• Philosophy and Spirituality
    Welcome Guest
    Posting Rules Bluelight Rules
    Threads of Note Socialize
  • P&S Moderators: Xorkoth | Madness

Would numbers exist if no one had ever invented them?

how does that make a difference to my assertion? how is that "the thing"? i don't understand.
 
Your post is inconsistent in relation to your original assertion( natural order != numbers ) otherwise no difference. You're saying that mathematics is something that happens within subjects and natural order is what mathematical qualia grasp/signify. To say that mathematics has an existence outside of subjects and can do work/interact is inconsistent with the differentiation.

It's "a thing" that conveys the difference between mathematics as a process that takes place in space-time from mathematics as a valid ontology beyond space-time aka beyond subjects.
 
Last edited:
apologies for my poor choice of words. thanks for the clarification, yougene.

i meant that the maths seen in nature is not maths but nature when it is not interpretted as maths.
 
no problem
These types of conversations always end up in self-referential and recursive terminology. Makes for excellent mental masturbation trying to unwind it all.
 
chinup said:
i don't think mathematical objects need a consciousness to interact with them in order to exist. i certainly don't see how the empty set, which numbers are built from (and it doesn't matter which way you build them,{{o}} or {o,{o}}), can require anything to exist. its just emptiness.

However, an empty set is not "nothing". Rather, to be constructed, one needs maintain those axioms necessary to construct sets as such, including axioms sufficient for constructing operations which may be performed on sets. I hold such axioms to be active moves, emergent from the investigator/environment interaction, not properties of the 'environment as such' (I'm not sure that I believe in the latter, at least as a stable set of logically constructed, semantically delineated 'stuff'). However, in using axioms to structure our participation in the world, we alter, and indeed participate in constructing, this world. Hence the inadequacy of the dichotomy of subjective/objective.

Really, I agree with Yougene here (again :p).

I'll also note that I could be totally wrong here...it's just a guess that fits with what I've seen of philosophical problems.

Max P said:
I fapped to this post.

But seriously, mathematics is a language. The numbers we use are merely a vocabulary -- a voice used to interpret. Much like coordinates on a map are used to denote locations. And just as the map is not the actual territory itself, mathematics is not inherent to Reality.

Hahah...thanks. However, while I think that there is a good bit of credence to the analogy with language, I also think that our linguistic practices leave their mark on the world...at least that world in which we participate. The territory indeed includes both this map and the map-makers' acts of construction and use of this map.

ebola
 
However, an empty set is not "nothing". Rather, to be constructed, one needs maintain those axioms necessary to construct sets as such, including axioms sufficient for constructing operations which may be performed on sets. I hold such axioms to be active moves, emergent from the investigator/environment interaction, not properties of the 'environment as such' (I'm not sure that I believe in the latter, at least as a stable set of logically constructed, semantically delineated 'stuff'). However, in using axioms to structure our participation in the world, we alter, and indeed participate in constructing, this world. Hence the inadequacy of the dichotomy of subjective/objective.

an empty set is the absence of the type of objects that can be in sets. the sorts of things that can be in a set depend on the axiomatisation but i don't see how the empty one does. analogously my (probable, not decided on) atheism does not depend on a particular view of god. what about the empty model? the model which instantiates no set of axioms, (and also all sets of axioms trivially...), how can that depend on a specific axiomatisation?

i understand the dichotomy of the subjective/objective in physical theory but i think its a red herring when you come to maths. you take a set of axioms, there is choice there, after that, what follows is objective. also, since some propositions are independent of some axioms, e.g. the continuum hypothesis, teh subjectivity the axiomatization doesn't always make the propositions you derive subjective.

if time and action is an important factor in maths, how was 2+2 = 4 before we conceived of 2...? i know its the laziest argument against intuitionism ever but its also a damn good one. if physical laws are mathematical, which i believe, then it can't really be the case that, for example, linearity of QM depends on us having set up the relevant operator algebras just so. there's no recourse to equivalent definitions in other axiomatisations without being open to the same objection again. its possibly to deny the applicability/effectiveness of mathematics to physics but that cripples physics so isn't really an empirically sound supposition. i started out more intuitionistic but practical considerations have beaten me into a somewhat more tegmarkian position...
 
Last edited by a moderator:
If your asking whether numbers would exist if no one had coined the word "numbers"? Or if no one ever decided to count a single thing or equate anything? It seems to me once a certain level of intelligence is born, it wants to deconstruct its environments using set codes. The code isn't what matters IMO, more the principal behind it though.
 
chinup said:
an empty set is the absence of the type of objects that can be in sets. the sorts of things that can be in a set depend on the axiomatisation but i don't see how the empty one does.

