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Between Hermes Trismagestus and the Buddha...

Jamshyd

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One tells us:

" 7) Separate the earth from the fire, the subtle and thin from the crude and coarse, prudently, with modesty and wisdom.
8 ) This ascends from the earth into the sky and again descends from the sky to the earth, and receives the power and efficacy of things above and of things below.
9) By this means you will acquire the glory of the whole world, and so you will drive away all shadows and blindness."

The other tells us:

"There are these two extremes that are not to be indulged in by one who has gone forth ... Avoiding both of these extremes, the middle way realized by the Tathagata — producing vision, producing knowledge — leads to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding."

Do note that "Tathagata" implies someone who has simultaneously gone forth and come back - just as one who is at once below and above.

So are these two sages talking about the same thing? And if not, why not?
 
If I saw these words in the context of Platonism I would say there's definitely a connection.

In the context of Greek and Egyptian mythology I really don't know. It's a reasonable idea to entertain.
 
^ Hermes Trismagestes - not Hermes. He is neither neo/platonic nor helleno-kemitic (although he does make guest-appearances on the Neoplatonic stage). It is in the context of Hermeticism, as embodied in the corpus hermeticum. My excerpt is from the Emerald Tablet. (And, in case anyone was wondering, the Buddha Quote is taken from the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta).
 
Yea, I've never heard of him before, but I'm gathering he is made of the same cloth as Neo-Platonism.

The masculine/feminine polarity in Mahayana can represent any dichotomy but it most immediately represents the dichotomy of the immenant world of seperation/parts and an "other" transcendent reality of unity/wholeness. The middle path would represent a Oneness with the two. I think they are speaking through essentially the same ontology.

In this light you might enjoy(or hate) Lateralus as much of the metaphor references Hermeticism.
infinite possibilities.
As below so above and beyond I imagine,
drawn outside the lines of reason.

Saturn comes back around. Lifts you up like a child or
Drags you down like a stone
To consume you till you choose to let this go.

Give away the stone.
Let the oceans take and transmutate this cold and fated anchor.
Give away the stone.
Let the waters kiss and transmutate these leaden grudges into gold.
Let go.
 
Hermeticism looks interesting. I'm sure I'll find my way to a more in depth exploration at some point.

This graph might be relevant to relating east/west ontologies of higher/lower.
greatchain-correspondences.gif


I've beaten this horse dead on here but a great relevant read is "Great Chain of Being" by Arthur Lovejoy. It's a historical exploration of how higher/lower metaphysical ontologies evolved in the West. Truly opened my eyes to the perspectives of pre-modern man.
 
i'd favor a 'it's alike' interpretation. in terms of a movement metaphor, i'd say the first one is speaking of the circular movement between above and below, while the second is speaking of the center of the circle. perheps in the fashion of a wheel. the left and the right side of the progressing wheel would be the axis of time, past and future. while the Buddha is to the point (literally here), hermeticism points us towards the constant change of this point, which is, consequently, not really 'a point' actually.

the opposition as you put it here seems a perfect illustration here of the problem of language: that is, any choice you make, which is necessary to express anything at all, implies a delineation, which necessarily excludes the other side of what you are saying. any defining or delineation does so by way of exclusion. any speech regarding anything absolute suffers from the same problem. language implies a choice and implies thus inherently a judgement; that , or you cannot speak at all. this is the reason why so much of continental philosophy is riddled with paradoxes, in an attempt to countereffect this essential property of language. the language (or rather, ones own hermeneutical dialogue with it) carves a path to the abyss, but in which any language dissolves by means of its constructed opposite. this is a central thesis in Heideggers 'On the way to language', where he regards any of the concepts he builds as 'temporary construction sites, only to be abandoned lateron' in this, i think, we recognize exactly what your quote from the emerald tablet is about.

in the Tao, one finds also a similar
May not the Way (or Tao) of Heaven be compared to the (method
of) bending a bow? The (part of the bow) which was high is brought
low, and what was low is raised up. (So Heaven) diminishes where
there is superabundance, and supplements where there is deficiency.

