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What are some examples of Objective Truth?

People see the world and use language in similar ways primarily because their brains and sensory inputs are similar.

Do people see the world in similar ways? How can you tell?

Do people use language in similar ways?

Have you ever studied an American Indian language, or another language that differed greatly in structure from English? I have, and it convinced me both that
1) People do not see the world in similar ways, and
2) People use language in incredibly different ways.

That said, what commonalities do exist are surely due to shared perceptual/conceptual apparatus as well as social and environmental similarities.
 
I think that intersubjectivity, entailing constant practical interaction between social organisms and their environment (and thus each other) conditions the emergence of both subjectivity and objectivity. Insofar as intersubjective practices coordinate individuals to undergo particular (ie, 'shared') experiences, intersubjectivity conditions how we form subjective impressions, socially conditioned concepts framing personal meanings. Insofar as intersubjective practice coordinates overt investigation of the world, it conditions objectivity, in framing what criteria constitute 'evidence', and in leading individuals to observe a common object in similar ways, to establish 'objective knowledge' (ie, universal across time, space, and individuals, and thus reproducible).

ebola

I think that this is close to the mark, but are you saying that subjectivity emerges as a social and psychological phenomenon, rather than as something externally inherent in the world? I believe that you are, and in that case, I can agree.
 
All of your rebuttals failed, in my mind, because you merely restated that convention does not permit certain interpretations, which you then labeled as "fact" (and ostensibly were referring to objective truth with this label).

I really don't know what else to add. But let's go with this: Is it true or false that the convention does not permit certain interpretations? Is it objectively true or false? If it is not objectively true or false, in what consists the convention?

Just where do the objective truths lie?
In the language? I have already argued that such an interpretation does not work.

Sorry, I was not convinced. :p
What about tautologies? Aren't tautologies a clear case of truths that are (a) objective and (b) artifacts of language?
 
I really don't know what else to add. But let's go with this: Is it true or false that the convention does not permit certain interpretations? Is it objectively true or false? If it is not objectively true or false, in what consists the convention?

It is clearly true that convention does not permit certain interpretations.
But what does that have to do with objectivity?
As I have already argued, convention can be violated.
Objectivity presumably cannot.
The convention consists of social accordance on a set of rules.
These rules change over time, and over space.
Objectivity should be stronger than this, dontcha think?

Sorry, I was not convinced. :p

Then permit me to ask which part of my argument failed to convince you.
For example, I mentioned that Americans cannot say that
Sherlock Holmes lives on XXX Y Street
unless he literally lives on top of the building.
Is there some objective truth there that American English speakers are missing?

What about my questions highlighting how language is interpreted differently by different people at different times?

What about tautologies? Aren't tautologies a clear case of truths that are (a) objective and (b) artifacts of language?
Tautologies are most definitely NOT artifacts of language, as I understand them.
They arise from a study of formal logic, which is something entirely different from (and, dare I say, tangential to) language.
 
We believe objective reality exists. 'Abstract truth' (referred from here on as 'truth', you'll see why) exists in the form of language and mathematics. But 'truth' is only a concept that helps us to understand the world, created by man and interpreted by man; therefore it is necessarily subjective.

We would not say that an atom is the truth. Atoms exist sure, and our interpretation of their existence may be true for us, but labelling an atom as an atom brings nothing new to the table, no objective truths have been established. All we created was a sound that we attribute to an entity we can't fully understand, so we simplify it with words and believe we really grasp its essence.

It seems this example of naming objects/concepts in language can be extrapolated to our entire understanding of the world, that all 'truth' is composed of only words that relate (in a very watered-down and simplistic way) to existences strung together with logic in order to make sense of reality. Not to say this isn't useful, but it is not the truth.
 
slimvictor said:
Sorry, you have lost me here.

In that case, you'd love Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, as you are putting forth very similar ideas.

