What are some examples of Objective Truth?

[IamMe90]

If you are going to define objective truth as such, then you effectively rule out the possibility of any truth-bearers but language having the property, and given that all language is necessarily contingent on convention for meaning, you have framed the concept in such a way that it is impossible before we even begin.

This is where the problem stems from. Yes, the way we're defining objectivity in a way that makes it SEEM impossible (this is important, because we're not actually creating a tautology here, the purported "impossibility" really stems from a synthetic root, not an a priori root) to begin with. That doesn't imply some sort of incorrectness with the definition, it implies that we mean by "objective truth" is impossible. In a philosophical debate, it is not an option to snake out of every argument by redefining the central question at hand so that it fits your view of the answer.

Do you understand what OBJECTIVE means? It is inherently not subjective and to claim something as an objective truth when it is confined to your own subjective perspective is simply incorrect. Again, you can redefine objectivity to essentially mean subjectivity but then you've created a tautology that renders the entire point of this debate moot given that the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity no longer exists - there would be no point to the question "are there objective truths?" because it would simply translate to "are there truths?" This is NOT the question at hand. We want to know if there are truths which transcend the restriction of our own perception/subjectivity.

So yes, it IS seemingly impossible to start out with because the structure of our consciousness prevents it. I ask you to offer evidence to the contrary that anything here isn't true without redefining the question at hand.

 

[Vader]

This is where the problem stems from. Yes, the way we're defining objectivity in a way that makes it SEEM impossible (this is important, because we're not actually creating a tautology here, the purported "impossibility" really stems from a synthetic root, not an a priori root) to begin with. That doesn't imply some sort of incorrectness with the definition, it implies that we mean by "objective truth" is impossible. In a philosophical debate, it is not an option to snake out of every argument by redefining the central question at hand so that it fits your view of the answer.

I don't see how a definition can be incorrect. As we've established, language only has meaning by virtue of convention, and anyone is free to define their terms as they please.

Do you understand what OBJECTIVE means?

I understand what I mean by it. I may not understand what you mean by it.

Again, you can redefine objectivity to essentially mean subjectivity but then you've created a tautology that renders the entire point of this debate moot given that the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity no longer exists - there would be no point to the question "are there objective truths?" because it would simply translate to "are there truths?"

Truth is a property that is borne only by such things as propositions and beliefs, things that supervene on consciousness. Given that, I agree that the existence of what you consider an objective truth is impossible. Thinking about it, I'm not really sure that I understand the nature of the dichotomy. In fact, I was returning to this thread to suggest that there not need be a triangle that exists outside of my consciousness in order for my beliefs about it to be objectively true. It is a mental object, yes, but it has certain concrete properties.

 

[IamMe90]

I don't see how a definition can be incorrect. As we've established, language only has meaning by virtue of convention, and anyone is free to define their terms as they please.

Of course a definition can't technically be "incorrect" but when someone asks a question, we answer in the terms they've laid down. It is not "incorrect" to answer someone's question by redefining his central question and then answering, but it is entirely unhelpful to the asker of question.

I understand what I mean by it. I may not understand what you mean by it.

an objective truth is an assertion about "reality in itself" that coheres to reality in itself. the fact that you're perceiving an object at all negates the possibility of the object being "objectively true," no matter how veracious it may seem to you. until you somehow gain the ability to view reality free of perception, "in itself," you can't know for sure if the way you're perceiving the object of your mentality is coherent with the way reality it is.

i agree this subject gets a bit muddled in discussions because it's hard to distinguish yourself as a subject from reality, perhaps even impossible... but you still have to understand that your perceptual tools may be clouded and you could hypothetically never know this as you have no way of accessing another perception or a view of yourself and the objects of your thought without perception. it's a fundamental issue

 

[Vader]

Of course a definition can't technically be "incorrect" but when someone asks a question, we answer in the terms they've laid down. It is not "incorrect" to answer someone's question by redefining his central question and then answering, but it is entirely unhelpful to the asker of question.