It is the Way of Heaven to diminish superabundance, and to
supplement deficiency.

if you look carefully, you can see that there is a dual movement; both of grasping (and thus going towards) the high and the low, as well as bringing them back towards eachother. same fashion, one does not know the center of something unless one knows its borders; to exemplify what i was talking about in the bit about language. the center of something is defined not by itself, but rather by its opposite, namely, its extremes.

at the same time, precisely because of this, they are very different paths though. which is noticeable in the fact that in the Tao quoted above, it speaks of the Tao of Heaven.
 
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at the same time, precisely because of this, they are very different paths though. which is noticeable in the fact that in the Tao quoted above, it speaks of the Tao of Heaven.
The paths are different in many respects but I'm not following your reasoning for how or why they are different. From what I see "Tao of Heaven" has a close correspondence to "Ideas of God"/"Platonic Forms".

i'd favor a 'it's alike' interpretation. in terms of a movement metaphor, i'd say the first one is speaking of the circular movement between above and below, while the second is speaking of the center of the circle. perheps in the fashion of a wheel. the left and the right side of the progressing wheel would be the axis of time, past and future. while the Buddha is to the point (literally here), hermeticism points us towards the constant change of this point, which is, consequently, not really 'a point' actually.
That's an interesting and I think valid way to characterize the Buddhist statement. To me it;s the Buddha standing at a vantage point outside of opposites looking in. At the same-time the higher reaches of Buddhism are described as an experiences of no center. Of inter-penetrating/inter-enveloping opposites.

This doesn't so much contrast the difference between hermeticism and buddhism but the vantage point from which the statements are made. The hermetic statements are of one below looking above. The buddhist statements are of one above looking below.
 
hm. i'm not sure where you see the idea's of God/Platonic forms come into he bow metaphor or diminish superabundance or supplement a deficiency. i think its troublesome to bring platonic idea's into the picture here. i think they are pretty much a prime example of an extreme, not a center. unless you presuppose some form of ontological idealism, a platonic idea does not 'exist' (latin: ex-istere - 'to stand outside') in the external world. in my reasoning, should there not be an external world, all of these idea's become essentially indistinguishable from eachother. the 'idea of the idea' would collapse unto itself, and one is left with only 'the Good'. i believe this is the core of the Platonic hierarchy of the idea's. in order to maintain there order, their seperation and delineation, one needs the other extreme of the low, the 'imperfect' manifestation. it is this that seperates, individualizes differing forms (cf. Schelling's 'dark force/gravity' culminating in mass/matter). so i think platonic forms are very much tied up with their opposite that is an individual/unique manifestation.

i know as much that Heaven (Tian (not very informative wiki) is a key philosophical concept in oriental philosophy. its meanings are extremely varied, yet all philosophical traditions keep using the same word. i don't feel i have enough expertise regarding this concept to divulge in its meaning (which is but a very basic course in chinese philsophy that was, unfortunately, but understandably, very much sinological and only slightly philosophical in nature, many years ago.)

This doesn't so much contrast the difference between hermeticism and buddhism but the vantage point from which the statements are made. The hermetic statements are of one below looking above. The buddhist statements are of one above looking below.

i agree that the contrast is in a way one of a vantage point, though i would characterize them as on the outer edge, looking inward (hermeticism) and centered, looking outward (buddhism). the problem with this, however, is that in making all of these statements, one assumes for himself an archimedian point; which really is an illusion, as the very language we speak and the culture that comes with it and is expressed in it, which formed our thoughts and way of thinking has always already taken care of that. one such an assumption would be that thinking confers univerisality, for instance.

