MyDoorsAreOpen
Bluelight Crew
- Joined
- Aug 20, 2003
- Messages
- 8,549
I just spent some time last week reading about the Sokal Affair, where prominent physicist Alan Sokal published a rambling, incoherent paper in a leading journal of postmodern philosophy, and declared all of postmodern philosophy to be intellectual chicanery when he confessed to it. Now I'm not an avid follower of all the drama that goes down in the world of academic philosophy and academe in general, but I've known people who are of that world, including a few who are sold on postmodernism (or at least used to be), and I have a general idea of what the philosophical movement entails (or at least did in its heyday).
Postmodernism basically says that truth is socially constructed, that what any of us take for granted as true is simply a function of what we've been taught and whose company we've kept. From what I gather, a lot of the charges against postmodernism and its defenders in academe have been led by scientists, who object to postmodernists denigrating scientific truth on these same grounds. Scientific truths, they say, are not agreed upon by social convention -- they're arrived at by testing, using tests that anyone could theoretically perform and witness the results for themselves. Yeah, things get murky and "witness" gets tenuous when you're talking about proxies for, and lengthy convoluted extensions of, our sensory organs, which few know how to use, and whose raw data is not easy to interpret. But point is that all people seem to inhabit a common physical world with common properties that don't really vary from person to person.
I'm with the scientists -- I think there is a physical world that is common to all people and other sentient beings on earth. I think postmodernists who sought to deny this were definitely applying their philosophy's foundational principle incorrectly. But I do think they have a point, which merits further investigation: I think there is a degree to which our sentient beholding of the physical world creates reality. That is to say, there is a real contribution to "reality" that is made by our first-person experience of it. By extension, since so much of our first person experience of the world involves trying to understand and relate to the way others experience the world, I think our social interactions also play a major role in defining what is real.
I've always been a big fan of Kant's notion of things-in-themselves (the physical "outside" world common to us all) being fundamentally inaccessible to us, because our beholding of them turns them into, simply, things. Plato's Cave is another good analogy that essentially says the same thing. Rather than trying to undermine the idea that some truths are testable and true for us all, I think postmodernists should try to explore the borderlands of where "patently true for us all" leaves off, and "not necessarily true for us all" begins. They should work on identifying those apparent truths whose only real appeal is that they are socially useful. Not to say that these ought to be thrown away, but that they are negotiable and flexible, while others ("the sky is blue") are really not.
Thoughts?
Postmodernism basically says that truth is socially constructed, that what any of us take for granted as true is simply a function of what we've been taught and whose company we've kept. From what I gather, a lot of the charges against postmodernism and its defenders in academe have been led by scientists, who object to postmodernists denigrating scientific truth on these same grounds. Scientific truths, they say, are not agreed upon by social convention -- they're arrived at by testing, using tests that anyone could theoretically perform and witness the results for themselves. Yeah, things get murky and "witness" gets tenuous when you're talking about proxies for, and lengthy convoluted extensions of, our sensory organs, which few know how to use, and whose raw data is not easy to interpret. But point is that all people seem to inhabit a common physical world with common properties that don't really vary from person to person.
I'm with the scientists -- I think there is a physical world that is common to all people and other sentient beings on earth. I think postmodernists who sought to deny this were definitely applying their philosophy's foundational principle incorrectly. But I do think they have a point, which merits further investigation: I think there is a degree to which our sentient beholding of the physical world creates reality. That is to say, there is a real contribution to "reality" that is made by our first-person experience of it. By extension, since so much of our first person experience of the world involves trying to understand and relate to the way others experience the world, I think our social interactions also play a major role in defining what is real.
I've always been a big fan of Kant's notion of things-in-themselves (the physical "outside" world common to us all) being fundamentally inaccessible to us, because our beholding of them turns them into, simply, things. Plato's Cave is another good analogy that essentially says the same thing. Rather than trying to undermine the idea that some truths are testable and true for us all, I think postmodernists should try to explore the borderlands of where "patently true for us all" leaves off, and "not necessarily true for us all" begins. They should work on identifying those apparent truths whose only real appeal is that they are socially useful. Not to say that these ought to be thrown away, but that they are negotiable and flexible, while others ("the sky is blue") are really not.
Thoughts?