I'm afraid I missed the precise definition of "objective" that determined how we were to understand the term in this discussion. There was no such definition in the OP.

i agree this subject gets a bit muddled in discussions because it's hard to distinguish yourself as a subject from reality, perhaps even impossible

I think it's impossible because it's an arbitrary and artificial distinction. That's what I was getting at when I discussed the possibility of an objective truth about my mental objects. I don't see how they're not part of objective reality tbh, does your ontology not permit things of this kind?

EDIT:
Another interesting point has occurred to me:

How you can know if your conception coincides perfectly with objective reality is baffling to me.

Do I have to know that it coincides with reality for it to be true? My belief might be totally unjustified, and it might be impossible for me to know if it coincides with reality, but that doesn't make it false.

 

[Psychodelirium]

Detached from the language is a mental object, that exists in my consciousness, the nature of which is not subject to debate because I know what it is.

This is a pretty baffling statement. Any attempt to move beyond mere hand-waving and describe the nature of this "object" (even to yourself) will necessarily involve you in the use of language. Further, any attempt to describe the condition of "external reality" such that your mental object might correspond or fail to correspond to it, will also necessarily involve you in the use of language.

If you insist that nevertheless, before language comes into the picture, there is a something or other that is "mental" that corresponds to a something or other that is "external to the mind", then you have succeeded in saying nothing that makes any sense. I do not know what you could possibly mean when you say that its nature is not subject to debate and that you know what it is. What is it that you know, exactly?

All of this is to point out that it makes no sense to speak of truth as a property independent of language. It is impossible to step outside of our language and compare it with reality. A non-linguistic reality might be, so to speak, gestured towards, but certainly it cannot be described, by definition. If it cannot be described, then talk of your beliefs corresponding or failing to correspond to it cannot be made to make sense.

 

[IamMe90]

I'm afraid I missed the precise definition of "objective" that determined how we were to understand the term in this discussion. There was no such definition in the OP.

ok, but there is a pretty commonly held definition of what "objective" means in the context of philosophy. if you had a basic understanding of the etymology of the word, I would have thought it would be clear? From wikipedia (not citing it as a source because it's a "good" source, but because they succinctly state how MOST people define objective):

"a proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are "mind-independent"—that is, not the result of any judgements made by a conscious entity or subject."

thus, your examples aren't objective because they are confined to a mental perception.

I think it's impossible because it's an arbitrary and artificial distinction. That's what I was getting at when I discussed the possibility of an objective truth about my mental objects. I don't see how they're not part of objective reality tbh, does your ontology not permit things of this kind?

I think the distinction is impossible, too, I guess I wasn't clear enough on that, reading back. I'm not saying mental objects are or aren't part of objective reality, I'm saying we have no way to confirm that they are because they're inherently confined to your subjective interpretation of them. The objective world is the mind independent world, the world "in itself" and the objects of your mind are necessarily restricted to your perception of them, which necessarily dictates that they are subjective. That is why we have the word subjective.

EDIT:
Another interesting point has occurred to me:

Do I have to know that it coincides with reality for it to be true? My belief might be totally unjustified, and it might be impossible for me to know if it coincides with reality, but that doesn't make it false.

No, you do not have to know that your perception of an object coincides with reality for it to be true, but you do have to know this if you want it to be objectively true. *forehead slap* I have already outlined why that is above.

 

[Vader]

This is a pretty baffling statement. Any attempt to move beyond mere hand-waving and describe the nature of this "object" (even to yourself) will necessarily involve you in the use of language. Further, any attempt to describe the condition of "external reality" such that your mental object might correspond or fail to correspond to it, will also necessarily involve you in the use of language.

I don't understand why a description is necessary.

If you insist that nevertheless, before language comes into the picture, there is a something or other that is "mental" that corresponds to a something or other that is "external to the mind", then you have succeeded in saying nothing that makes any sense. I do not know what you could possibly mean when you say that its nature is not subject to debate and that you know what it is.

