I agree with this, but I think we're now a long way from Giddens and his pure relationship.
Indeed, and as I've said a few times in this thread I think Giddens' ideas are actually massively problematic. Just not for the reasons you do, which is why we've had this discussion.
I'm not entirely sure why the idea of a subject as constructed relationally is at odds with the idea of a sovereign individual. Regardless of how the subject is constructed, there is in fact a subject, no?
The sovereign individual of capitalism creates themselves and is the author of their own life. This is inconsistent with the idea that our identities are constructed socially, since it implies a kind of sui generis self, and a lot more agency in self construction than the views I'm arguing for would allow.
In the 1950s vast majorities of people have identities built around work... hmmm... and now that employment at any given job is less stable, work becomes a less stable source of identity. I'm really not sure I agree. Employment instability is a source of anxiety, to be sure, about where the money is coming from next. But are we saying that who one is changes depending on whether one works as an auto-worker, a cop, a lawyer, a doctor, etc?
Fifty years ago a person identified with their job, which they were quite likely to have for life. These days people might have six or seven different careers, go back to study different things after going into the workforce, all that kind of thing. That means saying that you are "a whatever" makes less sense. Rather, this part of your identity is much less stable, and requires reflection in order to make sense of. Maybe you think about your work identity not as "a whatever" but rather as the kind of person who can do lots of different whatevers.
Eh, "less stable" isn't the same as "unstable," remember. The vast majority of people still get married, and divorce has largely flat-lined or fallen in the last couple decades. And, actually, the push for gay marriage has, if anything, simply brought different sexual relationships into the conventional fold.
Sure and in fact this is exactly what I'm arguing. With the push for gay marriage we see a different kinds of relationships becoming accepted as normal. So then the kind of relationship that you want, that you really truly want, becomes something you have to think about. It's not a rational, conscious self creation, but it is a kind of soul searching which while I'm sure it existed in earlier times, has become quite pervasive recently.
Is there any empirical way of verifying that claim? Most aspects of work-ethic and manhood are highly stable: responsible, hard-working, honest, courageous, strong, knowledgeable, virtuous. Certain aspects of what it means to be a "real man" may be in flux, such as with respect to sexuality. But, I don't view sexuality as something within an individual's ability to choose, and so I don't see a change in whether a real man can be gay as posing an existential crisis for anyone.
Indeed there is empirical work on this. You can compare studies on subjectivities done before this shift to 'late' (or whatever) modernity, to studies done now, and the kinds of subjectivities being constructed are more heterogeneous, and draw on much more diverse sources of meaning for their integrity. I'm not sure about empirical support for the pure relationship, but as I said I agree with you that the idea has problems (I just disagree with you as to what they are).
What I find interesting is that you're completely neglecting the role of individual human relationships in constructing a person's identity as they grow. How did their mother or father treat them? What were their friends like? What sort of things were they taught about themselves, and about others? How did they interact with others? I view all of these things as far, far more important than whether the father is straight or gay, whether he's an auto-worker or a rocket-scientist. And once these things are set, as one grows up, they're very difficult to change. Identity, on this account, is for any one individual quite stable once they mature, regardless of employment instability or family instability.
Maybe I'm not being clear enough in what I'm saying, that isn't what I'm doing at all. None of what I'm saying is disregarding the importance of family relationships. But you can't just say the family is everything either. People live in a wide (and widening) variety of social contexts which shape their identities. Furthermore, the family is not an institution that exists outside this context. The kinds of things your mother or father teach you, what your friends are life, etc, are all a function of the broader social context. The stability you describe does exist, but it is
accomplished.
Eh, people work on habits. I don't think people work on becoming new selves. As far as accomplishing a coherent subjectivity, I have met very few people outside an academic environment who talk or think in those terms, or in any analogous terms. People worry about relationships, bills, jobs, vacations, the stuff of everyday life. They may worry about individual traits-temper, anxiety, depression, etc.-to the degree that such traits may interfere with their lives, but they don't worry about accomplishing a coherent subjectivity.
Oh I see, so it's all just academic mumbo jumbo with no relevance to the real world? I mean, if that's what you basically think then I don't see why you're bothering to discuss these ideas. People in these academic environments (that you don't seem to have much sympathy for) are dedicated to understanding contemporary subjectivity using theoretical tools. People like Giddens are providing us with some tools we might find helpful for understanding some aspects of contemporary life better. People do indeed worry about relationships, bills, and the stuff of everyday life. But the 'stuff of everyday life' is much less straightforward than you are implying when you contrast it with what you see as meaningless academic games. Academics are people too you know.
