Meta-ethics

[drug_mentor]

This is a thread for the discussion of meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is the branch of philosophy which examines the nature, foundations and scope of morality.

Some meta-ethical questions one might ask are as follows:

Are there such things are moral facts?

If there are moral facts, what makes them true?

If there are moral facts, how do humans come to possess knowledge of these facts?

If there are no moral facts, what are people doing when they make moral statements?

Whilst I do have some tentative views on the answers to some of these questions, rather than frame the discussion around my opinions I thought it might be more interesting to leave it open for now and see what the regulars of P&S come up with.

I had considered giving a brief outline of the various meta-ethical views but decided it would make the post too long and boring. If anyone would like me to canvass the different positions quickly I am happy to do so, just let me know.

 

[polymath]

Some people may say that there are never any absolute moral facts and it's always culture-dependent, but it's damn hard to accept things like female genital mutilation just because some primitive superstitious culture accepts it.

 

[drug_mentor]

Cultural relativism is basically philosophically untenable. I have addressed this elsewhere and won't thoroughly dismantle the position unless several posters express their commitment to the view here. If anyone is interested in why this view (as well as ethical subjectivism) are so problematic I recommend consulting Chapter 19 of The Fundamental of Ethics by Russ Shafer-Landau.

It is a topic for another thread, but I have always found it strange how easily most in the West accept male circumcision whilst being vehemently opposed to female circumcision. For the record, I am not saying the two things are equivalent in physical impact, but both are a mutilation which the child can't consent to, and there are less severe forms of female circumcision/FGM.

 

[belligerent drunk]

My response is probably not very interesting, but I don't believe in absolutes and absolute objectivity, especially when it comes to questions of morality. Our nervous system has evolved to survive in this particular environment, and its functions are limited by these requirements. Thus, what we perceive as true is only as far as our minds need to in order to survive, there is no reason other than minor random "fluctuations" in genetics for us to "look beyond". The morals humankind has come up with throughout time (a big portion of which is outdated, and being replaced actively - another sign that it's anything but absolute) reflect that very well in general. Of course, with the exception being all kinds of superstitious bullshit - for which religion is largely responsible.

I know that it's hard to wrap one's head around the idea that murder is not amoral in the general sense, or eating a newborn baby alive. However, there are both examples of (humanly perceived) morality in the rest of the animal kingdom, as well as examples of complete lack of consideration for others. We're just mammals with extraordinarily evolved nervous system and our own set of moral codes.

As a side-note, I believe in evidence-based policy, which includes questions of "morality" - I actually believe the word morality is somewhat misleading in this context. In any case, I believe laws and so on should be based on what works the most efficiently (obviously impossible to satisfy everybody!).

 

[drug_mentor]

The morals humankind has come up with throughout time (a big portion of which is outdated, and being replaced actively - another sign that it's anything but absolute) reflect that very well in general.

Is the fact that moral practices evolve really evidence that there cannot be objective moral facts? It could be that through reform society is slowly getting closer and closer to behaving in accordance with these facts.

I know that it's hard to wrap one's head around the idea that murder is not amoral in the general sense, or eating a newborn baby alive. However, there are both examples of (humanly perceived) morality in the rest of the animal kingdom, as well as examples of complete lack of consideration for others. We're just mammals with extraordinarily evolved nervous system and our own set of moral codes.

We are considering whether there are such things as moral facts. You are a very scientific guy, think of it this way, not so long ago everybody believed that the world was flat, however, it is a fact that the world is not flat. Just because everybody thought and behaved as though the world was flat did not make the world flat, facts are not relative in this way.

If there are objective moral facts it could be the case that nobody is acting in accordance with them. The beliefs and behaviours of individuals have no bearing on objective fact. For this reason I don't see how the observation that many people don't act in accordance with what we consider moral could count as evidence that there are no objective moral facts.

As a side-note, I believe in evidence-based policy, which includes questions of "morality" - I actually believe the word morality is somewhat misleading in this context. In any case, I believe laws and so on should be based on what works the most efficiently (obviously impossible to satisfy everybody!).

When you say you believe in evidence based policy in relation to morality, what exactly do you mean? I could interpret this claim in a number of ways:

- You believe the correct normative ethical view is some form of consequentialism, and in order to make a judgement about which types of actions bring about the best types of consequences you need evidence.

- You believe moral goodness/badness refers to whatever the majority of people to consider to be morally good/bad.