When I picture a triangle in my head, that conception is not caught up with the word "triangle". I didn't realise that this was so controversial. I have a clear, distinct image of an object that has some inherent properties. It seems to me quite obvious that a person oblivious to language could have a mental object, and that this mental object could correspond to something in the real world. A baby can have a perception of a rattle, a mental object, which corresponds to a real rattle, an external object, before it knows any words.

What is it that you know, exactly?

I know that it has three things that , were I attempt to describe them, I would call "angles", and that as such, it also must have three things that I would call "sides".

All of this is to point out that it makes no sense to speak of truth as a property independent of language.

Of course it does. A belief can be true. When I drop a glass onto a hard surface, I believe it will shatter. At no point to I form a proposition, "that glass will shatter", but I certainly have a belief which is true.

A non-linguistic reality might be, so to speak, gestured towards, but certainly it cannot be described, by definition.

I'm afraid I still don't understand the problem.

If it cannot be described, then talk of your beliefs corresponding or failing to correspond to it cannot be made to make sense.

Redness and pain and love cannot be described, is it impossible to have true or false beliefs concerning these things?
...

"a proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are "mind-independent"—that is, not the result of any judgements made by a conscious entity or subject."

And it is objectively true that if there is a thing that has three of what I would describe as "angles" then it would have three of the things I call "sides". The concepts are, of course, mind-dependent, but the kinds of objects they latch on to are not.

thus, your examples aren't objective because they are confined to a mental perception.

They are confined to mental perception because belief is necessarily a mental kind of thing. How can I have a non-mental belief?

No, you have to know that your perception of an object coincides with reality for it to be true, but you do have to know this if you want it to be objectively true.

I still think you're getting justification all tangled up with truth when it need not be. My belief is objectively true if its truth conditions are mind-independent. Why do I have to know that it is objectively true for it to be objectively true?

if you had a basic understanding of the etymology of the word, I would have thought it would be clear?
*forehead slap*

There's no need to be condescending. I'm sorry I'm not as brilliant a mind as you; please be patient with me, I'm just a simple country mouse, Sire.

 

[Psychodelirium]

I don't understand why a description is necessary.

When I picture a triangle in my head, that conception is not caught up with the word "triangle". I didn't realise that this was so controversial. I have a clear, distinct image of an object that has some inherent properties. It seems to me quite obvious that a person oblivious to language could have a mental object, and that this mental object could correspond to something in the real world. A baby can have a perception of a rattle, a mental object, which corresponds to a real rattle, an external object, before it knows any words.

I know that it has three things that , were I attempt to describe them, I would call "angles", and that as such, it also must have three things that I would call "sides".

The description is necessary to communicate and to express your meaning, i.e. to make sense. Moreover a description is more or less what you have now produced. You have parsed the contents of your mental imagery into discrete objects and assigned names to them ("triangle", "angle", "side"). You have parsed the world into objects and assigned names to them ("rattle"). Now, I know what you mean. We can make meaningful statements and figure out if they are true or false.

Of course it does. A belief can be true. When I drop a glass onto a hard surface, I believe it will shatter. At no point to I form a proposition, "that glass will shatter", but I certainly have a belief which is true.

The point is that you cannot be said to have such a belief unless you understand the concepts "glass", "surface", etc. You have to interpret the world to form beliefs about it.

 

[IamMe90]

And it is objectively true that if there is a thing that has three of what I would describe as "angles" then it would have three of the things I call "sides". The concepts are, of course, mind-dependent, but the kinds of objects they latch on to are not.

I think there is just a disconnect between what I'm saying and what you're understanding me to say. I'm not sure how I can clarify any further...

Whether truth of objective or subjective does not make any negative or positive assertion on the truth itself - it only qualifies it. It's kind of like asking "is this balloon red or blue?" - the question doesn't touch on whether the object is a balloon or not, only the type of balloon it is.

"The concepts are, of course, mind-dependent, but the kindsof objects they latch on to are not."

