Plagarism Fodder (on Foucault and Marcuse)...

[ebola?]

...if you're nerdy enough to read other people's academic essays for fun, I'm your guy. The works cited list is nonexistent (the final version is on the computer at school), but it has a reference key at the end. I had to make a zip file due to stupid attachment length limits.

ebola
np: teh mars volta

 

[satricion]

Good essay man. What was the actual essay question? Was it freedom? Subjectivity? Sex?

What are you studying? Sociological theory?

I agree with your basic argument...I think you're right in that Foucault's idea of subjectivity is superior to Marcuse's...the whole Freudian thing that a lot of the Frankfurt School were into makes their idea of subjectivity shaky, although I don't think that's necessarily very damning for Marxist thought generally. It's important to have some kind of material analysis or you lose sight of what you're actually setting about trying to do when you do sociology.

I'm a massive fan of Foucault and I think his power/knowledge/subject view is a very persuasive and powerfull one especially in constructing the subject. But I do think the Frankfurt School Marxists do see things that Foucault doesn't...while he's stated that he's not a postmodernist (which is completely true despite accusations that people level claiming that he is) I think his ideas of freedom are not very well defined...I think that if you totally accept Foucault there really is no way out and you end up in an unsettling sea of complete ambiguity.

What do you think of the criticism of Foucault's work that he completely ignores emotion? Some people say that you can see Foucault's obsession with sado-masochism reflected in his theory since sex is all about power and knowledge and whatever for him, whereas for most people there is some element of individuality in their sexuality, reflected in their relationships?

I personally think there is something to be said for this view, but I think Foucault would argue that the emotionality of sex is constructed by power relationships in society just as much as any other relationship. What do you reckon?

 

[ebola?]

Thanks!
The essay question? I got to come up with my own. Basically, I went in with the intention of comparing Marcuse and Foucault, and just started writing. This is for a graduate-level sociological theory class.

And I would go so far as to indentify myself as a Marxist sociologist, although I like a lot of Foucault's work too. I think, though, that Foucault adds a very important dimension to Marx's material analysis: he looks at the concrete micro-relations that undergird larger institutions. These relations are every bit as important as even basic class-relations.

And, yes, Foucault's view of freedom is very ambiguous. He wished not to establish a discourse of liberation which would in turn be deployed as power, to subjegate others. This is his main dialogue with Marxism.

I think that Foucault was hesitant to engage emotion because he wished to avoid engaging in psychological speculation. He considered non-discursive experience a "black box". On the other hand, in his own life, he sought intense, holistic experiences to escape discourses of power (eg, his LSD trip in the Californian desert).

And, yes, I think he would point to the role of power in constructing emotion, but he would not regard such power as the only pertinent factor.

ebola

 

[satricion]

^^
100% agreed, especially on Foucault's analysis of micro-relations (although I liked Birth of the Clinic much more than the History of Sexuality).

I guess one of the things that draws me to Foucault is (apart from the internal watertightness of his theory) the way he escapes the Modernist assumptions behind the Frankfurt School theorists about beginnings and endings in history.

This is a very powerfull and important perspective...he also avoids a lot of the class bias that exists even in Frankfurt School theories (for example Adorno and Marcuse's work on what a self-actualised person would do and enjoy...it all seems suspiciously like what they themselves do and enjoy...)

I guess the only problem I would have with it is that I really think that people will be properly, objectively happier in certain circumstances than in others, which I think Marxist material analysis points out. And after all, even if you're a postmodernist sociologist (which I still think is a contradiction in terms given the discipline) the moral imperative still means we have to set out to do something...I don't think that just trying to deploy a nicer discourses is enough.

I guess the reason why I don't identify myself entirely with either camp is because I keep reasoning myself in circles...I think Foucault's views on subjectivity are watertight, but I also think that there are concrete things we should be going about doing in order to improve society and make people happier...but how do I know what these things are if my knowledge is entirely socially produced?

I suppose in the end I'm more of a Foucaultian than a Marxist (never thought I'd say that two years ago!) because I think that Foucault's theory can ultimately still explain issues like class relations and so on, as well as being a more effective paradigm in which to look at the sociology of scientific knowledge (which is what I'm into). But that's today...tomorrow I might be Marxist to da bone.

 

[protovack]

but I think Foucault would argue that the emotionality of sex is constructed by power relationships in society just as much as any other relationship.

I would say that it is constructed by chemical relationships in the body.