I think that this is close to the mark, but are you saying that subjectivity emerges as a social and psychological phenomenon, rather than as something externally inherent in the world? I believe that you are, and in that case, I can agree.

I'll note from the outset that my best ontological guess is unorthodox: I believe it a misstep to parse the world into subject and object as separate phenomena on an absolutely a priori basis; rather, the interaction between organism and environment stands logically primary to subject and object, the latter two emerging as 'aspects' of this interaction.

I've for the most part abandoned the notions of things 'in themselves', of objectivity as usually construed, as a viable project; at best, this kind of objectivity is myopic. Similarly, I don't think that construing subjectivity as radically free, adopting perspectives completely arbitrarily, yields much either.

ebola
 
It is clearly true that convention does not permit certain interpretations.
But what does that have to do with objectivity?
As I have already argued, convention can be violated.
Objectivity presumably cannot.
The convention consists of social accordance on a set of rules.
These rules change over time, and over space.
Objectivity should be stronger than this, dontcha think?

The point is that so long as the convention is in force (i.e. agreed upon), the convention can serve as an objective standard. If you agree to the rules of chess, you must agree that you cannot take a piece on the first move. You cannot agree to the former but disagree about the latter without being factually wrong.

You seem to be arguing against a position that I never claimed to endorse, viz. that objectivity is some kind of mythical noetic property that transcends speakers' agreement on shared epistemic standards. But all along I have been saying that speakers' agreement on shared epistemic standards is all there is to objectivity. This is precisely why I initially tried to pick mundane conversational examples and insisted that truth and objectivity should not be capitalized (i.e. mystified). We all know how to use these concepts in daily life but suddenly start picking nits and talking nonsense on philosophy boards on the internet. Or do you mean to tell me that you do not draw any distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion in your daily life?

Then permit me to ask which part of my argument failed to convince you.
For example, I mentioned that Americans cannot say that
Sherlock Holmes lives on XXX Y Street
unless he literally lives on top of the building.
Is there some objective truth there that American English speakers are missing?

This is picking nits as far as I am concerned. To begin with I am an American English speaker and use that expression interchangeably with "at", as do many other people I know. My point was simply that although Holmes is a fictional character, it is not simply a matter of your personal subjective opinion where that fictional character resides. If someone asked you, "where did Sherlock Holmes live?" and you answered, "Sherlock Holmes did not live anywhere, because he was a fictional character" you would either be being snarky or being an idiot, but in no way would you be legitimately answering the question that was asked. On the other hand, if you answered that he lived on (or at) 218C Barker Street, you would just be wrong. Or do you mean to tell me that the number and the name is a matter of opinion?

What about my questions highlighting how language is interpreted differently by different people at different times?

These are fair insofar as they illustrate context-sensitivity, but so what? Again, I say simply that so long as all the parties agree as to the context, matters of fact may be settled objectively.

Tautologies are most definitely NOT artifacts of language, as I understand them.
They arise from a study of formal logic, which is something entirely different from (and, dare I say, tangential to) language.

I would say that formal logic is just a special case of language, but this is getting off-topic. I think that tautologies are relevant not only because they are an obvious case of objective truth but also because they illustrate the lack of necessity for invoking "correspondence to reality" or some such mysterious notion in order to see "objective truth" staring you right in the face.
 
You seem to be arguing against a position that I never claimed to endorse, viz. that objectivity is some kind of mythical noetic property that transcends speakers' agreement on shared epistemic standards. But all along I have been saying that speakers' agreement on shared epistemic standards is all there is to objectivity.

Forgive me; I did not understand what you had in mind when using the word objective.
I was arguing that you had equated objectivity with convention, but little did I suspect that you had knowingly done so.

In that case, I am not sure why we need the concept of objectivity, however...
 
We believe objective reality exists. 'Abstract truth' (referred from here on as 'truth', you'll see why) exists in the form of language and mathematics. But 'truth' is only a concept that helps us to understand the world, created by man and interpreted by man; therefore it is necessarily subjective.