But they are. The objects they latch onto are mind-dependent because any object that coheres with the concept you've thought of is necessarily perceived by your mind. You have no way of telling me whether an object with three "angles" that will necessarily have three "sides" exists in objective reality. You don't even have a way of telling me if, in objective reality, if "angles" necessitates the existence of a correlative "side." This is because you have no access to objective reality.

It seems to me what you're saying is "if object a contained angles in objective reality, it would necessarily contain correlative sides." But despite you can't actually prove this assertion to me, since you can't access objective reality. You can't prove to me that this relation isn't manufactured by your mentality.

They are confined to mental perception because belief is necessarily a mental kind of thing. How can I have a non-mental belief?

You can't. And thus your beliefs can't be objective.

I still think you're getting justification all tangled up with truth when it need not be. My belief is objectively true if its truth conditions are mind-independent. Why do I have to know that it is objectively true for it to be objectively true?

Uh.. because "truth" is an assertion about a claim's correctness. For an objective true belief to be true, it must be objectively true. This is basic non-contradiction, here. You don't need to know if an objective truth is objectively truth for it to be objectively true, but you still can't assert that it is objectively true if you don't know the status of its objective truth.

I suppose what we're getting at isn't "are there possibly objective truths" but "are there confirmed truths which are objective and could there ever be?"

It's not exactly the same, but it's practical - we're not really interested in the possibility of objective truths so much as if we can ever access them.

There's no need to be condescending. I'm sorry I'm not as brilliant a mind as you; please be patient with me, I'm just a simple country mouse, Sire.

you're right, and I apologize. However, putting the facepalm after the etymology statement made me sound a LITTLE more condescending than I was being, just sayin

 

[slimvictor]

When we talk of objective truth, I guess what I think of is truth concerning what Locke would term primary properties of objects, the thing as it is independent of perception. My belief, even if it is shared by no-one else, would be objective (in my understanding) so long as it concerned objective reality.

The thing as it is independent of perception?
In that case, there is no way you can know what it is.
You can only experience it through perception.
So you (and all of us) have no direct experience of objective truth, right?


And yet you insist that it must exist...

 

[thesoundofmotion]

slim, I am glad I started this thread because it provided some good thoughts.

I do agree with you. Everybody views the world differently therefore it really is hard to decide on whether Objective Truth exists or if even Truth exists at all.

Language is just convention like you said.

I think if some sort of Objective Reality does exist, it can't be explained in just mere words and that humans can only get glimpses of it from time to time. Maybe it's beyond all human perception.

 

[Pythagoras]

7 is a prime

It seems that you believe that logic has a role as a "meta-language".
I would argue that logic is only tangentially related to language.
Language is about subjective experience. (as in my post immediately above)
Language is a purely human creation and tool.
Logic is scientific, mathematical, and super-human.
Human beings are mostly illogical.
(Hadn't you noticed? )

Syllogistic Logic can be easily described as a metalanguage. Certainly this is how the logical positivists/empiricists viewed it, using it as a tool for ascertaining valid truth statements.

On the question of objective truth it depends on one's metaphysical position.

As a strict Kantian whose ontology places value and reality to the phenomenal world, whilst parsing off the noumenal as unknowable and lacking any correspondence to mental phenomena, then the 'objective truth' is anathema, your anti-realist stance precludes it.

One can argue from a neo-Platonic ontology that the statement "7 is a prime number' is an example of an objective truth, represented by the Form "7" A combination of two different abstractions, number, and the primes which exist apart from human opinion. Once must accept neo-Platonic concepts.

The question hinges on whether one is an epistemological metaphysical realist or anti-realist.

As a neo-Platonist I give you "7 is a prime" as an example of an objective truth.

FIAT LUX

 

[IamMe90]

Someone who believes in the theory of forms... interesting, to say the least.

 

[Tromps]

Will you be a male after you've died?
What is the "I" to which you refer?
Some people have claimed that the "I" is a spirit, neither male nor female.
Don't under-think it.
It might not be as self-evident as you take it to be.