- The wide divergence in moral practice is an indication that morality is either subjective, relative or non-existent.

 

[polymath]

It's difficult to handle moral questions in a scientific way, because things that can be objectively measured almost never have any moral content in them. It would be absurd to say, for example, that water at temperature 50 deg C is more "morally right" than water at temperature 20 deg C. Moral questions arise when something involves conscious suffering by some human or animal, and conscious decisions that can either cause it or work against it. If you think in a completely scientific way, there doesn't seem to be even any evidence that we have a free will to make moral decisions with.

 

[belligerent drunk]

I don't have the energy to go into fine detail right now, so maybe I'll expand on it later/tomorrow.

Is the fact that moral practices evolve really evidence that there cannot be objective moral facts? It could be that through reform society is slowly getting closer and closer to behaving in accordance with these facts.

No, it's not real evidence against the existence of moral facts, it's just the reason why I believe that they don't exist. I believe you can tell that there's a significant difference between the two (me arguing that they don't exist vs. me saying why I don't believe in their existence). For me it's like the god existence question - you can't really prove that it doesn't exist, but there's also little reason to believe that it does.

We are considering whether there are such things as moral facts. You are a very scientific guy, think of it this way, not so long ago everybody believed that the world was flat, however, it is a fact that the world is not flat. Just because everybody thought and behaved as though the world was flat did not make the world flat, facts are not relative in this way.

If there are objective moral facts it could be the case that nobody is acting in accordance with them. The beliefs and behaviours of individuals have no bearing on objective fact. For this reason I don't see how the observation that many people don't act in accordance with what we consider moral could count as evidence that there are no objective moral facts.

That's exactly what I mean. Whether we view something as moral or not doesn't mean that it really is or isn't. Maybe I misunderstood what you meant in the OP or I explained myself poorly in my first reply, but that's what I meant.

When you say you believe in evidence based policy in relation to morality, what exactly do you mean? I could interpret this claim in a number of ways:

- You believe the correct normative ethical view is some form of consequentialism, and in order to make a judgement about which types of actions bring about the best types of consequences you need evidence.

- You believe moral goodness/badness refers to whatever the majority of people to consider to be morally good/bad.

- The wide divergence in moral practice is an indication that morality is either subjective, relative or non-existent.

Hmm, I know it's a very vague and silly way to put it, but what I mean is that policy should be based on what "works" taking all kinds of rights into account. A simple example is the question of drug legality and whether drug use is OK or not. I say that it's none of anyone's business what one does in their free time in the comfort of their home as long as it doesn't directly harm anyone else. When I say evidence, then I mean that there's decades of evidence against the War on Drugs and the hardline approach in trying to eliminate drug use. I agree that the world would probably be better off if people didn't use drugs, but the reality is that we do, and we need to come up with a system that is more user-friendly and is actually successful at eliminating dangers/harms associated with drug use. Well, that's just one example I can think of right now. Many people view drug use as a moral failure or something similar - I say it's irrelevant what they think.

Again, I don't want to get into detail too much, but another subject would probably be how to punish people for crimes (capital punishment or no?). I know that in the end people's feelings do affect the final decision, but I don't know how to exclude that.

It's difficult to handle moral questions in a scientific way, because things that can be objectively measured almost never have any moral content in them. It would be absurd to say, for example, that water at temperature 50 deg C is more "morally right" than water at temperature 20 deg C. Moral questions arise when something involves conscious suffering by some human or animal, and conscious decisions that can either cause it or work against it. If you think in a completely scientific way, there doesn't seem to be even any evidence that we have a free will to make moral decisions with.

If we get very technical, then yes - I don't believe in free will. But taking that into account when thinking of policy or morality is more of an obstacle, because in reality nobody thinks they don't have free will, and basing arguments on the fact that we don't is just useless in my opinion. Again, you're right that moral questions can't be handled in a scientific way properly, but I think we should at least try to eliminate the subjective aspect as much as possible. The main idea I tend to circle around is that there's no absolute right or wrong, and that everybody has a right to personal freedom as long as it doesn't infringe others' freedom. I know it's pretty vague, but oh well.

 

[drug_mentor]

No, it's not real evidence against the existence of moral facts, it's just the reason why I believe that they don't exist. I believe you can tell that there's a significant difference between the two (me arguing that they don't exist vs. me saying why I don't believe in their existence). For me it's like the god existence question - you can't really prove that it doesn't exist, but there's also little reason to believe that it does.

