Free Will?

[ebola?]

Great reply, although I fear some of it might be beyond my understanding. I'll try though.

as soon as the subject is taken as object, it is no longer subject. therefor, one's investigation is already missing its point, before one actually started. when you make an abstract movement (and this is a difficult one to actually grasp; if only for a fleeting moment) of the subject as subject of its own subjectivity, it is as if a point of 'singularity' is reached; no doubt the one you are after. this is the subjectivity of the subject. the duality becomes a two-way recursive definition of itself (without any reverting to an objective determinism), creating an infinite 'mindspace'.

I think that this is a good argument in that with investigation of the world / organism-environment interaction, the object of investigation does not determine subjectivity of the an observer/actor free to reorient said investigation. However, if we take as axiomatic that the subject in some sense emerges of the surrounding non-subject context and takes this context as its target of investigation (a target never reached, at least adequately), determinism becomes possible. That is, the underlying context out of which the subject 'loops out' shapes what the subject does. From another angle, the subjectivity of the investigator encompasses this subject only insofar as it can take this subject as object, and the partiality of the perspective of this subject dictates that the subject never fully takes itself as object. The singularity appears only as a movement aiming to jump beyond duality that structures subjectivity as incomplete, and it is singular only insofar as the subject-object relation encompasses the entire field of what structures the investigation / organism-environment relation. From another angle, the investigation and meta-consciousness is arbitrarily extendable, not infinite, partial in how far it extends in abstraction but also in terms of how widely in scope it encompasses the context that structures consciousness. Your view seems entirely apt if we begin from solipsism though.

ebola

 

[azzazza !?]

indeed, you can't beat Descartes. and that's exactly the problem; you can't escape him. as you note yourself, you get stuck in either dualism, or solipsism. and as was noted earlier in the thread, the problem becomes the mind-brain bridge. if i remember correctly that was where i and mr. wobble settled our argument; that ones starting point determines a view of determinism or indeterminism. the only thing you can agree on is that one never can fully overtake the other unless the mind-brain gap is closed. an excessive neuroscientific enthusiasm often seems to account for that. but from an ontological point of view, i don't see that ever happening though.

the advantage of my side of the argument is that the argument suffers no internal contradiction, as opposed to the dualism of the other side; even though it is reduced, but only in an ad posteriori movement. consequently, it fails to account for the need of this reduction in the first place. because of that, it never reaches the strenght of the univocality that results from the subject as starting point. simply put: the objectivity of an object is never reached but by the mediation of the subject. so; while starting from the object immediatly and necessarily posits the subject as well, therefor giving rise to a duality in which neither subject or object can be adequatly reached, starting from the subject as subject (ex-istence) does not suffer this problem. this point is not solipsism really, it is 'solipsism without an i'. any philosophy decribing this 'singularity of the subject' is but a theoretical construction that only manages to inconspicuously 'point' to what it is talking about. the point is beyong any words, for any word already implies a discrimen, and thus subject-object. the word here is a performative one.

the simple point is that a subject is not an object. you seem to talk about the possibility of taking the subjectivity at least partially as an object of investigation. no! it is no longer anything even remotely close to subjectivity itself the minute you do that. sure, you can take subjective concepts, impressions etc. but those are really objects of/in ones subjectivity. the subjectivity itself, as subject is immediatly 'forgotten'. it is not really nameable either, it slips between ones fingers. it is a 'no-thing', or in Sartres words, a 'néant' (lit. 'non-being' or 'denial of being'). it determines itself as that which it is not. any determination of it reveals the 'not' of the subject. for example, it may say "i am human" but at that very moment, the subject transcends any determination that this concept 'human' entails. even the objectification of its own subjectivity therein! it is "free" from any determination it makes of itself. and this is what you are saying here:

From another angle, the subjectivity of the investigator encompasses this subject only insofar as it can take this subject as object, and the partiality of the perspective of this subject dictates that the subject never fully takes itself as object.

what i add to it is that the 'object of investigation' has nothing to do anymore with subjectivity, at all! you began talking about an object within the subject, such as a concept or whatever. yes, it may have identified itself with it, encompassed it; but this is not the subject itself! the subject is that which is encompassing. and it can leave any of the identifications it pretends itself to be. (yes this is a bold statement. don't take it too literal though. it doesn't mean it becomes a non-human subject, it means it surpasses any determination of that concept. this may seem awkward, but any ideal (concept) does so, within a certain limit which is undisclosed though. as per illustration; try to think of a specific, universal characteristic to determine what is 'human')

in other (popular) words, be-ing (subjectivity) is not a substance (object), rather, it is a verb.

