Anthropic Principle

[protovack]

"The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so."

Are carbon-based lifeforms the only way in this universe?

Do the highly specific properties that we "observe" in the physical world indicate something amazing?

Or is it an argument from lack of imagination? (X seems highly improbable, so not X)

 

[DigitalDuality]

Are carbon-based lifeforms the only way in this universe?

If i'm not mistaken, i think there are theories that there could be such a thing as sicilone(sp?) based lifeforms...

 

[ebola?]

hmmm...where did you get that quote?
I am having a bit of trouble discerning its meaning.
the way I usually think of the anthropic principle is that it tells us that the seemingly amazingly coincidental set of circumstances we see in the universe are necessary (not THAT kind of necessary, Kant) precoditions for our ability to reflect on these circumstances in the first place. In this way, these circumstances are not amazing, wonderfully coincidental, or divine but are instead those which have given rise to our amazement. I dunno. I find the application of this principle tricky, and I think my understanding is rather poor.

Now, if we are to entertain the many-universes interpretation of quantum mechanics and couple that with the anthropic principle, we find that the circumstances which gave rise to life are not amazing but are rather one aspect of the structure of the multiverse which contains all possibilities. I used to be more taken with the many-universes interpretation, but I am now wondering whether it is just another expression of the Western philosophical urge to make the possible "real".

now on to the musings!

>>Are carbon-based lifeforms the only way in this universe?
>>

I STILL don't see why. They are probably the only way on planets like ours though.

>>Do the highly specific properties that we "observe" in the physical world indicate something amazing? >>

No, properties as such do not exist. Seriously, though, we need to say how these would be amazing.

>>Or is it an argument from lack of imagination? (X seems highly improbable, so not X)>>

heh...wouldn't it go "X is highly improbable given that all known possibilities have equal probabalistic standing; therefore, God designed X"?

ebola
np: venetian snares

 

[protovack]

^^^ Yeah, but you could make the same mistake without attributing it to God.

And, I think the multiple universes thing is bunk

 

[ebola?]

but how can you say "not X"?
obviously, "X", right?

 

[David]

Wait multiple universes in Quantum? Did I miss something here. I thought that was a theory in cosmology, not particles physics. M-Theory, and M-based theories are based on multiple universes... Those are derived from relativity though.

Sorry, I just think you have me confused here.

Ebola you have a PM.

 

[ebola?]

yeah, there is also a many-universes theory in cosmology. I'm not very familiar with it, but I think it is unrelated to quantum-mechanics.

the idea behind the many-universes theory in quantum mechanics is that for every probabalistic particle-interaction, everything that can happen does happen. each particle-interaction is a split in the multiverse, each outcome giving rise to a separate universe where that outcome happened.

ebola

 

[yougene]

the idea of multi-verses is also present in Metaphysics.

Infinity and its implications are mind boggling and amazing.

 

[ebola?]

whose metaphysics, though?

 

[yougene]

whose metaphysics, though?

From what I have seen this seems to be a relatively accepted view of metaphysics, but like anything else there is always someone that is going to see it completely differently. Anyways here is a link as an example

The Theory Of Statistical Metaphysics

 

[ebola?]

>>relatively accepted view of metaphysics>>

philosophers everywhere just gasped.

ebola

 

[MrM]

"The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so."

This theory is actually very sensible.

There are two different ways of looking at the universe.

One is that it is amazing that the universe has evolved in just such a way that planets could form, and that planets have evolved in just such a way that life was possible, and that the nature of the universe is such that that life could evolve to become sentient, and the nature of that sentience is such that we are sitting here today thinking about the universe and how amazing it is.

The other kind of goes in the other direction. It says that since we ARE sitting here today thinking about the nature of the universe we can take certain things as given. We can take for granted that the universe is set up in such a way that we could evolve, since the fact we are here thinking about it is proof that this is the case. Thus, if you understand certain things about how the universe works well enough, you can actually work out things about how it much have started simply given the fact that we are sitting here right now thinking about it.