So it is in fact a matter of time then?
My physical body will still be male after I die, for as long as its there.
The "I" I am referring to is my physical being, it is male, in this moment.
I am not talking about a spirit. I am distinguishing the physical world from the mental world. The physical world being objective, and the mental world being subjective. There are physical 'laws' which cannot be broken, however when referring to the mental world, possibilities seem to be endless. It is how I interact between these two worlds which causes variations.

 

[Pythagoras]

Someone who believes in the theory of forms... interesting, to say the least.

If you follow current Platonic theories of correspondence theories of epistemology, then the inevitable question is 'to what does your metaphysical objective universe relate. It seems the only way to answer the OPs question

You may be surprised that Platonism is undergoing a resurgence, in metamathematics for eg in concretising such concepts as number, and other objective conceptions. It may have been well critiqued with Moral Error theory, though I contend that there are objective moral Goods that exist in a 'realist' sense, I don't see how that is stranger than theories that conclude that there is nothing we can know about the noumenal world that they posit in support of their phenomenalistic epistemology


...the forms merely commit us to metaphysical beliefs of a kind not so bizarre given the various philosophies they contend with and at least offers the possibility of 'objective truths'

 

[Vader]

You have no way of telling me whether an object with three "angles" that will necessarily have three "sides" exists in objective reality. You don't even have a way of telling me if, in objective reality, if "angles" necessitates the existence of a correlative "side." This is because you have no access to objective reality.

It seems to me what you're saying is "if object a contained angles in objective reality, it would necessarily contain correlative sides." But despite you can't actually prove this assertion to me, since you can't access objective reality. You can't prove to me that this relation isn't manufactured by your mentality.

Well, if we're getting right down to the nitty gritty of it, I can't prove anything to you. I can't even prove that I exist; even if I were to sit at a table, smoke a joint and play backgammon with you, I wouldn't have any way of proving to you that I'm not a philosophical zombie. No-one can prove anything, really. It all comes down to faith, and to making sensible inferences from the phenomena we percieve. I think that anyone who doesn't infer to an objective reality (preferably one in which all triangles have three sides) is being rather silly.

 

[IamMe90]

what exactly is bizarre about theories that assert the unknowability of the numenal world?

just curious, i'd like to hear an explication of those condensed views you have put forward. i don't really know much about neoplatanism, i've only lightly studied plato's actual theory of forms itself, not modern takes on it.

 

[IamMe90]

Well, if we're getting right down to the nitty gritty of it, I can't prove anything to you. I can't even prove that I exist; even if I were to sit at a table, smoke a joint and play backgammon with you, I wouldn't have any way of proving to you that I'm not a philosophical zombie. No-one can prove anything, really. It all comes down to faith, and to making sensible inferences from the phenomena we percieve. I think that anyone who doesn't infer to an objective reality (preferably one in which all triangles have three sides) is being rather silly.

no one is saying that things aren't practically knowable, though. i agree with you that objective reality probably exists and, our experiential perception correlates to a consistent degree with what is going on in objective reality - even if it isn't descriptively accurate (that is, every time i experience a "red," object, i'm experiencing an object in objective reality that has some sort of consistent quality).

the point though, is that "truth" and "certainty" are different from probability. we can intuit and depend on these probabilities, but we still can't assert objective truths. that's all.

 

[webbykevin]

Sherlock Holmes lived on 221B Baker Street.

Sherlock Holmes didn't live anywhere, he was a fictional character in a book.

 

[Vader]

the point though, is that "truth" and "certainty" are different from probability. we can intuit and depend on these probabilities, but we still can't assert objective truths. that's all.

Well, we can assert them without making a knowledge claim. I believe it to be objectively true that triangles have three sides.

Sherlock Holmes didn't live anywhere, he was a fictional character in a book.

Well, now we're going off on a tangent...abstract objects can have properties. Unicorns have a horn, right?