I also think that there are concrete things we should be going about doing in order to improve society and make people happier...but how do I know what these things are if my knowledge is entirely socially produced?

It's not!

ebola, I have a long list of things to address in your paper, I will return to this thread tommorow (after my exam).

 

[satricion]

I would say that it is constructed by chemical relationships in the body.

Foucault would argue that this view is a result of the medicalisation of sex by the medical profession, using the medical paradigm to construct sex in fundamentally different, historically specific ways which change the way we 'do' sex, both at the level of knowledge and the actual act itself.

Please keep in mind here that this is not a debate about the 'correct' place that sex comes from. That's not what Foucault is addressing and to aim arguments against him in this way fundamentally misinterprets what Foucault is going about with his analysis.

 

[protovack]

You guys are just liberals

 

[protovack]

Ok....

The clinician codifies sex in terms of psychological science, endows sex with immense causal potency, and accordingly dictates obligations for his patient to meet (HS 65). It is in this relationship that the power exerted in sexuality becomes most apparent: the professional investigator may judge, forgive, condemn, etc. her object of investigation (HS 61).

Why should I believe that there is this "power" in sexuality being exerted on someone?

A clinician "endows sex with immense causal potency" because sex HAS immense causal potency.

She codifies sex in terms of psychological science because, in what other terms would she codify it? Words are merely symbols.

She dictates obligations for the patient to meet....such as? Sex is a serious subject that involves not just the patient but also her family and what kind of life her future offspring may have.

! Modern sexual techniques (those associated with disciplinary society) emerge first in the bourgeoisie (HS 120). Why? The Bourgeois woman becomes hystericized so as to intensify her sexuality and deploy it in the service of procreation (HS 121, 123).

I don't quite understand...where is this going?

thus, the proletariat becomes subject to statistical techniques and measurements, ideological campaigns in the service of the regulation of population size and health, widespread distribution of birth control, the use of modern medical technology, etc. (HS 146). All these measures serve the purpose of creating a productive population of the appropriate size

The leveling off of population growth in a modern society is mainly the result of increasing lifespans due to medical discoveries. Of course there are other factors, but I sincerely doubt that "ideological campaigns" have much to do with it.

While psychiatric science has long considered homosexuality a pathology, a deviation from nature , many within gay rights movements have asserted that homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is a natural expression of variation of human genetics and development (HS 101). In both cases, however, discourse remains grounded in the terrain of the dichotomy of the natural and pathological; truth remains grounded in science

As it should!

It is from anxiety, conflicts, and guilt wrought of this process that the conscious ego emerges, serving a functional role in managing such sublimation and repression. It is also the submission to sublimation and repression that links the individual to society, or in the case of industrial capitalism, the neurotic, alienated individual to a rationalized society built of estranged relationships.

There's nothing wrong with a rationalized society, and it is entirely possible to construct intimate relationships within one.

While on the surface it appears that sexuality is shrouded in silence, placed under the constraint of taboos, there emerges an inner compulsion to surveil the self in order to penetrate into the depths of one’s own sexuality, to truly understand it and scrutinize it for transgression of these taboos.

If you are a teenager, I guess this is true. I think most people get over it.

While it is clear that Eros’s weakening coupled with emerging destructive impulses threaten the basis of civilization as we know it

"Clear" is not the word I would use

, it also follows that such discontent could be channeled into the revolutionary creation of a society free of domination

Is this your opinion?

The first precondition of the collapse of industrial capitalism is strictly material: as the productive efficiency of society increases, the labor-time necessary to meet sustenance-needs shrinks to a minimum (EC 138).

This is one of many illogical premises built into marxist ideology. Man is clearly an animal that must labor, for it is necessary for survival. Just because we have progressed technologically to the point where surplus production exists, does NOT mean that man's genetic programming will reverse itself. We are perfectly adapted to using our brains and our bodies to be productive. Therefore our present level of production has never surprised me and never will.

Under the regime of rationalized, alienated labor of industrial capitalism, the reality principle is specifically expressed as the performance principle, whereby success within rationalized society is defined in terms of the individual’s productive output

Should we not in some way define "success"? Or should we define success as merely "eating and sleeping"?

because Eros is restricted and channeled into toilsome laboring activity (alienated labor, if you will), technological development intensifies by way of the productivity of such labor, culminating in the staggering levels of productive output we see today (EC 4, 74-5).

This assertion is interesting, but unsupported in the essay. How do we know eros has been "channeled" or "restricted"? Eros, as I conceive of it, appears to be alive and well in modern society.

