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Free Will?

The ass would have simply made a choice and eaten from which pile it chose (i'm with the two piles of hay it's too complex mixing water into such an equation).

I'd venture to suggest that determinism would cause the ass to die !

I'd venture to say that such a perfectly balanced set of circumstances would never occur in reality. ;)

The ass would choose one over the other, but such a choice would be predetermined, say, by the ass' habit for turning to the left or right.
 
i don't think paradoxes are bad. neither do i hold that they deny or invalidate something. on the contrary really. they are the best teachers one can find. but you have to learn to listen to what they are speaking of. in order to do that, you first have to leave behind a kind of naieve, yet seemingly inherent totalitarian goal of knowledge (not that this is 'bad' or 'wrong' knowledge', rather, its about a transcending of knowledge itself). knowledge is inexhaustable. paradoxes stress the dynamism of two sides, and neither can be reduced ('put at rest') in the other.

are you really surprised that there is no definition of free will besides that of the paradoxal? and do you hold that something paradoxal does not exist? if free will is free; anything said about it will automatically be self-denied. it immediatly frees tself from it. to put it simply; you cannot capture something that is free. it would no longer be free. you can only inconspicuously point in its direction.
 
^^ Disagree in an infinite universe everything is possible - including a state of perfect balance - however rare that may be - Of course if you subscribe to the big bang theory i'd suggest you're in a state of contradiction ref determinism. :)
It may well be possible to study & predict behaviours with much accuracy but once we get down to which of two identical ham sandwiches to eat i'm definitely choosing the right one ;)
 
or, lets put it like this:
you accept random events, no? a random event can stop, start or change a causal chain. could free will then not be the resulting whole of this process? it'd be neither the random event, nor the determined event. it would be the process; the result, the event(-ing) of the synthesis of both.
 
I have consistently stated that i accept determinism exists as well as freewill - i cannot see why they need be mutually exclusive
 
If everything in the universe is determined, then our decisions are too. If they are determined, they are not subject to our agency, and are not free. I cannot see how a mechanistic process is compatible with volition. Kant called the notion that free will and determinism are compatible a "miserable subterfuge" iirc, and William James considered it "a quagmire of evasion", two turns of phrase that have always delighted me.
 
or, lets put it like this:
you accept random events, no? a random event can stop, start or change a causal chain. could free will then not be the resulting whole of this process? it'd be neither the random event, nor the determined event. it would be the process; the result, the event(-ing) of the synthesis of both.

Well (I have said this before), I'm not so sure whether there really are truly random/uncaused events. QM, randomness is a mathematically defined, probabilistic randomness and non linear systems (deterministic) can produce sequences that pass some statistical randomness tests.

Azzazza, I concede that there may well be something beyond our ken that somehow passes the test of the paradoxical definition of free will, I just don't see how it is necessary, apart from fulfilling my need to feel like I'm really controlling my destiny. In the same way I concede that there may well be such a thing as God - a concept that would also fulfil a yearning for meaning or purpose.

I'm agnostic and sceptical about both, because I don't find either necessary, I don't see any compelling evidence and because the concepts seem to satisfy some human needs suspiciously easily for me (which makes me suspect that both are the result of evolutionary psychology at work).

I'm an empiricist and a rationalist, I think that you are a metaphysicist (maybe with mystical leanings?) - neither of us is right or wrong, probably best we leave it at that. :\
 
^Reason, experience, metaphysics and mysticism are all mutually compatible IMO.
 
metaphysics (well, technically, since phenomenology we have left 'metaphysics', but i guess an empiricist would still call it metaphysics) and philosophy of religion are my two favourite subjects yes :)
however contradictory it may be with the former at times, i certainly do not abhor empiricism. its good 'grounding' and good discussion. my aim is generally to (try to) see the good and beauty of all things.
 
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^Reason, experience, metaphysics and mysticism are all mutually compatible IMO.
Aye, well I didn't mean to imply that they were incompatible, rather that they are perspectives and, yes, one can also have a metaphysically informed perspective of empiricism and vice versa.
 
Assuming the notion that "free will" is a delusion of awareness insofar as we believe that our choice was independent of a mechanistic, deterministic process (our consciousness deludes itself into experiencing a choice and apprehending the reality of that choice) it ultimately does not matter.

Whether all of our choices are determined or not, if your consciousness believes that it is ultimately making the choice, then you will experience the event as though you chose the outcome. Believing you made a free choice does not augment the fundamental process (or perhaps algorithm describes it more accurately) producing that choice.

One must be cognizant of the possibility that phenomenal consciousness (the 'experience') may very well be incommensurable with the current Standard Model of physics and that the architecture of phenomenal consciousness is much more abstract and complex than our current understanding of physical reality.
 
Whether all of our choices are determined or not, if your consciousness believes that it is ultimately making the choice, then you will experience the event as though you chose the outcome.

This gives a whole new meaning to 'freedom is a state of mind'. :)

Believing you made a free choice does not augment the fundamental process (or perhaps algorithm describes it more accurately) producing that choice.

I think I grasp what you're saying, and agree with you at some level in a way I can't quite put my finger on. However, on the contrary, I think going through life with the a priori attitude that you are fundamentally free does, in most cases, lead to a fundamentally different sort of life outcome than choosing to be a determinist. This is just as possible as the other way around (life's experience leading one to [dis]believe in free will, in a deterministic fashion). In fact, I could see this causation going both ways at once, in a sort of vicious cycle, independently of whether or not free will is real.

Regardless, your main point stands, I'd say: it's a moot point. The practical grounds for convincing anyone to change their fundamental worldview regarding free will is shaky at best. Feeling 'free' (or not) is such a subjective phenomenon, and dependent on such a large array of unmeasurable factors, that I doubt its existence as an objective phenomenon can ever be proven.