Are carbon-based lifeforms the only way in this universe?

There may well be other forms of sentient (or non sentient) life, but since we have no proof of this (yet) we cannot use this to work things out in the way we can with carbon based life.

 

[ebola?]

>>http://www.physics.unc.edu/~tmgarret/statmeta.pdf>>

Interesting article. I dont really have the background to take it all in, but nonetheless, I have a few criticisms.

1. The larger theory, especially the idea that observers and the observed are both composed of mathematical structures, relies on Occum's razor. The application of Occum's razor to extra-observer ontology is dubious because what constitutes a simple description is dependent on human experience and means and ends situated within that experience.
2. The criterion for disconfirmation of the theory would be that the complexity of our minds ceases to increase. With looming environmental crisis threatening the livelihood of our species, it seems that humans won't be the example of these increasingly complex minds. Of course, the author raises the point that if all possible cases play out in many universes, minds would increase in complexity infinitely in one of these universes, at least, supporting his theory. This argument is circular though, presupposing the author's ontology in the first place.

I have another hesitation about his argument in that it compares the complexity of the observer with the complexity of that which is observed even though the two are unified in the same universe.
3. The author's view of concepts is strictly functionalist. Recent physiological research (see Lakoff and Galaise (sp?)) has shown the functionalist view to be unlikely. Instead, it seems that concepts are emergent in a co-option of the sensory-motor system for alternate purposes. In this way, concepts are situated intimately in the human (and perhaps lower-animal) organism-environment interaction and it would seem unlikely (although possible) that the universe would be conceptual in structure.

3.5.
If we concede that the functionalist view is untenable, how does the qualitative fit into the quantitative mathematical structure of the multiverse?

4. The author here presents a grand idealism where the multiverse consists of all possible mathematical structures. in addition to the above criticism, the author's ontology is also inadaquate in that it fails to explain the emergence of separate subjects. If our thoughts are merely conceptual content, continuous with the rest of the universe, why is it that my thoughts and experiences are private? Of course, this same criticism applies to pretty much all ontologies that avoid both dualism and solipsism. and I'm not saying that I necessarily have anything better.

ebola

 

[compact]

I haven't read the above link, but thought it was worth noting that the author is a graduate student (and not a professor) and in particular that link is not to a publishable journal-quality article. Not that it should dissuade from the work itself, though; I just wanted to note that not everything from a physics.xxx.edu URL is academic "canon".

 

[ebola?]

Well, I thought it was well written and quite interesting.
Even though this piece is not in the canon, would it be well-representative of the metaphysics emerging from quantum physics and cosmology?

ebola

 

[zorn]

^^^ There's no such animal.

yeah, there is also a many-universes theory in cosmology. I'm not very familiar with it, but I think it is unrelated to quantum-mechanics.

Yup. The ordinary many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics won't actually do what you want it to do here. It deals with the various results of measurements on a quantum systems all existing in different worlds -- not various physical constants or laws.

The cosmology versions will work: generally, they suggest those constants are randomly selected by some physical process. (There's actually good precedent for this; 'spontaneous symmetry breaking' is an important phenomena in physics.) If the universe is in some sense big enough, there will be enough causally disconnected regions each with different laws so that some will seem 'fine-tuned' for life. Adopting many-worlds QM would free you from the assumption of an extremely large universe, since the 'random selection' would come out differently in the different worlds.

3. The author's view of concepts is strictly functionalist. Recent physiological research (see Lakoff and Galaise (sp?)) has shown the functionalist view to be unlikely. Instead, it seems that concepts are emergent in a co-option of the sensory-motor system for alternate purposes. In this way, concepts are situated intimately in the human (and perhaps lower-animal) organism-environment interaction and it would seem unlikely (although possible) that the universe would be conceptual in structure.

I'm curious -- can you elaborate on that? Are you talking about functionalism in the philosophical theory-of-consciousness sense? If so, I don't see how such research could bear on it at all.