This proves empirically the performance-principle’s success. The primacy of the performance principle in turn leads to the complete means-ends rationalization of social relations as well

empirically? No. This is circular.

since practically all activity is administered through rationalized institutions, they appear as the necessary basis of any possible productive activity (EC 83, 89)

So activity should just be a diffuse collection of random events? While I wouldn't say that "rationalized institutions" as you call them are necessary for productivity, I do think that rationalized institutions are doing a pretty good job so far.

Even leisure falls under the grip of these institutions, as mass media and consumer culture come to dominate "free time" (EC 86,91). The individual in the industrialized world (that is, the Global North) may be, on average, happy (or at least amused) but remains unfree, as "spurious" liberties of consumption conceal domination through mechanized rationalization of labor (EC 90) .

Mass media and consumer culture only dominate the free time of those who mistakenly seek rewards from outside of themselves. While I do agree that this is a problem, I do NOT believe that it is "caused" in any way by a "rationalized" society. You can't just conjure up a causal relationship just because it fits nicely into a theory.

). In order to bear to live in the face of this domination upon which subordinate individuals are dependent, the sons of the tribe must constrain their instincts for instant gratification, restricting their once boundless hunger for pleasure, channeling a restricted Eros into displeasurable, ungratifying but necessary toil (EC 55) .

Why is toil always "displeasurable" and "ungratifying"? Always a "necessary evil"?

The expression of Eros is thus transformed, from the pursuit of absolute pleasure, whereby Eros extends indefinitely (according to the pleasure priniciple), to a restricted but ultimately secure and useful extension of Eros (according to the reality principle) (EC 56).

It's called the transition from childhood to adulthood.

Thus, this first instance of domination establishes the psychological preconditions for the reproduction repressed, dominated society.

No, it establishes the appropriate psychological preconditions for parenthood - a task which would be impossible if eros were to remain unchanged.


Overall, I think this is a good essay with some thought-provoking subject matter (some of which I happen to disagree with). I would like to hear more about eros. And also I would like to understand why so many people have such a problem with "rationalized institutions."

 

[ebola?]

I will give you a better response when it is not 4:45 AM.
However, you are clearly again playing the role of ideological chameleon and devil's advocate.
So what are you in this post?
A socio-biologist and conceptual essentialist?
Some of your rhetorical questions involve inferential jumps that are discharitable enough to lead to non-sequitor...

I will also note that this essay is, for the most part, Foucault and Marcuse speaking through me.

ebola

 

[yougene]

I guess the only problem I would have with it is that I really think that people will be properly, objectively happier in certain circumstances than in others, which I think Marxist material analysis points out. And after all, even if you're a postmodernist sociologist (which I still think is a contradiction in terms given the discipline) the moral imperative still means we have to set out to do something...I don't think that just trying to deploy a nicer discourses is enough.

I guess the reason why I don't identify myself entirely with either camp is because I keep reasoning myself in circles...I think Foucault's views on subjectivity are watertight, but I also think that there are concrete things we should be going about doing in order to improve society and make people happier...but how do I know what these things are if my knowledge is entirely socially produced?

Marxism and Foucaultism deal with two different levels of reality. Marxism deals with exchanges in physiosphere(exchange of material goods) while Foucaultism deals with exchanges in the noosphere(exchange of ideas and culture). They are different levels AND perspectives of the same thing.

 

[protovack]

conceptual essentialist?

I do have an essentialist understanding of man, if that is what you are asking. I think that the emergence of any kind of society follows directly from our physical history. Thus I see society and its constituents as analogous.

For that reason, I must question any social theory where man's psyche is in any way "constructed" by macro-level phenomena. The macro-level phenomena that emerge in society are simply the echoing of human activity, radiating outward from the individual. It is Brownian motion on an ephemeral, macroscopic scale.

To be a bit more explicit:

Humans appear to have constructed what we now call a "rationalized" society. I see the "rational society" as analogous in some way to those who inhabit it. But what is it analogous to? I'll call it X. X = an inherent property of humans. It naturally emerges as humans congregate in groups.

But suppose we feel for some reason that "rational society" is having some specific effect on it's constituents. This is entirely possible, and nothing in my own philosophy says that this can't happen. However, the fact that macro-level phenomena ("rational societies") temporarily effect change on the individual does not change the underlying, unchanging trait "X".

In the case of a total extinction, trait "X" would again produce a society with similar macro-level phenomena, along with the same individual effects.

