Free Will?

[Mr Wobble]

I understand that you as a determinist do not believe in volition of any nature, but that doesn't refute the definition of free-will I simply gave (the ability to act on ones own accord or discretion). To do so would inadvertently refute the definition of determinism.

No it wouldn't.

There's no place for discretion in a strictly deterministic universe.

And apologies if my short replies to your posts have come across as overly critical, impolite or disrespectful - that's certainly not my intention.

 

[Mr Wobble]

So what's your point?

Okay, (and apologies again if this ends up coming across as overly critical - it's not meant as a personal attack!).

A couple of things from your post at the top of this page:

However, volition exists

And,

The bottom line is, we do not as of yet have a sodding clue why free-will exists

Well, there's some big assumptions there! You're just right out stating volition/free-will exists, without providing any kind of supporting argument or evidence.

The existence of Free Will isn't a priori knowledge - that's half of my thesis here.

Then your definition:

Free-will is the ability to act (think, behave, learn, etc.) through one's own accord, discretion, volition, etc.

That doesn't really say a whole lot - volition is a synonym for will, discretion a synonym for choice (freedom to choose being implied therein) - so the definition is in great part tautological, and it says nothing to qualify the nature of the 'Free' part of FW. What does 'Free' mean?

And it's the free part of FW that really is the sticking point here. The ability to make a free choice seems to preclude determinism - a 'choice' where the outcome is predetermined is not really a choice.

 

[B9]

Determinism cannot be beginingless - can it ?


Therefore free will exists - probably incredibly rarely tho.

 

[Mr Wobble]

Determinism cannot be beginingless - can it ?


Therefore free will exists - probably incredibly rarely tho.

Well, that's the prime-mover argument (usually used to infer the existence of a creator - God).

According to quantum mechanics there are uncaused or random events at the quantum level. It is conceivable that everything began with such a random event, which, as it happens, is pretty much the thinking behind the Big Bang Theory.

 

[B9]

Random or "uncaused events" would = lack of current explanation to me. I can't quite buy into it.

Would uncaused event not = freewill ? Because it's difficult to see how it can be predetermined.

Or is the premise of determinism constructed so that anything that cannot be proven to be predetermined becomes shuffled sideways into the quantam theory field ?

If you have an eternal universe then determinism seems more plausible - however this seems at odds with the general consensus over the big bang.

 

[Vader]

^The idea is that an uncaused event is a random event, and that such freak events resulting from pure chance form no better basis for free will. Also, there are those who have advanced the idea of an oscillating multiverse, or that the universe itself is a brute fact. And if infinite causal chains are plausible in epistemology, I suppose they might be applied to this sort of case too.

 

[B9]

^ I agree they do not, but they do form a reasonable defence against determinism.

 

[Vader]

^If one accepts the ultimately incomplete description of the universe that current quantum theory offers, I know I for one find it dissatisfying that after centuries of intellectual endeavour the greatest questions of the universe boil down to nothing more than chance. I just find it highly unlikely that future research will not uncover some underlying mechanism for what we now believe to be random events, and thus show them to be deterministic. And yes, it certainly forms a good argument against determinism, but I imagine that for many there is little motivation to pursue a response to the determinist that fails to preserve free will.

 

[Mr Wobble]

^ I agree they do not, but they do form a reasonable defence against determinism.

Is the idea of a deterministic universe so unpalatable that one needs to find a "defense" against it?

Some might argue that a universe that is predictable is preferable to a universe that is unpredictable.

 

[Mr Wobble]

I just find it highly unlikely that future research will not uncover some underlying mechanism for what we now believe to be random events, and thus show them to be deterministic.

I lean towards this view too.

Behaviour that satisfies statistical criteria of randomness need not necessarily be truly random.

By some measures Wolfram's cellular automata Rule 30 exhibits statistical randomness, yet is the result of a simple deterministic process.

Wolfram even speculates that the universe might be rule based.