Furthermore, nobody is arguing that people go around having crises all the time regarding authenticity. I'm not saying there is a massive, conscious, collective anxiety which is all pervasive. But I think it is silly to argue that it never happens, and I think it's silly to dismiss the problem of when it happens and why as just an academic game.
There is a large difference between saying "we do not value an inability to control one's temper" and saying "we value selves with an inability to control tempers less than selves with an ability to control tempers." The second account implies that when change that trait, we've somehow changed selves as well; the first account implies that we can change such traits without becoming a different self.
The first account does not make sense unless you hold to a sui generis human essence which exists and constructs identity in a way unaffected by the wider environment. Otherwise what are you aside from your traits? Traits that are made meaningful socially (and in fact have no other meaning aside from socially). Unless you're going to say there is an inner essence which constructs identity, you have to accept that changing traits is going to mean a different self.
I think college students are simply young and inexperienced, with generally insufficient experience of the world and themselves to grasp well what is actually happening. This isn't true in all instances, nor in any individual instance, of everything they say or describe. I don't think they're idiots at all. Inexperience and idiocy aren't the same.
You are still arguing that they are wrong because they are college students, and because of that they can't grasp what is actually happening (I'm still not sure what you think is actually happening, aside from that you don't seem to think this problem is worth discussing). But if you're going to accept that young people are conscious, thinking beings who live in society just like you, then you need to accept their experiences as reflecting the social conditions they live in (just like you).
In my own empirical work my participants talk about finding themselves. It's very important for them and reflects the politics of contemporary subjectivity: people 'find themselves' typically by accomplishing subjectivities which are regarded as valuable in the social contexts that they are invested in. People 'find themselves' when they accomplish the markers of adulthood, are able to manage their interactions with institutions with success, are able to accumulate cultural markers of success, and whatnot. This is the problem I have with the idea of the pure relationship - it ignores all this politics in favour of an idealised kind of relationship which supposedly exists outside of all these processes. But the problem of authenticity is real, it has to be if people are going to 'find themselves' in ways they really believe in.
I don't think learning the seven habits of highly effective people, for example, changes one's identity. I simply don't view identity as quite as unstable, or subject to shift with a change in trait or habit, as you do.
I learn the habits of highly effective people so that I can become a highly effective person (as opposed to what I am now, which is less effective than I want to be). This isn't directly related to authenticity though, but all the talk of 'finding yourself' is.
I view identity as being as unstable as the social conditions which construct it. Most people's identities aren't unstable in the sense of being in constant flux, but they do change over time, and the kinds of identities available to us to accomplish varies according to the social context we're in.
So adjectives, words, of course draw their meanings from social contexts. But those contexts themselves depend upon individuals coming together with certain types of experience, certain ways of organizing that experience, etc., that must exist PRIOR to the development of a social context as such.
The fact that human societies are so similar, that languages are so similar, and that human beings across cultures can all communicate with one another, all use similar facial expressions to communicate the same emotions, etc., strongly supports the view that there is a biological component, common to all human beings and cultures, to human experience, which plays a large role in shaping and forming our experiences of society and culture.
Who says human societies are similar? Since when? According to who? In what ways are they similar? Aren't their differences important for understanding certain problems? There are some facial expressions that are universal, and some that are culturally specific. But regardless of this, when do we feel happy? When do we feel sad? All these situations, aside from ones coming from basic physical needs (like hunger) are reactions to social contexts.
Your argument that there is a presocial foundation to sociality doesn't make sense. Those things which individuals bring to an interaction are socially constructed if they are meaningful. There is no presocial essence of people which constructs sociality. Of course social contexts are composed of individuals with different histories, that's not inconsistent with anything I've said. But if you're going to argue that there are things that people bring to interactions (in terms of their meaningful identities) that are not social you are on shaky ground.
Ultimately we're talking about
identity here. We're talking about subjectivity and meaning. We're talking about culture. I find it useful to understand culture in two ways - as language, and as symbolic systems. I can't think of any other way of understanding what culture is, and biology it sure as hell isn't. Keep in mind what we're talking about - meaningful subjectivity, subjectivity which is articulated and experienced. So think about your own identity, the ways you understand yourself, the ways you articulate yourself, the kinds of identities you're able to build. What part of these isn't only socially meaningful? None of them. It is
(common problem w/ many authors of that time, of course. . .) What if role-ascription when negatively received, even if restricted to but a few 'identities', still breeds the striving to express an 'authentic' self by relating to others?