It seems inconsistent on one hand to acknowledge that a particular observation does not function as evidence against a particular thing (in this case morality), yet on the other to cite it as the reason you don't believe in that particular thing. If there is no logical relationship between the two then why would one influence your view about the other?

I feel that to say there is little reason to believe morality exists is much more reasonable grounds for thinking it doesn't. There are ways to put tension on the idea that there is little reason to believe morality exists, but the primary one which springs to mind right now is somewhat inconsistent with other things I have said, so I will let the point rest for now.

Hmm, I know it's a very vague and silly way to put it, but what I mean is that policy should be based on what "works" taking all kinds of rights into account. A simple example is the question of drug legality and whether drug use is OK or not. I say that it's none of anyone's business what one does in their free time in the comfort of their home as long as it doesn't directly harm anyone else. When I say evidence, then I mean that there's decades of evidence against the War on Drugs and the hardline approach in trying to eliminate drug use. I agree that the world would probably be better off if people didn't use drugs, but the reality is that we do, and we need to come up with a system that is more user-friendly and is actually successful at eliminating dangers/harms associated with drug use. Well, that's just one example I can think of right now. Many people view drug use as a moral failure or something similar - I say it's irrelevant what they think.

Again, I don't want to get into detail too much, but another subject would probably be how to punish people for crimes (capital punishment or no?). I know that in the end people's feelings do affect the final decision, but I don't know how to exclude that.

I find it interesting that you appeal to rights, in the absence of any legal framework or mutually agreed upon contract wouldn't you agree that the notion of a right presupposes some kind of moral obligation? After all, if there were no such thing as right and wrong in a moral sense, why should I have any duty to refrain from taking what is yours if it would be to my advantage?

If one buys in to the ought implies can principle then it is fairly self-evident that determinism would entail there is no such thing as objective morality. In a thread about morality I feel it is unproductive to bring determinism in to the conversation as it hijacks the topic from morality to metaphysics.

 

[Nixiam]

On the note of ethics in modern society, it is immoral to steal if it harms the other person. Just because it helps one in a sense doesn't make up for the harm done to the "victim". Right and wrong, I believe, changes with concious beings, since concious beings change their conditions. I feel all historical evidence to support that claim is already prior knowledge to you guys.

Maybe if you could compile a list of what ethics are in response to a certain condition, you would wind up with two or three classifications.

- Non conciously aware organisms at the mercy of their enviornment.

- Conciously aware organisms at the mercy of their enviornment.

- Conciously aware organisms at the mercy of a
conformed enviornment.

"Man is the measure of all things" - Protagoras

"There are no absolute truths, but individuals deem it to be true." - Paraphrasing Plato's interpretation of what Protofuck said.

 

[drug_mentor]

Hey Nixiam!

You have some interesting thoughts (although I am sure most consequentialists would disagree with you quite strongly on your first point). Unfortunately, what you are talking about is a bit of a mixture between normative and applied ethics. If you made a thread on either topic I would happily contribute, but the line of thought you are running with isn't strictly within the realm of meta-ethics, which is what this thread is for.

Let me explain in a bit more detail. Your post presupposes that there is a right and wrong, and seeks to explain what features of a particular action make it right or wrong. Meta-ethics is questioning whether actions can be classified as right and wrong as a matter of fact, and if so what makes these facts true, as well as the question of how human beings could come to know these facts. I hope this explanation elucidates the type of discussion I am looking to generate in this thread, and highlights that what you posted is quite distinct from that.

 

[belligerent drunk]

After all, if there were no such thing as right and wrong in a moral sense, why should I have any duty to refrain from taking what is yours if it would be to my advantage?

Again, this is probably not the kind of input you're looking for, but the simplest way I can put it is the following. You would refrain from taking what is mine because you don't want me to take what is yours. Modern societies are not a free-for-all because it just is counter-productive to all parties. The reason I don't want to label these things right or wrong or whatever is because I feel that ideally, right or wrong should be decided on a case-by-case basis. As in, there's no universal rule of right/wrong that applies to all situations.

An example I recently used in another thread: would it be wrong to take something along the lines of <1% of a rich person's belongings in order to save the life of a poor person? I believe many would say that it's not wrong. Would it be wrong to take >50% of a poor person's belongings for the amusement of a rich person? Many would agree that it is wrong. Still, in both cases there is "theft" going on.