 

[yougene]

Interesting article. I dont really have the background to take it all in, but nonetheless, I have a few criticisms.

1. The larger theory, especially the idea that observers and the observed are both composed of mathematical structures, relies on Occum's razor. The application of Occum's razor to extra-observer ontology is dubious because what constitutes a simple description is dependent on human experience and means and ends situated within that experience.

Personally I don't even know if other universes if they do exist do consist of mathematical structures. For all we know math is just some variable(s) that are highy dependant on each universe. Human experience may be a limiting factor, regardless I still believe it is in at least some ways reminiscent of the truth. The fact that we can imagine a multi-verse says something to me.

2. The criterion for disconfirmation of the theory would be that the complexity of our minds ceases to increase. With looming environmental crisis threatening the livelihood of our species, it seems that humans won't be the example of these increasingly complex minds. Of course, the author raises the point that if all possible cases play out in many universes, minds would increase in complexity infinitely in one of these universes, at least, supporting his theory. This argument is circular though, presupposing the author's ontology in the first place.

Who knows the human race may or may not die out. In the long run I have hope for it.

I've found many thoughts to be circular within the realm of metaphysics.

I have another hesitation about his argument in that it compares the complexity of the observer with the complexity of that which is observed even though the two are unified in the same universe.
3. The author's view of concepts is strictly functionalist. Recent physiological research (see Lakoff and Galaise (sp?)) has shown the functionalist view to be unlikely. Instead, it seems that concepts are emergent in a co-option of the sensory-motor system for alternate purposes. In this way, concepts are situated intimately in the human (and perhaps lower-animal) organism-environment interaction and it would seem unlikely (although possible) that the universe would be conceptual in structure.

To me this is just one of an infinite amount of perspectives of existance. To me both can coexist, just how I believe Free-Will and Predetermination can exist, but thats another thread.

3.5.
If we concede that the functionalist view is untenable, how does the qualitative fit into the quantitative mathematical structure of the multiverse?

Are you asking how do we mathematically concieve subjective beauty?

If so the Golden Ratio may be a good example. It's probably very complex and I don't really have the full answer to that, but who really does.

4. The author here presents a grand idealism where the multiverse consists of all possible mathematical structures. in addition to the above criticism, the author's ontology is also inadaquate in that it fails to explain the emergence of separate subjects. If our thoughts are merely conceptual content, continuous with the rest of the universe, why is it that my thoughts and experiences are private? Of course, this same criticism applies to pretty much all ontologies that avoid both dualism and solipsism. and I'm not saying that I necessarily have anything better.

Your thoughts and experiences are not fully private. You share ideas and values with other peoples, you share concepts with other people. And you also share the potential to share your thoughts and experiences on greater levels than already present.

 

[yougene]

Well, I thought it was well written and quite interesting.
Even though this piece is not in the canon, would it be well-representative of the metaphysics emerging from quantum physics and cosmology?

ebola

I'm not sure which type of thought came first and gave rise to the other one really. After all Feynmenn did LSD(may or may not be true) and Einstein was a very spiritual man. I'm sure many physicists have dabbled within what would now be considered metaphysics without neccasarily knowing it. I may be wrong here I'm really not up on the history of metaphysics. But yeah I do thing the piece is representative to a degree in certain key aspects. Such as the belief of infinite possibilities.


Within metaphysics I've come across 2 general beliefs.
Everything the mind can come up with is possible.

Consciousness plays a role in the development of these possibilities.

 

[compact]

In one of his books (I can't remember which), I remember Feynman saying that he never tried LSD because he was worried about damaging his brain as his brain was so important to his work. Did he try it in his later years? I know he did experiments with sensory deprivation and other things and was friends with John Lilly.

 

[yougene]

In one of his books (I can't remember which), I remember Feynman saying that he never tried LSD because he was worried about damaging his brain as his brain was so important to his work. Did he try it in his later years? I know he did experiments with sensory deprivation and other things and was friends with John Lilly.

I'm not sure, you may be right, i'll look into it to it though.