Therefore I doubt the explanatory power of any social theory that focuses too intently on these phenomena. You can't conceive of the superstructure without first accounting for the emergence of it. And if you look closely at the emergence, you will find that no other explanation for the superstructure is necessary.

 

[satricion]

^^
I don't think your assumptions leave much room for any social theory at all...

I mean you seem to be arguing that society could not be anything other than it is, and that it is legitimate because it comes from some trait that's inherent in individual human beings. (and by individualising it you remove most of the explanatory power in analysing the social sphere).

I mean if this is true why have social theory at all? Why not just look at humanity's inherent genes or whatever and see how society grows out of that? I mean that's what socio-biologists are doing and that's what you seem to be doing. By 'doubting the explanatory power of any social theory that focuses too intently on [macro level] phenomena' you doubt pretty much all social theory that exists...

 

[satricion]

Marxism and Foucaultism deal with two different levels of reality. Marxism deals with exchanges in physiosphere(exchange of material goods) while Foucaultism deals with exchanges in the noosphere(exchange of ideas and culture). They are different levels AND perspectives of the same thing.

I'm not sure that's really true...I mean they are different perspective on the same thing but that's because they're social theories and they're different perspectives on society...

Marxism does deal with culture...it just uses material class analysis to do it. Gramsci wrote about culture...so did Marcuse, Adorno...Habermas is still writing about it...these guys are all Marxists...

These two theoriests have different ideas of what causes culture to be what it is...I think ultimately Foucault's is stronger because of his views on subjectivity. I also don't think he ignores the things that Marxist analysis focuses on...he just recognises that there is more going on.

 

[ebola?]

>>Marxism deals with exchanges in physiosphere(exchange of material goods) while Foucaultism deals with exchanges in the noosphere(exchange of ideas and culture).>>

I disagree. I think that both theorists deal with both these levels of analysis, and both would argue against the very hard disctintion you're making (you'll have to take my word for it. Marx and Foucault are both dead, clearly. ).

>>[protovack's post]>>

Yeah...that is a very clear exposition of your philosophy de jour (heh...looks like I'm still in grading mode from the class I taught). To be frank, your perspective precludes, almost entirely, the viability of social theory.

Still working within your framework, I am looking ONLY at "temporary" interaction of individuals with society.

Here is where I break from your perspective (whether you actually believe it or not. I have no idea if you do, 'cause that's just how you roll):

X does not give rise to social forms. X as such does not exist. If we redefine X as genetic tendencies, then we can observe only X*society*environmental contingencies*memes*etc...

In other words, the individual (including genetic expression) and society are mutually constituitive. In sum, your ontology is untenable.

ebola

 

[protovack]

In other words, the individual (including genetic expression) and society are mutually constituitive. In sum, your ontology is untenable.

No I don't think so. I don't think society has any permanent effect on genetically determined behavior. It just isn't powerful enough.

However, I think there are two separate discussions here. One is whether or not macro-level societal phenomena can effect behavioral changes on a genetic level. The other is whether or not these phenomena significantly affect individuals during their own lifetimes.

My argument centers more on the second question, to which I believe the answer is no. People are basically pre-programmed to behave in certain ways. [note to self: watch out for sociology police]

Now, two people have already dismissed my theory supposedly because it "precludes all social theory." Maybe this is because they cannot conceive of any social theory that does not presuppose an all-powerful, superstructural tyranny that is actively changing man from an ideal perfect being to a toiling serf.

We should not *over-analyze* society like that. We have seen over centuries of scientific thought that humans are particularly good at dreaming up very complex solutions to simple problems. When pondering society, we tend to latch on to the big superstructural phenomena and see them as being the most important explanatory devices. As impactful as these phenomena may seem, the truth may be far simpler.

Mine is simply a different (and more elegant) approach to sociology. It examines the emergence of society as a way to understand and predict it. Is that so bad?

"What is society"
"Why does it operate the way it does?"
"How does it emerge"

These are all great questions, and people should be encouraged to think about them and develop their sociological imagination. To do that, we can't afford to ignore certain theories just because they go against the established theory.

 

[ebola?]

>>My argument centers more on the second question, to which I believe the answer is no. People are basically pre-programmed to behave in certain ways. [note to self: watch out for sociology police]>>

This programming, however, does not operate outside of society. Genetic expression will vary according to environmental variables, many of which are influenced heavily by societal context.

>>We should not *over-analyze* society like that.>>

One year ago, I embarked on dedicating my entire life to doing just this.