 

[azzazza !?]

there really is no real (convincing) argument against determinism. neither is there one against free will. it depends on ones starting point; ie the physical or the mental. if there would be an argument on either side to refute the other; the mind-body problem would be 'solved' by means of a 'reduction' (annihalation actually).
the only thing one can do is show that the mind-space cannot be reduced to the physical, as i did earlier in the thread. the opposite is equally true (but who takes idealists serious in this age of physicalism anyway). For there to be a 'will' from either side completely 'overriding' the other (effectively obliterating it), the mind-brain gap has to be solidly bridged (100% predictability). ironically, at this point, absolute determinism and absolute idealism become the same thing (which is not that surprising since one reduces either to the other. if either side did not exist, we wouldn't be reducing now would we.)

i know you think of my argument for the fundamental irreducability of mind-space as 'metaphysical' (eww!) Mr. Wobble, but your arguments for determinism really are equally metaphysical once you cross the bridge from the physical side and step unto the territory of predetermined mind. rather, what you seem to call 'metaphysical' is a property of the mind itself. theoretical mathematics, for example. and where would physicalism be without such a thing?

so, as to my answer to "is 'will' free or determined?", i say "neither!", and answer with the paradoxal statement i started off with at the very beginning of the thread; "free will is complete surrender to necessity"

 

[Mr Wobble]

there really is no real (convincing) argument against determinism. neither is there one against free will.

Hmm, at the risk of repeating myself, I still find this a fairly convincing argument:

Although there is no satisfactory definition of what Free Will is, I would argue that the definition"FW is agency that is neither deterministic nor random", is a satisfactory definition of what it isn't (most people agree that FW is neither determined nor random) and, as the types of agency that FW is not are the only types of agency which can be conceived of (caused/uncaused), then, by it's own definition, there can be no such thing as FW.

so, as to my answer to "is 'will' free or determined?", i say "neither!", and answer with the paradoxal statement i started off with at the very beginning of the thread; "free will is complete surrender to necessity"

Well, perhaps to you that has some profound meaning, but I'm afraid to me it doesn't provide any real insight.

---

Anyway, perhaps contrary to the rest of my posts in this thread, I'm not really a hardline determinist in an absolute sense - obviously I can't know the nature of the universe. Maybe there is more to it than determinate and random events? And, tbh, I'd prefer that the thing I call 'I' to be something more exotic than a determinate automaton. Similarly, and no doubt in common with many others, one of the reasons that I find QM theory so appealing is largely because of its apparent weirdness; perhaps if a photon can be both a particle and a wave at the same time, then maybe FW can be both determinate and indeterminate?

Then again, beyond my egotistical need to feel special, I just don't see FW as a necessary concept. Determinism seems an adequate, indeed, the most simple conceptual model. I can't help but think that FW is an idea rather like that of God, something that many believe ought to exist, and so attempt to find a proof that that is the case.

 

[Philoscybin]

Okay, (and apologies again if this ends up coming across as overly critical - it's not meant as a personal attack!).

A couple of things from your post at the top of this page:

And,

Well, there's some big assumptions there! You're just right out stating volition/free-will exists, without providing any kind of supporting argument or evidence.

The existence of Free Will isn't a priori knowledge - that's half of my thesis here.

Then your definition:

That doesn't really say a whole lot - volition is a synonym for will - so the definition is partly tautological, and it says nothing about the 'Free' part of FW. What does 'Free' mean?

And it's the free part of FW that really is the sticking point here. The ability to make a free choice seems to preclude determinism - a 'choice' where the outcome is predetermined is not really a choice.

Don't worry about coming across as overly critical- you're not. I'm pretty much agnostic over the FW vs. determinism debate. I just try and look at both ends of the spectrum, as they both have loopholes. For instance, the theory of determinism is all based under the conclusion that everything acts within a precise manner of which is calculable. However, this basis is flawed since finding a complete and consistent mathematical set of axioms is impossible.

Regarding my definition of free will, synonyms are commonly used within any definition. You regard choice as an illusion or deception, but what really is an illusion? Who's being deceived and how? For you to say something is an illusion, you're assuming that one is being deceived by the illusion, and one has the ability to integrate knowledge through forming judgements/conclusions.

In other words, for one to be deceived requires that one makes the wrong judgements over something, coming to the wrong conclusion. By implying that one makes judgements and conclusions, in a way you must imply that one is choosing; contradicting the idea that choice is an illusion, saying that one incorrectly judges that they can make judgements. So again, what is an illusion, and how is it any different from making a false judgement? Free will has another interpretation, which is not dependent on the replaying of moments in time: if we had all the information about the current states of all the matter in the universe, we could not predict with certainty every future state, because of the element of human choice.

Seeing as you're a subjectivist, you don't believe in human perception as reality. However, both subjective and objective mandates the existence of a perspective via an observer. A belief implies a believer, and so on. The distinction between them is that the objective is related to reality by a specific means of causation and all other forms of the subjective are variations on being arbitrary. What moves your body fingers or your legs is a cause, called your will. Your will also directs your thoughts. Your will is perceived as self-evident as your sense of being a self. Your will directs your philosophical and causal inquiries into your will, therefore can never logically invalidate itself. An objective yet impersonal and deterministic interpretation of self is a contradiction.

