Scientists vs. Philosophers

[Illyria99]

sounds like an argument over semantics. philosophers don't do science, they do philosophy, scientists do science, mathematicians do math, they are all distinct and yet overlap in some areas. who cares. Half of these posts are just pseudo-philosophical bullshit that you hear from people when they are completely stupid and really stoned.

I think I love you.

 

[casualuser]

A good argument against the computer simulation idea is that perturbative phenomena like many body problems in classical mechanics and self interaction in quantum mechanics can not be solved by algorithm, but obviously, reality can solve them.

Indeed, I believe the counter argument goes; the complex computational system needed to form such a simulation would be by definition able to solve said problems. Or the code for such a simulation could make those problems appear unsolvable within the simulation when in "actual reality" they are perfectly solvable. Regardless, I don't really give it much credence. I only brought it up to demonstrate my point.

sounds like an argument over semantics. philosophers don't do science, they do philosophy, scientists do science, mathematicians do math, they are all distinct and yet overlap in some areas. who cares. Half of these posts are just pseudo-philosophical bullshit that you hear from people when they are completely stupid and really stoned.

Science really is philosophy man... no it's not actually.

But that's precisely my point... Everything is just an argument over semantics when you break it down; does something deserve one arbitrary label or another?
Whichever it ends up being, it's still just any arbitrary label constructed from our perceived reality. The only question that matters then is why.

 

[rangrz]

But that's precisely my point... Everything is just an argument over semantics when you break it down

Syntax matters... "The cat is sitting on the mat." has a different meaning from the "The mat is sitting on the cat." and " Matting on sit cat the" is just meaningless.

 

[casualuser]

Syntax matters... "The cat is sitting on the mat." has a different meaning from the "The mat is sitting on the cat." and " Matting on sit cat the" is just meaningless.

Only because we don't give it meaning. If everyone started saying "Matting on sit cat the" in place of "The cat is sitting on the mat" it would have meaning.

 

[rangrz]

Keeping the structure of the language intact, it would never mean anything. (So, like listing out a set of syntactic rules and semantic meanings to words that does not change...like a computer language...) that sentence is just nonsense and could never mean anything without changing that stuff.

 

[ebola?]

Of course, Science never PROVES anything. It's inductive, and always considers itself to be wrong/only an approximation, but strives to be less and less wrong and to approximate to a higher precision.

I think that this particular interpretation of scientific practice (wherein the objects of study are taken for granted) marks a certain abstraction from the processes through which investigation is conducted. One cannot merely 'induce' what our objects of study should be, nor how we should parse out such objects from an indeterminate flux, this flux presenting the potential for many objects of study to be parsed out from it, how hypotheses should be generated, etc. Similarly, we cannot take for granted that the particular influence of the experimental apparatuses we employ are sufficient to parse out the set of empirical objects that fit in with a potential system of inquiry and knowledge to which all phenomena of investigation may be reduced.

Scientific inquiry is thus partial and tentative, subject to expansion and revision, but never hermetically sealed from the body of active assumption which facilitate the deductive moment that allows us to launch inductive activity in the first place (this inductive activity allowing refinement of further deductive processes).
...
Science (construed widely...I doubt a physicist would recognize the science of...for example, extended case method ethnography, as fundamentally similar to the philosophy of science that guides particle physicists) is our best shot so far, but we shouldn't allow it to establish blinders of epistemological arrogance. We have some good starts, but we are nowhere near some sort of adequate, unified ontology yielded via reliable and valid epistemology. This gap is what gives philosophy and science distinct purposes.
...
All this said, the reductionist philosophy of science championed by most physical scientists has brought us far more useful shit (see every transistor-implemented computation, every pieced of laser-read optical media, etc.) than heterodox methods of investigation.

ebola

 

[casualuser]

Keeping the structure of the language intact, it would never mean anything. (So, like listing out a set of syntactic rules and semantic meanings to words that does not change...like a computer language...) that sentence is just nonsense and could never mean anything without changing that stuff.