what im trying to bring into focus here is that in a matter such as spiritual development, there is no real independant vantage point whereto one can 'step back'. it is inextricably bound to the path you follow, and that path is, at least to some extent, outside of ones own control. you are 'born into' a language and a culture which irrevocably and continually shapes you. 'stepping back' from it for a moment is an exercise that only works to the extent you 'see' or consciously pursue your own 'bias'. whether or not this can be completely overcome, and as such render thinking universal, is but an assumption. a strong counterargument to this assumption for instance, is the fact that this understanding itself, which we use to distance ourselves from 'ourselves', is actually given to us by the means of assuming a language and identity; without that, there would be no understanding at all. an empirical example of this (very western of me) could be found in 'feral children', for instance.
 
i'd favor a 'it's alike' interpretation. in terms of a movement metaphor, i'd say the first one is speaking of the circular movement between above and below, while the second is speaking of the center of the circle. perheps in the fashion of a wheel. the left and the right side of the progressing wheel would be the axis of time, past and future. while the Buddha is to the point (literally here), hermeticism points us towards the constant change of this point, which is, consequently, not really 'a point' actually.
Wow! I'm actually not sure if you did this on purpose or if you were just replying to my post as you saw it; but such an interpretation of the two excerpts on their own accord and only in relation to each other (as in, without regards to the full texts out of which they were excerpted) is a fascinating artifact of my less-than-careful choice of excerpt :). But this is truly lovely! Insightful as always, azzazza.

the opposition as you put it here seems a perfect illustration here of the problem of language: that is, any choice you make, which is necessary to express anything at all, implies a delineation, which necessarily excludes the other side of what you are saying. any defining or delineation does so by way of exclusion. any speech regarding anything absolute suffers from the same problem. language implies a choice and implies thus inherently a judgement; that , or you cannot speak at all. this is the reason why so much of continental philosophy is riddled with paradoxes, in an attempt to countereffect this essential property of language. the language (or rather, ones own hermeneutical dialogue with it) carves a path to the abyss, but in which any language dissolves by means of its constructed opposite. this is a central thesis in Heideggers 'On the way to language', where he regards any of the concepts he builds as 'temporary construction sites, only to be abandoned lateron' in this, i think, we recognize exactly what your quote from the emerald tablet is about.

Thank you, monsieur de Sausseur! =D

I completely agree, and I find it interesting you mention this now as this last week I have been reviewing past readings on Semiotics, with the intent of making it my primary tool of inquiry should I find myself back in Academia...

As I mentioned before, you do have the tendency to put to answer with words to my implications - which is an amazing demonstration of mutual-understanding, IMO. Thank you for mentioning this text by Heidegger... I was wanting to attempt a reading by him, but didn't know where to start. This seems like a great one to start with!

in the Tao, one finds also a similar


if you look carefully, you can see that there is a dual movement; both of grasping (and thus going towards) the high and the low, as well as bringing them back towards eachother. same fashion, one does not know the center of something unless one knows its borders; to exemplify what i was talking about in the bit about language. the center of something is defined not by itself, but rather by its opposite, namely, its extremes.

at the same time, precisely because of this, they are very different paths though. which is noticeable in the fact that in the Tao quoted above, it speaks of the Tao of Heaven.
Oh certainly. To my knowledge, all spiritualities with a conception of some absolute echo the same message, if not literally, then through symbols. This is why my personal approach to religious hermeneutics is primarily through the exposition of archetypal patterns.
 
I'll have to agree that the entire notion of 'center' (and its opposite, periphery) is problematic for someone seeking the sort of inner transformations either spiritual path offers. You are at the same time far to the periphery of the half of the world that is outside of you, and dead center of the half of the world that is within you. But then... yeesh... what use is 'half'? Language can be a seeker's worst enemy indeed. But words like 'center' and 'half' are at the same time necessary structural components of their respective metaphors, and they do work half decently, when the seeker doesn't fall prey to the forgivable mistake of misinterpreting them.
 
thank you for the kind words jams :)