 

[ebola?]

I think that we might be converging on the same idea...but you again might be outdoing my ability to think about this.

the only thing you can agree on is that one never can fully overtake the other unless the mind-brain gap is closed. an excessive neuroscientific enthusiasm often seems to account for that. but from an ontological point of view, i don't see that ever happening though.

But wouldn't one possible route of closure be to begin prior to the investigator (subject/object complex), as I was trying to do? I guess this approach presents the problem of requiring vague language pointing inadequately at an indeterminate flux (what's prior to the movement out of which subject and object emerge). However, doesn't the autonomous subject defy explication too? I definitely don't want to come off as a substance dualist or hard material reductionist (except insofar as the whole of nature, including mind, is one 'stuff').

starting from the subject as subject (ex-istence) does not suffer this problem. this point is not solipsism really, it is 'solipsism without an i'. any philosophy decribing this 'singularity of the subject' is but a theoretical construction that only manages to inconspicuously 'point' to what it is talking about. the point is beyong any words, for any word already implies a discrimen, and thus subject-object. the word here is a performative one.

Okay...so if I get you, the 'subject' you spoke of is truly the process of investigation (interaction, perception, w/e), as subject is what 'takes' the world (including inadequate self-representations) as object, subject's movement never determined by the object it takes.

the simple point is that a subject is not an object. you seem to talk about the possibility of taking the subjectivity at least partially as an object of investigation.

I guess that I was imprecise. The subject (as process) can take the result of prior subjectivity as an object (indeed, part of a complex object that involves the now objectified subject's object), but you're right, objectified 'subject' doesn't remain subject.

it determines itself as that which it is not. any determination of it reveals the 'not' of the subject. for example, it may say "i am human" but at that very moment, the subject transcends any determination that this concept 'human' entails. even the objectification of its own subjectivity therein! it is "free" from any determination it makes of itself.

Here's where we might disagree. What if phenomena outside of the scope of what the subject can take as object, beyond what is partitioned off by the subject as 'not-subject' in terms of the subject's awareness, structure the movement of that subject's awareness? Assuming such, while we cannot capture the subject as a 'thing', we can describe subjectivity as a process taking motion that is determined from outside of that process (In describing the 'conditions of possibility for a subject to 'emerge' (more precisely, for a process of subjectivity to emerge in motion), I was trying to point to the ineffable body that could structure subjectivations). Wouldn't this open up the possibility for determinism of some sort to be contingently valid, as a partial picture?

in other (popular) words, be-ing (subjectivity) is not a substance (object), rather, it is a verb.

This sounds right, but I would say that being of this sort probably cannot encompass the entire universe in which the subject emerges. . .of course, we could never confirm nor disprove such, but I think that there is existence outside of the process of subjectification (or being, as you put it).

This is doing my head in.

ebola

 

[azzazza !?]

don't worry, this stuff still tends to fry my brain as well one is really trying to dance around the boundary of what is possible to think. making it notoriously difficult to articulate.

But wouldn't one possible route of closure be to begin prior to the investigator (subject/object complex), as I was trying to do? I guess this approach presents the problem of requiring vague language pointing inadequately at an indeterminate flux (what's prior to the movement out of which subject and object emerge). However, doesn't the autonomous subject defy explication too?

i think we're after the same idea here. i keep calling this 'subject' because the movement of ex-istence ('standing-out') is the quintessential movement, the heart, of this flux (=the constitution of time). subjectivity is the most intimate experience of time (ie. Being and Time)

Okay...so if I get you, the 'subject' you spoke of is truly the process of investigation (interaction, perception, w/e), as subject is what 'takes' the world (including inadequate self-representations) as object, subject's movement never determined by the object it takes.

no. the subject appears an sich. when you speak of the process of investigation as such, you are already in the subject-object relation. i think i have a clearer idea of what you are saying now. you have to leave the entire idea of object behind. while the object needs the subject in order to be defined as object (Kants categories), the subject does not require any object in order to be. that is why it takes ontological precedence.

think away any and all objects. as long as you keep the subject as in relation to an object, as a 'towards' an object, it will indeed always be determined by the object. that is a given really, as you are not thinking the subject itself, but rather, you already require the object as object of a subject in order to see the subject. this is a path that goes through the outside world first, and returns to itself as 'in contrast with' this outside world of object. you never left the idea of object to begin with, and therefor, the subject-object duality is never broken but always presupposed. in which case you are right, the subject as such remains determined by its objects. but what i'm after is a direct road; one that remains internal. it is not the process of investigation, it is a pure passivity. it is sub-ject (as in sub-mitted to); when you take your subjectivity as subject, there is no trace of any object. you have to 'draw' the subject that is always already in the world, that is outside itself, back inside. this is what Heidegger calls 'forgetfulness of Being': the subject is immediately determined as trough the objects of its intention. and as such, the subject as subject is never even considered. you see, you have already accepted the objective world as objective, and the subject as an emergent property thereof. the point i'm making is that this objective world is not really there. it is a construct of the mind. your only access to the world is your subjective one. the objective world is inaccessible to you.