That is where I disagree, meaning is not given by the language it is given by the person reading it. Everything is about perspective.

 

[akautonomics]

True that. You can use any word, sound, symbol or gesture to mean the same thing, (or mean nothing) and that thing only has semantic meaning when an active agent/"perceiver" assigns it.

 

[Cthulhu]

Interesting where this thread has journeyed.

True that. You can use any word, sound, symbol or gesture to mean the same thing, (or mean nothing) and that thing only has semantic meaning when an active agent/"perceiver" assigns it.

I agree with a fundamental fluidity of language and symbols, but I think you and casualuser have taken it too far. Language and symbols are not completely arbitrary, and would not substitute for one another on the mere condition that people began to do so. Here are some examples: body language (e.g. smiles, grimaces) have biological bases; verbal language evolved based on sounds and natural rhythms (think: onomatopoeia. Thunder crashes, it doesn't flow); syntax, while fluid, does affect a sentence's meaning imo - such as putting the subject at the end, which could (depending on accent) either emphasize or de-emphasize it; symbolic acts have certain constraints, e.g. I cannot imagine an execution ever symbolizing a commitment to nonviolence.

 

[akautonomics]

I guess it depends on your definition of "meaning". I believe for something (a symbol, facial expression, word, act, whatever) to have meaning, that meaning must be "assigned" (usually in the form of societal conditioning but some people make up their own) by the individual. As an example, if there happened to be some random marks on a wall; regardless of whether it looks like squiggles, an alphabet letter or a star of David, if there is no one to assign meaning to the squiggle/someone literate/a Jew there, there is no inherent meaning. Facial expressions and other physiological processes might be the exception because there has to be an observer (the individual who makes the expression, if they saw it in a mirror or just feeling their face contort, will associate that emotion with making the expression).
As for the execution being a symbol of non-violence, it *could*, in the sense that killing a killer decreases net violence (though its an oxymoron some individuals do see it as valid depending on what meaning they assign to the term non-violence.)

 

[casualuser]

Interesting where this thread has journeyed.



I agree with a fundamental fluidity of language and symbols, but I think you and casualuser have taken it too far. Language and symbols are not completely arbitrary, and would not substitute for one another on the mere condition that people began to do so. Here are some examples: body language (e.g. smiles, grimaces) have biological bases; verbal language evolved based on sounds and natural rhythms (think: onomatopoeia. Thunder crashes, it doesn't flow); syntax, while fluid, does affect a sentence's meaning imo - such as putting the subject at the end, which could (depending on accent) either emphasize or de-emphasize it; symbolic acts have certain constraints, e.g. I cannot imagine an execution ever symbolizing a commitment to nonviolence.

You should watch The life of David Gale, interesting movie pertaining to your execution example... I agree syntax matters(at least to a degree) but only because we decide that syntax matters, it just seems much more natural or inherent but that's only because there is a general consensus about it, which can change if the consensus changes. To go along with your body language example, people can have odd physical reactions contradictory to the circumstance that caused them i.e. a nervous laugh.

 

[rangrz]

Science (construed widely...I doubt a physicist would recognize the science of...for example, extended case method ethnography, as fundamentally similar to the philosophy of science that guides particle physicists)

I can see the science in the "soft"/social sciences. Well, sometimes. It *can* be done in a very rigorous and scientific way, and sometimes it is, but I find that the social sciences have a lot more "line noise" in them than the do the natural and physical sciences. But that is not to say the physical sciences are immune from such things, indeed a good deal of Science (construed widely...I doubt a physicist would recognize the science of...for example, extended case method ethnography, as fundamentally similar to the philosophy of science that guides particle physicists) theoretical physics strays into the region of being a wanky pseudo-philosophical circle jerk. Brane cosmology (which tbph, I think is what happens when physicists and mathematicians smoke too much weed and/or do mushrooms...think about it) and String theory Which draws criticism from various members of the science community and could be seen as unphysical and meaningless [/QUOTE]and the endless series of barrage of thought experiments on interpretations of quantum mechanics. But for this kind of thing is still a small portion of what the physical science community actually does, and in particular, the experimental community tends to be more or less immune to this kind of nonsense and sticks to building multi-billion dollar tunnels filled with superconducting magnets. Chemistry has it wanky aspects, mainly electro-chemical fusion (cold fusion) positing truly absurd claims of fusion of a proton into nickle-56 (which does not even happen in a fucking supernova.) Still, the social sciences tend to do a lot more circle jerking than the physical and natural sciences, but at their best, can be outstanding examples of science.