However, it involves constructing what a set is (and then, as follows, what types of things go in it) depends on some axiomization (even if many different sets of axioms would work). A set without such properties is not a description of a set.

analogously my (probable, not decided on) atheism does not depend on a particular view of god. what about the empty model? the model which instantiates no set of axioms, (and also all sets of axioms trivially...), how can that depend on a specific axiomatisation?

A couple of issues:
1. If Atheism doesn't require a set of possible gods to reject, then what is it a rejection of? Here, implied semantic undergirding matters.
2. Even if a logical construction is compatible with all possible axioms trivially, this compatibility still points to an assumption about relations of this logical construction to types of axioms (and can we delineate all possible axioms? If not, how can we prove that something is consistent will all those possible?).

you take a set of axioms, there is choice there, after that, what follows is objective. also, since some propositions are independent of some axioms, e.g. the continuum hypothesis, teh subjectivity the axiomatization doesn't always make the propositions you derive subjective.

My point was that assigning things as objective or subjective doesn't work. Rather, 'logically primary' are processes, later characteristics and moments of these processes taking on subjective or objective uses.

if time and action is an important factor in maths, how was 2+2 = 4 before we conceived of 2...? i know its the laziest argument against intuitionism ever but its also a damn good one. if physical laws are mathematical, which i believe, then it can't really be the case that, for example, linearity of QM depends on us having set up the relevant operator algebras just so. there's no recourse to equivalent definitions in other axiomatisations without being open to the same objection again. its possibly to deny the applicability/effectiveness of mathematics to physics but that cripples physics so isn't really an empirically sound supposition. i started out more intuitionistic but practical considerations have beaten me into a somewhat more tegmarkian position...

But theorization of physical laws and the structure of necessary math appear (as far as we see) in the universe FOR US, as our interaction with it. This says little about the structure of investigator-less being. However, maybe we agree on one point: within the context of a certain domain of axiomatic propositions, mathematical constructions, and empirical relations, physical laws and underlying math take on characteristics as objective as we use them.

ebola
 
However, it involves constructing what a set is (and then, as follows, what types of things go in it) depends on some axiomization (even if many different sets of axioms would work). A set without such properties is not a description of a set.

A couple of issues:
1. If Atheism doesn't require a set of possible gods to reject, then what is it a rejection of? Here, implied semantic undergirding matters.
2. Even if a logical construction is compatible with all possible axioms trivially, this compatibility still points to an assumption about relations of this logical construction to types of axioms (and can we delineate all possible axioms? If not, how can we prove that something is consistent will all those possible?).

my kneejerk reaction to the first point is 'yes, but as an object, the empty set doesn't need us to require sets to exist' then i realise i'm just moving the boundaries of objective and subjective. i agree with the seoncd points. though there is one axiom that i'm pretty sure is universally held by logicians. x=x, i think its a kind of special case.

My point was that assigning things as objective or subjective doesn't work. Rather, 'logically primary' are processes, later characteristics and moments of these processes taking on subjective or objective uses.

But theorization of physical laws and the structure of necessary math appear (as far as we see) in the universe FOR US, as our interaction with it. This says little about the structure of investigator-less being. However, maybe we agree on one point: within the context of a certain domain of axiomatic propositions, mathematical constructions, and empirical relations, physical laws and underlying math take on characteristics as objective as we use them.


I am starting to see your point, i don't have any logical arguments against your arguments. all i have is an inability to see what the alternative to a divide between subject/objective (and how would we experience the fact that what we experience is only that way to us?) might be coupled with an intensely emotional sense that mathematical objects hold some type of objective reality. i work with a certain type of them daily and it seems certain properties are fairly ubiquitous in sufficiently interesting systems. though its arrogant i can't see how such abstract things can appear to have such a profound reality without us having hit on some key concepts concerning reality.


finally.... i am quite interested in what your saying and did a couple of searches and found nothing useful. can you recommend any good reading material?
 
chinup said:
though there is one axiom that i'm pretty sure is universally held by logicians. x=x, i think its a kind of special case.

