Surely the people in the train scenario are just as mortal, and so one could argue that saving them is equally just a "postponement" of death?
i concede it is a rather arbitrary difference [see edit just before you posted this reply]. there is still an irreducable difference though -when one strictly limits himself to the situation at hand- in the fact that organ failure is a matter of time, while stopping the train is an absolute avertment.
So, given that the whole world is full of suffering and unequal, could I not argue all of our situations to be unethical? And if so, doesn't that mean that persisting in this world at all is an evil action?
the problem in your trolley problem is that the situation does not allow for even a possibly ethical outcome. If you say the people in the trolley problem are real world people with history and faults, then conceding that this cannot be your judgement, and allowing fate to run its course would be the ethical thing to do. for any detailed moral issues within the persons escape your perception. any choice cannot be justified.
its equally impossible to prove the suffering and inequality of the world are fundamentally unjust. However, the assumption, be it only an unprovable assumption, that it is just, in the end, is universally human. it simply
has to be. when we see it is not,
we ourselves set up institutions to make it as such. (and yes, even sociopaths, serial killers etc. do justify themselves, but only to themselves; in a schizophrenic/psychotic solipsist-like fashion, which allows for anything really. they do not allow for any 'alterior' respons (-ability)). thus we set up an external, impartial system for justice.
when one assumes it is not, and assumes it cannot ever be, a state of cognitive dissonace ensues, and maintaining the will to live (in a world of which you
know it will always take advantage of you from the beginning, and will always treat you completly unjust, without any hope) can be difficult, if not impossible. For no measure of trust can ever be built up, and no love is possible
the ontological tragedy is, that it is exactly this fundamental trust in the good that makes us vulnerable to evil, allowing for evils existence. the absolute victory of evil would be to destroy this trust, and this is what it seeks to do. however, it would also paradoxically be the self-destruction of evil, for this trust, in being an unprovable open-endedness, is the only reason evil can uberhaupt exist. without fundamental trust, there is no access-point for anything other then self; but, resulting in absolute meaninglessness (which would be eternal suffering of absolute fact solipsism). thus this trust can't nor ever will be a proven fact [unambiguous certainty], for that would, again paradoxically, be the ultimate victory of evil; for the trust-relation is destroyed by a need of proof. the trust relation allows for seperateness within communion. much like it is with children growing up. the destruction of the trust-relation seperates the two entities defining themselves in terms of the other. which ultimately results in nothingness. which is the ground of all fear. which is angst. which is origin. neither good nor evil by itself. only through its trust in itself as other, its creation, it is 'good'. thus it is good because it trusts.
my ontological excursion probably won't make much sense. but this inaccurate example may shed some light. please don't go picking on the example, its inaccurate.
terrorism vs a free state: the acts of terrorism make the state want to protect itself from this evil. it does so by passing legislation, controlling, tightening freedoms (loses its trust). which ultimately end up rendering the state a freedomless police state. Now what is the difference between the force the police state applies to its citizens to ensure its safety with the force the terrorism applied to the state? trust has been replaced by control/power/force/certainty/suffocating safety
[/lights his pipe]
![:\](https://bluelight.org/xf/BL_Images/Orig_Emoji/wrygrin.gif "wry grin :\")