and it is here we come in the vicinity of the 'prior' of the subject-object distinction. once the objective world is known as unreached, the subject can begin to fall back in/return to itself. to give you a frame of reference; this is what a psychedelic trip does as well: it shows the subjectivity of what we consider to be the objective world. while usually the world is not destroyed, a peak experience may just do as such: the 'ego', which constitues the boundary between the subject and object, dies, and one comes to a state of 'unity'. at this moment, a state of pure subjectivity (the singularity i spoke of earlier) is reached, wherein no object is in sight. you only have a subject that is subject of itself in a direct relation. there is no 'world' here. just this paradoxal state of an utter emptyness that is complete fullness as the subject becomes aware of his own subjectivity. i don't realy like reverting to these kind of inaccurate/open to interpretation kind of wordings, but i'm afraid keeping it 'pure' will be completely useless in terms of understandability.

in the regular (non-psychedelic) world, this translates to the subject being the 'not' of any object. this 'not' is precisely the constitution of the inaccessability of the objective world an sich. this is the space of the subject, the openness, in which it itself appears as this openness itself. to be subject is to be opened.

so yes, you can be determined (if you want to be) by the objects. but you yourself are not an object, and therefor, you are only determined by your surrender to these objects. which doesn't mean you can't be stuck to them. is an absolute autonomous freedom possible? well not for us of course. subjectivity as localized perspective automatically assumes the determation that comes with the particulary of the viewpoint, which implies at least a minimum of determination entering with the birth of the 'i-subject'. perhaps determination simply is the consequence of choice. but perhaps at some strange timeless point there was a choice. of sorts. or maybe it was simply the choice for the Other; thus determinination? now thats an interesting paradox.

and there i happened to return to my very first point in this thread; that true freedom is surrender to necessity.

i don't have a solution really, only a road of travel


(this post is probably going to be relatively jumbled, i blame tiredness and a lack of nicotine :S)
(i might try to edit some clarity in it later)

 

[HippieChick]

Well, are you speaking in terms of 'will' - as in what you are going to leave your children? Or 'will' as in the 'will to take a vacation'? In the first instance, not really - there's legalzoom.com and I think you can make out one for like $60 or so.

If you're speaking of the second instance, the 'will' or desire to take a vacation or buy a car ... whatever ... yes, the will is free, but the actual desired item/vacation whatever is not free (Unless you have a wealthy relative/wife whatever that is willing to pay for it for you) in that case, yes.

I realize this is a smartass answer, but it's been a long day.

 

[ebola?]

no. the subject appears an sich. when you speak of the process of investigation as such, you are already in the subject-object relation.

So you know, I might be coming from a 'weird' ontological spot (heavily influenced by American pragmatism, early Marx). So by investigation, I simply mean a process through which a subject takes something as object. The investigation does not depend on subject and object but rather the latter two follow necessarily from the former process.

i think i have a clearer idea of what you are saying now. you have to leave the entire idea of object behind. while the object needs the subject in order to be defined as object (Kants categories), the subject does not require any object in order to be. that is why it takes ontological precedence.

Ah. I disagree (if I understand) in that:
1. Subject requires object in the same sense that investigation requires subject/object: to have a process of subjectivation, said subject need take an object (even if in relation to a projection of itself).
2. I would think that whatever grounds the existence of the possibility of subjects emerging would take ontological precedence.

when you take your subjectivity as subject, there is no trace of any object. you have to 'draw' the subject that is always already in the world, that is outside itself, back inside. this is what Heidegger calls 'forgetfulness of Being': the subject is immediately determined as trough the objects of its intention.

But wait: didn't an object emerge in this process, even if not causally impelled by something 'objective'? Perhaps I have not been clear, as I regard neither subject nor object as ontologically primary.

the point i'm making is that this objective world is not really there. it is a construct of the mind. your only access to the world is your subjective one. the objective world is inaccessible to you.