Since I don't believe in self-evidence, I consider this consensus (one that would be silly to reject for nearly all situations, to be sure). Sure, holding the converse allows derivations of contradictions, but we also have to take on a certain assumption of truth value as binary, and of entities as atomically unitary at some level. Again, these assumptions prove nearly ubiquitously useful as we engage/transform the world, but we can't take ourselves out of this picture of the world.

all i have is an inability to see what the alternative to a divide between subject/objective (and how would we experience the fact that what we experience is only that way to us?)

The way I think of it is that the interaction between organism and environment itself holds logical primacy, not the entities interacting. Instead, organism and environment emerge as aspects of this interaction. From another angle, processes give rise to participants within them, rather than discrete entities interacting to form processes. With (at the very least) humans, the subjectivity of the organism and objects of its perception and practices emerge in the root interaction.

However, our 'common sense' experience of subject and object emerging in interaction is of our experience as subjects, cultivating a view beginning from a point where subject and object present themselves already 'analyzed out', as discrete things.

i work with a certain type of them daily and it seems certain properties are fairly ubiquitous in sufficiently interesting systems. though its arrogant i can't see how such abstract things can appear to have such a profound reality without us having hit on some key concepts concerning reality.

Well, as various emergent organism/environment interactions arise from similar contexts, similar properties will appear to hold across subjects investigating and objects of investigation. Insofar as certain types of contexts are most crucial for the possibility of organism/environment interactions arising, these contexts will appear as universal properties of objects involved.

sorry if this is explained poorly...kinda near the limits of my thought. :p

finally.... i am quite interested in what your saying and did a couple of searches and found nothing useful. can you recommend any good reading material?

I'm profoundly influenced by the ontological work of John Dewey and Karl Marx. I don't consider my view some unique insight, but I think that these two converged in their takes.

Or, one could approach this take as serious engagement with the view that experience begins with the universe coming to look and act upon itself.

ebola
 
I think the natural numbers are a perfect set we use to compare reality.
Just like a perfect concept doesn't exist, neither do natural numbers.

They are a base to relate things to. They are concepts.
Nothing is ten because ten is an observed approximation.
Say I have ten fingers, but do I really have ten whole fingers? What dare the properties of a whole finger look like?
Maybe I have ten .95 fingers which would mean i only have 9.5 fingers by the law of addition. Since fingers all differ, there is no standard finger we can relate to, so we developed natural numbers.
Counting numbers are kind of like statistics of real approximations with a natural deviation and error.

Say cells divide into two. So we have 1/2 = .5 this implies that all the properties of these cells are both .5. But in reality, these cells are different which means 1/2 = .5 +/- error which =/= .5.



but on a side note, i like thinking about writing numbers according to their angles

0 has zero angles.
1 if you take out the bottom line, has one angle.
2 if you make it more of a Z has two angles
3 can be like a zigzag line
4 has 4 angles if you snip the horizontal line that intersects
5 if you square the bottom curve, and have a "tail" that sticks up at the bottom (you can kind of see it on a regular 5)
6 if you corner the top and have a complete square at the bottom
7 if you had a horizonal line half way through the diagonal line, and add a horizontal line at the bottom
8 if you make it look like two diamonds on top of eachother
9 is too much to type lol

i almost think they were meant to be like that and got transformed over the years
i think i rmeember hearing 0 used to be represented as |
 
Last edited:
No as of 1234 ect, they wld not exist to us if we didn't invent them,
or if they were not passed down from other beings, as far as some
other numerical system used elswhere, who has proof we invented numbers
anyway?
 
I agree with alasdair. I'd like to add that I think numbers weren't invented as much as discovered.
 
Numbers are just a language (written, spoken, or thought of) tool used by humans. Things are just there in a quantity and size, location and position, whatever. It's just a way humans can communicate this to themselves and others. It's like asking if words would exist if nobody invented them.
 
It's like asking if words would exist if nobody invented them.

its not, its like asking if the things that words index would exist without the words to index them.

ebola thanks for your response i will get back when my brain feels slightly less abused.
 
its not, its like asking if the things that words index would exist without the words to index them.

ebola thanks for your response i will get back when my brain feels slightly less abused.
i like that analogy. the things that words index are only cognitive tools. they don't exist. discretization is an illusion present because of our viewing apparatus (a neurological computer, and human sense organs).

actual discrete occurrences, like energy levels in the atom, perhaps are due to us living in a higher dimensional space than 3D. in which case there is an overall continuous description of energy, just more multidimensional. though i may just be really stoned.
 
Last edited:
Copy-pasting blocks of text with no original content is poor netiquette- if you can't be bothered to add anything, why should anyone bother to read it? Thanks for the link, but in future please post in the format above.
 
Top