I'm sorry if I keep talking about stuff that's not really related to the original question, I'm somewhat tired and still a little cloudy from yesterday's ether.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Some people may say that there are never any absolute moral facts and it's always culture-dependent, but it's damn hard to accept things like female genital mutilation just because some primitive superstitious culture accepts it.

Preventing female genital mutilation performed on a consenting/requesting adult, in the absence of any duress, coercion, or grooming from childhood would likely be amoral.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Meta-ethics is questioning whether actions can be classified as right and wrong as a matter of fact, and if so what makes these facts true, as well as the question of how human beings could come to know these facts.

Then I propose we remove morality from the discussion. One can be moral and unethical, one can be ethical and immoral.

It is unethical to act against an agreement or contract that you have entered into.

 

[drug_mentor]

Again, this is probably not the kind of input you're looking for, but the simplest way I can put it is the following. You would refrain from taking what is mine because you don't want me to take what is yours. Modern societies are not a free-for-all because it just is counter-productive to all parties. The reason I don't want to label these things right or wrong or whatever is because I feel that ideally, right or wrong should be decided on a case-by-case basis. As in, there's no universal rule of right/wrong that applies to all situations.

An example I recently used in another thread: would it be wrong to take something along the lines of <1% of a rich person's belongings in order to save the life of a poor person? I believe many would say that it's not wrong. Would it be wrong to take >50% of a poor person's belongings for the amusement of a rich person? Many would agree that it is wrong. Still, in both cases there is "theft" going on.

I'm sorry if I keep talking about stuff that's not really related to the original question, I'm somewhat tired and still a little cloudy from yesterday's ether.

Are you familiar with consequentialism? It sounds an awful lot like that is what you are talking about, and consequentialism is an ethical theory. What you are talking about is somewhat related to the topic, because in a sense you are attempting to defend anti-realist views about ethics. At the same time, if we start getting into the specifics of consequentialism that would become normative as opposed to meta ethics.

I will say this much, consequentialist theories judge good to be what brings about the best consequences (obviously people may disagree on what qualifies as the good that ought to be promoted in order to bring about the best consequences). A consequentialist can believe there is an objective right and wrong, but they still hold that circumstances largely dictate what action is right or wrong. If you are interested you should have a read of this.

Then I propose we remove morality from the discussion. One can be moral and unethical, one can be ethical and immoral.

It is unethical to act against an agreement or contract that you have entered into.

Generally in philosophy ethics and morality are interchangeable, and in my posts I am using them interchangeably. I would really prefer not to debate the merits of this approach here, if you are interested enough in such a discussion to make a thread then I may contribute.

 

[Nixiam]

Hey Nixiam!

You have some interesting thoughts (although I am sure most consequentialists would disagree with you quite strongly on your first point). Unfortunately, what you are talking about is a bit of a mixture between normative and applied ethics. If you made a thread on either topic I would happily contribute, but the line of thought you are running with isn't strictly within the realm of meta-ethics, which is what this thread is for.

Let me explain in a bit more detail. Your post presupposes that there is a right and wrong, and seeks to explain what features of a particular action make it right or wrong. Meta-ethics is questioning whether actions can be classified as right and wrong as a matter of fact, and if so what makes these facts true, as well as the question of how human beings could come to know these facts. I hope this explanation elucidates the type of discussion I am looking to generate in this thread, and highlights that what you posted is quite distinct from that.

Ah, thank you. I suppose I misunderstood, at least I learned something. I've now used Wiki as my reference to what, Normative, Applied, and Meta Ethics are and feel I'm now prepared to discuss effectively without derailing. Hi!

If I may, to answer the first question, I would say trying to prove whether or not moral facts exist is as fruitful as asking if god exists. Whether it does or doesn't, we have to get there to find out. I'd say using our current system for deciding between right and the constant (not as constant as it should be) revision of our ethics is a good base for climbing to the discovery of true, moral facts.

In effect, if there are moral facts, in modern society I would venture to say moral facts are dead. We haven't seen any moral absolutes yet, which doesn't mean there aren't any, but there is harm in assuming we have discovered them too soon, when we really haven't .

It cannot be proven or disproven.