We would not say that an atom is the truth. Atoms exist sure, and our interpretation of their existence may be true for us, but labelling an atom as an atom brings nothing new to the table, no objective truths have been established. All we created was a sound that we attribute to an entity we can't fully understand, so we simplify it with words and believe we really grasp its essence.

It seems this example of naming objects/concepts in language can be extrapolated to our entire understanding of the world, that all 'truth' is composed of only words that relate (in a very watered-down and simplistic way) to existences strung together with logic in order to make sense of reality. Not to say this isn't useful, but it is not the truth.

Agree.
However, when you say in the first paragraph that truth is created by (hu)man(s), you seem to be using the word differently than at the end of the final paragraph, when you seem to be using it more traditionally.
 
You want an objektive truth? here it comes:

Something exists. Because the process to fake what we perceive as existence would also need something to exist.
 
What do we mean, "thing"? What do we mean, "exist"?

This may appear facile, but I believe that your statement of the self-evident (I hold a similar belief) carries key assumptions, these assumptions necessary for anchoring the objectivity of your claim.

ebola
 
What do we mean, "thing"? What do we mean, "exist"?

This may appear facile, but I believe that your statement of the self-evident (I hold a similar belief) carries key assumptions, these assumptions necessary for anchoring the objectivity of your claim.

ebola

I'd say that the process of being self aware and to experience is enough to claim that there 'is' something, although the nature of 'being' can just be experienced intuitively - I don't think that someone could claim that the feeling of being self aware could be based on something not in existence.
The argument continues as in my last post.
 
I'll concede that experiencing occurs, in some fashion...and that this fact holds necessarily for all matters we encounter. However, need we assume that a process inheres in 'things' 'as such'? And how do we evaluate whether this immediate fact is "objective"?

ebola
 
I'll concede that experiencing occurs, in some fashion...and that this fact holds necessarily for all matters we encounter. However, need we assume that a process inheres in 'things' 'as such'? And how do we evaluate whether this immediate fact is "objective"?

ebola

Whats the alternative for a process, if it's not in some way existent? It wouldn't make any sense to say that something described as 'process' don't exist, or simpler: It doesn't make any sense to say something is nothing.
I only claim that it is an objektive fact that there is MORE than nothing. What 'something' is doesn't matter.
 
That is the vaguest objective truth I have ever heard, but I think you may be right.

The only alternative embodiment of a process would be a metaphysical one; by its very definition it would be beyond our realm of verifiability and is thus pure speculative nonsense, although the possibility -however infinitesimal- cannot be excluded.

slimvictor: I'm glad you agree! My usage of the word man was a lazy shorthand for humanity, stuck in old habits I guess :/ And yeah I meant objective truth in that last sentence
 
Because the process to fake what we perceive as existence would also need something to exist.
only if you assume that the process to fake what we perceive as existence would also need something to exist...

:)

alasdair
 
I think that there are many assumptions needed to even begin to approach this question.
Which leaves me unconvinced that we can answer it successfully...
 
Whats the alternative for a process, if it's not in some way existent? It wouldn't make any sense to say that something described as 'process' don't exist, or simpler: It doesn't make any sense to say something is nothing.

I believe that I explained myself poorly. Rather than implying that the immediate such-ness of experience could somehow not exist, I wanted to suggest that our delineation between things and actions those things take might not apply to reality outside of our investigation of it. My qualm with the claim that something must exist is with the "thing" part. Abandoning this, though, suggests that we cannot capture this truth linguistically

However, further scrutiny demonstrates it hard to establish what existence and nonexistence are, set in general relation to one another. Similarly, engaging this raw suchness, what subjectivity or objectivity might mean becomes unclear.

I only claim that it is an objektive fact that there is MORE than nothing. What 'something' is doesn't matter.

I think that I agree with the gist of this, but I'm still dissatisfied with my conception of nothing.

ebola
 
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