Right, but what of that section of the world beyond my capability of access?

the 'ego', which constitues the boundary between the subject and object, dies, and one comes to a state of 'unity'. at this moment, a state of pure subjectivity (the singularity i spoke of earlier) is reached, wherein no object is in sight. you only have a subject that is subject of itself in a direct relation. there is no 'world' here. just this paradoxal state of an utter emptyness that is complete fullness as the subject becomes aware of his own subjectivity. i don't realy like reverting to these kind of inaccurate/open to interpretation kind of wordings, but i'm afraid keeping it 'pure' will be completely useless in terms of understandability.

I'll have to think about the implications more and return. . .but what if, to use a perhaps sloppy metaphor, what if this universal subjectivity is a veneer, emergent of a larger entity?

subjectivity as localized perspective automatically assumes the determation that comes with the particulary of the viewpoint, which implies at least a minimum of determination entering with the birth of the 'i-subject'. perhaps determination simply is the consequence of choice. but perhaps at some strange timeless point there was a choice. of sorts. or maybe it was simply the choice for the Other; thus determinination? now thats an interesting paradox.

This is what I tried to get at earlier. From this 'structure'/'space', the question of will/determination is moot, as this arena inheres logically 'prior' to that from which the dichotomy follows.

(and at this point, I'm hitting a road-block trying to go further )

ebola

 

[Vader]

the point i'm making is that this objective world is not really there. it is a construct of the mind. your only access to the world is your subjective one. the objective world is inaccessible to you.

Hang on, azazza, I thought you said that on a phenomenological view the external world exists, but that we have no access to it? Just because it's inaccessible, it doesn't mean it's real. Surely the simplest inference to make in order to explain our experiences is that there is an external world?

 

[azzazza !?]

^wholly correct. but there is no subject or subjectivity to be found in that external world. i'm attempting to describe the road to gain an awareness of an actual understanding of what the term 'subject' entails, contrary to the way it is usually understood, as a 'covert object' of sorts. a subject is not an object.

1. Subject requires object in the same sense that investigation requires subject/object: to have a process of subjectivation, said subject need take an object (even if in relation to a projection of itself).
2. I would think that whatever grounds the existence of the possibility of subjects emerging would take ontological precedence.

1. i understand that from within the subject/object dichotomy, you cannot come to transcend the object, nor the (particular) subject. that is a given, and i fully agree with you on this count. However, what i am trying to reach for is a sort of 'The Subject'; an abstraction of this individual consciousness we have. the understanding of what 'subject' or 'subjectivity' as an abstract concept entails, as a universal. it is indeed arguable if this is objectively possible; and i don't think it is. it requires a 'leap' of sorts, akin to a the completed infinity. lets start from the normal, everyday subject-object distinction. then, we make abstraction of the external world, ie.: concepts etc. here we arrive at categories; of which subject-object is one. as noted before, this is a transcendental deduction (in Kants words): by means of the mediation of the external world, the categories of the subject are discerned; as the recurrent synthetic a priori's. as you see, we're still 'stuck' in the category of subject-object here. in other words, the true transcendetal subject, as one pole of this dichotomy, has not been reached. but, we can deduce its presence. just as we deduce the presence of the object, even though we don't have access to it directly. the entire Kritik der Reinen Vernunft is spun between this tension:
the inaccessible absolutes/poles that are subject/object. the question that emerges is of course: then how did we ever come to know of this category then, if it cannot be seperated? somewhere, a leap happened in this transcendental deduction. In Kant work, this is known as the work of the imagination, which, on the empirical level, is the 'schematism'. a notoriously obscure text about how the categories and the empirical world become connected in the production of concepts. many have said it the text is unintelligible; and that should come as no surprise, since its concern is essentially the mind-brain gap.

so, the imagination is that which produces concepts, theories etc.; through and by means of the logical distinctions (categories); which were deduced from the empirical appearance of objects in the subject. i take it that this is what you mean by the investigation. it is what is 'between' subject and object, and mediates both to each other. however, neither 'subject' nor 'object' (an sich) are ever 'reached'.