>>Maybe this is because they cannot conceive of any social theory that does not presuppose an all-powerful, superstructural tyranny that is actively changing man from an ideal perfect being to a toiling serf.>>

You are making a staw-man out of sociology.

>>It examines the emergence of society as a way to understand and predict it. Is that so bad?>>

Your theorizing is "bad" insofar as it ignores social influences, and is in this way inadequate. Sociology is "bad" insofar as it ignores genetic influences.

ebola

 

[yougene]

I'm not sure that's really true...I mean they are different perspective on the same thing but that's because they're social theories and they're different perspectives on society...

Marxism does deal with culture...it just uses material class analysis to do it. Gramsci wrote about culture...so did Marcuse, Adorno...Habermas is still writing about it...these guys are all Marxists...

These two theoriests have different ideas of what causes culture to be what it is...I think ultimately Foucault's is stronger because of his views on subjectivity. I also don't think he ignores the things that Marxist analysis focuses on...he just recognises that there is more going on.

>>Marxism deals with exchanges in physiosphere(exchange of material goods) while Foucaultism deals with exchanges in the noosphere(exchange of ideas and culture).>>

I disagree. I think that both theorists deal with both these levels of analysis, and both would argue against the very hard disctintion you're making (you'll have to take my word for it. Marx and Foucault are both dead, clearly. ).

They may both deal with it, but they both assume that their approach or point of view is superior. Foucault sees everything through a 2nd person cultural lense. While Marx looks at the world through a 3rd person material lense. When it comes down to it they are both right as far as their perspective takes them. What goes on in the material(3rd person) world certainly does effect and mold culture. But at the same time the manmade material world is largely a reflection of our own interiors. It goes both ways equally.

 

[protovack]

>>My argument centers more on the second question, to which I believe the answer is no. People are basically pre-programmed to behave in certain ways. [note to self: watch out for sociology police]>>

This programming, however, does not operate outside of society. Genetic expression will vary according to environmental variables, many of which are influenced heavily by societal context.

The question I asked was whether or not these phenomena significantly affect individuals during their own lifetimes. They do not because genes do not change during one lifetime. A society may temporarily alter the behavior or psyche of a person, but I think that the major factor is still the individual. In open competition, the idiosyncracies of individual interactions will result in a superstructure or "society."

If you are right, then show me an environmental variable that is brought about by a particular society, and then show how it could permanently or significantly alter a human being in any way.

My point is that you cannot *presume* the existence of change without evidence. For example, how can you *prove* that humans are becoming "more and more" alienated due to society becoming "more and more rationalized"?

And I'm not saying you have to prove something for the idea to be valuable. Just don't call it science

>>We should not *over-analyze* society like that.>>

One year ago, I embarked on dedicating my entire life to doing just this.

Maybe so. Just be careful about your assumptions. A lot of people will start with an assumption about human nature and THEN dream up a theory that fits it...which in the end does not tell us much about anything.

>>Maybe this is because they cannot conceive of any social theory that does not presuppose an all-powerful, superstructural tyranny that is actively changing man from an ideal perfect being to a toiling serf.>>

You are making a staw-man out of sociology.

Am I? I never directed my argument at the study of society in general. I was referring to people who are latched on to one particular subset of theories. These are theories which I believe make a fundamental error.

Your theorizing is "bad" insofar as it ignores social influences, and is in this way inadequate. Sociology is "bad" insofar as it ignores genetic influences.

This is not a genes vs. society debate. My theorizing is not bad, nor is anyone else's.

My theorizing starts with evidence:

1.) Societies over the course of history share trends, such as hierarchical organization and a division of labor. Hierarchy was not so important early on when group sizes were small, but as group size increased (and division of labor emerged), hierarchical systems emerged.

2.) These trends are present in multiple independent societies which have risen and fallen at different times throughout history, in different geographic locations.

3.) Today, society appears to share the same properties as other societies long ago. We have a highly specialized division of labor. People navigate the social world by separating public and private life. There is hierarchical organization where it is necessary, but communal activity in most other sections of society.

And then you can look at the individual. For example, *individuals* within society do not appear to take on the property of being organized by hierarchy. Neighbors do not separate into different clans. Neighborhoods do not have a block "director." Yet in the public sphere we choose to have these things because it is efficient and it works.

There has never been a society which was either perfectly communal or strictly hierarchical, and there never will be.

Yet time and time again, we see societies rise and fall according to similar principles.