I often do take on quotes simply on their own yes, as it usually produces interesting and (semi-) original musings. still, one should mind the pitfall and keep the reference at least somewhere in the background though, as it serves an anchor point for the communion of ideas (in other words; 'mind the gap'). and in this instance it's also very related to the rest that i was saying. a quote can (and often does) function just as any signifier in that through the language it is inscribed in it opens up towards the infinity of hermeneutics. so yes, it was on purpose :). I should mention that Heidegger's "On the way to language" is a notoriously difficult text though, you'll probably need to have had a good introduction to Heidegger in general in order to delve into its proper depths. As far as semiotics goes, a text which i can wholeheartedly recommend is "S/Z" by Roland Barthes. i thought this one relatively accessible, he introduces his concepts through a literary study of Balzac's "Sarrasine"
 
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In Hermetic kabbalism, the tree of life is drawn as a closed circuit, where the uppermost point on the tree (Kether, the godhead) is equivalent to the lowermost point (Malkuth, the world of physical manifestation) in some way that is not directly spelled out.

In Alchemy, which is an expression of Hermeticism, the holiest of holies, the philosopher's stone, is often said to be a mundane, profane, and lowly thing that is beneath your notice.

Similarly in Buddhism, it is said that form (samsara) is emptiness (nirvana) and emptiness is form.

I take all these ideas as variations on the theme that the thing you seek is so obvious that you cannot notice it.
 
In Hermetic kabbalism, the tree of life is drawn as a closed circuit, where the uppermost point on the tree (Kether, the godhead) is equivalent to the lowermost point (Malkuth, the world of physical manifestation) in some way that is not directly spelled out.

In Alchemy, which is an expression of Hermeticism, the holiest of holies, the philosopher's stone, is often said to be a mundane, profane, and lowly thing that is beneath your notice.

Similarly in Buddhism, it is said that form (samsara) is emptiness (nirvana) and emptiness is form.

I take all these ideas as variations on the theme that the thing you seek is so obvious that you cannot notice it.

This is actually my personal opinion on the matter, verbatim :). Well, maybe not 100% - I'd rather spell Qabalah with a Q and a single B as that would be a closer transliteration of the biblical Hebrew.
 
hm. i'm not sure where you see the idea's of God/Platonic forms come into he bow metaphor or diminish superabundance or supplement a deficiency. i think its troublesome to bring platonic idea's into the picture here.
I just didn't see how the presence of "heaven" makes it different from western conceptions. In a broad sense it is similar to forms.


in my reasoning, should there not be an external world, all of these idea's become essentially indistinguishable from eachother. the 'idea of the idea' would collapse unto itself, and one is left with only 'the Good'. i believe this is the core of the Platonic hierarchy of the idea's. in order to maintain there order, their seperation and delineation, one needs the other extreme of the low, the 'imperfect' manifestation. it is this that seperates, individualizes differing forms (cf. Schelling's 'dark force/gravity' culminating in mass/matter). so i think platonic forms are very much tied up with their opposite that is an individual/unique manifestation.
The way I understand "Ideas" is they can themselves be individual emmanations of higher "Ideas". In a sense there is a quantum jump between the world of abstract forms and the world of particulars, but then again particulars are just one more level of form enumerations. Whether you see polarity or unity between forms and particulars is a matter of vantage point.

in making all of these statements, one assumes for himself an archimedian point; which really is an illusion, as the very language we speak and the culture that comes with it and is expressed in it, which formed our thoughts and way of thinking has always already taken care of that. one such an assumption would be that thinking confers univerisality, for instance.
Point is taken but it is equally fallable to assume that all language/context is mutually exclusive in semantics, syntax, and/or phenomenology. While we can't ever really know from a philosophical pov, we can survey for universal intersections spanning across most cultures/languages. There are enough known cross-cultural phenomena that it's worthwhile to step back from the philosophical problem of truly knowing such things to assuming they are so and seeing if it leads anywhere interesting.
 