 

[azzazza !?]

both subjective and objective mandates the existence of a perspective via an observer. A belief implies a believer, and so on. The distinction between them is that the objective is related to reality by a specific means of causation and all other forms of the subjective are variations on being arbitrary. What moves your body fingers or your legs is a cause, called your will. Your will also directs your thoughts. Your will is perceived as self-evident as your sense of being a self. Your will directs your philosophical and causal inquiries into your will, therefore can never logically invalidate itself. An objective yet impersonal and deterministic interpretation of self is a contradiction.

ahaa now this was what i was trying to say the whole time.

to Mr. Wobble: your definition argument is not convincing for someone who accepts free will. your agrument is again a physicalistic one. you have defined 'existence' a priori as 'material existence'. your arguing for existence through the material universe. mind is not reducible to the material. ergo, your argument doesn't say anything about a property of the mind. its like arguing: there are no non-spatiotemporal things in the universe, therefor, mental imagination (or theoretical mathematics, or...) does not exist. well it does exist, its just not something physical. you see, you have a proiri ruled out mental qualia as 'existing'.

 

[wykydtron]

In what world do we live? On what level do we live? What am I? Am I atoms? Do we live live in the world of atoms, or the world of ideas?

To say we're just atoms, and that there is no free action is to go back and forth between different levels of existence. If we are just atoms then so is everything else, and there really is no action at all, nor are things other than atoms. I, this computer, this couch, are all just atoms, and to group them together into meaningful shapes and events is just an illusion. But, don't we live in this illusion. Isn't the illusion more important, more real, than the reality of the atoms, since it is where we abide.

I have a theory of free will. I call it the "cog" theory.

A cog is a part of the machine, and it reacts to other parts of the machine based on its size and shape - what it is. The cog doesn't choose what it is, but the running of the machine depends on what it is in order to run. If you removed the cog, the machine would no longer be able to run, and nothing could replace that particular cog. Here a cog is being defined as a certain size and shape. You could replace it with a different individual cog of the same size and shape, but if a cog's essence is its size and shape then the replacement would be, in essence, that cog. The cog in this sense isn't an object, but an eternal idea like a triangle. Without the cog no machine like the original machine can exist. While the cog is part of this determinant structure it nevertheless must exist in order for the structure to exist and work the way it does.

Obviously, the cog represents a person in this analogy. We are part of a deterministic universe. I think the tendency of people who realize this is to remove themselves from the structure, as though it would proceed without them. As a part of the deterministic universe, we do not initially chose what we are, but what we are IS part of the structure. Without what we are nothing could happen the way it is going to happen. If I were removed from the world, this predetermined universe could not exist in it's totality the way is does now, nor would anything that results from my action happen. I contend that any replacement that would allow the universe to proceed exactly the way would if I existed would in fact be me. So, like the cog, I too am not merely an object that exists but an idea, a shape, and it is because of this shape that the machine can operate.

So, the question becomes "what am I?" or "what is my shape?" How complex is it? Can it interact with the world in morally good ways? Can it behave like a person?

So yeah, the will is just part of the interaction, a personal part of the process.

 

[B9]

Is the idea of a deterministic universe so unpalatable that one needs to find a "defense" against it?

Yes it is, for me it would devalue everything & remove the excitement of my reaction to the moment as it unfolds.

KLF burning £1,000,000 seems contrary to determinism to me.
It gives a distinct impression of freewill.
One can of course make the deterministic argument very complex & ultimately it's not currently provable.

 

[Vader]

^No-one's disputing that we have a distinct impression of free will, the argument is that this is illusory.

 

[B9]

^ Yup I realise that - but there appears to be no proofs either way.

 

[Mr Wobble]

^ Yup I realise that - but there appears to be no proofs either way.

Do you know of any accepted philosophical proofs for anything?

And by 'proofs' I'm talking about an equivalence with mathematical proofs?

(All of the various arguments for the existence of God, Ontological, Teleological etc, have counter arguments)

 

[B9]

I know very little when it comes to mathemetical formulas - what proofs do you have for determinism or freewill - if you have the patience of a saint i might get it - if "it" truly exists.

Mr wobble if i may - you asked "does freewill exist" (paraphrased slightly) in your opinion does it exist - do forgive me if i've skipped most of the earlier replies & missed your response to this very point