Newcomb's paradox basically runs like this:
You are playing a game against the Predictor. You are presented with two boxes, Box A and Box B. You may choose to take Box A alone, or or both boxes. Box B contains £1,000. The Predictor has already made a prediction about whether you will take one or both boxes; if he thinks you will choose to take only Box A, he has placed £100,000 in that box. If he has predicted that you will choose both boxes, then Box A contains nothing. The Predictor has never been wrong. So, what would your choice be? (It would be nice if you could explain why rather than posting a one word answer).
I feel obliged to take both boxes, even though I know that if I do so, I can be almost certain that I will be worse off for the choice. This is stupid, of course: I am doing so because it is rational to take both boxes. After all, there is no backwards causation. However, how can it be rational to act in a way that you know is against your best interests?
I have some things to say about this paradox with regards to morality and predetermination, but that can wait.
You are playing a game against the Predictor. You are presented with two boxes, Box A and Box B. You may choose to take Box A alone, or or both boxes. Box B contains £1,000. The Predictor has already made a prediction about whether you will take one or both boxes; if he thinks you will choose to take only Box A, he has placed £100,000 in that box. If he has predicted that you will choose both boxes, then Box A contains nothing. The Predictor has never been wrong. So, what would your choice be? (It would be nice if you could explain why rather than posting a one word answer).
I feel obliged to take both boxes, even though I know that if I do so, I can be almost certain that I will be worse off for the choice. This is stupid, of course: I am doing so because it is rational to take both boxes. After all, there is no backwards causation. However, how can it be rational to act in a way that you know is against your best interests?
I have some things to say about this paradox with regards to morality and predetermination, but that can wait.