Point is taken but it is equally fallable to assume that all language/context is mutually exclusive in semantics, syntax, and/or phenomenology.

exactly my point really. you can't do without the 'unificationist's presupposition' as thinking automatically assumes a universalist tense. this is a presentation of an absolute. However, this absolute does not exist, but by means of its current expression or emanation as you refer to it. the thinking essence or form can be said to be the 'high' extreme. While a 'unificationist' interpretation is certainly possible, I personally strongly disagree with equating the oriental 'Tian' with the platonic form. at least, not directly. I'd put Plato much closer to the Hermetic tradition infact, but that is only generally speaking. One such point where Plato does contrasts himself, resulting in a way that strongly resembles the concept of Tian (at least, insofar as it is concieved of in the Tao; keep in mind that within different chinese philosophies the word has many and sometimes very different conceptualisations) is when Socrates lets a woman take the stand in the Symposium. In the text, Diotima's reasoning is often starkly contrasted with Socrates'. the result of that contrast is something that comes rather close to 'that which was high is brought low' et vice versa; which is expressed by Diotima herself. Even though it is ultimately very Platonized in the sense that we must rise to the ever higher abstractions of the Ideas, she speaks of a genuine need, an ontological ground for the conrete, the particular, the low. this is in stark contrast with the allegory of the cave for example, or the related platonic disapproval of the image (as the particular world around us is only an unclear image of the Forms).

it is also very much in contrast with
The way I understand "Ideas" is they can themselves be individual emmanations of higher "Ideas". In a sense there is a quantum jump between the world of abstract forms and the world of particulars, but then again particulars are just one more level of form enumerations. Whether you see polarity or unity between forms and particulars is a matter of vantage point.

there is a problem with this line of thinking; and it surfaces when you think about the particular as an idea. it is on this point that Diotima criticises Socrates. because it really isn't. the single moment the particular becomes a form it is no longer particular. when you speak of particulars as one more level of form enumerations, they are no longer particulars. instead, an ontological operation of a reduction towards idealism is performed. this has a very sore point however, and that is that it cannot give any reason for the existence of the ontic particularisation of itself (and by extension, ex-istence per se). and so one immediately returns to the 'high', but without ever having actually touched upon 'the low'. the particularity of the particular escapes reason because it itself is grounded in the very particalurity of that reasoning. This is also Schelings point when he speaks of a 'dark' force, as it cannot be brought to light. when you shine your flashlight into the darkness it is no longer darkness that is lighted up; instead, you see a reflection of light.

while you speak of a vantage point from where you can see polarity or unity between forms and particulars, your ontological point (that particulars are a level of form enumerations) has already dismissed the vantage point of the contrast as anything but an unexplained illusion. the 'idea of particularity' fails to capture the actual singularity of the particular in its saying that it isn't particular at all. it never actually touches upon singularity/individuality.

and only then we arrive at the point i was intending: that the universality of thinking lies precisely in its particularity (in a very Ourobouros kind of way). i will try to illustrate this with your point about cross cultural phenomena, as it suffers the same problem: there is no way of knowing that these phenomena have the same meaning within each of these cultures. infact, that which bestows them with a level of universality is not the cross-cultural phenomenon itself as it appears to itself in every instance, but the point of view that the observer assumes; for example, should he look trough a lens of say, 'functionality': this universalizing conceptualisation of the phenomena is his own and has little to do with the phenomenon as it appears inside the culture. the observer has already assumed his own point of view as absolute, and (unsurprisingly) finds universality in such.