All this said, the reductionist philosophy of science championed by most physical scientists has brought us far more useful shit (see every transistor-implemented computation, every pieced of laser-read optical media, etc.) than heterodox methods of investigation.

I.e. It works, bitches.

True that. You can use any word, sound, symbol or gesture to mean the same thing, (or mean nothing) and that thing only has semantic meaning when an active agent/"perceiver" assigns it.

Yes, but the person/agent that perceives must understand the meaning as intended by the agent presenting it. You can use any symbols you want as long as everyone agrees on their meaning. I.e. an encoded message between two people that both know the code is still meaningless to a third party. Writing your own notes that only you understand in your own symbols still only works if you make up a set of symbols and rules for manipulating them that you remember. (Example for you: Look at how we made up our own symbols and meanings for them... "Merh!" is just meaningless to anyone else but has a definite meaning between you and myself.). Much the same is how talk of "opening your third eye and seeing the 5th dimension" "The third eye" is patent nonsense to a physician and "The 5th dimension" is just silly to a physicist, but it means something (I have no fucking idea what exactly) to mystical and spiritual people.

As an example, if there happened to be some random marks on a wall; regardless of whether it looks like squiggles, an alphabet letter or a star of David, if there is no one to assign meaning to the squiggle/someone literate/a Jew there, there is no inherent meaning.

Exactly, which is why you would not use a Star of David to represent the concepts of Judaism to an un-contacted tribal person, you'd have to learn her language and explain it to her that way, then maybe tell her that the Star of David is the symbol you use to represent those ideas and maybe she'll understand it from that point on.

 

[ebola?]

I can see the science in the "soft"/social sciences. Well, sometimes. It *can* be done in a very rigorous and scientific way, and sometimes it is, but I find that the social sciences have a lot more "line noise" in them than the do the natural and physical sciences.

I actually think that things run a bit epistemologically deeper than this. The social scientist takes as his object of study a system of which he is a part (of course, so does any experimenter, but the implications of this turn are different for most 'natural scientists'). This means that a whole 'nother set of conceptual machinery needs be employed to ensure reliable and valid findings. It also means that the character of what it is for a social scientific finding to be 'valid' needs be different...in short, social scientists conceptual tools to shed light on previously hidden social dynamics, not a description that corresponds in a one to one fashion with objects of study 'as they are'.

But that is not to say the physical sciences are immune from such things, indeed a good deal of Science theoretical physics strays into the region of being a wanky pseudo-philosophical circle jerk.

I think that a lot of this, though, is instead exposition of the ontological implications of the findings of theoretical physics. One can run experiments in theoretical physics which build upon the standard model, for example, creating somewhat novel theory that is congruent with multiple empirically justified ontological interpretations of the theory. Since one cannot adjudicate empirically between these interpretations, these squabbles are instead over philosophy of physics.

String theory Which draws criticism from various members of the science community and could be seen as unphysical and meaningless

I thought that some of m-theory's predictions were empirically testable (at least in principle), but currently outside of the scope of our experimental abilities.

Still, the social sciences tend to do a lot more circle jerking than the physical and natural sciences, but at their best, can be outstanding examples of science.