Based on this it is reasonable to assume that there is some aspect of humanity that remains fairly static in the face of whatever else is going on. People seem to be very "hardy." This makes sense, of course...we are survival machines that happen to be highly social. We will socialize to a great extent, but there is a core aspect of our psyche that remains constant throughout time, that is not subject to change. This is the part of our being that drives us to:

- make tools
- recognize patterns in the world
- infer causal relationships from those patterns

No amount of "repression" can prevent these things from emerging. In fact, there isn't *anything* that could stop people from doing these things. Yet there is no shortage of social theories claiming that that all kinds of macro-level phenomena are stripping people of their basic humanity.

But strangely, the critical questions go unanswered. What exactly are these phenomena? What exactly are they doing and how are they doing it? Who is most affected?

The result is a theory that, while internally consistent, has no explanatory power in the real world. To have a good theory, you have to go back and do your research and gather evidence that supports your theory. That's just the way it is.

 

[satricion]

"Now, two people have already dismissed my theory supposedly because it "precludes all social theory." Maybe this is because they cannot conceive of any social theory that does not presuppose an all-powerful, superstructural tyranny that is actively changing man from an ideal perfect being to a toiling serf."

This is not what Foucault is arguing at all. You are not addressing his basic thesis.

Have you actually read any Foucault? Or any of the sort of work that he started other people doing?

Your theories, the way they are constructed and the way they produce your very arguments about 'human nature' can, with sound empirical work (which Foucault and many others have done) have their evolution traced through history, with the way they interacted with other paradigms and social facts analysed to produce them.

Your arguments dismiss sociology as a discipline. Don't you think this is a little arrogant?

Furthermore, your points about making tools, recognising patterns and infering causal relationships basically miss the point. These are not what Marx (or the Frankfurt School theorists) is talking about when he talks about alienation.

But these points don't seem to be levelled at a theorist per se, but at sociology as a discipline. While I don't feel particularly compelled to have to defend an entire discipline, I will make the point that societies have changed dramatically according to the various social and material influences that have created them. We have had wildly different methods of social production through history which have produced wildly different kinds of people living very different lives. We have had wildly different dominant ideologies across societies that have produced different kinds of knowledge, different kinds of social structures and again, different kinds of people. People view themselves in wildly different ways across history. To just say 'well they still use tools and notice patterns' is sort of irrelevant in the present context.

Marx has a view about human nature, and so do you. Neither of these views are particularly strong...you can prove things as long as you work within the paradigm of course, but that's true of anything...

Foucault's subjectivity is watertight, unless you believe in genes predicting everything, in which case you might as well not analyse society at all.

 

[protovack]

Furthermore, your points about making tools, recognising patterns and infering causal relationships basically miss the point. These are not what Marx (or the Frankfurt School theorists) is talking about when he talks about alienation.

ebola has described it to me before. It seems like alienation is basically when a person is prevented from pursuing the "human" side of themselves. For instance, when a worker has no time to pursue any creative hobbies because they are constantly working.

I would say that making tools, recognizing patterns, and having a healthy curiosity about the world are all aspects of humanity. When these are taken away, I think that constitutes alienation.

My point was that in a modern free society....alienation is not a problem. For most of the people most of the time....creative pursuits are easily available. For a lot of people, they are creative in their work. For example, pretty much anyone in a professional field gets to be creative - architects, doctors, researchers, urban planners, product designers, chemists, policy-makers, writers, producers, musicians.....it goes on and on.

Now, ebola has informed me that people with tedious repetetive jobs are alienated. Well, when they go home they can do whatever they want.

The fact is, we live in a physical world where we need to eat. Gathering food is boring and repetetive, but needs to be done.

Nobody every promised that technological innovation would emancipate everyone from tedious work. The people in modern society who get to be creative are those who pursue the education necessary to be creative, or who take the risks involved with mass production. There is no inherent "right" to be entertained 100% of the time. Sometimes life is boring, get over it. If you don't want to expend the effort beyond just working at some factory....then that's what you choose.

Now please, don't tell me I don't know what alienation is because I am working from knowledge gleaned from specific conversations with ebola about the subject. I am basing my arguments on exactly what he has told me.

Whenever I encounter the "alienation" theory (and I see it alot), I must protest. It crops up in a lot of sociological thought, but it is never questioned from within the discipline. I think the people writing about alienation are actually alienated themselves, and writing "alienation" into their story of the world allows them to feel normal. We all feel alienated from time to time, and it's OK to feel that way. It's what draws us in to social relationships.