in an analogue manner, i 'imploded' what could be called 'naieve platonism' in the post you quoted. not that Plato himself was not aware of this, mind you. the entirety of his work is the result of that awareness really. He has a lot of trouble with the doubling of the image, and pecisely there lies an opening towards 'the nothingness between his words'. in the hierarchy of the Ideas it is not clear what exactly seperates them. and it is precisely this that gave rise to the neo-platonic mysticism, because Plato's explanation is simply mystical; namely the 'overflowing of the Good from within itself'. and this is the heart of the matter in what i tried to express in the phrase 'the idea of the idea' (the reflection, or image, of itself). because in their ultimate unification in the form of the Good, their very seperation becomes exactly the Good within each particular one here, at their highest point, the forms implode unto themselves, and then the magic happens, because suddenly, in that the Good has become the Form of all forms, it is the ultimate singularity in each and every one of them. this is all very well mystically speaking, union and such. but then the Good, at its heart, has become a non-overflowing singularity because of its 'overflowing from within itself. as you can undoubtedly see, reason is driving itself hopelessly stuck in the mud here. it simply cannot touch the singularity that is the essence of the particular without succumbing its autonomy to it.

it's worthwhile to step back from the philosophical problem of truly knowing such things to assuming they are so and seeing if it leads anywhere interesting.

ah, but it is the tension of knowing at same time that it is as such as well as that it is not as such, that makes it interesting. when you already assume something as being the case, you already know where you will end up, and the journey does not leave the comfort of the assumption. luckely, that is why we have contingency =D
 
I needed some time to digest your post.


While a 'unificationist' interpretation is certainly possible, I personally strongly disagree with equating the oriental 'Tian' with the platonic form. at least, not directly.

I'll have to rephrase my previous post. In a broad sense the Taoist ontology is similar to Platonic ontologies. They are both organized into hierarchies where higher levels give forward the following lower level.
Tao Te Ching said:
From one comes two, from two comes three, from three comes ten thousand things
It's a combinatorial enumaration of masculine, feminine, and masculine-feminine whole.

I'm not sure where T'ien figures into all of this because I've never heard of it before nor am I very familiar with Taoism. I was asking what qualities of T'ien do you believe make it different from the upper echolons of Forms.

From what I can see T'ien is part of a cosmological hierarchy similar to the geocentric model. Something that has a counterpart in platonic conceptions( geocentric model ). Even though platonic forms deal with relationships between abstracts and particulars, the model also plays a role in ranking everything. planets, animals, elements, etc...

There are certainly key differences between the two in how things come together but I still think that both can be broken down in terms of abstract schemas and shown there is a level of broad but significant correspondence. A common deep structure.



In the text, Diotima's reasoning is often starkly contrasted with Socrates'. the result of that contrast is something that comes rather close to 'that which was high is brought low' et vice versa; which is expressed by Diotima herself. Even though it is ultimately very Platonized in the sense that we must rise to the ever higher abstractions of the Ideas, she speaks of a genuine need, an ontological ground for the conrete, the particular, the low. this is in stark contrast with the allegory of the cave for example, or the related platonic disapproval of the image (as the particular world around us is only an unclear image of the Forms).
In terms of motion I think this sort of polarity is emphasized by Plotinus. He breaks down love into "eros" and "agape". The drive to ascend and the drive towards descent/emanation. He saw completion in the coming together of the two.

I believe this has its counterpart in the allegory as well, since the man is driven to look at the sun(eros) that is emmanating light(agape).



there is a problem with this line of thinking; and it surfaces when you think about the particular as an idea. it is on this point that Diotima criticises Socrates. because it really isn't. the single moment the particular becomes a form it is no longer particular. when you speak of particulars as one more level of form enumerations, they are no longer particulars. instead, an ontological operation of a reduction towards idealism is performed. this has a very sore point however, and that is that it cannot give any reason for the existence of the ontic particularisation of itself (and by extension, ex-istence per se). and so one immediately returns to the 'high', but without ever having actually touched upon 'the low'. the particularity of the particular escapes reason because it itself is grounded in the very particalurity of that reasoning.
I agree that there is a qualitative difference between "forms" and particulars. With that said, the relationship between higher forms/lower forms is isomorphic to the relationships between lower forms and their particulars. In that sense you have illustrated a problem of semantics. We can say that both particulars and forms are a subset of a common ground, but then this relationship between the common ground and forms/particulars is isomorphic to the relationship between higher forms->lower forms and lower forms->particulars. Going up this ladder of hypothetical structure I imagine reaching a point where there is an infinite recursive unfolding which alternates between a common ground to all things and a common ground structured as a higher form. Cycling between a perspective where there is polarity between forms<->particulars and a perspective which sees them as consisting of one transcendent substance.