I think this is because any particular social situation can be analyzed from a multitude of theoretical perspectives, each perspective parsing out some aspects of the dynamics of a social phenomenon but none exhausting them.

ebola

 

[rangrz]

I actually think that things run a bit epistemologically deeper than this. The social scientist takes as his object of study a system of which he is a part (of course, so does any experimenter, but the implications of this turn are different for most 'natural scientists'). This means that a whole 'nother set of conceptual machinery needs be employed to ensure reliable and valid findings. It also means that the character of what it is for a social scientific finding to be 'valid' needs be different...in short, social scientists conceptual tools to shed light on previously hidden social dynamics, not a description that corresponds in a one to one fashion with objects of study 'as they are'.

Fair enough, and I can appreciate how hard/practically impossible it must be to conduct research in the social sciences that has the strict rigour and control that one can do in lab, and I by no means think of the social sciences as being unscientific. Perhaps it's a mixture of lack of familiarity with it, and the stuff I am familiar with being outdated or otherwise bad examples.

I thought that some of m-theory's predictions were empirically testable (at least in principle), but currently outside of the scope of our experimental abilities.

A few yes, but are absurdly beyond our ability to test. The various other string and brane theories (there are a lot of them) are either testable or make predictions that contradict things already observed/which quantum field theory more accurately predicts.

 

[AlphaMethylPhenyl]

science is a school of philosophy

they are by no means mutually exclusive

 

[ebola?]

Fair enough, and I can appreciate how hard/practically impossible it must be to conduct research in the social sciences that has the strict rigour and control that one can do in lab

Yeah, and I think that my auxiliary point is that in lieu of being able to take up the paradigmatic controlled experiment, the social scientist instead needs to use personal 'interference' with (or participation in) his or her object of study as a tool rather than something to be curtailed. In particular, hard science strives to observe 'objectively', leaving the object of study unchanged (aside from the experimental effect applied to the experimental group), but the social scientist disrupts social systems in ways expected to reveal previously implicit social dynamics (for social systems tend to remain out of empirical view (ie, as the unattended bases of habit) in routine situations). Furthermore, these disruptions are meant to show how empirically novel (or as of yet undertheorized) aspects of social systems. This distinct tactic of investigation in turn changes what analytical comparisons are appropriate to make and the conceptual import of new findings

(Most of this is expounded upon in Burawoy's The Extended Case Method 1991 (or is it 97...memory's fuzzy))

Perhaps it's a mixture of lack of familiarity with it, and the stuff I am familiar with being outdated or otherwise bad examples.

While I can think of many examples of social science done poorly, it is also because sometimes it's not clear whether a particular social scientific study employs 'positivist' (think a la hard sciences) methods. Research conducted using alternate systematic frameworks looks like a miserable failure when evaluated by positivist criteria. In fact, many social scientists critique each other on the basis of this very misunderstanding.

ebola

 

[rangrz]

While I can think of many examples of social science done poorly, it is also because sometimes it's not clear whether a particular social scientific study employs 'positivist' (think a la hard sciences) methods.

I would say that the fact they do not make the methodology clear is itself a sign of poorly done science. I can understand not using the positivist rigour of the physical and natural sciences, but one should still state their methodology so people reading it can make sense of what's going on.

 

[ebola?]

I would say that the fact they do not make the methodology clear is itself a sign of poorly done science.

Well, poor sociological studies don't make their methodology (or the theoretical underpinnings thereof) clear, but good studies do. The problem, though, is that for readers coming from alternate disciplines, study in a long, particular strand of social theory might be a necessary prerequisite to understand what underpins the methodology of the study.

ebola

 

[ebola?]

Rangrz:

I'd like to know: do you see anything analogous to the theoretical and methodological anarchy of the social sciences in any of the hard/physical sciences? It seems like positivist construction of objects of study and the 'typical' scientific method (observation--->hypothesis via inference---->experimental testing of what may be deduced via the hypothesis----->results----->modification of bodies of theory (or back to the drawing board), of course) are ubiquitous in hard sciences.

The closest analogy I see is controversy over the proper ontological interpretation of theoretical physics and experimental events. And...I guess computationally intensive modeling of dynamic systems (linked to what laypeople know as "chaos theory"?) provides an alternative to production of straightforward physical laws, but I'm not sure how many inroads the former practice is actually making.

ebola