 

[belligerent drunk]

@drug_mentor: I'm not very familiar with all the definitions of the terms that have been used in the thread (although I've made myself familiar now), so I apologize for the confusion. I believe you're correct in saying that my views are awful similar to consequentialism, although, as always, I mostly arrived at it myself. Still, if we get back to the original question of whether moral facts exist, then I will repeat my opinion: the moral values (not moral facts) humankind has come up with is a result of evolution and the environment we live in. That makes them subjective and dependent on the environment and the mechanisms for the evolution of our nervous system. What it also means is that if there were other intelligent life in our universe (or even better, in some other universe with unimaginably different laws of physics), then it's quite likely that they would have slightly, or significantly, different views on morality. Again, because they're subjective.

Since my previous comments, I thought about it and would word my view on whether actual moral facts exist or not this way: they may, but since they have to be objective and absolute, then they most likely have to be a result of laws of physics. For example, a negative charge being attracted to a positive charge is pretty universal no matter how you look at it. The mechanisms behind human behaviour are a lot more complex than simple interactions like that, and, again, they vary depending on environmental factors. To me, that's a pretty good argument against the existence of absolute morality. Or actually, not against its existence, but against the idea that humans have access to it. Again, the god question - can't really disprove its existence, but then again there's little evidence supporting it.

I feel like I keep trying to get my point across, but fail miserably. Can you share your opinion now?

 

[Cosmic Trigger]

Some people may say that there are never any absolute moral facts and it's always culture-dependent, but it's damn hard to accept things like female genital mutilation just because some primitive superstitious culture accepts it.

How could something be moral when it is done without consent?

Beyond that I have no idea how we could consider something ultimately true or false not being the creators of our experience. Without absolute knowledge of all aspects of existence we can have no sureties IMO.

 

[Nixiam]

Well, let me answer that question with a question.

What if someone were to do something to some person, that is non detrimental to that person, and serves a greater benefit for everyone, even though the person did not consent? Yes, consent was broken, but the good would not outweigh?

This is in no way related to genital mutilation by the way.

 

[Cosmic Trigger]

good question. I would think that if the outcome was good for all there could be no objection. Or why would someone object to something good?

 

[drug_mentor]

Can you share your opinion now?

Personally I subscribe to a view called Rationalism. I believe that through the exercise of reason it is possible for rational beings to apprehend moral truths. Whilst I do believe there are such things as moral facts, they are not true in the sense that scientific facts are true. By this I mean their truth is not derived by corresponding to physical facts about the world, which is generally the mechanism which legislates the truth of scientific facts.

There are obviously problems with this view. For one, there are plenty of rational beings who disagree quite strongly on which actions are right and wrong, moreover, even when two rational beings agree on which actions are right and wrong they will often disagree on which features of the actions make them so. At face value this would certainly seem to suggest there are serious problems with relying on reason alone to apprehend absolute moral truths.

There have been numerous attempts to come up with ways to rationally apprehend moral facts, undoubtedly the most famous would be Immanuel Kant's various formulations of the categorical imperative. Whilst I think Kant is one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived, there are some problems with his views which I won't get into here.

Personally, I tend to favour a conception closer to Scanlonian Contractualism. Broadly speaking, this view entails that actions are right or wrong on the basis of whether a society of rational beings would agree to live under principles which permit those actions. This is certainly useful for identifying wrong actions, but I think it does have a bit of a deficit in that under such a principle there is no explicit way to differentiate between merely permissible actions and particularly laudable actions. Perhaps you could build in a Kantian notion of acting from duty in order to mitigate this deficit.

In relation to the question how to humans come to have knowledge of moral facts, my response is that such truths are known a priori, much like mathematical truths. I suppose many would regard this as an unsatisfactory response, but even the most ardent sceptic must concede that human beings do possess a priori knowledge whose origin is mysterious, and there is no explicit reason this cannot be true when it comes to moral facts.

In my more sceptical moments I am quite sympathetic to moral sentimentalism, which is essentially the view that moral judgements are fundamentally motivated by our emotional responses to different actions. The most famous proponent of this view is almost certainly David Hume. More recently some philosophers have attempted to defend this view using empirical evidence from cognitive science, notably Jesse Prinz did this in an article titled 'The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments' which is well worth checking out (if you are unable to find it I can send you a copy).

Anyone who is interested in rationalist meta-ethics would do well to consult Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant, although I must warn that this can be an extremely difficult text to grapple with, especially if one is not particularly familiar with philosophical writing. It is worth the read if you can manage it though.

Anyone interested in Scanlonian Contractualism ought to consult Chapter 7, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism' in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy by Thomas Scanlon.