period of years before becoming eligible for a
31 Treatment also has this effect, drawing from markets individuals who are both users and
sellers, thus simultaneously affecting demand and supply. For an analysis of this phenomenon
see Caulkins et al., 1996
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maintenance program. One might also argue that heroin maintenance would reduce the
likelihood that an addict would become abstinent. We find this compelling in the abstract, but the
argument loses some of its force when one considers the remarkably long duration of heroin
"careers" in the current system (e.g., Hser, Anglin, & Powers, 1993). At any rate, such
prevalence-increasing effects might be counterbalanced by the substantial reduction in black
market access that would result when current addicts stop frequenting (and running) those
markets.
Conclusion
The harshness of reactions in the international community to the Swiss trials illustrates
the difficulty faced by nations interested in testing harm reduction innovations. Whereas Dutch
coffee shops, the other much disapproved of harm reduction innovation, could arguably be
viewed as undercutting the sovereignty of neighboring countries because of drug tourism, the
Swiss heroin maintenance programs were clearly restricted to that nation's own citizens. Rather
than enthusiasm about the promising findings of the trials, the undoubted weaknesses of the
evaluation were seized on for accusations of irresponsibility. There was no recognition that
current policies, in particular the tough enforcement of prohibitions, have a much thinner research
base supporting them. Aggressive crack-downs, even if they have no demonstrable benefits and
highly visible harms in terms of increased violence, get no such international condemnation.
What is so striking here is that all this hostility is engendered not by a policy idea but
simply by a proposal to conduct a demonstration or trial. Clearly there are serious ethical issues
to government provision of a prohibited drug. Though it is not precisely a slippery slope, heroin
maintenance goes further down a path started by methadone maintenance and needle exchange,
two programs we endorse heartily. We confess to some squeamishness about heroin
maintenance. It is easier to feel than to articulate the qualitative breakpoint between it and the
other two programs. Needle exchange and methadone maintenance each help the addict meet her
need in a safer way. Methadone maintenance does so in a way that is less pleasurable than heroin24
but that is not true of needle exchange. But providing a full rather than an empty needle seems a
substantial step, perhaps because needles of themselves are so often seen as benign, the source of
cure rather than illness. One can object to facilitating pleasure on either consequentialist or
deontological grounds; we explore these matters in our forthcoming book.
Even some of the empirical objections cannot readily be answered through a small scale
trial in a very large city. But it is still difficult to account for the indignation and the willful
misrepresentation of foreign experiences (Britain in the 1970s; Switzerland in the 1990s). If a
substantial percentage of current heroin addicts were to participate, which is by no means certain,
heroin maintenance would result in large gains in health, social functioning and criminal justice
costs.
We return to our initial point. Society's tools for alleviating the problems of heroin
addiction are weak. Heroin maintenance offers some prospect of helping. It is worth serious
consideration, certainly more than the hasty dismissal that it routinely receives from so many
participants, researchers included.
http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facu...aintenance.pdf
, rather it is was a correction of what may have been an oversight. I understood heu as saying that the criteria of dependence does not necessarily include regular use (which is the only way any of these criteria can be true) - he did not say that the criteria specifically excludes regular-but-responsible use.
like intervention, celebrity rehab, ect... but in all harm reduction, if a concept remotely related to that comes up, the reflexive action is "thats your disease talking, thats excactly what an addict/ alcoholic would say, your rationalizing your disease." I'm in AA but in the media the puritanical approach of zero tolerance is advanced. Yet drug use is glorified so that if you are sober and have a drug problem you start jonesing to use. On Dr. Drew's show sub and MMT are the devil's children. Harm reduction is discredited by terms like denial, lying to yourself, killing yourself, substituting one addiction with another, ect...
) have chosen to approach the question in this way because it engages a more general analytic framework for how to approach social change. Cast in this way, it speaks to the central issues of how harm reductive discourses and practices will evolve and in turn what the dynamics of this evolution will look like. Here, the question of how harm reduction relates to the wider social system must be engaged.