Royce’s contradiction of disjunction also shows our experience as underdetermined by our choices and descriptions of it, always presenting an indeterminate number of future possibilities in spite of the constraints placed thereon by the choices we have already made. Recall, again, the disjunctive contradiction. Because our logical description of this disjunction is contradictory, this shows the failure of our logical distinctions to wholly capture the continuum of experience before us. Thus, even though certain distinctions we have made render parts of our experience determinate and certain choices we have made constrain future options open to us, the continuum of experience still serves as a context for future choices. Not having been captured by our description of it, the continuum of experience continues to be ripe with an indeterminate number of possibilities. For example, even if we have chosen join a rural commune, this choice having constrained a number of future possibilities, there is still an indeterminate number of future possibilities open to us. Although we could not get a job as an investment banker, we can still choose whether to farm, build houses, pick flowers, run wildly, our mouths agape and screaming, murder our house-mates, etc.
This notion of the field of experience as presenting an indeterminate number of possibilities for choice and distinctions is further exhibited by the boundless number of logical borders we can create from the fundamental disjunctive division. Recall our continuum of experience divided into p and not-p, its border symbolized as not-(p v not-p) or simply p . not-p. We can see that additional divisions can be made between p and p . not-p or between not-p and p . not-p. These divisions can each be symbolized as not-(p v (p . not-p)), i.e. p . not-(p . not-p), and not-(not-p v (p . not-p), i.e. not-p . (p . not-p), respectively. These secondary borders too are contradictory, again displaying our logical system’s inability to capture the whole of experience. Furthermore, we see that we could also make tertiary borders between our secondary borders and the first border or the secondary borders and p or not-p, quaternary borders, fifth-order borders, and so on. There is an infinite regress of borders we can make. What this shows us is that, even given the constraints previous distinctions and previous choices made place on our experience, there are still an indeterminate number of possibilities for choices and future distinctions open to us.