and only then we arrive at the point i was intending: that the universality of thinking lies precisely in its particularity (in a very Ourobouros kind of way). i will try to illustrate this with your point about cross cultural phenomena, as it suffers the same problem: there is no way of knowing that these phenomena have the same meaning within each of these cultures. infact, that which bestows them with a level of universality is not the cross-cultural phenomenon itself as it appears to itself in every instance, but the point of view that the observer assumes; for example, should he look trough a lens of say, 'functionality':

For the reasons you've stated it is difficult to perform many studies in a cross cultural context. Special care needs to be taken in designing the research. But then again any cross-cultural studies that can make a minimum/reasonable assumption(e.g "more"/"less", numbers, etc... ) about meaning and still find cross-cultural correspondence adds more and more weight to a common ground of phenomenological structures.

example of cross-cultural phenomena
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLj0IZFLKvg&feature=related

It's worthwhile to test out supported hypotheses as axioms in the context of philosophy.


this universalizing conceptualisation of the phenomena is his own and has little to do with the phenomenon as it appears inside the culture. the observer has already assumed his own point of view as absolute, and (unsurprisingly) finds universality in such.
I don't think it neccesarily has to be a matter of assuming your pov is absolute. Assuming your pov is valid is enough. It's completely possible to acknowledge that you are not grasping the phenomenological content "as it is" but the exterior functional dimension.


ah, but it is the tension of knowing at same time that it is as such as well as that it is not as such, that makes it interesting. when you already assume something as being the case, you already know where you will end up, and the journey does not leave the comfort of the assumption. luckely, that is why we have contingency =D
Take all the roads. See where they go.
 
I don't think it neccesarily has to be a matter of assuming your pov is absolute. Assuming your pov is valid is enough. It's completely possible to acknowledge that you are not grasping the phenomenological content "as it is" but the exterior functional dimension.
Take all the roads. See where they go.

indeed, exactly my point. i was merely drawing attention to this very strange and interesting phenomenon, namely that a kind of 'relative absolute' come forward. the path assumes its own absoluteness by being the individual/particularized/chosen path, even though as a path (an sich) it remains but one of many. i find this peculiar because its absoluteness comes not from its end, goal, or unifiable essence; but from there very difference itself, or this singularity of the particular i was speaking of earlier. in the case of the choice of the individual, the unificationists' universal becomes a metaphysical voluntarism of the individual. of course, the individual is not absolutely autonomous regarding pov's and cultural background, but that's another jar of pickles.

to put some of it in a metaphor: all roads lead to Rome, not because at the end of each road lies Rome, but because they are Rome


about your example from develomental psychology; i'm somewhat unsure about your point. it shows the strenght of scientific reduction yes. but in a context of cross-cultural phenomenon, its kind of akin to saying, speaking fromthe detached western (scientific) pov, this rock here is the same rock as when its over there lying in the midst of another culture. it is very likely a result from a developmental stage very closely related to the physical. my point is: the scientific reduction has already discarded any cultural difference as non-essential. whitin the scientific discourse, it is meaningless. you see, in this example, culture has been ruled out a priori. a genuine cross-cultural phenomenon in this context would be the case where two different cultures have given this developmental 'shortcoming' of the child the same meaning/interpretation and expression therof within their respective cultures.