Kant takes the subject to be the ground of the empirical (copernican revolution). an investigation of 'what is empirism' means an investigating the transcendental subject. while it cannot be proven by pure reason, from practical reason, it is deduced that the subject is a substance underlying all of our actions.

now here is where Heidegger steps in. just like you, he says that the imagination is the constitutive process of subjectivity (what you call the process of investigation), and not some kind of underlying 'substance' that as such becomes utterly disconnected from the world. being is being-in-the-world. so far so good; i think this is where you are standing at the moment. at the gates of Being and Time, so to speak

now Heidegger throws Kants entire substance-ontology out the window. it is an inadequate way of posing the question of the subject. a subject is 'being', existence. enter process-ontology. existence is 'to stand out' towards the world. it is the process of identification/entschlossenheit (with objects) that constitutes subjectivity. here you are at the reciprocal mediation of what you call 'the investigation'. i think you already know all of this up until this point. so here it gets interesting. an important distinction to make is that it is not these identifications themselves, these temporal 'alignments', that constitute the subject. the subject is a process of 'taking in'; but just as much one of 'letting go'. as much as the subject can be entschlossen ('determined'; identified), it can also be erschlossen (opened, revealed). the identification is only the second movement, and actually amounts to the concealment of the subject. In Being and Time, the subject is erschlossen in two ways: through boredom, and through anxiety. what do both of these ways have in common? absence of object.

in extreme boredom, (real boredom, not the boredom of doing something that does not really interest you) the world does not interest you. you sit on your couch, uneasy; you find yourself thrown back unto yourself with nothing at hand. in anxiety, the same thing happens: the world, the object completely disappears. it is a fear without object; something is coming, but you don't know what. such is death, and Heidegger calls this mode of being 'being-unto-death'. the death of the subject is an unknown that completely lifts the world. it is an unknown, and the root of all anxiety. when the subject takes its own death upon itself, it is anxious, but anxious of 'nothing'. and this is how we come to know of the subject as subject, something that Kant could not explain. in its being 'recalled from the world, the subject is 'opened', made accessible. the nothing of the subject overtakes it completely. and it is this anxiety, it is our awareness of our very own, intimate death that makes us free, as subjectivity. it is here, in the 'being-towards-death', that the mediation of the investigation as subject-object can be transcended. to be subject of ones subjectivity is to be subject to nothing, and thus, to be free, as subject.

 

[complexPHILOSOPHY]

I haven't been to Bluelight in a couple of months but I was reading through my subscribed threads and after reading back through this, I had a very simple thought (disconnected from any philosophical or logical analysis of the thought itself):

If my choice to cause a certain action is determined, then why do we have events which cause us remorse, regret, guilt, harm, etc.? From a biological perspective, why would our brains have evolved to deterministically cause actions which we will regret? There doesn't seem to be any evolutionary advantage, considering determinism very simply involves our genetic and biochemical architecture and our past experiences to generate a choice to act. Would we not integrate our past experiences into future choices to prevent those feelings of regret, remorse, guilt, etc.?

Obviously one would argue that the biological and genetic architecture of the individual would be the primary factor in affecting imperfect choices because of an imperfect, dysfunctional biochemical and genetic architecture (I use the word dysfunctional assuming the notion that a functional deterministic 'consciousness' would not identify actions that cause regret, remorse, guilt, etc., as the correct choice in a particular situation).

When we consider the notion that a consciousness may have to experience an event that causes remorse, regret, guilt, etc., in order to integrate the event, choice and result into future choices, it doesn't explain why people repetively make the same bad choices. Now, one might consider the notion that defective neural structures or defective electro biochemical networks, determine the inability for the deterministic consciousness to properly integrate and analyze past events, choices and results into future choices.

However, it does not seem logical that almost all brains (I do not want to say every brain because there do exist people with brains that are 'missing' certain neurological structures that govern important features of decision making, such as: social judgment, planning, empathy, fear, etc.), are the product of genetic mutations since I would argue that noticeable mutations are very, very, rare and wouldn't affect nearly all human beings (almost all people have had moments of regret, remorse, guilt, etc.). However, I recall situations in which individuals who were missing certain neurological structures that are required for cognition, were still capable of experiencing or demonstrating cognitive abilities that should be 'missing' or 'disabled'.

I don't know, I am too exhausted (lots and lots of stress in my life) to construct a cogent, cohesive, rigorously logical argument to illustrate my thought more accurately, however, I did want to present a streaming consciousness as I contemplated the initial thought.

Alright, nap time for me. I hope everyone is having a beautiful day! Missed you guys. I'll be back with the energy to put more effort into any responses.

 

[Raw Evil]

These negative emotions are simply the mechanism by which the brain self-corrects its behaviour. We may experience them negatively in a subjective sense, but I ask: when did conscious phenomena ever, throughout evolutionary history, become a significant selection factor?

A lot of things which aid the body, for example, in fact cause us pain. Consider the immune system, in the case where you are ill. Your body temperature may rise, you may cough or vomit etc., and all of these cases are generally indicative of the body fixing itself somehow; often to remove or kill a pathogen. Or the case of an injury, where you cradle a wound to protect it because it hurts.

In all of these cases, what matters is the functional outcome, rather than the subjective experience.