One must be cognizant of the possibility that phenomenal consciousness (the 'experience') may very well be incommensurable with the current Standard Model of physics and that the architecture of phenomenal consciousness is much more abstract and complex than our current understanding of physical reality.

Quite possibly.
 
Free Will - What do you believe?

Do you believe in free will? Please include the logic and/or evidence behind your answer. Be as specific as possible.
 
No, I believe we must create it for ourselves, until then we'll be riding the paths that we're given. But thats just me.
 
I'll chime in with my usual:

these dabates usually aren't particularly fruitful, as people begin to talk past one another. We need an operationalized definition of what it is to "will", but then what it is to do so "freely". I haven't arrived at any satisfactory answer to my own question, so I'll let others chime in. Provisionally, however, I will say that predictive indeterminacy of will doesn't seem sufficient to establish free willing.


azzazza?I said:
you are looking at your room. at a certain point you become aware that you are looking at your room. you become aware of, you know of, a you and the fact that it is looking at your room. you know that you are looking at your room. this meta-perspective is the transcending of the subject-object relation, and is what i call 'self-awareness'. it is a sort of observing of the observer himself. that escapes both the object itself, as well as the perciever. it is the awareness of your perspective. but what is this meta-observer? its impossible to say. it is both you and it is not you. it is you looking at yourself. this is a fundamental 'freedom' you have from yourself, characterized by a sort of 'non-being'. you take a distance, a step back from yourself. but into what exactly? a sort of 'nothingness'.

Sorry if I'm covering redundant stuff: I don't yet have the wherewithal to read this entire thread.

I like this formulation, but I also find it somewhat incomplete / imprecise.

What actually happens, concretely, for the investigating subject when she pops up a level of meta-awareness? I believe that the subject/object schism is re-carved, still retaining subject-object duality. Now, the object encompasses the prior complex of investigating subject and investigated object, the subject encompassing an investigator that takes the prior investigation (a prior self) as an object. We can see, then, that the investigator may pop-up an arbitrarily extendable number of levels of meta-investigation. In no case will the question of free will dissipate: it's still open to interpretation whether we should describe this process as determined, causal processes outside the scope of investigation determining shifts in what the investigator does (most crucially, which 'level' of abstraction she focuses on), or that the crucial point is that we can't form a body of causal laws which intelligibly describe how particular categories of phenomena external to the investigation cause particular shifts in awareness.*

My opinion (sans firm evidence) is that the body of processes determining these shifts in awareness (and thus structuring the non-dual space into which awareness plunges anew, structuring possible novel dualities) lies in the set of conditions of possibility that govern how investigation emerges in the first place. Per this picture, both these conditions of possibility for investigation and the space of possible investigations into which actual investigations launch defy the question of willing, as they inhere logically prior to characteristics which allow willing and freedom to become intelligible, namely temporality and clear division between what is possible and what actually transpires. More generally, the temporality and realization of the possible as actual mark the emergence of dualism, emerging out of the one/many blur, into the space of the one/many blur.**

Whether the willing that occurs is "free" is a matter of particular aspects of the observer/environment interaction (logically secondary to the 'space' of possibilities which structure this interaction but logically primary to either subject or object, as we come to know the two), these aspects necessarily perspectivally partial and in constant flux.


this freedom may be limited to awareness of perspective. but to deny this 'freedom' would be preposterous, for it is to deny the very awareness that comes to positing this position. without it, you couldn't say "im a determinist" for you cannot be aware of this fact. ie.: object: "determinist", subject: "i", transcendence of object-subject: "i am determinist."

Is this autonomy of awareness from object of awareness what people tend to mean when they describe someone 'willing' 'freely'? And do we at root agree, but just with differing foci?

ebola
*I believe that the problem is that the fruits of investigations establish intelligible laws governing objects of investigation, not laws governing the context which shapes this investigation.
**One problem that you may have noticed is that my ontological schematic is riddled with dualities, as I try to describe the non-dual. That is because I too take the character of a subject investigating an object as I write this, never fully capturing the object that I truly desire to aim at, the investigation itself.
 
Free Will in a Predetermined Universe

we live in a universe based on cause and effect, the law of karma, so therefor all actions are ultimately and absolutely predetermined. however we can have free will in a predetermined system by giving up attachment and becoming realized beings. to live purely in the moment, free of attachment, in a realized state is to have free will because your mind is no longer subject to karma.. but even that free will is predetermined because you still have a body that is subject to karma. so ultimately, no we are totally determined beings and we are an inseparable part of the rest of the universe.
 
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I like this formulation, but I also find it somewhat incomplete / imprecise.

i simplified my argument at that point because i felt i wasn't reaching my discussion partner. translucency at the cost of accuracy.
also, if i remember correctly, i was in a rather bad mood, which drove the discussion in a rather heated direction on my part.


**One problem that you may have noticed is that my ontological schematic is riddled with dualities, as I try to describe the non-dual. That is because I too take the character of a subject investigating an object as I write this, never fully capturing the object that I truly desire to aim at, the investigation itself.

that is actually the spearpoint of my argument against determinism. as soon as the subject is taken as object, it is no longer subject. therefor, one's investigation is already missing its point, before one actually started. when you make an abstract movement (and this is a difficult one to actually grasp; if only for a fleeting moment) of the subject as subject of its own subjectivity, it is as if a point of 'singularity' is reached; no doubt the one you are after. this is the subjectivity of the subject. the duality becomes a two-way recursive definition of itself (without any reverting to an objective determinism), creating an infinite 'mindspace'.

again, it is not the object that is first, it is the subject. the point lies in a subject 'bending back unto itself', which creates a circularity independent of object, instead of the linearity that is 'subject towards object'.
 
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