but okay, let us follow this path now in order to arrive at a point i made in my earlier posts about the implosion of the pure form: assuming that there is this physical essence that lies at the basis of everything (ie. the physicalistic reduction). now we take the universalist's assumption therein, namely that at its very core, there is this 'matter/particle' which expresses the sought-after properties of the grand unified field theory. what we are left with here is this core, this singularity of pure sameness. this is an unimaginable, dare i say even impossible, entity, that is in a static state of being infinitly collapsed unto itself. why? given that it is the very core of the universal, there cannot be anything that keeps any (non-existant; since it is the very core of sameness) constituents apart. it is infinitely dense. and now comes the pickle: given as such it cannot be in any relation with anything that constitutes any difference towards it at all. it is completely isolated by the very nature of its universality. i don't think i have to tell you how paradoxal that last sentence is. but its one of the most interesting paradoxes of existence, together with something/nothing and being/non-being :)

I'll have to rephrase my previous post. In a broad sense the Taoist ontology is similar to Platonic ontologies. They are both organized into hierarchies where higher levels give forward the following lower level.

the problem is that when you employ such a broad category to determine sameness, the nomer tends becomes rather close to a moot point (at least, insofar as sharp research into a field goes). i mean, using such a broad category Platonism is similar to both Islam, Hinduism and Judaism as well. i do understand why you do that though, you are seeking out the universalities in each, or at least, those universalities insofar as they correspond to your pov regarding them. but this is your very in-dividu-ality really (to stress its latin root, meaning 'indivisible'). and so we come full circle with that above again (to remain within the spirit of the OP). my general point in all these posts here has been an emphasizing of a fundamental, a radical difference. and this is certainly not a bad thing, or heaven forbid, a shortcoming (lol), on the part of existence!

Originally Posted by Tao Te Ching
From one comes two, from two comes three, from three comes ten thousand things
It's a combinatorial enumaration of masculine, feminine, and masculine-feminine whole.

im missing one and three there =D (or three and ten thousand things, depending on ones interpretation)
(not that i myself know what these should be)

as far as the concept of Tian goes; i'm afraid 'ill have to disappoint. though i certainly will do so at one point, as of yet it is a study i have yet to embark upon before being able to say anything about it. i really don't feel like i have enough expertise to make any definitive statements about it; which is, i feel, a matter of respect. the wikipedia page should make clear how many different meanings the word has. from it, it should also be clear that 'a concept', or conceptuality itself, is conceptualized differently in western and eastern philosophy. for example; (very, very tentatively) ~there appears to be at least some exceedinly strange intertwining of sorts with their 'idea' of the 'face' (Lian 臉) (which is perhaps somewhat more straightforward in confucianism); but this is such a mighty strange territory, really.

just take these; i mean, in western philosophy, any of these meanings have a complete philosophical field of their own!

wikipedia said:
The Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan differentiates five different meanings of tian in early Chinese writings:
(1) A material or physical T'ien or sky, that is, the T'ien often spoken of in apposition to earth, as in the common phrase which refers to the physical universe as 'Heaven and Earth' (T'ien Ti 天地).
(2) A ruling or presiding T'ien, that is, one such as is meant in the phrase, 'Imperial Heaven Supreme Emperor' (Huang T'ien Shang Ti), in which anthropomorphic T'ien and Ti are signified.
(3) A fatalistic T'ien, equivalent to the concept of Fate (ming 命), a term applied to all those events in human life over which man himself has no control. This is the T'ien Mencius refers to when he says: "As to the accomplishment of a great deed, that is with T'ien" ([Mencius], Ib, 14).
(4) A naturalistic T'ien, that is, one equivalent to the English word Nature. This is the sort of T'ien described in the 'Discussion on T'ien' in the [Hsün Tzǔ] (ch. 17).
(5) An ethical T'ien, that is, one having a moral principle and which is the highest primordial principle of the universe. This is the sort of T'ien which the [Chung Yung] (Doctrine of the Mean) refers to in its opening sentence when it says: "What T'ien confers (on man) is called his nature." (1952:31)
 
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